Pierre Manent, the director of the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris and one of the foremost political thinkers alive today, conducts his political thought through close and persistent engagement with the great minds of the past. In prior writings, his interlocutors have been modern figures such as Tocqueville, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Indeed, Manent's great project to understand modern politics has proceeded by playing the different theorists of its birth against one another. His latest book, however, extends the borders of the conversation to include a Greek, a Roman, and a Roman Christian: Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine. Aristotle's importance is obvious enough, but the inclusion of Rome was foreshadowed by the concluding sentence of Manent's previous major work, The City of Man: “We never understand more than the half of things when we neglect the science of Rome.”
In Metamorphoses of the City, Manent applies this Roman science to understand the odd fact that although we have been modern for centuries, we have just as long continued to want to be modern. This unfulfilled desire to be something we already claim to be points to the possibility that we do not really know what it is we want when we want to be modern. Another way of saying this is that modernity is a project with no obvious terminus, no clear point, or set of circumstances, when we will know we have at last arrived. For Manent, the key to understanding the object of desire that is modernity is to see it as a project of word and action in concert. If modernity is anything, it is recognition on the part of human beings that they can articulate a goal and orient their actions towards its fulfillment. Humans have always done things, of course, but to be modern is to believe in the capacity of human beings to transform their situation and the condition of life itself. If this is true, to understand the modern project begins with the city, because “the city is that ordering of the human world that makes actions possible and meaningful” (4). The city, however, is not a static entity but one that has carried Western history forward and been transformed along with it. Manent's quest is to uncover the internal logic of the city's changing form, its metamorphoses. These transformations, according to him, are motored by a tendency to expand the concern of the political. Modernity extends it as far as humanity itself, yet it is not clear that politics is capable of reaching that far. Thus, the question arises whether modernity has attained that point of inclusion at which human action is no longer possible, whether modernity means the end of the city itself.
Manent admits that to think of Western political history in light of transmutations of an original form marks a change in his intellectual outlook. In previous works Manent emphasized discontinuity between the modern and the pre- or antimodern, seeing the modern as a rupture with all that went before. However, now he sees that the shifts in Western political history are best seen as “so many reverberations” of the original attempt to establish a common life within a city. Of course, tracking these transformations is far from simple, especially since Manent insists that political forms do not “pass directly from one form to another” (105). Thus, he must move from the Greek city, to Rome's transformation from city to empire, to medieval competition between church and empire, to the formation of the modern nation-state, ending with multinational entities such as the European Union and the United Nations. Manent's motivation to tell this story is clear: he fears that the energies that created Europe are at the point of exhaustion. There is a general sense that the “future belongs to a delocalized or global process of civilization and that we have no need of a political form. Thus the necessity to articulate words and actions politically has been lost from view. The technological norm and juridical rule are supposed to be enough for organizing common life” (13). Much has been lost, or rejected along the way, and to understand the consequences allows the possibility of retrieval.
In the beginning was the polis. The Greeks began to apply science to their common experience of forming their lives together in a city. This linkage of experience and science would prove a challenge for modern political thinkers and their desire to reject the medieval and begin wholly anew. Accordingly, they were forced to contrive a purely theoretical state of nature to legitimate the power of the sovereign. The Greeks had no need for such abstract entities; they had their own civic life. Their playwrights unveiled the tragic possibilities inherent in the inevitable conflicts pitting family against city. Plato and Aristotle analyzed the universal truths detachable from the particulars of Athenian civic life, and their historians recounted how cities come to thrive and wither. At the heart of it all was word and action. For this reason, it makes sense to begin with Homer's Iliad, in which the Greek war camp is represented as a “city of speech” enabling collective action. These actions were distinctively human because they concern what we all share, the potential to take the life of another and to have it taken from us. The stakes involved make war an arena for heroic action. Modern politics, in contrast, is premised on a universal desire to avoid war and to stave off death as long as possible. “The Hobbesian State carries out an implacable critique of heroism and heroes. It brings heroes, or those who aspire to be heroes, into line” (50).
