During 1754 the Ohio valley witnessed skirmishes between the British and French colonial military. The following year, Britain sent out an expedition of regular soldiers commanded by General Braddock to wrest control of the territory from the French – this, despite the fact that the lands were populated by Native American tribes. The campaign was to be a preemptive strike before an official declaration of war, but the expedition did not go well. The resulting battle at the Monongahela and its legends continue to fascinate. In popular myth the story of the campaign is simplified: Braddock is a caricature of old Europe, his imperiousness highlighted by his disdain of American colonists and Indians. The campaign was a grueling march from Virginia into thick forest, slowed further by dragging heavy cannon and wagons over the mountains to destroy Fort Duquesne (present-day Pittsburgh), the French stronghold in the region. Braddock's army collapsed, outflanked by the agile French and their Indian allies just miles from the fort. The French and Indians took cover behind trees and poured fire into the dumbstruck redcoats. All the while the heroic, young George Washington urged Braddock to take to the trees and bring the fight to the enemy in the American way.

Despite numerous considerations of this campaign, Preston believes that the “British side of the 1755 campaign is in need of a complete retelling” (6). He cites the work of Paul Kopperman (Braddock at the Monongahela (1977)) as the foundation for his study, enhanced by newly discovered primary sources and, uniquely, “extensive personal fieldwork on the campaign's geography and terrain.” The book is structured over seven chapters, beginning with the origins of the war, a character study of Braddock and his troubles on arriving in America. It then details the logistics of moving both armies to Fort Duquesne. This section is the book's greatest strength. Preston's own experience of the routes travelled by both armies enlightens readers to the harsh realities of British road building over the Appalachians and French river navigation with the many portages south from Niagara. The book concludes with an account of the battle and its consequences.

By revealing the proceedings of negotiations at Fort Cumberland before the campaign, Preston demonstrates that Braddock was not a bigoted Indian-hater. Braddock provided generous gifts and attempted to reassure the tribes that their lands would be respected. However, Indian support for the British colonies had been waning for months before his arrival. There was little Braddock could do to regain support in the time before the campaign. Only eight Indians joined his expedition. The narrative of the campaign from the British point of view will be familiar to those who have read other works, albeit with old errors corrected along the way and with a superlative amount of detail. Preston's other aim for the book is to fully explore the French and Indian perspectives of the campaign. Chapter 5, “Beaujeu's Journey,” describes the preparation of the French commander in as much detail as possible, which has been hitherto overlooked. New information on Native American involvement is tantalizing, such as the reasons why Braddock received no support from the Cherokee and Catawba tribes. Even more interesting is a hint of a 1754 pan-tribal agreement, in which various groups came to Fort Duquesne in the spring to weigh up which side to back in the coming campaign. These glimpses do get a little squashed in amongst the Anglocentric perspective.

Once battle is joined on 9 July 1755, the narrative becomes less convincing. Statements are confusing and seemingly contradict earlier conclusions. The introduction claims that the Monongahela was “more Beaujeu's Victory than Braddock's Defeat, for in the end, the British general was outfought by a veteran Canadian officer and combat leader” (5), but the conclusion calls it a “distinctly Canadian victory” (292). However, during the battle itself, Preston credits “Native war parties” who “conducted their own battle parallel to that of their French allies, who were being quickly reduced to the status of auxiliaries.” The French could not “command in any meaningful sense” (236–37). Preston still treats Washington as a hero – he offered to counterattack the Indians with his Virginian regiment while confusion reigned in the British ranks – despite this story coming from Washington's memoirs years later. It could well be true, but Preston treats similar boasts of glory from French officers with more caution, while Washington goes unchallenged. Similarly, Preston reaches the conclusion Braddock witnessed his army saved by a rearguard action which “kill'd a great number” (259–60). The evidence for this is an anonymous, retrospective criticism of Braddock. A rearguard was not noted by the French, who lost less than twenty in the whole battle and whose accounts are not consulted here. They present a contrasting picture, describing the victory as a complete rout, and thought it “not worth following up.”Footnote ¹ Preston describes how the French judged that the experiment with “irregular warfare” had failed, following the defeat of Baron Dieskau at the Battle of Lake George just a few months after the victory at the Monongahela. The sources used to back up this opinion do not hold water and paint French commanders in the same way as the old caricatures of Braddock. Preston does not take into account of the amount of Indian diplomacy undertaken by Montcalm and his regular officers, despite cultural friction, in the coming years of the war.

For the British, Preston shows that Braddock's defeat brought divisions between provincial and metropolitan to the fore and contributed in a small way to the views of the British military years later during the Revolution – connections which have been made in earlier studies. A more tentative and interesting conclusion, that the Monongahela forged Indian alliances and provided war experience against future encounters with European armies, is worthy of much greater emphasis, which should initiate some further work. However, the conclusion that the French could have won or stalemated the war in America by looking to the example of the Monongahela is far-fetched for anyone who has studied the situation of New France in the 1750s. For readers wanting the newest information on the Braddock campaign this is an essential piece of work. The appendices contain detailed notes for the orders of battle and names of British and French officers. The newly discovered sources found by Preston are also transcribed and there are some excellent maps which place the campaign on the modern urban landscape of Pennsylvania. Braddock's Defeat is a comprehensive study of the Monongahela campaign which demonstrates the importance of studying logistics and local diplomacy during the Seven Years War in America.