Islam, Modernity and New Millennium: Themes from a Critical Rationalist Reading of Islam is authored by Ali Paya, a prolific author and a critical scholar of Islamic thought. Various chapters of the book had been previously published but the author has successfully put together ten chapters with a comprehensive introduction. The book is a testimony to Paya’s in-depth and critical thinking in medieval, modern and contemporary Islamic studies. It is an excellent representation of “critical rationalist” reading of Islam in the Popperian liberal tradition.

The introduction provides a useful historical context, and highlights different schools and approaches to the old and yet crucial question of Islam and modernity. It successfully sheds light on the central thesis of the book, arguing why and how “critical rationalism,” first introduced by Karl Popper, is “a way of life,” a “philosophical outlook” and a “methodological framework” best suited for the new millennium Muslims in their response to modernity (pp. 7–16). Paya discusses Muslims’ multiple responses to modernity; his categorization of such responses is as follows: followers of Orthodoxy, Traditionalists, Rejectionists, Fundamentalists, Assimilationists, Modernists, Post-Modernists, Secularists, and finally Late Moderns/Reformers, or what he calls “Critical Rationalists” (p. 10). The latter is Paya’s favorite approach, which promotes “critical reason” and “autonomous reason in its deliberations,” advocates “religious and political pluralism” and supports “well-thought piecemeal reforms introduced by rational and reliable institutions” (p. 14).

The Introduction clearly highlights the book’s central argument and demonstrates how each chapter serves the book’s purpose. Nonetheless, a closer and more comprehensive critique of the following points would have made Islam, Modernity and New Millennium even more incisive. First, a more extensive examination of “multiple modernities” and ill-effects of colonial/hegemonic modernity would have enriched the ontological and epistemological discussion of modernity (pp. 6–8). A critical examination of modernity’s motto of “one size fits all” would have complemented the discussion of modernity as a “global phenomenon” (p. 8, n. 29). Furthermore, the book considers Kant, Marx and Nietzsche as “three influential architects of modernity” (p. 7). But we also know that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are known as the radical critics of modernity, or “Masters of Suspicion.”Footnote ¹

Second, the book is clearly critical of assimilationist modernists and relativist post-modernists. And yet post-structural thinkers are not necessarily relativist post-modernists. Post-structural and post-colonial Muslim thinkers would have been appropriate additions to the categorization of Muslim intellectuals (p. 10). Furthermore, the book identifies the majority of Muslims as “Followers of Orthodoxy,” meaning they “stick to the letter of sharia law” (pp. 10–11). Such a characterization seems problematic since, as the contemporary social movements in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate, the overwhelming majority of Muslims are neither literalist nor Westophobic. They seem more pragmatist. Likewise, the Rejectionists are certainly at odd with ontological and epistemological foundations of modernity (p. 12). They are, however, simultaneously a product of, and a reaction to, modernity and the lived experience of autocratic modernization in Muslim postcolonial contexts. Daesh and Al-Qaeda are cases in point where they use modern western technology to pursue their political goals. A postcolonial account of this phenomenon seems useful in this context. Besides, “critical modern thinkers” would probably better define the category of “Modernists,” since they are critical of both tradition and modernity. Moreover, Muhammed Arkun is identified in the category of “Critical Rationalists/Reformists” and critical rationalists, we are told, believe in autonomous reason (p. 14). Given Arkun’s critique of modernity and positivist rationalism (not reason), he would have been a better fit for a new category of post-structural Muslim thinkers. Likewise, Hassan Hanafi does not seem to fit a category of “Postmodernists” as he is neither a relativist nor believes in privatization of religion. He, among several other Muslim critical thinkers such as Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Ali Shariati (1933–77), Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (1909–85), Amina Wadud (b. 1952), Farid Esack (b. 1959), Asma Barlas (b. 1950), and new generations of critical egalitarian Muslim thinkers may symbolize a school of Islamic liberation theology.

Third, following Karl Popper’s approach, and explaining “critical rationalism,” the book argues that “knowledge claims out to be objective” (p. 18) and “value-neutral” (p. 19), and methodologically relies on “situational analysis,” defining the time and place of the situation, and finding a “rational explanation for the actions of the actors in particular situation” (pp. 20–21). The reader would have benefited from further critical analyses on why Popper’s epistemological approach and the book’s “critical rationalism” would not fall into a trap of positivism and modernist rationalism. How would a “value-neutral/objective” approach and “critical rationalism” informed by particularity of temporal and spatial situations coexist?

Chapter 2 is entitled “What and How Can We Learn from the Quran? A Critical Rationalist Perspective,” and offers a detailed and rich analysis of how to use the Quran as a “source of knowledge which complements the ‘book’ of nature” and in relation to our “human condition.” The chapter introduces a critical rationalist approach to studying the Quran, and offers three specific ways to support the argument (p. 49). Chapter 3 sheds more light on “A Critical Rationalist Approach to Religion.” “For critical rationalist Muslims,” it is argued, “reconciliation between modernity and tradition can be achieved in more smooth, less radical ways” (p. 61). Such a dialogical and reconciliatory approach upholds the “Popperian motto that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort we get nearer to the truth’” (p. 61). As mentioned before, a more comprehensive representation of the literature of multiple modernities would have enriched the debates on tradition and modernity in Muslim contexts.

