1. Introduction
Effective implementation of minority rights is a challenging set piece of post-conflict resolution. Few contexts illustrate this challenge as dramatically as the current situation in Kosovo. Even though the governments of Kosovo and Serbia have reached an agreement on the vexed issue of settling administrative power over Kosovo, significant lingering post-war tensions and delicate interethnic relations persist. While the 2013 First Agreement1 represents a significant and historical political compromise, it does not put an end to enmity between Kosovar and Serbian populations. However, opportunities for progress still remain and must be exploited. Both sides have a strong interest in European Union (EU) accession, and as a result the process leading to the agreement and continuing thereafter is driven by EU membership criteria. Given this context, and the possibilities for building coalitions between and within the minority communities themselves, the current obstacles to enforcement of minority rights and peaceful coexistence of the different groups should not be insurmountable.
This paper examines the impact of two transitions – the post-conflict period and EU dialogue and negotiations – on the Roma and other minority communities living in Kosovo. We argue that minority integration criteria, established for countries seeking EU membership, have yet to be translated into effective administrative mechanisms in Kosovo. At present, a system of extensive parallel administrative structures, especially evident in the field of education but in operation more broadly, militates against robust moves towards effective integration. Although highly endorsed by the international community through its substantial physical presence in Kosovo and through its energetic participation in ongoing international negotiations, real minority integration is not a priority for a Government largely preoccupied by governance scandals and economic challenges. The lackluster support for integration is clearly illustrated by the ongoing divisions, complex and multilayered, that continue to separate the various Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities living in Kosovo in this postwar era. These divisions not only hinder development of a common national agenda but also perpetuate the serious social and economic rights challenges facing the Roma community in this much contested Balkan territory.
Roma issues in Kosovo must be understood within a broader European social and political context, where respect for Roma rights is increasingly under serious threat. Most alarming is the dramatic and ongoing failure of EU institutions to effectively stem egregious anti-Roma violence in Hungary. However, evidence of anti-Roma sentiment is much more pervasive, a disturbing backdrop to economic troubles across the continent that peaks from time to time in extreme acts of xenophobia and discrimination. This paper uses the current situation in Kosovo, a post-conflict state in transition to greater European integration, as a lens for examining the troubling ineffectiveness of EU institutions in translating National Strategies for the Roma2 community into enduring results within Members States (MS). It investigates the opportunities for Roma civil society generated by the sizeable de facto international presence in Kosovo and by the fact that minority rights are a visible component of the international community’s agenda. We argue that the international presence has contributed towards some improved protections (against school segregation, for instance) and towards implementation of important infrastructure projects. However, national scale up of isolated projects and governance integration across the country is still sorely lacking. This deficiency reflects both EU wide bottlenecks in the coherent implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of minority policies as well as Kosovo specific problems inherent in minority community divisions and sectional interests. As a result, the potential impetus of EU accession is stymied by failures that impede the path towards a multicultural and rights respecting Kosovo society.
This paper follows a June 2013 investigative mission to Kosovo by the authors. The mission included visits to five Roma communities: the Plementina/Obelic and Gracanica districts in the Pristina area, the Roma Mahala (or settlement) in Mitrovica (a Serbian controlled area in the northern part of Kosovo), the Leposavic Roma camp in Serb-controlled Northern Mitrovica and Prizen in South Kosovo, close to the Albanian border. The research team also engaged with leaders of international organizations, diplomats, political officials, members of Kosovar civil society, scholars and independent experts.
2. The Post-war Settlement and Situation Prior to the Process of Negotiations with the EU
Kosovo is a multiethnic society with Kosovar Albanians, Serbians, Turks, Bosniaks, Croats, Kosovo Montenegrins, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians.3 Kosovar Albanians make up 92%4 of the total population, and the largest minority group is the Kosovar Serbians. Based on the 2011 census data, Kosovar Serbians constitute about 1.5% of the total population.5 However, the Serbian population in northern Kosovo boycotted the most recent census, so the actual figure of minority populations is probably higher. The Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian population together numbers only 35,784,6, 7 comprising about 2% of Kosovo’s total population. For complex political reasons, over the past several decades, those perceived as simply ‘Roma’ by the majority population have slowly defined themselves as members of three separate communities, namely Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. These three groups are now recognized as distinct communities by the Kosovo legislative framework, by Kosovo institutions, and by international organizations.8
Following the end of the NATO bombing in 1999, Serbians continued to operate political, social, and economic institutions in the Serbian-dominated areas of Kosovo, creating a system of parallel governance in Kosovo.Reference Van Der Borgh and Lassance9 This system of parallel Kosovo–Serbia administrative structures10 has complicated the political context in Kosovo for over a decade, and it continues to generate a series of political, social and economic challenges both from the perspective of democratic governance as well as for minority integration and well-being.
