This book uses a historical sociological perspective to account for the resurgence of the radical Right in France. Departing from the voluminous literature on the European radical Right, which focuses monstly on the ascendance of the radical Right in past the few decades, Gabriel Goodliffe’s work examines French political development since the late nineteenth century.

The author links the resurgence of the radical Right with the historical trajectory of two socioeconomic groups: the petits indépendants (shopkeepers, artisans, etc.) and industrial workers. Dealing primarily with the former, the historical and sociological analysis documents how the modernization of the French economy led to the gradual erosion of the socioeconomic status and, ultimately, the political clout of these groups. Due to their cultural proclivity to an exclusionary or “closed” conception of the nation, these groups became—each at different times but generally during periods of acute social crisis—a potential reservoir of support for the radical Right.

The first chapter introduces this class-cultural theoretical framework and delineates the historical evolution of the radical Right. Goodliffe suggests that the radical Right had its greatest support in France in three periods, when conditions of political supply and demand converged: the late 1880s and 1890s, the 1920s and 1930s, and the 1980s to the present (p. 19). The second chapter examines factors of political supply, and the next six chapters examine how changes in the socioeconomic status of small business owners (Chapters 3 to 7) and industrial workers (Chapter 8) gave rise to political demand for radical Right appeals. Toward the end of the book, a comparison of the French case with those of Britain, Germany, and Italy is attempted.

The emphasis of The Resurgence of the Radical Right in France on the losers of modernization builds on earlier work on the subject. Whether due to postindustrialism or because of globalization, it has long been thought that those “left behind” by the advent of these socioeconomic processes constituted a reservoir of potential support for radical Right parties (e.g., Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 1994). Changes in the structure of the post-Fordist economy burden specific socioeconomic groups, like the petite bourgeois and industrial workers, who are more likely to be proselytized by radical right appeals (e.g., Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe, 1995, Chapter 1).

One of the main strengths of the book is that it brings together a wealth of historical information to document how the rationalization of the French economy has affected the petits indépendants and, in the past 20 years, industrial workers. Carefully analyzing repeated attempts at economic modernization and a vast array of economic policies implemented since the late nineteenth century, Goodliffe convincingly shows the erosion of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical position of small producers. He suggests, for example, that the postwar advent of a strong technocratic state limited the access of the petits indépendants to economic planning and policymaking (pp. 244–45), or that the Barre administration’s austerity program hit small producers the hardest (p. 261). In the case of industrial workers, the book shows—albeit in less detail—how the liberalization of the French economy in the mid-1980s “exacted a heavy socioeconomic toll on the French industrial workforce” (p. 287).

Another strength of the book is that it demonstrates how these two socioeconomic groups were culturally predisposed to identify with the political ideas of the radical Right. Adopting a “culturalist approach,” Goodliffe examines how socioeconomic experiences shape cultural subsystems and makes the case for bringing culture back “to the center of political analysis” (pp. 311–12). He shows how “certain groups in French society evolved antimodern and illiberal political cultures that facilitated their identification with the radical Right” (p. 16). The effect of political culture on the political predispositions of each group is quite varied or, arguably, somewhat contradictory. The book shows that since the nineteenth century, the petits indépendants developed a cultural system that laid emphasis on autonomy from the state and on the primacy of the family. Ultimately, this led to the repudiation of economic and social modernity. In the case of industrial workers, it was the deconstruction of their cultural subsystem that led to the identification with the radical Right. The erosion of class consciousness and working-class culture created a need for new forms of collective identification that the radical Right effectively provided.

The near exclusive focus on the petits indépendants and industrial workers is based on the understanding that these groups have lent more support to the French radical Right than others. The book provides evidence suggesting that the petits indépendants have been overrepresented among radical Right activists, members, and voters. It also shows the “proletarianization” of the National Front’s (FN) vote since the late 1980s (pp. 19–25). Both the literature and some of the evidence in the book suggest a more varied picture of the radical Right electorate. First, small agricultural producers and some service-sector employees can also be thought of as modernization losers but have not consistently supported the radical Right. Second, the percentage of petits indépendants who voted for the FN has ranged considerably, from 14 percent in 1986 to 31 percent in 1988 before dropping to 9 percent in 2007 (p. 25), suggesting more volatility in the electoral behavior of this group than historical sociological accounts would tend to allow. Third, even in 1988, when their support for the FN peaked, only a minority of the petits indépendants voted for the radical Right.

The emphasis the author places on the demand for radical Right appeals raises questions about the supply side of the electoral equation that future historical sociological work could try to answer. One such question relates to the timing of the radical Right resurgence. He does not make entirely clear why the industrial workers turned to the FN in the late 1980s and not much earlier, when the modernization of the French economy started taking a toll on their socioeconomic position, or why small producers defected to the radical Right in the mid-1980s and not a decade earlier, when the austerity policies of the center-right government was affecting them. Another question relates to the dynamics of partisan competition, on which much of the recent literature on the European radical Right has focused (e.g., Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 2007). Rich historical analysis might help explain why and how competitors to the radical Right are sometimes able but often unable to effectively combat its advance.

In summary, this is a book that should be read by those interested in the resurgence of the European radical Right and in French political development. It is based on a remarkable synthesis of historical information and raises important questions about the residue of radical Right ideas in French society. The persistence of the National Front in French electoral politics points to the value of the historical perspective offered by this work.