Chapter 4, titled “A Critical Assessment of the Programs of Producing ‘Islamic Science’ and ‘Islamization of Science/Knowledge’,” problematizes shortcomings/failure of the Islamization of knowledge. While modern science, it is argued, “has a problem-oriented approach and develops in response to real problems,” all approaches towards the Islamization of knowledge are “either based on pious wish and aspiration without detailed programs or, if they have any program, they combine pious wishes and aspirations with misguided conceptions about science and its methodologies” (p. 78). This is an excellent critique of a regressive, nativist and essentialist approach to knowledge. And yet it could have been advanced by introducing the concept of decolonizing knowledge production as well as epistemic disobedience.Footnote ² More specifically, one could make a clear distinction between a regressive/nativist Islamization of knowledge and a progressive emancipatory approach towards decolonization of knowledge production, recognizing the contribution of the global south, including the Muslim world, in the global process of knowledge production.

Chapter 5 is entitled “Faqih as Engineer: A Critical Assessment of Fiqh’s Epistemological Status,” and provides a detailed critique of deficiencies of the fiqh. It argues that “equating a faqih, who is a practical problem-solver par excellence (i.e. engineer), with an alim (man of knowledge/ scientist), who deals with theoretical ideas, has helped the fuqaha further consolidate their dominant position in the ecosystem of Islamic culture” (p. 26). It then suggests that “if the faqih is to be effective, he must constantly improve his knowledge and awareness of local and particular problem-situations and contexts” (p. 96). It further argues, “a faqih who knows nothing about modern banking,” or is “insufficiently educated about modern developments in genetics, proteomics, molecular biology, cloning, neuroscience and similar fields will be completely unable to issue informed fatwas on any of countless problems emerging from these developments.” It is therefore, the chapter seems to suggest, vital for the fuqaha, like engineers, to specialize in “sub-categories that deal with a specific range of highly specialized issues.” In the final analysis, the chapter argues, “if the ‘technology of fiqh does not adapt itself, it will be in danger of becoming an obsolete technology” (p. 97). This is an interesting observation and yet one could pose even more challenging questions: to what extent do the fiqh and fuqaha still hold an omnipotent legitimacy in the new millennium? And how practical and/or useful is the specialization of fiqh where the clerical institution/episteme remains stagnant?

Chapter 6 is a detailed case study: “A Critical Assessment of the Method of Interpretation of the Quran by the Quran, in the Light of Allameh Tabatabaei’s Tafsi al-Mizan.” The chapter examines Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei’s (1903–81) masterpiece, Al-Mizan, historicizes the method of interpretation of the Quran by the Quran, and critically examines Tabatabaei’s approach.

Chapter 7, titled “The Disenchantment of Reason: An Anti-rational Trend in Modern Shi’i Thought—the Tafkikis,” is one of the most informative and interesting chapters of the book. It provides an excellent historical context to an anti-rational and elitist trend in modern Shi’i thought, and introduces major contemporary figures of the Tafkikis in Iran. Moreover, the chapter masterfully examines the Tafkikis’ epistemological deficiencies, mostly its claim for the monopoly of the so-called “autonomous religious reason” in comprehending the Quranic wisdom, and exclusively relying on Revelation and most trusted guides (Prophet and the Shi’i Imams) as the source of inspiration and knowledge (pp. 131–2, 145). Besides, the chapter contends that the “school of Tafkik is against epistemic pluralism” (p. 145), and that the Tafkikis argument is “untenable since it fails to make a distinction between the actual content of message, in this case the Quran and the genuine ahadith, and the believers’ understanding of the message in question” (p. 154). After reading this excellent chapter, one could still ask to what extent the Tafkikis’ critique of the autonomous secular reason resembles a post-structural critique of positivist and instrumental rationalism.

Chapter 8, titled “Islamic Philosophy: Past, Present and Future,” is another excellent chapter. It applies “Popper’s conjecture to the case of Islamic philosophy” (p. 149), assesses the contribution of Kalam (theology) and the Greek rational culture to Islamic philosophy, and extensively examines the challenges theologians, jurists and mystics posed to Islamic philosophy (p. 150). The chapter masterfully traces historical development of Islamic philosophy, the rise and crisis of “scientific spirit” in Islamic civilization, the development of the “rational mode of philosophizing” and “novel systems of theosophy,” the rise and legacies of two significant schools of Isfahan and Shiraz in Islamic philosophy, the state of contemporary Islamic philosophy in Iran and beyond, and finally sheds some light on the future prospects of Islamic philosophy. It rightly suggests that the future success of Islamic philosophy heavily depends on how much it would enhance and encourage the “spirit of critical and rational thinking, openness to ideas and views in other cultures and civilizations, and tolerance which was once among Muslim thinkers” (p. 186). Like other chapters, this one is guided by the author’s approach of “critical rationalism” where on rare occasions the line between appreciating reason/rationality and advocating rationalism as the exclusive source of knowledge could be clearer. If “critical rationalism” accepts the limits of reason, how does it assess the contribution of mysticism to the development of Islamic civilization? Moreover, the militant jihadis are certainly indoctrinated by dogmatic/fundamentalist readings of Islam. But their brutality, like the secular Nazis/fascists, is equally rooted/situated in modern instrumental rationality and modern techniques. Reason is neither an exclusive source of truth nor does it ensure emancipation.