The decision to adopt parallel administrative structures has resulted in a challenging and strained environment with significant ongoing impacts for Kosovar citizens. The Serbian government in Belgrade continues to fund educational, economic, health, and social security services for Kosovo Serbians,Reference Fotiadis11 a legacy that perpetuates a system where Kosovo Serbians are both politically and financially dependent on Serbia.Reference Philips12, Reference Fotiadis13 However, for Kosovo Serbians living in the south of the country, among an overwhelmingly Albanian population and far from the substantial North Kosovo Serbian enclaves, engagement with some Kosovo institutions is inevitable.14
As a result of this complex legacy, in a small country of only 1,847,708 inhabitants15 (one of Europe’s smallest countries), even today, young Kosovar citizens lack an integrated educational or civic experience. Kosovar and Serbian schools operate in parallel within adjacent neighborhoods, barely, if ever, intersecting. Classes are conducted in different languages; schools use different curricula (including teaching significantly different histories), remunerate their teachers and staff at different rates, and observe different holidays. This bifurcated system severely limits the interactions between school children from Albanian Kosovar and Serbian backgrounds. It separates them into different school buildings, into different playgrounds, into different administrative units, and into different cultural spheres. The system hinders the ability of families to choose bilingual education or cultural diversity as elements in their children’s education.
The bifurcation of educational content and administration is not the only divisive factor in contemporary Kosovo. The post-war agreement established different mechanisms for proving the legal identity required to attend a particular schooling system. For the Serbian schools, Serbian identity documents are necessary in order for a child to enroll, documents that have to be issued by authorities in the Serbian enclaves scattered across the Kosovar territory.16 To this day, Serbian administrative offices are not routinely situated in all Kosovar municipal offices, and as a result are not easily accessible in many parts of the territory. However, this system only affects the Serbian speaking minority. By contrast, from the post-war period onwards, identity documents have not been required for children seeking enrollment in the Kosovar (Pristina-run) schools. Children in the Kosovar system do not have to prove legal identity prior to enrollment. Rather, they have a flexible period in which to submit necessary identity documents after school has started. In practice, families do not choose their children’s schools based on their pedagogical interests but on their ethnicity.
One consequence of the parallel administrative system just outlined is that minority members have little opportunity for academic or social integration into the best majority schools.
The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, divided by language and by their cultural traditions, have also been forced to choose between Serbian and Albanian schools on the basis of non-academic criteria. Because of enduring cultural and historical differences, the new generation among this, already fractured, community has little opportunity for integration as a cohesive and unified Roma constituency within the broader social framework. Rather, the political context perpetuating the existence of parallel institutions plays a significant role in maintaining educational deficiencies among children. The authors spent some time in Mitrovica, a city in the embattled and divided northern part of the country. Roma parents living in the Roma Mahala or community in this district emphasized the imperative of keeping their children enrolled in the Serbian school system. They explained that their children had never been part of Albanian speaking communities and therefore only knew how to read and write in Serbian. They recalled that Kosovar Albanians – perceiving them as supporters of the Serbian occupation forces – had forced them out of their homes in the south during the war. A Roma community member told us that within the majority, ‘we always swim in the water of discrimination.’ A young Roma father-to-be said, ‘I was educated in the Serbian system and of course my son will be too.’ But didn’t he want his son to be fluent in the majority language, we asked? ‘Yes, of course, and in Romani and English too,’ he responded.
3. Implications of the 2013 First Agreement on the Principles Governing Normalization
In April 2013, the Kosovar and Serbian Governments signed the First Agreement on the Principles Governing Normalization (First Agreement). The goal of this Agreement was twofold: to settle Kosovar administrative powers over Kosovar territory and to grant Serbs living in northern Kosovo some level of autonomy. The EU-facilitated dialogue produced a 15-point text, heavily focused on governance issues in Northern Kosovo. Bilateral relations are only addressed at one point of the Agreement: ‘neither party will block the other’s progress toward the EU.’ Following this agreement, the Serbian government has agreed to cede authority in northern Kosovo to Pristina and has implicitly recognized Kosovo as a state.Reference Prelec17 This First Agreement was intended to reduce and eventually end the tensions caused by the existing dual governance system, especially at the local level. Many observers however are not optimistic about the likely impact of the agreement. They are skeptical of something they consider a flimsy solution to a very complex political situation.
