The problem of choosing between the lesser of two evils is a familiar enough one that applies in many areas of life and, without much reflection, one might have thought that it covered much political debate and law reform. In plural democracies, a legislator acting out of religious conviction from a minority position will have to make unholy alliances and some compromises with his or her conscience in order to make any progress in enacting laws. These laws will be less than perfect; however, they may be better (or less bad) than they would otherwise have been – so the argument goes.

In this densely argued book, Colin Harte seeks to refute that conventional wisdom by examining the politics of abortion law reform over the last thirty years. His conclusion is that law-makers ought not to support restrictive abortion laws, that is, those laws that seek to restrict the availability of abortion, as an achievable alternative to the unachievable goal of absolute prohibition. Consequently, he argues that legislators should not vote for reforms that may save some lives by reducing but not eliminating abortion, since such laws in effect permit or tolerate abortion – something that is unjust. One area where they may be tempted to do so is in the case of children who may be born disabled – the ‘last and the least’ of the subtitle. This, he is fully aware, flies in the face of the received wisdom of the pro-life movement in many countries (including the UK and the US), that change on abortion can only be achieved incrementally.

The argument, it must be said, is by no means as straightforward as the sketch above suggests. It is a closely reasoned, step-by-step argument that takes issue with some of the most prominent natural law thinkers of the age – John Finnis, in particular. It involves minute dissection of the papal teaching in Evangelium vitae. The technique is certainly much more philosophically rigorous than much discussion concerning abortion reform and the approach to the ethical dilemma is potentially one of broader application (although Harte fails really to draw out these implications).

That said, this is a disappointing book. The writing is frequently turgid. Harte's close familiarity with abortion reform politics as a central figure in the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children turns out to be a drawback, since in many passages he is unable to resist re-fighting old battles. This would try the patience of the cognoscenti and for anyone (like this reviewer) not intimately acquainted with the campaigning history of abortion reform it makes the book unnecessarily heavy-going. The legal and philosophical argument suffers from too narrow a focus, with little awareness of the rich jurisprudential literature (especially on the nature of rights) relevant to its central themes. Those with a close interest in abortion reform may find Changing Unjust Laws Justly of interest but, unfortunately, it cannot be recommended more widely.