In Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems, Andrew Linklater combines the sociology of Norbert Elias with the “English School” of international relations to analyze the “civilizing” of inter-state relations. The book offers a broad comparative-historical analysis of norms governing the use of violence in international relations, covering ancient Greece, classical Rome, the Middle Ages, the Italian city states, European colonial empires, Early Modern Europe, and the contemporary period. As a cultural analysis of norms governing violence, Linklater skilfully draws on the views of influential intellectuals and officials who both exemplified and shaped norms governing violence in the international arena. At the same time, he offers a historical analysis that traces transformations in states and the international systems of states and highlights the interrelationships between norms and institutions. Elias’ footprint looms large in the book: Linklater begins every analytic chapter with a quote from Elias and clearly links the argument to Elias’ claims.

The main conclusion is that “civilized” domestic relations in Western Europe have increasingly shaped inter-state relations over the past half millennium. As part of his argument, Linklater describes the taming of great powers, the expansion of international society, growing cosmopolitan standards of restraint, and an increasing concern about global justice. Thus, while recognizing the reality of continued violence, he concludes that international relations have been influenced by the “civilizing process.”

There is much to praise about this book. Although such a broad and complex tour can be difficult to synthesize, the writing is clear, and Linklater reminds readers about the argument and explains the significance of each chapter’s findings. The analysis is very erudite, providing a history of the leading intellectuals in Western Europe over the past 2,500 years; the bibliography alone is some 70 pages long. The book is also thought-provoking, as it makes major claims about important historical social change and makes an important contribution by applying Elias’ influential work to international relations. Finally, Linklater does not avoid issues that seem to poke holes in his theory, reviewing how his theory stacks up against overseas colonialism, slavery, total war, and the Holocaust. And in addressing these issues, Linklater builds a more nuanced argument.

While agreeing with Linklater’s basic claim that norms against violence are increasingly present in international relations, the overall analysis is open to different criticisms. One is that the book at times seems to mould events to fit the favoured theory. For example, nuclear weapons are a major reason for less conflict between global powers, and Linklater considers the nuclear peace as part of the civilizing process (p. 440). Yet the threat of mutual destruction hardly seems based on norms of non-violence, and Linklater only discusses nuclear weapons in passing and does not support his claim with evidence. Similarly, there is little direct evidence on whether inter-state relations have become more peaceful. A more systematic analysis of deaths from international conflicts for both combatants and civilians—including transformations over time in terms of numbers and types of violence—would have provided a needed empirical base that the subsequent narrative could have built on to make a more convincing argument. Interestingly, Steven Pinker’s acclaimed The Better Angels of our Nature (2011) makes similar arguments, draws heavily on Elias, and offers evidence about trends in international violence, but Linklater does not mention the book.

Another criticism concerns Eurocentrism and potential bias. The book focuses on European state systems and—rightfully—notes the important role the region played in constructing the present global system of states. While recognizing some of the horrors of colonialism and the slave trade, Linklater ultimately focuses on how European colonialism helped to spread “civilized” values about violence to the rest of the world both through a civilizing mission and by sparking anti-colonial and anti-slavery movements. Although making some important points, this is an overly rosy portrayal. European colonialism was enormously violent in untold ways, and the ultimate aims of colonialism were power, status, and wealth. Yes, colonial powers (especially the French) did present their domination of foreign peoples and lands as an effort to spread civilization’s glories, but these were little more than empty declarations meant to legitimize the brutal reality that was colonialism. And Linklater’s one-sided focus on Europe overlooks the influence of Gandhi, Mandela, and other formerly colonized subjects who did much to influence international norms of non-violence; clearly this was not a unidirectional process, and the colonized helped to “civilize” the colonizers.

Last but not least, Linklater does not provide sufficient attention to the influence of nationalism and the nation-state on inter-state violence. Instead, he suggests that a human community is gradually emerging and—although not all powerful—is restraining both nationalism and international violence. While international cosmopolitanism is present and shapes discourses, nationalism and the nation-state are still the supreme rulers of the system of states and must be a focus of any study of the international-state system, especially works that try to downplay their importance. As Linklater himself notes (p. 429), Elias makes this point, concluding that “we feeling” in the form of nationalism prevents the civilizing process from expanding internationally. Elias described how the combination of powerful nationalism and sovereignty contributes to spiralling competition that promotes inter-state violence. Unfortunately, Linklater does not pay enough attention to nationalism to debunk Elias’ claims.

In the end, Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems lacks an empirical analysis sufficiently rigorous to convince skeptics, has common biases of civilization studies, and overlooks the continued hegemony of nationalism and the nation state. That being said, it would be difficult for Linklater to address these critiques because the book is already enormously ambitious. And this critique should not minimize the many strengths of the book: It provides an intriguing and well-researched analysis of the civilizing process in the international arena, raises important issues, brings Elias into international relations, and provides a new application of theory. For these reasons, it is an important read for all scholars interested in international norms, Norbert Elias, world society, and international conflict.