I.
What is the primary task that reflection on the nature of evil sets for philosophy? Everyday moral understanding includes a clear enough concept of evil, according to which evil consists in extreme moral failure. At the same time, most individuals seem to possess strong intuitions that certain particular actions or events constitute evils. Indeed, the renewed philosophical interest in the concept of evil has no doubt been sparked in large part by the fact that reflection on the events of the past century yields no shortage of these. The primary task that the consideration of evil imposes on philosophy lies in articulating a determinate conception of evil that answers the question of why specific actions constitute such significant moral failures as to be evil. That is, a conception of evil serves to link everyday moral understanding with our often unreflective intuitions that particular acts or events constitute evils. It is puzzling when philosophers engaged in an inquiry into evil intentionally eschew this task on the grounds that setting out a determinate conception of evil would require providing a “theory” or “definition” of evil.Footnote 1 Whether moral understanding takes the form of a theory, a definition, or something else, absent a determinate conception of evil, we are left either with an empty set of moral concepts possessing no clear link to our moral experience, or a blind conviction that this or that action or event is evil. The articulation of our intuitions often provides a helpful starting point for philosophical inquiry. However, in ethical questions especially, we all too often proceed as though we had a clear understanding of the relevant moral phenomena in advance. A philosophical investigation that refuses to advance beyond those intuitions can provide only very weak results. Notably, in the absence of a determinate conception of evil, which yields specific criteria justifying the assertion that this or that event constitutes an evil, the inquirer has almost no grounds for criticism of competing views, since the critic’s intuitions can always be opposed with the contrary intuitions underlying the position with which she takes issue.
This is a point of particular importance for those engaged in a study of historical conceptions of evil. It has, unfortunately, been overlooked by a diverse group of critics and interpreters of G. W. F. Hegel’s conception of the nature of evil and its role in history. On the one hand, Hegel’s critics tend to neglect inquiry into his specific conception of evil. As is well known, Hegel asserts that a philosophical examination of world history can contribute to a “theodicy, a justification of God,” by means of which “the thinking spirit [can] become reconciled with evil [Böse].”Footnote 2 Critics attribute to Hegel the view that world history is progressive because it is the product of the agency of a cosmic “world spirit,” which realizes its “purposes” in time. They take issue with this conception of the role of God in history on the grounds that it entails some unattractive conclusions having to do with the nature of evil and our capacity for reconciling with it. That is, if we understand the events of world history to be the product of the agency of a world spirit, we are obliged to account even for historical evils by showing how they must, in some sense, stem from God.
However, in dwelling so much on Hegel’s philosophy of history, critics tend to neglect the more basic question of what Hegel understands evil to be. In the texts on which they tend to focus, especially the Lectures on the Philosophy of History and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel does not actually explain what evil itself is. This point is obviously significant: absent a determinate conception of what evil is, it is unclear exactly to what the study of history is supposed to reconcile us. Barring further investigation, critics must depend either on some intuitive sense of what Hegel has in mind by ‘evil’,Footnote 3 or on a supposed link between Hegel’s theodicy and Leibniz’s.Footnote 4 However, neither of these approaches is sound. Appropriately addressing Hegel’s views about our capacity to reconcile with evil requires that we first clarify what he means when he calls an agent “evil”—it requires clarity concerning his determinate conception of evil—and for this, we must approach Hegel’s account of evil on its own terms.
More sympathetic interpreters do address those texts in which Hegel spells out his specific conception of evil, in particular the accounts of “morality” that we find in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit and in the mature systematic philosophy. In this connection, interpreters rightly observe that Hegel understands evil to consist in an extreme subjectivism or in hypocrisy.Footnote 5 However, in spite of the recent resurgence of interest in Hegel’s ethics, no one has dedicated significant attention to explaining why Hegel believes these things constitute such significant moral failures as to be evil. This should be a pressing question, given both the renewed interest in the nature of evil in normative ethics, and the predominant tendency to argue that the infliction of suffering or harm (which need not be an implication of subjectivism or hypocrisy) is an essential element of evil.Footnote 6
My primary aim in what follows is therefore to spell out the essential elements of Hegel’s conception of evil with a view to explaining why subjectivism and hypocrisy are sufficiently great moral failures to be evil. It is important to note that Hegel’s approach to finding evil is not the experiential one most common to recent accounts, which begin by identifying a certain action or event as paradigmatic of evil, and then articulate a determinate conception of evil on the basis of reflection on the salient aspects of that action or event.Footnote 7 Instead, Hegel’s approach to evil is primarily conceptual, concerned with identifying the locus of evil within our system of moral discourse. Hence, I begin by situating Hegel’s conception of evil within his account of the “moral standpoint,” demonstrating that it consists in an “inversion” of the moral will. (II.) Evil arises when the moral subject refuses to acknowledge any source of value transcending the individual, instead appealing only to her own subjectivity to justify her action, while hypocritically claiming to others a moral motive for it. I argue that this conception of evil bears significant similarities to Kant’s, insofar as both identify evil primarily as a misuse of the will, in such a way that an action can be evil even if it does not directly cause suffering or harm to others. (III.) Even though evil is rooted in the “moral standpoint,” it remains a significant and potentially damaging possibility within the scheme of institutions and practices that Hegel identifies as “ethicality” or “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). (IV.) In short, we cannot hope to eliminate evil simply by broadening our focus from the “moral standpoint” to the broader social and institutional sphere which constitutes its “foundation.”
