Daniel Bell of Tsinghua University has written a thought-provoking book about a controversial subject, arguing that “the China Model” based on “political meritocracy” is a superior and credible alternative to liberal democracy. The model, as Bell has claimed, is best exemplified by the city-state of Singapore, and it increasingly characterizes China. The book is written by a western political theorist who has intimate knowledge of Asia, having taught in various prestigious universities in the region. Compared with typical writings by political theorists, this volume is written in surprisingly accessible prose, with a balance of political philosophical theories and empirical analyses from the discipline of political science.
Bell’s “China Model” embodies three central features, which are “democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top.” He argues that this is the best combination because grassroots democracy provides political leaders with legitimacy, experimentation with various governance models in the intermediate levels allows for potential improvement, and meritocracy in the apex of powers select individuals who do not only have the virtues of great leaders but also the far-sightedness that their democratic counterparts typically lack.
Because of space constraints, I will focus my critique on the concept and application of meritocracy. Bell argues, “Political meritocracy” (PM) is “the idea that political power should be distributed in accordance with ability and virtue” (emphasis in original). Following that logic, he further asserts that PM is superior to electoral democracy because the latter may not necessarily or always produce the most capable or virtuous leaders. In Bell’s own words: “There are morally desirable and politically feasible alternatives to electoral democracy that can help to remedy major disadvantages of electoral democracy… Chinese-style political meritocracy can be viewed as a grand political experiment with the potential to remedy key defects of electoral democracy.”
Let me focus on two key elements of the model: leaders’ virtue and replacement. I assume that the question of leaders’ ability—that is their ability to govern, manage and deliver—is taken care of by a carefully designed meritocratic system. The remaining questions are, how do we ensure a) a supply of virtuous leaders, and b) that the current leaders will voluntarily cede control in a bloodless power transfer? How do we ensure we will always get “good emperors” such as Lee Kuan Yew or Tang Taizhong (AC 599–649) who oversaw one of the strongest periods in Chinese history, assuming that such leaders can be held up as models of capable as well as virtuous leaders? One’s virtuosity, after all, unlike knowledge or even capability, is not something that can be detected by a series of meritocratic assessments. The model renders the advent of this essential characteristic of a leader to chance or sheer luck. The other issue is, without democratic institutions in place, there is no guarantee that those in power will voluntarily step down when they are unable to perform. This is the problem of succession in a non-democratic system.
Yet, a graver problem with the PM model is the lack of checks-and-balances and accountability. A democratic system is as much about selection of political leaders as it is about creating institutional checks-and-balances that make them accountable to the people. Granted, a democratic system is not without its flaws; the system could be hijacked by the majority or the minority, and it could ossify over time, as Bell has argued. However, once a political leader is selected on meritocratic basis, the PM model has no mechanism in place to ensure that power will not be abused. This goes beyond the problem of corruption that Bell has acknowledged. Power could be abused not only for private financial gains; unbridled power concentrates all prerogatives in the hands of an individual to the extent that he could take away legitimate power of the other meritocratically selected leaders. In other words, when a leader’s power is unchecked, he could undermine the integrity of the very system that put him in power. These three problems—leader’s virtuosity, succession, and lack of accountability—are in my mind inherent flaws in the PM model that render it inferior to electoral democracy.
The other issue with non-democratically elected leaders in the PM model is legitimacy, which pertains to the stability and longevity of such a system. What are the sources of non-democratic legitimacy? I do not believe PM in itself can be a source of legitimacy. Selecting leaders on the basis of meritocracy maybe less contentious than other non-democratic means, such as kinship ties or military dictatorship, but meritocracy per se does not provide moral or political legitimacy. Looking at the prototype of PM model, Singapore, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has derived its legitimacy from two sources: performance and nationalism. Under PAP’s leadership, Singapore has transformed itself from a third-world entreport to a first-world city-state within a short timeframe. Being the only developed nation among the Southeast Asian countries, Singapore’s citizens enjoy living standards as high as those of the Scandinavian and Western European countries. As a predominantly Chinese island-state surrounded by Muslim countries of Indonesia and Malaysia that have a long-tradition of institutional discrimination against the Chinese, the PAP government has been able to craft a narrative of “credible threat” that advances its state-building efforts and strengthens nationalism. However, with rising cost of living and influx of immigrants in the last decade, the PAP has seen declining popularity, which is most clearly manifested in the losses in the 2011 election (but it regained a foothold in 2015 due to a range of factors, among which is the Lee-Kuan-Yew dividend). Chinese emperors in ancient times might have been able to anchor their legitimacy on the “mandate from heaven,” but Chinese leaders in modern times, even if they were meritocratically selected, must be able to deliver prosperity. When Chinese economic growth falters, as all high-performing economies eventually will, how are the leaders going to derive their legitimacy? By relying solely on nationalism?
In the remaining space let me address how China actually selects its political leaders. There is a large body of literature that empirically examines the selection of leaders at various administrative levels drawing upon individual biographical data and locality-specific information, such as GDP growth. At the risk of over-simplifying, there are three schools of thought: delivery of GDP growth, factional ties, and both. First, Li and Zhou argue that selection of provincial leaders is based on their ability to deliver strong GDP growth (Li, Hongbin, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China.” Journal of Public Economics 89(9–10):1743–62). Second, Shih, Adolph & Liu contend that central committee members advance their careers based on factional ties (Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. “Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” American Political Science Review 106(1):166–87). Third, drawing on biographical data of leaders across a few administrative levels, Landry et al. show that performance matters at lower levels, but political loyalty or factional ties is more important at higher levels (Landry, Pierre, Xiaobo Lu, and Haiyan Duan. Does Performance Matter? Evaluating the Institution of Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder. Unpublished manuscript). These are important studies based on rigorous methodology and published in top-ranking political science journals that I think from which Bell's PM model could have greatly benefited.
“The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy” is a serious intellectual work that deserves to be read by scholars who are interested in the merits and limitations of liberal democracy. While I agree with Bell's assessment of the failings of electoral democracy, I believe scholarly efforts would be better rewarded if we focus on improving the working of the current democratic systems, rather than discarding them altogether in favor of a completely different alternative.
