Recent years have seen a revival of interest in the civil war period from the death of Caesar onwards, including a growing interest in evidence from the other side of the civil war (e.g. K. Welch, Magnus Pius [2012]; K. Morrell, J. Osgood & K. Welch [edd.], The Alternative Augustan Age [forthcoming]). This well-written and accessible book, containing eight chapters, an introduction and a conclusion, is part of this trend. This is not a book presenting new material and new approaches, but one that tries to understand how Brutus was perceived. The preface states that the book takes an integrated approach to the topic, combining biography with historiography and literary analyses (p. xi).
At the outset of Chapter 1, ‘Becoming Brutus’, the famous EID[ES] MAR[TIAE] coin is connected to Brutus’ and Cassius’ claim to have liberated Rome from the tyranny of Caesar (p. 16). We must remember, however, that even though we find versions of this used by Cicero (Phil. 3.5; Rep. 2.46), it also appears in Caesar (BCiv. 1.22.5) and Augustus (RG 1.1). Brutus was born into a period of civil war, his father being killed in factional fighting (pp. 20–4). The end goal of the young Roman – indeed of any Roman – was personal advancement and the continuation of the family name (p. 29). Opportunistic self-interest was a key determinant. On page 31 we are introduced to optimates and populares. The need for a different approach to factional politics would have been a welcome addition to the discussion (cf. H. Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic [2017], esp. pp. 112–23). Chapter 2, ‘Independent Operator’, focuses on the early political progress of Brutus, hampered by the domination of Pompeius and Caesar in the 50s and the outbreak of the civil war in 49 bce (p. 33). Chapter 3, ‘The Politics of War’, outlines the gradual tension between Pompeius and Caesar. Pompeius, or so it is argued, could at the outbreak of the civil war claim to represent the res publica (p. 58). We are witnessing the struggle between two dynasts and their followers. Brutus chose to side with Pompeius (p. 60), clearly ignoring his early and deeply problematic career. After the end of the civil war, Brutus was pardoned as part of Caesar's ‘programme of clementia’ (p. 63). Changing sides at the opportune moment could mean survival. Brutus in the end decided to dissociate himself from the lost cause of the ‘Pompeians’ (p. 75). The great difficulty is whether ‘Pompeians’ suggests followers of the dynast Pompeius Magnus or ‘republicans’, whatever that means. The concept of ‘dynasts’, as used by Cassius Dio (52.1.1 etc.), seems in many ways a good starting point, as it is central to the description of the period by one of our main sources (cf. App. B Civ. 2.17; 2.19). Dio (56.37.1, ‘Tiberius’ eulogy’) includes Brutus in a ‘list’ of dynasts.
Chapter 4, ‘Thinking About Tyrannicide’, focuses on post-(civil)war issues, including ‘instances of [Caesar's] behaviour that went against the grain of traditional sensibilities’ (p. 80). This, one might claim, was a defining feature of the Late Republic from Marius onwards. Brutus accepted appointments from the dictator (p. 92). Ultimately a conspiracy was the outcome (pp. 97–100). Chapter 5, ‘After the Assassination’, describes a Rome in panic and fear (pp. 106–10). On page 108 we are at the core of the story; Lepidus had a legion at his disposal, and the open question was: how would Antonius react to the crisis? By not confiscating Caesar's property and revoking his decrees the assassins let the ‘tactical advantage slip to the other side’ (p. 108). But the conspirators had no soldiers in or around Rome. At the same time the assassins had misread the sentiments of the people (p. 109), and Antonius and Lepidus had the support of Caesar's veterans (p. 112). This is, according to T., balanced by hope of military aid from Sextus Pompeius. This scenario is, however, highly questionable; Sextus made a deal with Lepidus in 44 bce to avoid civil war, and later at Misenum made a deal with the triumvirs. As regards Sextus’ operations in 42–40 bce, were he a dedicated ‘republican’, we might have expected positive action in support first of Brutus and Cassius and later of L. Antonius. The assassins could also rely on the provinces of Macedonia, Bithynia-Pontus and Syria as well as Decimus Brutus in Gaul (pp. 112–13), but, again, this fails to understand the military situation facing the assassins. Long-term strategy is fine (p. 113), but only if you survive. The ‘amateurish’ narrative thus stands. Their plan was to establish peace, and consequently they had not planned a coup d’état (p. 113). They would, however, have been hopelessly unprepared had Rome turned into a battleground. In the end the liberators left Rome (pp. 116–17) because they lacked the basic currency of the Late Republic: money and soldiers (certainly they had none close by).
Chapter 6, ‘Reviving Republicanism’, emphasises that Antonius failed to stick to the amnesty agreement (p. 145). He clearly did what he thought best for himself. T. rightly points out that the assassins had not shared a united vision of what was to happen after the assassination. What united them was the war against the triumvirs. In the end Brutus did not go to Crete, his designated province, but secured Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece (p. 147). This was civil war whether declared or not. Cicero decided to rely on Young Caesar (p. 156). The battle of Mutina follows. T. fails to emphasise just how strange the alliances were: Caesar's assassins and Caesar's heir were on the same side, this time opposing Antonius, with Caesar's veterans fighting on opposing sides. The focus had shifted towards a mutual enemy, an alliance against the strongest faction: Antonius (cf. Cass. Dio 45.14.1–3). The main issue with this part of the book is T.’s extreme reliance on Cicero as evidence, a man who manifestly failed to comprehend the political situation. The forming of an alliance between Lepidus and Antonius – surely unsurprising (contra pp. 163–5) – comes next, followed by Young Caesar's actions in Rome, including the lex Pedia (p. 169). Ideological alignments were rapidly restored. The triumvirate with its assignment of constituting the res publica, including the ending of the civil war (C.H. Lange, Res Publica Constituta [2009]), was hardly a ‘veiled ploy’ (p. 170; T. wrongly talks of restoring). Chapter 7, ‘Brutus’ Last Fight’, underlines that much of our evidence is the product of an ‘intense desire to make sense of it all’ (p. 174). T. then reproduces the old and mistaken idea that Augustus tried to bury the past (p. 175). Ending the civil war was part of the assignment of the triumvirs. T. is dissatisfied with the sentence ‘men who killed my father’ (RG 2), but none of the enemies are mentioned by name in the Res Gestae. Civil war, however, remains in focus: the ending of the civil war is prominently mentioned in Chapter 34.1 (cf. RG 3.1). On page 181 T. suggests – with Appian – that the liberators and self-professed defenders of the res publica were remembered for the ‘shocking and aggressive assault of the Greek East’. They may have been liberators in their own view, assassins in that of others, but they behaved as dynasts. They all did what they thought best for themselves, trying to survive and to win. The chapter ends with a comparison between Brutus and Antonius, underlining that it was Young Caesar who wanted the head of Brutus (pp. 208–9), ignoring that it was Antonius who wanted the head of Cicero. Nobody is sympathetic in civil war, and society is confronted by a general state of chaos. Chapter 8 focuses on the ‘Death and Legend’ of Brutus, followed by a conclusion. Brutus, according to T., wanted to avoid civil war at any cost (p. 236), but the fact remains that by killing Caesar he initiated another round of civil war. One question remains unanswered: why is this different from the other politically motivated murders of the Late Republic? T. has written a fine book about Brutus, focusing on Brutus the enigma (p. 237). The volume will undoubtedly be a standard reference point in the foreseeable future. It is, however, this reviewer's hope that this and similar books might be taken as a starting point for reflection on the categories we use to describe the political upheaval of the period.