Indeed, in order to understand why Hegel identifies extreme subjectivism and hypocrisy as evil, and not as minor practical failings, it is necessary to identify their corrosive effects on ethicality itself. (V.) Most importantly, Hegel argues that ethicality and the good that it makes possible depend essentially on trust, both in ethical institutions and practices, and in other subjects. Extreme subjectivism and hypocrisy are practical failures significant enough to be evil precisely because they compromise the trust, the subjective disposition or sentiment, on which ethicality itself depends, potentially undermining the legal institutions and moral discourse that ethical practices support. Interpreters have come increasingly to appreciate the extent to which Hegel’s ethical theory depends essentially on human institutions and sociality. Instead of simply being the product of the application of a principle or rule to a particular case, Hegel understands ethical action to depend on a specific kind of disposition or virtue, itself embedded within a “world,” a shared set of customary institutions and practices.Footnote 8 I argue that an appropriate understanding of Hegel’s conception of evil points to the subjective conditions for the existence of an objective ethical world. In particular, it points to the importance of the subjective disposition of trust in supporting and sustaining ethicality, and to the need for what Hegel calls “Ernst,” earnestness or genuineness, in our engagement with others in institutional life. In short, we need to situate subjectivism and hypocrisy within Hegel’s theory of ethicality in order to understand why they constitute such significant failures as to be evil. I conclude by showing that an appropriate understanding of Hegel’s conception of evil can help us to respond to some common criticisms made against it. (VI.)
II.
Evil is rooted in what Hegel calls “the moral standpoint”Footnote 9 or sometimes “the moral world-view.”Footnote 10 For this reason, we can say that, for Hegel, evil is a moral concept. That is, Hegel does not simply identify moral evil as one form, among others, that evil can take. Instead, Hegel understands evil as moral, and does not countenance, in his published writings, a distinction of “moral” from “natural” or “metaphysical” evil.Footnote 11 On this view, it is not accidental that we find the most significant accounts of evil in Hegel’s various treatments of “morality,”Footnote 12 or that Hegel does not offer a clarification of exactly what evil is in the other discussions that we find in the mature lectures. Rather, understanding the nature and significance of evil requires that we situate it within Hegel’s account of morality, specifically by understanding the sense in which evil constitutes the “inversion” of the moral good.Footnote 13
The general task of the Philosophy of Right is to articulate those configurations of the will which count as determinations of “right” (Recht), that is, in which the will achieves a kind of objective “existence” (Dasein), and thereby wins its “freedom.”Footnote 14 “Morality” constitutes one such configuration of the free will, specifically the will considered as a “subject,” an individual agent capable of determining itself to act on the basis of its own activity of reflection.Footnote 15 Hegel’s interest is to examine the extent to which this moral standpoint can provide the foundation for an account of “the good,” the ultimate purpose toward which our actions ought to tend. “The moral standpoint” can furnish some formal materials which will be necessary elements of the good: the good is understood to be itself a configuration of the will which reconciles the demands of “abstract right” with those of individual “well-being” (Wohl).Footnote 16 Such a will is one which acknowledges duties as binding on its actions, and it considers the execution of those duties to be an inherent value. The moral conception of the good is therefore recognizably Kantian, as the good will is one which does its “duty for duty’s sake.”Footnote 17 However, Hegel argues that the moral standpoint cannot provide a complete account of the good. While consideration of the individual’s subjectivity and agency can yield some demands to which any conception of the good will be answerable, those considerations are not alone sufficient to provide the kind of content that the good requires to be a determinate purpose for our actions. Hegel suggests that we might (following Kant’s immediate successors like Fichte) appeal to the idea of individual conscience (Gewissen) to provide a substantive criterion for determining which actions are in fact required by duty.Footnote 18 However, Hegel argues that the idea of conscience contains a fundamental “ambiguity,”Footnote 19 and this ambiguity is essential to his conception of evil.
On the one hand, we might understand conscience’s contribution to right action to be merely formal, so that, as conscientious, I am capable of rationally affirming determinate purposes as good, but so that I do not understand conscience itself to be the source of those purposes. This notion of conscience, which Hegel identifies as the “true conscience” (das wahrhafte Gewissen) in fact depends for its content on a source that transcends the individual’s subjectivity.Footnote 20 While “the moral standpoint” can suggest to us the need for such a conception of conscience, it cannot provide a complete account of its nature and constitution. Morality is confined to consideration of the standpoint of the individual subject, while the true conscience requires a source that transcends individual subjectivity. The true conscience instead finds its proper place within “ethicality,” the system of objective institutions and practices which make possible a free life.Footnote 21 On the other hand, in contrast to this true conscience, we might attempt to derive concrete content for the good by appealing solely to the individual’s own subjectivity. On this account, conscience and its certainty are not merely formal means for affirming as good determinate contents stemming from without, but are rather themselves supposed to be the sources of such content. On Fichte’s account of dutiful action, if conscientious reflection on a determinate purpose yields a unique feeling of moral certainty, then I can know that that purpose is itself a duty.Footnote 22 However, there is no objective feature of the purpose itself to which I can appeal, or, for that matter, any discursive means for justifying the claim that it constitutes a reason to act. Instead, it is the unerring feeling of conscientious certainty in the subject that provides the criterion of goodness, so that conscience itself, and nothing transcending subjectivity, constitutes the source of moral content.
