In From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy, Tim Stuart-Buttle examines the impact of Cicero's legacy on the dialectic of early modern British moral philosophy (233). His main claim is that thinkers such as John Locke, Conyers Middleton, and David Hume read Cicero as an academic skeptic, and they endorsed his skepticism as the correct perspective from which to understand the relation between moral philosophy and moral theology. Unlike most scholars, then, Stuart-Buttle treats academic skepticism as a major influence on eighteenth-century ethical thought.

For Locke, Cicero performed two invaluable services. First, he demonstrated the salutary effects of the drive for honor and reputation, which Cicero held to be engines of virtuous behavior and a well-ordered society (24). Second, Cicero made room for faith by limiting knowledge (84). Ciceronian academic skepticism, more consistent with modern science than any other school of thought, undermined philosophy's hubristic and vain efforts to provide a rational foundation for morality. Middleton and Hume appear as the two main heirs to this side of Locke's work. Middleton, aided by Erasmus, embraced a similar view of the relationship between moral philosophy and theology. Philosophy becomes an “open-ended activity” fully aware of its own limits (153–54), while theology, anchored in faith, provides morality with a proper foundation. Hume rejected this harmonious picture, concluding that Ciceronian skepticism severs the link with theology (222). For Hume, the lesson is that moral philosophy should explore “the bonds that tie men together in society, rather than engaging in a fruitless attempt to justify a belief in divine being which all too easily dissolved those bonds” (222). The quest for happiness and a well-ordered society depended upon “our recognition of our mutual interdependence and our shared humanity”—not upon theology (222).

Stuart-Buttle makes several contributions worth emphasizing. For example, he portrays Locke's ethical thinking as systematic and unified. This challenges the common complaint that Locke lacks a systematic moral philosophy. Against those who call Locke a “tragic thinker” for this reason, Stuart-Buttle argues that, for Locke, the real tragedy lay in Christian philosophers’ inability to recognize the impossibility of vindicating morality by means of philosophical reason (88). Second, Stuart-Buttle enriches our understanding of the debates between neo-Stoics and neo-Epicureans. Such debates, he argues, must be understood in the context of Locke's academic skepticism, which was a major target of Shaftesbury's, in particular (113). For Shaftesbury, Locke's embrace of skepticism was a betrayal of philosophy's true vocation, which is to guide the soul's rational pursuit of the summum bonum. Furthermore, Locke endorsed Cicero's belief that action driven by a concern for reputation would, on the whole, produce laudable behavior and a well-ordered society. For Shaftesbury, this made a mockery of genuine virtue (95–96). Contrary to the received view, Stuart-Buttle portrays Shaftesbury as an austere, elitist Stoic – not the house philosopher of polite, commercial society (115–17). His account positions Mandeville as Shaftesbury's sharpest neo-Epicurean critic (118–23). And his interpretation highlights the importance of volume two of the Fable of the Bees, where Mandeville presents a theory of motivation and moral norms indebted to Locke's view of property and his Ciceronian valorization of the pursuit of honor and good reputation (130–31).

Finally, Stuart-Buttle offers an instructive account of Locke's mid-century legacy. First, he elevates the unjustly neglected Middleton. Second, he offers a refreshing interpretation of Hume. Rather than aligning Hume with either neo-Stoicism (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson) or neo-Epicureanism (Hobbes, Mandeville), Stuart-Buttle argues that the main thrust of Hume's project is a consequence of his engagement with Ciceronian skepticism. He is hardly the first to emphasize the secular, even irreligious, nature of Hume's ethics, but Stuart-Buttle's approach is unusual in its emphasis on academic skepticism. If correct, this also helps clarify skepticism's relation to the whole of Hume's philosophy, not just his epistemology.

From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy suffers from several, arguably minor, flaws. For example, Locke's ethics appears appealingly coherent, but Stuart-Buttle fails to demonstrate that Locke had a coherent, comprehensive moral theory. This would require, among other things, confronting Locke's expressed confidence in the possibility of morality as a “demonstrative” science, as well as places where Locke expresses a realist's conviction about mind-independent moral values. Such elements are present Locke's thinking, and are difficult to square with Stuart-Buttle's interpretation. Furthermore, there is hyperbole in his otherwise excellent discussion of Locke's engagement with Cicero. For example, it is misleading to say that Cicero's De Officiis is the “only” system of ethics recommended by Locke in his writings on education (19). In the cited source, Locke recommends this for the young pupil, but he also recommends Pufendorf and Grotius once Cicero has been mastered.

Stuart-Buttle's discussion would benefit from greater clarity about the definition of “moral philosophy.” At times Locke appears to have more of a meta-philosophical skepticism about moral philosophy than a full-blown moral philosophy. There are similar questions about what it means to offer an account of moral obligation. For some philosophers of the period, this involves explaining what it means to be obligated and what it is that grounds a claim of obligation. For others, it involves explaining the psychological mechanisms or social practices that lead one to feel a sense of obligation. Stuart-Buttle does not distinguish between the two endeavors, which makes it difficult to tell when one thinker has responded to another or merely changed the subject. When Mandeville, for example, offers an account of moral obligation (136–47), it is not a direct rival to, say, Shaftesbury's or Locke's. And it is certainly not the same kind of thing as Joseph Butler's account of obligation. Butler is mentioned but never discussed, which is a surprising omission, given his role in the period.

Such reservations aside, From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy is an excellent piece of work. The main narrative is compelling, and Stuart-Buttle clarifies and enriches our understanding of the period from Locke to Hume. No scholar of the subject matter should ignore his achievement.