According to the agreement, an association of four Serbian-majority communities in northern Kosovo – North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic – would be created to administer health, education, urban planning, and economic development in Northern Kosovo. The Kosovo Police would integrate law enforcement in the region, but the regional police commander would be chosen by agreement between the communities.Reference Brajshori and Jovanovic18 Some argue that ‘this agreement further prevents the integration of the Serbian minority in Kosovo [society] by establishing a political, economic, and social space separate from the rest of the country. It’s an agreement that disintegrates the country.’Reference Brajshori and Jovanovic19 The First Agreement addresses the role of Serbia in the governance of Kosovo, but key issues regarding implementation and short-term impact are not adequately addressed. For example, the regulation of Kosovo Serb healthcare and education as well as Belgrade’s civil service in Kosovo needs much greater attention.Reference Deda and Qosaj-Mustafa20 The future employment and insurance of the 21,000 people who live in Kosovo but are paid by Belgrade is still unresolved.Reference Deda and Qosaj-Mustafa21 Parallel structures for education are not likely to disappear any time soon, perpetuating the fissures within the society, including within the minority communities. The Serbian schools will continue to teach in Serbian, using Serbian curricula and respecting Serbian schedules and public holidays, while the Albanian schools will likewise use their own teachers, curricula, and language.
The political context surrounding the launch of negotiations over the First Agreement was optimistic. Open negotiations on Serbia becoming a possible EU member as well as the possible Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the EU were important factors. It was hoped that ‘an agreement and normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina would open a European integration future for both. Failure to agree would set this back and freeze the process.’22 As a political step, the First Agreement was warmly and promptly welcomed by the EU: ‘Not only are we welcoming Croatia as a new member state, we have also agreed to open accession negotiations with Serbia and taken a key step in our relations with Kosovo … These last two decisions are an immediate result of the agreement Belgrade and Pristina reached last April.’Reference Vogel23 The Kosovar Government of course had a direct interest in opening a dialogue with the EU. Better human rights and minority inclusion standards were a key part of that process.
In the course of fashioning an acceptable set of EU negotiation policies, the Kosovar Government started to embrace strategies similar to those adopted by the post-communist EU East European countries (Romania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, in particular). On the one hand, human rights standards were established in their legislative frameworks and administrative practice; anti-discrimination laws and targeted minority policies were adopted and institutions overseeing minority interests were created. On the other hand, however, vigorous non-discrimination policies were not in reality on the agenda of the governing regimes in these States and have continued to be of marginal interest, more isolated statements of intent than seriously internalized mainstream public goals. How does the Kosovar Government compare to these precedents?
In 2004, Kosovo adopted its anti-discrimination law.24 Under this law, the Ombudsman is authorized to receive and investigate cases of discrimination. Although Kosovo’s Anti-Discrimination Law goes further than some European and international models in tackling discriminatory pressures, it ‘has been criticized for its lack of clarity concerning the bodies that will implement the law, the lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms and the lack of statistical data to monitor community representation.’25 In the course of their research, the authors received numerous reports from community leaders, NGOs and members of international organizations, concerning educational segregation, community hostility and employment discrimination towards the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities. Discussions with local advocates and experts revealed considerable hesitation to report discrimination for fear of aggressive reactions from extremist individuals or groups. Indeed, according to a 2011 report, the Kosovo Ombudsman’s office received only 18 complaints from Roma plaintiffs (details regarding the specifics of the Roma complaints are not provided).26 Interviewees spoke of a legacy of enduring fear and hostility towards the community on the part of Kosovar Albanians.
3.1. Post Conflict International and EU Engagement
The significant ongoing presence and involvement of the international community, including EU related bodies, has generated distinct local and national dynamics in Kosovo, with some positive spinoffs for the minority community. Official responses to complaints regarding educational segregation provide an example. In conversation with the authors, an NGO leader27 described three cases of educational segregation where Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian community organizations, with the support of international bodies, had lodged official complaints with the Ministry of Education. The result of these complaints was positive: the relevant schools were instructed to end the segregation and in due course minority children were indeed included into multiethnic classrooms. Contrast this response with the behavior of the Czech Republic in relation to the same issue some years earlier. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) demanded28 in 2007 that Czech institutions stop placing Romani children in special schools. In response to the European Court’s judgment, the Czech institutions changed the name of the special schools, renaming them ‘vocational schools’, but this turned out to be a purely formal move. The practice of educational discrimination and segregation still continues to this day.