Hegel’s interpreters have done significant work to unpack the nature of this criticism of “the moral standpoint.” Dean Moyar provides a neat account of Hegel’s criticism, attributing it to an error in moral reasoning identified by Jonathan Dancy, specifically that of “detachment.”Footnote 23 What Hegel calls the “right of the subjective will” entails that I cannot be obliged to perform an action if I cannot have insight into its goodness, so that my own conscientious affirmation of the purposes I undertake is a necessary feature of moral action. However, the error involved in detachment lies in taking my belief in the goodness of my action and making it sufficient to lend it moral worth. Moyar cites as an example of this error the following mistaken inference: I might have a duty to provide aid to someone when I believe her to be in trouble, and to this extent, my beliefs—both about the fact that she is in trouble, and that it is right to help—are essential to lending my action value, so that it would be wrong for me not to act, given my beliefs. However, the mistake of which Hegel is critical is to infer from this case that it is my belief about the situation that is the source of my duty to help. It is necessary for me to act when I believe her to be in trouble, but it does not follow that the action is necessitated by my belief in its rightness.Footnote 24
However, beyond merely identifying this error as a “pernicious source of subjectivism in ethics,”Footnote 25 Hegel also argues that the will which understands itself to be the source of ethical content is in fact evil (Böse): “In the vanity of all already existing determinations, and in the pure inwardness of the will, self-consciousness is just as much the possibility of making the principle of arbitrariness [die Willkür] the universal in and for itself, [of raising] its own particularity over the universal, and realizing it through action, —to be evil.”Footnote 26 At its base, evil consists in a specific subjective attitude, one in which I ascribe to my own capacity to choose, my Willkür, ultimate moral authority in the sense that I understand it to be the source of moral content. Whether the evil agent explicitly recognizes it or not, her attitude is that of “subjectivity that considers itself to be absolute,”Footnote 27 since she ascribes ultimate practical authority to herself, rather than to any objectively binding norm.Footnote 28
In addition to being a subjective attitude, evil also consists in a specific social condition. This is because the “moral standpoint” is itself implicitly social. Whenever I act, I thereby assume a determinate relation to the will of others so that I must acknowledge claims that they make on me, and vice versa.Footnote 29 The social expression of this subjective attitude is hypocrisy (die Heuchelei),Footnote 30 specifically the hypocrisy of pretense, which consists in the declaration of a moral motive for an action that is, in fact, undertaken for other reasons.Footnote 31 On Hegel’s account, the hypocrite “takes on the appearance” of duty and virtue, thereby proving her “respect” (Achtung) for them. At the same time, she merely “uses them as a mask for her own consciousness,” degrading them to the status of mere means.Footnote 32
On Hegel’s view, evil therefore amounts to an inversion of the moral good. While morality requires the subordination of the individual’s own aims to the universal demands of duty—duty for duty’s sake—the evil agent makes her own capacity for choosing, her Willkür, the principle of her action, thereby subordinating the requirements of duty to her own arbitrary choice. For Hegel, evil is therefore a subjective attitude in which the agent inverts the appropriate order of moral motivation, making her own arbitrary choice the highest principle governing her action over and above the recognition of her duties. The social expression of this subjective attitude is hypocrisy, in which the agent avows to others a moral motive for an action which, in fact, stems from non-moral sources.
III.
We can better understand the specific sense in which Hegel’s conception of evil is a moral one by identifying some significant similarities that it bears to the notion of evil that Kant defends in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason. First and foremost, for both Kant and Hegel, in order for evil to count as a term of practical evaluation, it must be the product of responsible individual choice.Footnote 33 Hegel subscribes to Kant’s moral Copernicanism in identifying the rational will—and not any object or sentiment—as the locus of practical normativity. Any other approach would need to anchor moral claims in an unjustifiable “given,” thereby falling afoul of the “right of the subjective will.”Footnote 34 It is true that Hegel argues that all action—good and evil—presupposes a natural element, some “determination of the natural will, desire, drive, inclination, etc.” However, action equally presupposes what Hegel calls the “mystery” of the will, its capacity to raise itself out of its mere naturalness and to be “inward.”Footnote 35 Hegel stresses that this “mystery” of the will, and not its mere “naturalness,” constitutes the “origin of evil.”Footnote 36 This point is significant since it is the basis of Hegel’s unequivocal assertion that neither God, nor the world spirit, but “The individual subject as such … bears responsibility for evil [die Schuld des Bösen].”Footnote 37
This first similarity is significant, since it points to the fact that, for Hegel, the possibility of evil is ineliminable. Since evil is the product of responsible individual choice—it is a deed of the moral subject—and since it is always up to me to act hypocritically, it is always up to me to decide whether to act in a way that is evil. The “common root” shared by morality and evil is precisely the capacity of the will to transcend its natural determinations and “inwardly” to determine itself to act in accordance with its reflection and choice.Footnote 38 That is, the very same capacity that is essential for a free life—subjective self-determination—is also an essential condition for the existence of evil. When Hegel says that evil is morally “necessary,” he does not mean to say that we are required or necessitated to act in a way that is evil. Instead, as Adriaan Peperzak observes, Hegel demonstrates that the possibility of evil is necessary,Footnote 39 arguing that this very factor that “divide[s] human beings from animals” also makes it possible for us to be evil. At the same time, the rootedness of evil in the subjective will also indicates that there is no assurance that every hypocrisy can be “unmasked.” That is, there is no reliable procedure for judging whether a given act is hypocritical, since such judgments require a familiarity with the agent’s reasons for acting, and it is with regard to just those reasons that the hypocrite aims to dissemble. Since there is no guarantee that we will be able to “unmask” any particular evil, the possibility remains that every act, even an act that appears dutiful and right, might prove to be evil.Footnote 40