Chapter 9, “Doctrinal Certainty: A Major Contribution Factor to ‘Secular’ and ‘Religious’ Violence in the Political Sphere,” explains epistemological root causes of violence. While the chapter acknowledges psychological, cultural and socio-economic and political factors behind violence, it argues that such “phenomenological” accounts are short of an “epistemological” explanation, in which otherness, or “a sense of certainty concerning the superiority of one’s cherished doctrine in comparison to all other rival doctrines” explain violence at a “meta-level” (p. 193). In other words, “epistemic justification,” it is argued, “dehumanize[s] the other” and is a “root cause of all conscious acts of political violence” (pp. 194, 196). The chapter examines two case studies—a secular Khmer Rouge and a religious ISIS/Daesh—to unpack the argument. The chapter provides an excellent account of epistemological root causes of political violence. Nonetheless, a post-colonial analysis seems complementary to such a superb epistemological analysis, situating socio-political contexts, which contribute to the spread of doctrinal certainty. Abstract ideas are most often powerless, unless they are fused with material forces. In the end, the chapter argues, relativism “fuels to the flame of political violence” (p. 204) and puts forward “critical rationalism” and “epistemic humility” as antidotes to political violence. While the former, the chapter argues, “subscribes to the correspondence theory of truth,” the latter “emphasizes the moral significance of epistemic optimism” (p. 202).

Chapter 10 is an attempt to answer the following question: “Islam, Christianity and Judaism: Can They Ever Live Peacefully Together?” After a quick review of the complex relationship between religion, science and secularism, the chapter examines whether three Abrahamic traditions may have a chance for a “peaceful coexistence, or a destructive animosity?” (pp. 215–18). It then argues that, “despite the desirability of close ties,” Islam, Christianity and Judaism “do not appear to be very good at tolerating each other” (p. 216). The solution, it is argued, is “to strive towards truth via long process of interpretation and re-interpretation” of religious doctrines to promote tolerance. This should not be difficult, “since the notion of ‘emancipation through knowledge’ and ‘spiritual freedom’ is a common thread in these three traditions” (p. 218). One has to be extremely cautious, I would argue, not to make a simplistic conclusion about the nature of contemporary conflicts in Muslim contexts, characterizing such clashes as religious wars and ignoring socio-economic and political factors. The author certainly does not wish to make such a reductionist, and ahistorical culturalist argument, but a careless reading of the chapter might lead to such an unintended conclusion.

Chapter 11 is entitled “The Shape of the Coming Global Civil Society: Suggestions for a Possible Islamic Perspective.” It argues that the contemporary Islamic belief ecosystem is facing an identity crisis since its encounter with modernity. The discourse of civil society, it is argued, may provide a solution to this crisis. The chapter masterfully challenges the old Orientalist cliché that “the structure of Islamic societies has not been amendable to the emergence of civil societies” (p. 227). It also demonstrates some local/traditional social associations as “the precursors to the modern institutions of civil society” (p. 228). The chapter also challenges dogmatic interpretations of Islam, which suggest that Islam and civil society are incompatible. It then briefly discuss the concept of “Islamic civil society,” arguing that only “some of the rational interpretations of Islam are amendable to the idea of civil society” (p. 233). Although the author acknowledges some practical difficulties in the making of an Islamic model of civil society, the chapter argues that a civil society in a Muslim context may carry an Islamic value system and it is therefore legitimate to speak of an “Islamic civil society.” While the author does not intend to essentialize the concept of civil society and rightly underlines the particularity/situational analysis of Muslim majority contexts, the very concept of “Islamic” civil society might lead to a conceptual confusion and some unintended consequences, ignoring the pluralism and neutrality of public space. One may suggest an alternative concept of civil society in Muslim majority contexts to preserve the rights of non-Muslims, non-believers, and even all kinds of marginalized and subaltern Muslims. The chapter, and the book, ends with hopeful notes about how an Islamic civil society may contribute to a global civil society and a siblinghood of humanity. A model in which Islamic sensitivities and universal values coexist.

Ali Paya’s Islam, Modernity and New Millennium: Themes from a Critical Rationalist Reading of Islam, in sum, is a high quality work of scholarship, uses extensive primary and authoritative secondary sources, raises important questions, and contributes to the current literature in critical Islamic studies. The writing style is clear and meets high academic standards. The book is relevant for students and scholars of Islamic studies, philosophy, political science, and Middle Eastern and Iranian studies. This presents timely and valuable research in the critical intellectual history of medieval, modern and contemporary Muslim contexts.