Yet it must be admitted that Homeric heroes did not bring the city into existence. Their exceptional character was too threatening and the less powerful united to resist them. A city, however, comes about only when the few are united to the many, when they enter into a kind of exchange that can be called “civic.” Rousseau has given the characteristic modern view that the rich tricked the poor into helping them protect their riches with concepts such as “justice” and “ownership.” Accordingly, the city was founded upon, and will ever be characterized by, social domination. Manent challenges this notion by pointing out that Rousseau neglects the fact that simply by entering into dialogue with the poor, the rich go beyond domination. To converse with another is to give recognition to their viewpoint; it is to create a bond of mutuality, no matter how tenuous and prone to manipulation. “Even if at first it is for themselves, for their own interests, that the rich and the poor want to govern, engagement in the debate over the question of who governs draws both groups out of their social nature to engage them in the properly political adventure” (91). Thus, the city begins when a category emerges that transcends the competing groups. The city exists when there are citizens and, therefore, has within its very origins the dynamism toward democracy. Before moving on, Manent makes clear that ancient democracy is quite distinct from the modern ideal of the equality of every individual mediated and protected by the state. While there is no denying that modern politics has reduced violence between the few and many, Manent worries about the shrinking importance of civic dialogue, those moments when citizens enter into conversation concerning their common life, when word and action are joined in political purpose.
To understand the metamorphosis from city to empire requires, according to Manent, a shift of focus from Athens to Rome. Rome accomplished what Athens did not, a transformation from successful city to successful empire. “Whereas Athens had consumed itself, so to speak, Rome renewed itself entirely” (214). The bridge, of course, is Julius Caesar, and Manent expends great energy dissecting the reality of “Caesarism.” He does this not by historical study—that is not his way—but by analyzing what the great writers have said about the end of the Republic and bringing them into dialectic across the ages. The guiding disputatio is Leo Strauss's claim that Caesar can be explained within the Greek category of tyranny. Manent counters that the Greek “science of regimes” cannot explain his rise because the situation in which he emerged was alien to Greek experience. Caesar was the necessary solution to the breakdown of the republic, a truly postconstitutional leader. Aristotle could only understand a king at the beginning of the city. What he failed to see is that a king could arise from the ruins of a city and transform it into an empire. To explain this Manent relies upon Cicero, a political mind he believes is underappreciated. For Cicero, the Romans can be seen as oscillating between the Greek notion of democracy, in which each citizen is responsible for the political whole, and a new, contrary notion of viewing the magistrate as persona civitatis pledged to uphold the rights of all. Accordingly, the citizen was in danger of becoming a mere private individual before Caesar completed the process. Moreover, Manent sees here an anticipation of our contemporary situation in which the state transcends society and from that vantage point assigns each individual his or her rights.
The nation-state, however, will only emerge from the struggle between the two great ideas of medieval Europe: the temporal echo of the Roman Empire and the eternal word offered by the church. While Manent shows himself capable of appreciating the “Christian proposition” with stirring theological depth, he also recognizes its political limit. Although the church successfully mediates between the invisible world of grace and the visible world of nature, it has no politics of its own. It belongs in Manent's narrative not only because modernity is rightly seen as an attempt to attain a unity that Christianity could not provide, but also because its highest creation, the nation-state, served to suppress the high claims of the church. Ironically, it was required to suppress as well the heroic aspirations instilled by the pagan Romans. In a remarkable passage, Manent lays out his thesis:
It is important to note that the modern State represses almost equally the two divergent movements of the soul: not only does it severely circumscribe the public expression of religious convictions and affects—religion is henceforth essentially a private thing—but it makes and is organized to make the “ancient freedom,” that is, the direct expression of civic commitments, impossible: citizens can act only through their representatives. The modern State thus rests on the repression, in any case the frustration, of the two most powerful human affects: on the one hand the passionate interest in this world as expressed in active participation in the common thing, and on the other the passionate interest in the eternal and the infinite as expressed in the postulation of another world and participation in a community of faith. (217)
Europe's religious passion and its political passion go together, however uneasily. Leaving both behind, it now finds itself immobile, rendered incapable of the kind of action that has characterized Western history since the emergence of the city.