Second, we can also say that both Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions of evil are “stoic” (to employ the taxonomy proposed by Claudia Card) insofar as neither believes that it is necessary for an action to involve the infliction of suffering in order for it to count as evil. Rather, both insist that evil is a characteristic of the agent’s will that stands independent of the specific outcome of her action. For Kant, the feature that distinguishes a good agent from an evil one lies not primarily in what she does (evil actions can, but need not, be “legal,” that is, consistent with duty), but rather why she does it.Footnote 41 The evil agent inverts the appropriate moral order of motivation. She recognizes the claim of the moral law on her, but does not do her duty out of the feeling of respect that stems from that recognition. Instead, the agent who exemplifies “wickedness” (Bösartigkeit) recognizes the demands of the law, but subordinates respect for the law to a selfish motive of her own.Footnote 42 Something similar is true of the evil agent on Hegel’s account. That is, the hypocrite recognizes the claims of right and duty, in that she declares to others that she acts from these. However, her disposition is an inversion of the moral good, insofar as she treats duty and morality, as a whole, not as an inherent good, but rather as an instrument for the accomplishment of her own aims. Since evil is a characteristic of the agent’s will, for neither Kant nor Hegel is it necessary that an action result in suffering or a definite harm to an individual for it to count as evil. For this reason, Hegel distinguishes between evil and misfortune (das Übel), since misfortune and suffering can be the products of luck and circumstance just as much as responsible human action.Footnote 43
At the same time, even though evil actions need not be the source of suffering or definite harm to an individual, as hypocrisy, evil remains no less real for Hegel. Just because the possibility of evil is ineliminable does not entail that it is insignificant. In the same breath as he identifies the limited sense in which evil is “necessary,” Hegel insists “Evil is determined as that which necessarily should not be, that is, that it should be annulled [aufgehoben].”Footnote 44 In identifying evil as hypocrisy, Hegel does not intend to explain it away, or to say that it is really nothing. Rather, he aims to draw our attention to the reality and significance of hypocritical action, and to counsel us against its commission. This point is significant for a number of reasons, most notably because it indicates that we need to acknowledge the uniqueness of evil, and therefore to distinguish, as Hegel does, between acts that are evil, those stemming from an inversion of the moral will, and those which are criminal. Acts are criminal when they entail the violation of personal rights to life, bodily integrity, property, etc.Footnote 45 While it is possible for an evil act also to be criminal—a criminal can hypocritically claim a moral motive for her action, saying that the crime was really required by dutyFootnote 46—it is not necessary that evil acts also be criminal. Hegel identifies crime as a species of “misfortune” (das Übel), not necessarily of evil.Footnote 47 For Hegel, the judgment that an action is criminal is therefore different in kind from the judgment that it is evil. The former is a judgment based solely on the idea of abstract right, and primarily concerns the action’s outcome (were any individuals’ rights violated by it?), while the latter is an explicitly moral judgment concerned essentially with the agent’s reasons for acting.
In spite of these deep similarities, there are also significant differences between Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions of evil. These differences stem primarily from the fact that, while both identify evil as an inversion of the moral good, unlike Kant, Hegel countenances the existence of a higher good than that of morality, namely ethicality. As is well-known, Kant’s conception of moral worth is both regulist—moral actions are derived from a single principle or law, the categorical imperative—and individualist—the goodness of an agent’s will stems solely from her acting from the right motives or the right reasons. However, Hegel criticizes this merely moral conception of the good on the grounds that it can provide no determinate criteria for distinguishing dutiful actions from those which are not. This limitation is evident especially in evil actions. That is, I can claim that any and all of my actions are right or good because they stem from my conscience, so that it is always possible for me to make moral notions like duty mere objects of use in a way that would undermine all distinctions between actions that are dutiful and those which are not. In practice, merely moral goodness is ultimately rationally indistinguishable from moral evil. For Hegel, evil therefore points not simply to a difficulty within the moral perspective, but rather for the need to transcend the moral “standpoint” or “world-view” in favour of an ethical theory that can provide actual criteria for distinguishing those actions which are duties from those which are not.
IV.
Hegel’s theory of ethicality is supposed to provide a corrective to these shortcomings in the moral standpoint. However, the theory of ethicality does not consist in a full-scale rejection of Kant’s ethics. Instead, Hegel’s theory of ethicality retains but transforms essential elements of the moral good. As commentators have come increasingly to appreciate in recent years, Hegel appeals to the idea of ethicality to draw out what is in fact necessary for rational autonomy.Footnote 48 That is, Hegel argues that legal institutions and moral discourse in fact rest on and presuppose the existence of a set of stable customary practices which Hegel calls “ethicality”: “The legal and the moral [das Rechtliche und das Moralische] cannot exist for themselves, and the must have the ethical [das Sittliche] as their bearer and foundation [Träger und … Grundlage].”Footnote 49 Rather than anchoring his account of the good in a single highest rule or law whose source lies in pure practical reason, Hegel instead argues that a life of freedom consists in having a shared social world which agents can experience as a “home.”
In contrast to the abstract good of morality, the ethical good is a “living good”:
Ethicality is the idea of freedom, as the living good, which has its reality in the knowing and willing of self-consciousness, and acquires that reality through the action of self-consciousness, just as much as self-consciousness has in the ethical being its inherently existing foundation [an und für sich seiende Grundlage] and motive purpose,—the concept of freedom that has come to be an existing world and to have the nature of self-consciousness.Footnote 50
First and foremost, as was the case with the moral good, the ethical good consists in a life of freedom. However, while Hegel continues to hold that the highest good is realized through the execution of duties, in ethicality, the source of those duties lies not in merely formal reflective subjectivity, but rather in a shared social “world” structured by objective institutions and practices. Ethicality, therefore, resolves the problem to which moral evil points—that the moral good is “empty,” and cannot provide a substantive criterion for distinguishing dutiful action—by showing how the duties necessary to a free life actually stem from concrete social institutions. Likewise, Hegel also argues that ethicality requires a specific “disposition” (Gesinnung) according to which participation in ethical practices is understood and treated as an inherent good. To this extent, the execution of duties is not merely an instrumental good, but rather an activity constitutive of a life of freedom. However, in distinction from Kant’s ethics, where a single principle or law provided the source of moral motivation, ethicality is compatible with a plurality of particular motives and aims. The essential point, for Hegel, is that agents treat engagement in such institutional practices as an inherent good.Footnote 51 While the central components of the moral worldview are therefore maintained within ethicality—the highest good is a life of freedom, which requires the execution of duties and treating dutiful actions as possessing inherent and not merely instrumental value—ethicality acknowledges the central contribution that a plural range of objective institutions and practices (in Hegel’s view, those of the family, civil society, and the state) make to the specification and realization of the good. In contrast to Kant’s regulist and individualist conception of moral worth, for Hegel, the ethical good is one that is institutional and social.