Another example relates to public policy. In Kosovo, although the political environment continues to be insecure and often corrupt, there is evidence that the government is struggling to prove its human rights credentials and non-discrimination commitment to the EU. Kosovo’s anti-discrimination law signals the Government’s willingness to bring its legislation into conformity with the EU Race Directive.29 The law is currently being amended and expert international bodies, such as EULEX, are supporting efforts to establish the rule of law in Kosovo in accordance with European standards.30 However, as noted earlier, the paucity of Ombudsman complaints issued on discrimination grounds raises questions about the law’s effectiveness to date.
Other evidence of the gap between anti-discrimination policy and effective practice exists. The Kosovar Government adopted the Action Plan for the Republic of Kosovo for the Implementation of the Strategy for the Integration of Romani, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities, 2009–2015. The Strategy covers a wide variety of topics, including education, employment, returns and reintegration, political participation and representation, security, and justice. In the Strategy, the Government recognizes the existence of discrimination against Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians in Kosovo and commits to ‘ensure the effective implementation of its anti-discrimination legislation to combat racial and ethnic discrimination in all fields, including access to education, employment, housing, health and social services and citizenship.’31 The Strategy for the Integration of the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities in Kosovo and the related Action Plan present a promising legal, policy, and institutional framework for inclusion. In practice, however, there is inadequate public information about the Action Plan. Moreover, implementation tools are inadequate – clear instructions and budget allocations for the relevant authorities are lacking – and as a result the plan is being undermined, with insufficient employment of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians in public and private institutions.32 One of the first evaluations of the Strategy in 2011 stated that ‘implementation, both at the central and local level, lags behind the commitments set.’33 Some of the achievements pointed to by the Government were in fact implemented thanks to the efforts of the international community or local NGOs, suggesting a less than wholehearted government engagement with the program. A similar trend of limited results and manipulated reporting occurred in Romania and Bulgaria during the pre-accession period. Later in 2011, the European Commission Communication, ‘An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020’, stated that (as in Kosovo) ‘in spite of some progress achieved both in the Member States and at EU level over the past years, little has changed in the day-to-day situation of most of the Roma.’34
In theory, the economic and socio-political gains of EU membership for Kosovo could be huge. In exchange for a series of political undertakings, including a commitment to human rights standards, EU countries have received access to substantial economic opportunities and funds. In practice though, economic gains have trumped social advances. The cases of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are illustrative. These countries committed de jure to respect human rights standards and to implement policies aimed at reducing inequalities, but de facto both before and after the accession, many rights violations have occurred. State interventions to combat targeted anti-Roma violence, for instance, have been timid. At the same time, long-standing EU member states have developed anti-Roma policies, including most notably the Italian government proposal to fingerprint its Roma population, including children, in order to limit their freedom of movement. Yet, no EU measures have been taken in the face of these manifestly discriminatory initiatives. On the contrary, these Member States continue to benefit from the opportunities associated with EU membership. In the face of these developments, scholars and civil society organizations have rightly suggested that while the EU has time and again used its legal tools to enforce economic measures, it has not used comparable vigor to hold member states accountable for human rights violations or lack of implementation of inclusion policies for the benefit of marginalized groups. The EU’s infringement procedure35 has not been used to address anti-Roma rights violations, even though these are widely acknowledged. According to a 2012 Fundamental Rights Agency survey, 10% of the Roma population in the EU have been assaulted or threatened with violence.36
In Kosovo, the process leading towards eventual EU accession has just begun, but the lessons learned from other EU Members States are relevant. Careful consideration of past EU experience might help Kosovar civil society and Government representatives to take a different path, more politically challenging than one that ignores or tramples on minority interests, but with a more robust prospect of ensuring human rights protection and sustainable multi-ethnic stability in the long term. Drafting laws and policies that benefit the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian and other marginalized groups is an essential first step. Implementation is a critical second move, one that the Kosovar Government must vigorously embark upon if it is to make real progress towards these goals. As an expert commented: ‘Without fully functioning and democratic institutions supported by the rule of law and a functioning market economy, Kosovo cannot even pass the most basic tests required for consideration for EU candidacy... It is far more important to ensure that even basic levels of human and minority rights are in place…’Reference Ker-Lindsay and Economides37
4. The Plight of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in Kosovo
While Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities are technically afforded legal provisions for the protection and promotion of their interests, in practice they remain marginalized and are arguably still the most vulnerable communities in Kosovo. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians have little access to healthcare and education, they face enduring discrimination, and they live in the worst housing conditions in Kosovo.38
