G.'s book is a valuable and stimulating contribution to Plotinian studies as it offers a detailed insight into the field of beauty, a central yet ambiguous concept in the Plotinian cosmos. This revised version of a doctoral thesis presents beauty as a central tenet of Plotinus’ cosmos that ranges from the level of sensible objects up to the level of the Good. G.'s approach combines a systematic view of Plotinus’ ideas on beauty with a commentator's eye on the train of thought in single treatises. The main chapters are devoted to single treatises, but G. does not present these entirely in historical order since he rightly claims that even though there is ‘development’, there is no ‘significant evolution’ in Plotinus’ thought and thus no need to treat various stages of Plotinus’ thought on beauty separately (pp. 2–4). Furthermore, he underlines that a successful approach to Plotinian thought should consider, on the one hand, the train of thought of single treatises, their specific methods and ‘perspective’ (p. 2); he remarks, for instance, that V.8 is addressed to a more advanced reader than I.6 (p. 51). On the other hand, he presents and analyses the underlying systematic background that connects the treatises; he also uses passages and ideas from other treatises wherever their ideas help readers understand particular concepts (p. 3), and he presents, in the last chapter, a systematic overview of the topic of beauty on various levels from the phenomenal world to the Good and beauty as such.
The book is comprised of an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The short introduction (Chapter 1) gives a brief overview of the topic on beauty and of the treatises presented in the following chapters. Chapter 2 addresses treatise I.6[1] On Beauty or, in other words, ‘Beauty as a Stepping Stone’ (chapter title) or the ‘bottom-up perspective’ (p. 6). The central focus is the anagogic quality of beauty, of phenomenal beauty and higher forms of beauty. Chapter 3 explores the second treatise on beauty (V.8[31] On Intellectual Beauty). This treatise, part of the so-called ‘great treatise’ against the Gnostics (pp. 39–43), addresses more advanced readers than I.6 (p. 51) and models the ‘Top-Down Perspective’ (p. 4). A strong focus of this chapter is the connection between Beauty and Being (pp. 68–70) and the issue of Beauty and the Good (pp. 72–5).
The result of the analysis of V.8 is ‘that beauty is primarily to be found in Intellect and that it is closely linked with unity in multiplicity’ (p. 8); this result impels G. to investigate questions of Intellect and unity in multiplicity with regards to two treatises not commonly read in the context of beauty. Chapter 4 turns to treatise VI.2[43] On the kinds of Being II and the relation between Beauty and the highest kind from Plato's Sophist. Chapter 5 focuses on treatise VI.6[34] On Number and the topic of unity, form and the Indefinite Dyad. The two chapters on VI.2 and VI.6 seem somehow foreign to the context of the book; they are less focused on the topic of beauty and rather deal with the related topics of unity, multiplicity and intellect.
Chapter 6 discusses the central, rich and varied ideas on beauty in treatise VI.7[38] How the Multitude of Forms Came into Being and on the Good. A main focus of this chapter is the relation between beauty and the Good. Chapter 7 provides a brief conclusion, which discusses beauty on the levels of the Sensibles, Soul, Intellect, the Good and Beauty as Such.
G. does not present readers with clear theses or hypotheses in the introduction, but there are at least two main topics that resurface in a number of chapters. The first is the complex issue of the relation between Beauty and the Good and the connection between Beauty and Intellect. Plotinus mostly situates beauty on the level of Intellect, but he also regularly speaks of Beauty in connection with the Good. At the end of Chapter 2 G. discusses in detail ‘confusing passages’ that seem to equate Beauty and Good (pp. 33–8). He concludes that the experience of Beauty is different from that of the Good because the former ‘is always mixed with pain’ whereas the Good ‘brings utter bliss’ (pp. 34–5) and that beauty is ‘identified primarily with Intellect’ (p. 36, cf. p. 37). A brief section at the end of Chapter 3 addresses chapter 12 of Treatise V.5[32], the third treatise of the ‘great treatise’, and its essential claims about the difference between the Good and Beauty. Plotinus writes that the Good is ‘gentle’ and ‘gracious’ whereas Beauty ‘brings wonder and terror and pleasure mingled with pain’ (V.5.12, 34–5; quoted on p. 74). Treatise VI.7, however, seems again to connect closely Beauty and the Good as several attributes such as ‘beauty above beauty’, the ‘all-beautiful’ or the ‘beauty which makes beauty’ show (quoted on p. 147). In Chapter 6 (esp. pp. 140–60) G. discusses such ‘contradictory assertions’ (p. 177), reiterates the claim that Beauty is mainly found on the level of Intellect, but also admits that there are ‘some characteristics of beauty that make it suitable to be used in the ascent to the Good, that reflect the Good in some way and that bring the notion of beauty so close to that of the Good that they may easily be confused with each other’ (p. 178) and that ‘the relationship between beauty and the Good is ambiguous’ (p. 179).
The second recurrent topic is the issue of the existence of a form of beauty. G. writes that Plotinus ‘clearly avoids talking about the existence of the form of beauty in I.6.2 and V.8.1, simply connecting beauty to the presence of a form’ (p. 93), that he, put simply, does not believe that there is a form of beauty (cf. esp. pp. 92–3, but also 21–4), but that beauty comes to beautiful things by a form, or even more correctly by soul or intellect, (p. 23) and that he ‘is not speaking properly’ when he speaks about such a form in the context of VI.6 (pp. 92–3). In Chapter 7 G. further develops the claim ‘that he does not in fact endorse the existence of a form of beauty’, but adds ‘that beauty is somehow special, that even if it were a form, it would not be simply one form among others’ (p. 171). To claim that there is no form of beauty would be bold for a Platonic philosopher, and it is, in my view, not at all clear whether Plotinus really goes down this un-Platonic road. But is certainly correct ‘that beauty is somehow special’, according to both Plato and Plotinus.
G.'s book is a scholarly monograph and not a broader introduction to Plotinus. It presupposes readers who know more than basic tenets of Plotinian thought. Readers with little knowledge of Plato, Neoplatonism and Plotinus’ thought will struggle to understand the intricate theories of beauty, of Soul, Intellect and the Good, of unity and multiplicity, the highest kinds, the indefinite dyad etc. For advanced readers of Plotinus this more restrained focus is an advantage as G. comes right to the point; no time is wasted on exposition or presentation of loosely connected topics. However, at times a little more exposition or explanation would be useful: (a) both introduction and conclusion are relatively short. The main thesis and topics should appear more prominently in the introduction (e.g. Is there a form of beauty? What is the relation of Beauty and the Good?) (b) At times G. provides helpful lists of topics (i.e. pp. 14–16 on the phenomenal field of beauty), but this reader would have liked a deeper analysis in addition to the list. (c) G. mentions (pp. 50–1) a central passage from treatise V.5 (pp. 2, 36–8), which speaks of beauty as drawing some souls away from the Good, but he does not discuss it in greater detail even though it is an essential passage for the topic of beauty and the Good. This is unexpected since G. spends far more time and pages on treatises VI.2 and VI.6 and thus on discussions about related topics of Intellect, Being and Number. The index is limited to citations of Plotinus and does not list other ancient sources, names or subjects.