Ethicality is therefore supposed to solve the problem raised by conscience concerning the specific content of the idea of duty. Because Hegel argues that we can arrive at agreement on the nature of our duties to the extent that we share a common social world and participate in the same objective institutions, his ethical theory rests on the existence of a coherent system of ethical practices.Footnote 52 However, acknowledging the need for a theory of ethicality does not rule out the possibility of evil. That is, transcending the moral standpoint entails only that we have concrete criteria for distinguishing dutiful actions from those that are not, but it by no means entails that evil is not a problem within ethicality. Instead, evil can continue to exist within ethicality, only now as the inversion of what Hegel calls the ethical disposition. Within ethicality, the evil agent is one who subordinates participation in ethical institutions to her own individual aims and interests, treating them and the moral discourse they support as mere objects of use, and at the same time avowing moral or ethical motives for her actions. In short, the essential characteristics of evil—“subjectivity that considers itself to be absolute” and hypocrisy—remain equally as possible within the more comprehensive context of ethicality as they did in the more narrow “moral worldview.” An evil agent need not employ explicitly ethical discourse in justifying her action. Instead of appealing to reasons stemming ultimately from concrete ethical institutions—I acted because I am her father, or because it was my job, or because she too is a citizen—an evil agent might refuse to engage with those institutions, and simply appeal to abstract ideas like “right” and “duty” to justify her actions. However, since Hegel believes that legal and moral practice, in fact, rest on and presuppose ethical institutions and practices, even abstract reasons like “because it was right” or “because it was my duty” ultimately depend on ethicality. For this reason, whether the agent explicitly recognizes it or not in her own reasoning or in the justification she offers to others, evil amounts to an abuse of ethicality.
Indeed, close examination of Hegel’s moral phenomenology of evil in §140R of the Philosophy of Right shows that evil is more extreme to the extent that it involves a refusal to engage in the objective institutions and practices of ethicality. In that lengthy remark, Hegel identifies six different forms that evil can take—bad conscience, hypocrisy, probabilism, the appeal to an abstract good, the ethics of conviction, and moral irony. These different forms embody a progression, in which evil increasingly undermines ethicality by more explicitly claiming an ultimate authority for subjectivity over the claims of the objective ethical world. That is, evil becomes more extreme to the extent that it withdraws from or attempts to undermine the claims of objective institutions and practices.
When I act with a bad conscience, I recognize the claims of right and duty, but instead act in the promotion of my “particularity” against the universal claims of morality.Footnote 53 By contrast, hypocrisy requires, in addition to this assertion of my own subjectivity and particularity against the objectivity and universality of moral demands, an attempt to deceive others by presenting “good reasons” and a “justification” for my evil action.Footnote 54Probabilism, the appeal to an apparent moral authority such as a theologian, might seem a less extreme form of evil than hypocrisy since it involves an attempt to provide a shared justification for an action. However, on Hegel’s account, it is nonetheless evil since it submits the objective claims of morality or “religiosity” to the “subjectivity” of the individual who gets to “decide” which reasons she prefer.Footnote 55 The appeal to an abstract conception of the good undermines the “trace of objectivity” that we find in probabilism, since every subject, not just one with access to a moral expert, is able to posit some abstract good which their action is supposed to realize.Footnote 56 It is no longer the good that counts at all, but instead the individual subject who posits it. The appeal to individual conviction to justify an action raises the individual’s “beliefs” or particular subjective “meaning” (Meinung) above any possibly shared or objective basis for morality.Footnote 57
While the idea of ethicality is not prominent in Hegel’s account of these forms of evil, he argues that they are more significant to the extent that they involve either a refusal to engage with or an attempt to undermine the essential elements of ethicality. First, these forms of evil involve a progressive corrosion of the objectivity of moral distinctions and ideas. While action with a bad conscience and hypocrisy involve an explicit recognition of the objectivity of some moral demands, probabilism, the abstract conception of the good, and the ethics of conviction entail a gradual assertion of the subjectivity of the agent over and against the objectivity of practical norms.Footnote 58 Since, as we have seen, Hegel believes that those practical norms ultimately derive their shared allegiance from the ethical world which is their foundation and support, the attempt to undermine them involves a refusal to engage with that world, to recognize its objective demands. Second, these forms of evil progressively corrode the social conditions for ethical action, since they require more and more significant attempts to confuse moral discourse, from the explicit attempt at deception in hypocrisy, to the attempt to transform moral discourse through the innovations of the abstract good and conviction.
However, most importantly, they suggest a progressively more explicit attempt to subvert the institutional conditions for ethical action in submitting the demands of duty, whose true source is ethicality, to the arbitrary will and preferences of the individual agent. The highest and most significant form of evil is that of romantic irony. The ironist consciously submits “truth, right, and duty” to her own resolution and decision, an activity that may remain merely “implicit” in the other forms of evil.Footnote 59 By contrast, Hegel is explicit that the ironist “fully know[s] the objective ethical [das objective Sittliche],” and therefore recognizes the claim that institutions make on her. However, instead of “deepening oneself and acting from consideration of [the objective ethical] by forgetting oneself and genuinely surrendering to it,” the ironic agent rather regards herself as the ultimate authority over the demands which the ethical world places on her. She makes those demands into an object of play, intentionally subverting and undermining them for the sake of her own enjoyment. Hegel likely has in mind the kind of playful subversion of the norms operative in the ethical institution of marriage that we find in Friedrich Schlegel’s Lucinde. The highest form of evil is therefore one which both consciously acknowledges the objective claims of the ethical world, but at the same time submits those claims to the “dominance” of her own will, making them mere playthings. Since the concrete institutions and practices of ethicality therefore in fact provide the venue for the highest form of evil, it is clear that Hegel does not think that the possibility of evil is annulled simply by situating moral action within an ethical world.
V.
