Soon after I left Ghana I found myself with another and much more difficult and challenging assignment in Africa. This was a mission to Uganda to sort out the differences between the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro before the country became independent in October 1962.
The first attempt to solve this problem was made by the Uganda Relationship Commission, chaired by Lord Munster, in 1961. Lord Munster was Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office when he was sent out by the Colonial Secretary, Mr MacLeod [sic],Footnote 579 to report on relationships between the peoples of Uganda. He was accompanied by two officials from the Colonial Office, Mr Marshall and Mr Wade.Footnote 580 He himself paid short visits to Uganda in 1960 and 1961 but went home sick in February, 1961, while remaining titular Chairman of the Commission. The Report was therefore made de facto by the two officials. Their recommendation about the so-called ‘lost counties of Bunyoro’ was to propose a referendum in the disputed areas as: – ‘this problem is in a class by itself. The 1959 Census shows a clear majority of Banyoro in two of the counties claimed, and of Baganda in the remaining area. The figures are thought to be reasonably accurate.’ These counties were lost to Bunyoro in the wars which preceded the pacification of the Protectorate and were incorporated in Buganda territory under the 1900 Uganda Agreement, to which the British Government was a signatory.
However no referendum was held and, since that time, there had been no less than five Petitions to the Secretary of State from the Omukama of Bunyoro between 1943 and 1954, claiming territory he had lost to Buganda. So the Prime Minister, Mr MacMillan, decided to appoint a Commission of Privy Counsellors to visit the country and report on the differences between the two Kingdoms, and thereafter recommend what action should be taken to remove these differences before independence. His concern was that: – ‘as independence comes nearer, the tension has been rising, and the Munster Commission … gave a warning that, with other areas tending to sympathise with Bunyoro, [the differences] might even lead to a civil war’.Footnote 581 We were given a free hand to find a solution by agreement between the parties, or, failing this, by an imposed settlement. We were appointed by the Prime Minister on December 20, 1961.
‘Having regard’, as our terms of reference began,
to the paramount need for the people of Uganda, including Buganda, to move together into independence in conditions which would ensure them peace and contentment, to investigate allegations of discrimination of the kind contained in the Omukama of Bunyoro's petition and grievances referred to in the Munster Report concerning areas in Buganda which are named below … to advise whether, and if so, what measures should be taken to deal with the situation.
The Commission was immunised against Party politics by including one Labour member, myself, as well as two Conservatives, Lord MolsonFootnote 582 and Lord Ward of Witley.Footnote 583 Lord Molson, as a Conservative and an ex-Minister, was Leader of the Party.
By a curious co-incidence I was already familiar with some of the troubles in Uganda. In 1953 the Buganda Parliament, called the Lukiko,Footnote 584 had demanded independence from the rest of Uganda. The Governor, Sir Andrew Cohen,Footnote 585 for many years the brains behind the Colonial Office, now in the field something of an old style paternal autocrat, promptly deposed the Kabaka, the King of Buganda;Footnote 586 and sent him into exile in the United Kingdom. He lived in London in far from regal style, and I asked him to lunch one day at the House of Lords. We had only reached the soup stage of our meal when the tears started falling into the soup bowl in front of him. I concluded that his undoubted sense of injury was genuine, but that of a rather weak character. My embarrassment was much enhanced when I saw, striding past my table, but fortunately without noticing my guest, the Governor himself, in the company of one of my colleagues. The Kabaka was allowed to return to his Kingdom two years later, but only on condition that he would become a constitutional monarch, taking no part in politics, and that Buganda would remain part of Uganda.
Now let me return to the actual business of the Molson Commission. Our purpose was to persuade the Kingdoms to settle their differences by agreement and, failing this, to recommend to Her Majesty's Government the terms of an equitable settlement it would then be obliged to impose before independence, while Uganda was still a Protectorate. We were keenly aware that the United Kingdom was responsible for averting the risk of serious disturbances or even a civil war after the country had become independent.
We arrived in Uganda on January 8, 1962 and spent most of January in Uganda, hearing evidence from the Kabaka, and the Omukama, each represented by Counsel. One of them was John Foster Q.C.,Footnote 587 an old friend and Fellow of All Souls, who had been attached to the Washington Embassy during the war. There was a very large number of witnesses. As we drove through the disputed areas it was rather amusing to see posters along the roadside with the biblical flavour of the injunction ‘Oh Lords Deliver Us!’
My short stay in Uganda was not confined to sessions of the Commissioners. We found time in the early morning to watch the processions of wild animals in the game park that came down to the drinking holes in one of the rivers at dawn. This was a special pleasure for me, as there had been little wildlife in Ghana, and apart from some bird watching in the vicinity of Accra, I saw almost no wild animals. In those days at any rate in Uganda, unlike Kenya, where the tourists from Nairobi had turned the game park into something more like a zoo, with lions lying by the roadside as the cars drove past, the game park was a place where you could still enjoy the wildlife of Africa unspoilt by European or American intruders.
I must not fail to put on record the unfailing kindness of the Governor, Sir Walter Coutts,Footnote 588 or the benefit we derived from his wide advice during the talks we had with him at Government House before and after our official duties. I shall never forget the beauty of the rugged countryside, the pleasure of working in a tropical climate tempered by its altitude, or the friendliness and helpfulness of the many Ugandans and Europeans we met as we travelled about the country.
We decided that the only way to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the dispute would be by a limited transfer of territory. We therefore recommended that the lost counties of Buyaga and Bugangazzi should be transferred to Bunyoro, but there should be no change in the status of the territory to the East of these counties, where the Bagandas were in a majority. The town of Mabende, where there was a predominantly Baganda population, should be administered by the central Government. The main reason for the transfer of territory was an overwhelming majority of Banyoro inhabitants. In Buyaga there were 33,000 Banyoro against 2,000 Bagandas. While in Bugangazzi there were 16,000 Banyoros against 2,000 Bagandas. We did not take a plebiscite because there had already been a recent count.
Our Report was signed and presented to the Prime Minister on March 2, 1962. I have never been able to understand why Mr MacMillan and the Cabinet, having asked us to recommend a solution of the problem, immediately refused to give it a reasonable chance of success. In June 1962 the then Colonial Secretary, Mr Maudling,Footnote 589 announced in the House of Commons that he had decided that there would be no immediate transfer of territory. In other words, Uganda would be left to decide after independence, which was exactly what we wanted to avoid. I agree with the views expressed by Mr Kirkman in his excellent book on ‘Unscrambling an Empire’Footnote 590 : –
The Cabinet decision to allow Mr Maudling to ignore the solemn recommendations of a Commission appointed by the British Prime Minister specifically to make recommendations, was an act of cynical irresponsibility, a gamble that came off but ought never to have been made.
The gamble came off, in spite of the pusillanimous indecision of the British Government, because of the statesmanship of Dr. OboteFootnote 591 after Uganda had become an independent country. In 1964 his Government put forward a Bill providing for a referendum in the lost counties in the same year, in which the vote went overwhelmingly to Bunyoro. He softened the blow for the Kabaka by making him Head of State of the new country of Uganda. Our Commission had at any rate pointed the way to what successive British regimes had failed to achieve, and left our African successor to bring about the agreed peaceful conclusion for which we had always hoped.
