This book provides a lucid and detailed overview of Alvin Plantinga's contribution to Christian apologetics. Mascord sketches the intellectual context in which Plantinga operates and offers a critical discussion of Plantinga's negative and positive apologetics.
In chapters 7 and 8, which constitute the core of the book, Mascord offers a well-developed critique of Plantinga's theory of Christian belief formation. According to Plantinga, Christian belief is typically properly basic. In other words, when belief in God is formed, it is usually not based on other beliefs and epistemically proper in the way lots of other basic beliefs, such as perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs, are. In opposition to Plantinga, Mascord argues that belief that God exists, say, upon considering the beauty of nature, normally comes about by a quick inferential process (in Robert Audi's terms, a structurally inferential process). And, so he argues, the same is true of other Christian beliefs, such as the belief that God is speaking to me or that God is to be thanked and praised. Each of these beliefs issues from quick and often unconscious reasoning, for instance, by some sort of teleological argument, for example, I would not have the belief that God speaks to me if I were to disbelieve that God exists.
As it seems to me, Mascord is right that one's total system (or web) of beliefs can influence the epistemic status of one of the beliefs it contains. It does not follow from this, however, that none of those beliefs is properly basic. If I were to believe that there are no such things as cars, I would not believe that the car is in front of the house upon seeing it there. That other beliefs can function as (undercutting or rebutting) defeaters for some belief B, that there are defeaters for those defeaters, etc., does not entail that B itself is not properly basic. Perhaps what Mascord's discussion demonstrates is that we need more intricate distinctions between the ways beliefs relate to each other in their formation and maintenance. It might well be that the distinction between basic and non-basic is not as clear as one would prima facie think, or at least not sufficient to offer a satisfying account of belief formation. Another thing that we should notice is that Plantinga does not claim that all people's religious beliefs are necessarily or, as a matter of fact, properly basic. Some of those beliefs will be non-basic, others will be basic but not properly basic, etc. The only thing he claims is that belief in God is typically properly basic and the only thing he needs in order for Christian belief to be warranted is that belief in God can be properly basic.
In chapter 8 Mascord further develops his criticisms of Plantinga's account of Christian belief formation. According to Mascord, arguments are typically present and important in people's coming to hold Christian beliefs. He even claims that the New Testament supports the interpretation of Christian belief as typically non-basic. The author of John's gospel, for instance, brings forward seven different categories of witnesses and reports several miraculous signs, in order to persuade his readers of the gospel's truth. Mascord proposes what he calls the warranted trust model of Christian belief formation, in which not only the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit but also ordinary processes of inferential belief formation take centre stage. The Holy Spirit works at least partially through the ordinary workings of human epistemic faculties. This model is interpersonal and requires trust on the believer's part, trust partly based on evidence. Testimonial belief, so he argues, is not typically basic, since it is based on the belief that the testimony in question is reliable and that the testimony is plausible or at least does not contradict other background beliefs one holds, etc. It might be that theistic belief starts out as basic but, in the process of critical investigation, it will soon be based on evidence and arguments so that it will no longer count as basic. Also, it is often partly due to the explanatory power of the gospel that people come to believe in God. They often accept the gospel because it draws together different already existing beliefs. Thus it functions as some sort of inference to the best explanation.
Let me make a couple of comments on Mascord's criticism of Plantinga. First, I think we ought to distinguish clearly between a descriptive and a normative account of Christian faith. Plantinga is mostly concerned with the latter, although he offers some suggestions as to the former. He stresses, for example, that if belief in God were based on arguments, then it would most probably be uncertain and wavering over time. Mascord focuses on offering a convincing descriptive account of Christian belief. Second, I am inclined to think that most Christians are able to cite certain reasons or evidence for belief in God. It does not follow from this, however, that their belief in God is based on those reasons and evidence. Third, it is true that the gospels appeal to certain historical evidence and provide testimonies of different kinds, but it is not obvious how we should interpret the latter's function. Is this evidence provided to base one's belief on or to take away certain epistemic barriers in coming to believe? Fourth, many Christians come to believe on the basis of scripture's testimony, but many others do not. Many encounter God in liturgical practice, in nature, or in thinking about the person of Jesus Christ. Explicit inferential processes may, but need not at all, play a role in coming to believe in God.
Whether or not Mascord's warranted trust model is entirely convincing, his comments on Plantinga's account show that more philosophical reflection and perhaps even empirical investigation into people's religious belief formation is needed.