Even if we grant that Hegel believes that evil remains an enduring possibility within the context of the institutions and practices of ethicality, we might be worried that he makes a mistake in identifying vanity and hypocrisy—and not some more obviously significant form of practical failure, like crime or malice or cruelty or atrocity—as evil.Footnote 60 That is, we might accept accounts like Moyar’s, according to which “detachment” constitutes a genuine mistake grounded in a fallacious inference, which in turn brings us to false moral conclusions, but at the same time reject the claim that that error in reasoning is sufficiently pernicious to be called evil. Even if we accept that the hypocrite errs in believing that her own convictions can provide a sure foundation for moral action, why should we count this error as anything more than a relatively minor moral failure? What, if anything, justifies Hegel in calling hypocrisy evil?
It is essential first to note that Hegel is not interested in providing a single ranking of different moral failures to suggest that one is more extreme than the other. As we have seen, identifying an act as criminal and identifying it as evil do not involve placing it on a single scale. Rather, the two judgments require the deployment of different kinds of concepts, and appreciating this difference is essential to understanding what is distinctive of evil as a uniquely moral failure. Even if it turns out that evil is much more ubiquitous on Hegel’s account than on others—hypocrisy is, to be sure, much more common than Card’s paradigm of evil, atrocity—there is no reason why we cannot say that certain evils, say those that are also criminal, are more serious or significant than others.
At the same time, we ought to ask why Hegel believes that hypocrisy constitutes such a significant moral failure as to constitute evil. While Hegel offers us no direct argument for this claim, he does suggest in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that the excessive subjectivism of the modern age—the same “shallowness” of its thinking by means of which the “philosophy” of the “present day” inverts good into evilFootnote 61—undermines and compromises ethicality: “The destruction [Zerstörung] of both inner ethicality and the upright [rechtschaffenen] conscience, of love and right between private persons and of the public order and the laws of the state” follows from the principles according to which “right is based on subjective purposes and meanings, on subjective feeling and the particular conviction.”Footnote 62 This claim recalls the link that Hegel identifies in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History between “evil” and “the decline of the most flourishing states which the human spirit has produced [die Untergang der blühendsten Reiche, die der Menschengeist hervorbracht hat].”Footnote 63 In spite of its generally progressivist narrative, Hegel’s philosophy of history equally focuses on the ways in which it is possible for different shapes of ethicality—for different configurations of institutions and the self-understandings which animate them and which they in turn support—to undergo periods of decline, of “rot” or “ruin” (Verderben)Footnote 64 and “decay” (Verfall).Footnote 65
At the same time, Hegel does not clarify the specific way in which evil actually undermines ethicality. We find a clue for resolving this question in the 1821/1822 lectures on the philosophy of right. There, Hegel suggests that evil corrodes ethical practices by undermining the trust on which those practices in turn depend:
In present times… all duty, all right, and everything ethical has become vanity. And when, in such volatilization [Verflüchtigung], the living-together [Zusammenleben] of human beings, the state, has undergone a decline [untergegangen ist], there has remained no objectivity, no trust [Zutrauen], and where the state should emerge from this is difficult to see and to say.Footnote 66
This passage suggests that, on Hegel’s view, hypocrisy is sufficiently damaging to justify calling it evil because of its corrosive effects on ethical practices generally. Specifically, through her abuse of ethical practices, the evil agent not only inverts but also undermines the ethical disposition, which Hegel claims consists in a kind of trust on which the ethical world as a whole depends.Footnote 67 To this extent, as hypocrisy, evil is not simply the inversion of the moral good, but, more than that, its existence undermines the possibility of the realization of the good in the world.
Throughout his mature writings, Hegel stresses that ethicality itself presupposes the trust of its participants, arguing that, without that trust, a given set of institutions will not make possible a free life. This trust takes two primary forms, institutional and intersubjective. First, ethicality presupposes that its participants have trust in its central institutions:
The political disposition … is in general that of trust [das Zutrauen] (which can pass over into a more or less cultured insight), the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and purpose of an other (here that of the state), through which this other is immediately no other for me and I am free in this consciousness.Footnote 68
On Hegel’s account, I must be able to experience my own interests as “preserved and contained” within my participation in ethical institutions, and the felt consciousness that institutions are not alien impositions on me but rather expressive of myself is simply trust.Footnote 69 I need not experience the demands of duty as limitations on my freedom, since it is possible to come to experience life in the ethical world as a “second nature.”Footnote 70 Trust is so important for Hegel because it is only if ethical institutions are worthy of trust that I can experience my engagement in them as free and good.Footnote 71
This institutional trust (Zutrauen) founds a similar trust (Vertrauen) in other individuals: “The disposition of the individuals is the knowing of the substance and the identity of all their interests with the whole; and since the other individuals reciprocally know themselves in this identify and are real in it, trust [das Vertrauen] is the true ethical disposition.”Footnote 72 Hegel’s theory of ethicality is fundamentally a social theory in that institutions mediate relations between individuals. Hegel rejects social contract-type models of social cooperation which stress the ultimacy of reflection and choice, and instead argues that the common participation in institutions can furnish a set of shared expectations and norms which make cooperation and intersubjective trust possible. In the Jena Phenomenology, Hegel identifies a central role for language, in particular the expressive language of conviction and assurance, in mediating relations between individuals.Footnote 73 It is simple enough to see how language could play a similar role in the mature theory of ethicality. Through language I am able to communicate to others my understanding of the norms and standards implicit in institutions and practices. Moreover, I am also able to assure them that I consider such engagement to be an inherent good, that I do not merely treat such activity as an instrument for the accomplishment of some other idiosyncratic aims of mine. Through my actions and speech, it becomes possible for others to gain trust in me as an agent and knower.