In order to show a possible pathway out of stagnancy, Manent offers an extensive treatment of Augustine's City of God, focusing on the saint's subtle critique of Roman virtue. For example, Augustine is capable of understanding the Roman's praise for the suicides of Lucretia and Cato, despite the clear Christian prohibition against taking one's own life. In the case of Lucretia, who, raped by the son of the last king of Rome, chose death rather than dishonor, Augustine argues that she ought to be seen as a victim of the Roman obsession with weighing oneself through the gaze of others. She could not face the possibility that others might think of her as unfaithful despite knowing herself as innocent. In this sense, Christianity liberates since it gives priority to the testimony of one's own conscience before God. Likewise, Cato's suicide was distinctively Roman in that he took his life to escape the possibility of being pardoned by Caesar, depriving his enemy of that particular glory. Thus, for Augustine, Cato's act must be understood within the framework of Rome's great vice: the love of praise and the horror of shame. Yet despite this, there is something noble in the Roman quest for glory, a sense that mortal human beings can strive for something divine. In Christian terms, this gets things tragically backwards; God has, in becoming human, done the striving, and we only need accept the gift in faith and charity. Nonetheless, the Romans correctly saw the potency within human beings for a kind of divinity. Manent contrasts this with modern political theories that credit human beings with little more than an instinct for survival.
Manent concludes with a comparison of different views of universality in Greek philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and modernity. The Greeks divided human beings into those capable of contemplation of truth and the many who are not. Judaism, with its great Law, extends further but divides humanity into the elect people and the nations. The church is more universal yet, but its City of God does not contain all. Manent notes the progress towards universality: “By positing the ‘theoretical life’ as the superior goal of humanity, philosophy rends the fabric, dare I say, of common humanity whose life is essentially ‘practical.’ Revealed religion, whether Jewish or Christian, also ruptures human unity, but in an altogether different way by separating the Jewish people from the ‘nations’ or by separating the two cities and believers from nonbelievers” (300). On this reckoning, modernity, with its vision of democratic equality that excludes none, seems to be victorious. Yet its conception of universal humanity lacks mediation since subject and object are united. How can humanity mediate humanity to humanity? Even more problematic, there is no obvious framework for political action for universal humanity. In other words, the modern nation-state is bound to dissolve politically. Manent locates that dissolution in Europe's self-destruction in the twentieth century, solidified by the construction of the European Union. “Today among Europeans humanity is the reference point that can be immediately opposed to every effective political undertaking or action. Whereas the humanity that moved the people of 1789 to act was inspiring and capable of nurturing the vastest ambitions, the humanity in whose name the rule is decreed today, can only protect what is and prohibit what could be” (327).
It is not easy to know how to assess Manent's achievement. Indeed, it is difficult to know exactly whether one has properly understood him. His style, while not turgid, does not proceed clearly from thesis to conclusion by way of evidence, but rather consists in a series of constructed conversations between great political minds around a great claim. This is not the only way to do political theory, but there is something bracing about his confidence that great insights transcend time and place. For Manent, Aristotle as well as Machiavelli and Cicero are our contemporaries in the never-ending quest to understand ourselves. Unlike natural science, political science does not progress by leaving the past behind. Rather, politics is about human nature and an ancient has no less access to its mysteries than a fresh PhD. The influence of Strauss on Manent is clear, even as Manent is happy to go his own way when needed.
Here Manent asserts both that the city should be considered the source of Western political action and that its primordial energy is now exhausted. The fact that he links this loss to secularization is sure to be contested. The modern project has from its origins banked on the proposition that human self-assertion required liberation from the shackles of Christian dogma. Thus, the City of Man could only arise from the ruins of the City of God. Manent, however, goes the other way. Christianity and politics both require the unity of word and action, and loosening one loosens the other. This idea is not unique to Manent, but he explores the political ramifications. Others have argued that apart from the Word, our words lose any significance beyond their potency to manipulate. Without their participation in the eternal, human words have no lasting power to unite men and women of diverse backgrounds and interests in a quest for a common life that is truly good and truly beautiful. If the City of Man is made by words and actions in concert, it cannot lose sight of the City of God.
