Recent work in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas suggests that the classical neo-Thomist analysis of the structure of Aquinas's prodigious work is misdirected. Rather than a self-contained, almost deductive system, based upon a static reading of Aristotelian philosophical methodology, scholars for the past fifty years have argued for a broader – and at times a more theological – reading of Aquinas. That there is a vigorous debate among Aquinas scholars is not open to debate; where the more appropriate reading is to be found, however, is debatable. A different voice is Ralph McInerny's Praeambula fidei: Thomism and the god of the philosophers (2006).
This collection of essays, which results from a recent conference sponsored by the Aquinas Center at Florida's Ave Maria University, presents a justification for the position that Aquinas had strong Augustinian influences as he went about his philosophical and theological work utilising what Wayne Hankey calls his ‘philosophical logic’. In this substantive collection, scholars – principally with theological leanings – provide a rich array of analyses of various aspects of the oft-muddled relationship between the bishop of Hippo and the friar from Roccasecca. What is significant is that it brings together the work of both established philosophers and theologians – including scholars from western Europe and the United States – and of younger scholars. It is a rich and rewarding mixture which begins with a substantive introduction providing the reader with a suitable roadmap indicating the direction taken by the contributors.
The well-known French Dominican theologian, Gilles Emery, considers Aquinas's Trinitarian doctrine as an extension of his speculative work rooted in the patristic tradition with special emphasis on Augustine's texts, especially De trinitate. Bruce Marshall continues this discussion by suggesting that Aquinas spots a problem in the way that Augustine developed his Trinitarian theology. Marshall's analysis indicates how Aquinas used his finely honed philosophical skills in approaching theological conundrums. The analysis of the role that the philosophical category of relation works its way around Aquinas's analysis of the Trinity is well argued and clearly elucidated. Readers confused by Aquinas's account of the Trinity will find Marshal's treatment richly rewarding.
Harm Gorius and John O'Callaghan offer fecund philosophical analyses of Aquinas's philosophy of mind texts that pertain directly to theological concepts. Gorius discusses the inner word (‘verbum interius’) and the role of the plurality of the divine ideas and the connection with divine simplicity. In discussing intentionality, Gorius begins with the early Commentary on the Sentences, proceeds through De veritate and then considers the third re-writing (redaction) of the Summa contra gentiles. Philosophers interested in how Aquinas developed his Aristotelian cognitive theory will find Gorius' analysis intriguing. O'Callaghan too ventures into this philosophy of mind thicket, considering how both Augustine and Aquinas articulated their respective theories of mind through the ‘imago Dei'. O'Callaghan argues adroitly on the differences between Aquinas and Augustine on the nature of mind. Augustine's trinity of memory, intellect and will as one mind is an imago Dei; thus mind is the essence of soul. The human essence in Aquinas is a more Aristotelian-based hylomorphic composite with powers devoid of the Cartesian leanings that often plague Augustine's treatments. For Aquinas, the difference between mind, soul and person is articulated in his often-quoted proposition: ‘Anima mea non est ego!’
The versatility and depth of insight characteristic of John Rist are well illustrated in his essay. Rist raises three significant issues that he considers central to discussions regarding the relationship between Augustine and Aquinas. Beginning with a critique of Gilson's worries about latent Platonism in Augustine, Rist focuses attention on the essence/existence distinction, the role of human nature and original sin in Aquinas's analysis, and the Aristotelian biology Aquinas adopted in his cryptic account of the differences between men and women. All three of these analyses are fruitful discussions, especially the account of the acquisition of virtues in a sinful state; Rist argues that MacIntyre's analysis suggesting that Aquinas used Augustine's insights to modify Aristotle's secular version of virtue is correct. The issue remains, however; how much ‘depravity’ resulting from original sin does Aquinas adopt? Aquinas certainly was not a Calvinist, yet Rist appears to wish that Aquinas had leaned a bit more towards Calvin than several texts suggest. Continuing the discussion on original sin, Mark Johnson mulls over the role that will plays in Aquinas, especially in rejecting any tedious traducian treatment of the texts. Will functions differently in ‘human nature’ through Adam for original sin and in each person as an individual capable of actual sin.
Beginning with the Augustinian and Aquinian non-Pelagian commentaries on John's Gospel, Guy Mansini ponders the role of existence in Aquinas's speculative philosophy of being. Discussing God's creative activity in all aspects of rerum natura, Mansini's rendition is reminiscent of Brian Davies's writings considering the dependency of everything on God's creative role in conserving existence. Mansini puts the matter in a straightforward manner with a weighty contrary to fact conditional: were one to act independently of God, one would not exist. Quoting Chesterton, Mansini refers to Aquinas as ‘St Thomas the Creator’. Near the end of his reflective essay, Mansini introduces the apostolic thought of both the present and the immediately preceding bishop of Rome.
Michael Sherwin's historical and critical analysis of a psychology of love – charity – focuses attention on the reduction of love in Augustine to what Aquinas called hope. For Aquinas, charity is ‘friendship with God’. Sherwin, like several authors in this collection, suggests how Aquinas modified Augustine's arguments rendering them less problematic. Wayne Hankey articulates the historical impact that the Pseudo-Dionysius – along with Aristotle and Augustine – had on Aquinas's Platonic interpretations, which was significant in Aquinas's account of sensible signs coherent with his Aristotelianism.
Mathew Levering and Matthew Lamb write in a different genre providing more straightforward theological exegesis and argument. Readers more attuned to theological and scriptural themes might find these two essays more useful than the earlier ones that lean towards a philosophical analysis of concepts exemplified in Augustine and Aquinas.
Other than O'Callaghan, one wonders where the Analytical Thomists are in this anthology; certainly Brian Davies, Eleonore Stump and John Haldane, among others, have written on issues germane to these discussions. Including philosophers such as these would have added strength to this significant collection. None the less, this anthology is highly recommended.