Hypocrisy constitutes such a significant failure as to count as evil because it undermines both the institutional and intersubjective trust on which ethicality itself depends. Most directly, the hypocrite undermines the conditions for intersubjective trust. That is, when I dishonestly avow a moral motive for an act that is, in fact, self-interested, I make it impossible for others to assess whether my act is genuinely ethical, precisely since I aim to deceive them concerning my reasons for action. Actions that are simply wrong or in which an agent openly avows a self-interested motive do not tax the resources of our moral practice as hypocritical actions do, since we clearly possess the conceptual and judgmental resources to determine that and why such actions constitute an ethical failure. By contrast, while we can identify what, in general, is objectionable about hypocrisy, when attempting to judge whether a particular action is hypocritical, we must take stock of the agent’s reasons for action, and all we ultimately have to go on in assessing those claims is what the other says. As we have seen, for any particular action, there is no guarantee that the other is not trying to deceive us, and, for this reason, trust depends on our assurance that she is engaged in ethical practices in good faith. Ethicality itself depends on the possibility of intersubjective trust, and the deception which hypocrisy entails undermines precisely that trust. As Eva Feder Kittay observes, hypocrisy “confronts us with the tenuousness of our religious, moral, and interpersonal interactions,” precisely because it shows how much those interactions depend on our trust in the good faith engagement of our fellows.Footnote 74
At the same time, hypocrisy also undermines the conditions for institutional trust. In ascribing a merely instrumental value to the central institutions of ethicality, the hypocrite clearly fails to treat institutional participation as an inherent good, and she attributes to herself a higher authority than she does the demands of those institutions. To this extent, she shows us a way in which those institutions can be abused and manipulated, thereby undermining the trust in institutions that Hegel argues is necessary for the sustenance of ethical practices. Christine McKinnon notes this corrosive effect which hypocrisy has on “normative practices”: “Agents who are dishonest about their reasons and motivations sabotage our normative practices,” since those practices depend on our treating them as having “intrinsic value.”Footnote 75 Hegel would agree that the hypocrite “is taken to be so morally abhorrent” because “She uses the standards and judgments that comprise our system of morality in order to get for herself some unmerited glory or to escape some deserved reproaches,” and that we consider such behaviour to be so serious because “Moral assessments are things we take seriously.”Footnote 76
In undermining the possibility of trust, hypocrisy threatens ethicality at a deeper level than is possible for other forms of practical failure. Hypocrisy can contribute to ethical decline in ways that crime cannot. First, the judgment that a crime has been committed can, in general, be reliably made, through the marshaling of evidence that an individual’s rights have been violated, that someone else is responsible for that violation, etc. Second, crime can in fact be an occasion for the strengthening of ethical standards, insofar as the crime is publicly recognized as wrong, and those standards can (ideally, at least) be reasserted through judicial and penal practice. By contrast, as we have seen, the judgment that a particular act is hypocritical cannot reliably be made. Moreover, since hypocrisy undermines the very institutional conditions for ethical action itself, unlike crime, there can be no institutional recourse guaranteeing its correction and the reassertion of ethical standards and practices. While crime is a public and overt “violation” (Verletzung) of right,Footnote 77 the harm of hypocrisy is the subtler and more dangerous “rot” and “decay” of ethicality itself, the ultimate source of its decline.
That corrosion is so important for Hegel precisely because it doesn’t simply make moral action difficult. It makes it impossible. As we have seen, Hegel argues that ethicality is the “bearer” and “foundation” of legal and moral practices which cannot exist for themselves, and remain “abstract” and “unreal” when not anchored in an ethical world. Even though we can provide, in the abstract, a general rational account of the demands of right and morality, those demands remain empty and ineffective when not realized within a set of existent institutions and practices. Hence, if hypocrisy undermines ethicality itself, so too it compromises the effective power of law and morality, of the ideas of right and duty. As hypocrisy, evil therefore constitutes a kind of transcendental moral failure, since it undermines the very “foundation” for law and morality, for the conditions under which freedom, the highest good, can come to be real or actual in the world.
Acknowledging that hypocrisy is so dangerous because it corrodes trust points to the fundamental significance of Ernst, of seriousness or sincerity, to the ethical disposition.Footnote 78 Whenever he identifies romantic irony as a form of hypocrisy or evil, Hegel points to the fact that the ironist treats ethical institutions and practices as mere playthings, an attitude that is inconsistent with such seriousness. Hegel’s discussions of evil show us that this seriousness entails the need for a kind of genuine openness in our own engagement with institutions, and sincerity in our relations to others. If hypocrisy undermines the institutional and intersubjective trust on which ethicality is grounded, it is the genuine Ernst of ourselves and our fellows which sustains and, possibly, restores that trust.
We should note, however, that Hegel does identify a number of mechanisms that can insulate the ethical world against the pernicious effects of evil. First, ethicality can work to encourage the development of the ethical disposition by means of specific institutions whose purpose is to point the individual to the existence of common, inherent goods which transcend her own. We first acquire the “love, trust, and obedience” which constitute the “ground” of ethicality in the affective community of the family.Footnote 79 As members of a “corporation” or work-association, we come to identify our own interests with those of other members, by providing the mutual care and assurance against poverty.Footnote 80 The state most directly cultivates the political disposition of trust by habituating us to be concerned for the good of our fellows, even entailing a “disposition [Aufgelegtheit] for extraordinary sacrifice and action.”Footnote 81 Second, the broad distribution of functions across an entire system of institutions and practices means that the abuse and failure of one function need not compromise the work of the whole. As a result, other institutions can act as a kind of firewall preventing the harmful influence of isolated evil actions, potentially even those undertaken by individuals possessing significant authority or power in one domain of social life, from contributing to the decline of ethicality as a whole. At the same time, while these mechanisms strengthen institutions by insulating them from the negative effects of evil actions, they cannot prevent the commission of evil itself, which remains a choice open to the individual subject, and therefore as a persistent threat to ethicality.
VI.
Critics have consistently taken issue with Hegel’s conception of evil, in particular with his view of the role of evil in history, and his attempted theodicy. We can identify a range of common criticisms offered against Hegel’s conception of evil:
1. If what seem like evils are really the deeds of a benevolent deity, they cannot really be evil. In explaining evil, Hegel explains it away, and denies the reality of evil.Footnote 82
2. Since he elsewhere suggests that evil is the product of individual human agency, in attributing responsibility for evil to God, Hegel provides conflicting explanations of evil.Footnote 83
3. Since he understands evil to be the product of a divine agency, Hegel believes that evil is necessary, a view which encourages acquiescence in the face of evil.Footnote 84
However, Hegel’s critics neglect actually to examine his specific conception of evil, rooted in “the moral standpoint,” or to consider why he thinks that evil makes such a significant contribution to the decline of ethicality. When examined in light of Hegel’s actual conception of evil and its significance for the ethical world, these standard criticisms prove unsound. First, Hegel does not deny the reality of evil, holding that it is merely illusory, disappearing when considered from the cosmic perspective. Instead, he believes that evil is both a subjective disposition and a social action that is real, whose corrosive effects on ethicality are genuine, and whose damage to shared forms of social life is significant. Second, nor does Hegel provide conflicting explanations of evil, attributing it willy-nilly to the agency of a world spirit or to individual subjects, as suits him. On the contrary, in both the later systematic account of evil and in the Jena Phenomenology, Hegel consistently holds that evil is the product of responsible human agency, stemming from the individual will. Third, while Hegel acknowledges that the possibility of evil is ineliminable, and therefore “necessary,” he nowhere argues that the commission or occurrence of any particular evil is necessary. While it may be accurate to say of Schelling that he believes that evil constitutes a necessary moment in the unfolding of the cosmic spirit, or the division of the spirit from itself necessary for it to be restored to a higher unity,Footnote 85 Hegel’s account of evil is far less speculative. Instead, since evil constitutes a transcendental moral failure, undermining the social and institutional conditions for the realization of the ethical good, Hegel’s position instead requires moral seriousness and vigilance in the face of evil as something that “necessarily should not be.”Footnote 86
An appropriate understanding of Hegel’s moral concept of evil therefore provides the key to addressing these common criticisms. It is true that we also find a range of criticisms addressed at Hegel’s understanding of the appropriate response to evil, and of its persistence in history. With regard to the first issue, Hegel’s critics charge, first, that Hegel’s theodicy entails a demand that we reconcile with evil, such that it is not only possible to reconcile with all evils,Footnote 87 but actually necessaryFootnote 88; and, second, that Hegel’s conception of evil is “obscene” insofar he demands not only acquiescence in the face of evil, but actually aims to provide a positive justification for the existence of evil, and therefore for particular evils.Footnote 89
With regard to evil’s persistence, critics often appeal to the existence of extreme forms of evil in the twentieth century, arguing that Hegel’s own understanding of evil is inadequate to comprehend the horror epitomized by Holocaust.Footnote 90 In this connection, Claudia Card’s “atrocity paradigm” conception of evil as “foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing” points to one possible reason for rejecting Hegel’s view. On Card’s account, atrocities demonstrate the need to adopt a “hybrid” account of evil that involves both the stoic idea that evil consists in a “misuse of the will,” the malevolent and intentional subversion of moral standards, and the utilitarian idea that evil involves the infliction of unnecessary and extreme suffering.Footnote 91 By contrast, as we have seen, Hegel’s conception of evil would count solely as “stoic” on Card’s account, since hypocrisy consists fundamentally in a misuse of the will, so that it is not necessary that evil involve the infliction of suffering.
I am optimistic that Hegel’s moral conception of evil can provide the conceptual resources for addressing these criticisms as well, though an account of these issues would require a more extensive consideration of Hegel’s philosophy of history than I have been able to undertake here. I would like instead to conclude by pointing to two features of Hegel’s view that we would have to consider in addressing these criticisms.
First, while Hegel’s specific conception of evil makes no direct reference to the infliction of suffering and harm on individuals, he nonetheless understands that issue to be of fundamental significance. That is, atrocities involve the denial and extreme violation of rights which individuals ought to enjoy, and the actions perpetrated against the victims of atrocity are crimes, often of the grossest nature. The most basic standards of Hegel’s ethical theory are precisely those which are supposed to protect the integrity of the lives, bodies, and property of individuals, and Hegel is emphatic that violations of those rights constitute criminal wrongs. In short, the infliction of harm on individuals matters for Hegel, even if it is not an essential element of his conception of evil.
Second, while it is true that, on Hegel’s conception, evil need not also involve this criminal element, his moral conception of evil does point to the reason why it often does. As we have seen, evil consists first and foremost in an abuse of “ethicality” which constitutes the “foundation” and support for legal institutions and moral practices. Hegel’s conception of evil therefore focuses our attention on the subjective and social conditions at the root of the social decline and political breakdown which has so often preceded and accompanied the commission of atrocities. For this reason, there is a significant sense in which Hegel understands evil, a violation of the spirit of the age, a transcendental moral failure which undermines ethicality itself, as radical. However, evil is not radical in the sense that it needs to involve extreme suffering or harm (though it can), or because it indicates some opaque feature of experience, a mystical object resisting comprehension. Hegel’s conception of evil instead encourages us to reject the idea that evil must involve such extremes, or that it is ultimately incomprehensible.Footnote 92 Rather, for Hegel, evil is radical in the original sense, that is, that it attacks and corrodes the roots of legal institutions and moral practices, undermining and destroying the norms on which they depend.Footnote 93 Hegel’s conception of evil points ultimately to the fragility of law and morality, to their embeddedness within ethicality, and ethicality’s ultimate dependence on trust. Rather than encouraging a relaxation in the face of the commission of evil, Hegel’s view instead points to the seriousness and highest care required for the preservation and maintenance of the social and institutional conditions supporting our most basic and highest aims.