In late 1999, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set up temporary settlement camps in North Mitrovica for those who had fled the Roma Mahala in South Mitrovica after a wave of returning Kosovar Albanians accused this Roma community of supporting Serbia during the war and set fire to the Roma settlement. With one exception (a camp still in existence in Northern Mitrovica called Leposavic), the internally displaced Roma camps were located in the vicinity of the Trepca complex, a large mining site, known to be heavily contaminated with lead and other heavy metals left from decades of extractive activity. From 2000 to 2004, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) ignored the issue of lead contamination in this region, despite a 2000 report that provided recommendations on risk assessments and mitigation methods.39 In 2004, local and international Roma rights activities began to shed light on the lead contamination in these camps, documenting cases of children with black gums and with lead-related symptoms. From 2005 to 2008, according to Zoran Savich, a pediatrician with the Health Center of Kosovo Mitrovica, 77 people, including several children, died due to lead poisoning.40 Between 2007 and 2013, the camps were closed and families were resettled in the newly constructed homes in the Roma Mahala in Southern Mitrovica. However, lingering environmental issues still affect the health status of the local population, including the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians living in the UNHCR refugee camp in Leposavic in North Mitrovica.41
Environmental contamination is not the only serious human rights violation afflicting the Kosovar Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. After the war came to an end in late 1999, European countries started repatriating migrants forced out of Kosovo. From 1999–2007, around 51,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians have been ‘readmitted’ to Kosovo, and this figure will likely rise in the coming years.42 These repatriations have continued despite vigorous criticism of their inhuman impact on already vulnerable populations subjected to forced removal and routinely returned to states where they are unwelcome and lacking in familial or social support. This process strips already highly impoverished populations of basic human rights, both in their countries of refuge and upon re-entry to Kosovo. It is now clear that Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children of Kosovar parents born in EU countries and fully integrated into their German, Swedish, or French lives are being ‘returned’ with their families to their parents’ war-torn homelands despite vigorous protests. Careful reports document the tragedy of well-settled children, who could speak only German or French, forcibly removed from EU countries. These children are subsequently unable to enroll in school or to adapt to completely different circumstances, surrounded by incomprehensible peers, and degrading living conditions in Europe’s most impoverished slums and settlements.43
The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian population in Kosovo therefore distinguishes itself in several ways from the Roma population living in the rest of Europe. Relevant issues include their political refugee status, the devastating experience of deportation from Western Europe, including the tortuous return and reintegration process in Kosovo, the desperate economic situation that awaits them in Kosovo, and the dual pressures of political blame and racial discrimination that continue to intersect in the Kosovar Albanian–Serbian context. However, significant commonalities persist. Like other Roma communities in Europe, the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo have lower life expectancy, less access to jobs, and greater difficulty staying in school and reaching university-level education than their non-Roma peers.Reference Tmava and Beha44 These disturbing commonalities are striking across all Roma adults and school-going children in Europe.
4.1. Schooling
This paper has already noted the complex and divided administrative apparatus that still prevails in Kosovo, including in the educational system. Whether Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian children in Kosovo currently attend Serbian or Kosovar schools depends on various factors. These include the region where they live, their educational level, home language, and family history during the recent war. Some parents of school-going Roma children in Mitrovica explained to the authors that they were enrolling their children in the Serbian school system because this was the only language with which they were fully familiar. They acknowledged that this choice – enforced as they saw it – might reduce their children’s future competitiveness given the majority society’s exclusive use of Albanian.
Like Roma children in other European countries, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian children in Kosovo are placed at the back of the class, exhibit low school performance, and are recipients of low expectations by teachers and parents alike. Teachers demand less of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children and often promote them to the following class at the end of the academic year whether their performance justifies this or not. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian parents routinely lack the confidence and often the competence to supervise homework, to advocate on their children’s behalf, and to provide the motivation or support required for educational success. The devastating but pervasive result is widespread ‘push-out’ of young adolescents at the point of transition between primary and secondary school. A study from 2009 found that only 1.4% of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian children in Kosovo had attended or finished high school.Reference Tmava and Beha45 More than 90% of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian members left school early.46 While primary school is free in both the Kosovar and the Serbian systems, the cost of textbooks and transportation and the lack of information on scholarships create challenges for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians to access secondary school. The authors learnt that the Serbian administration provides stipends to families for each child (including Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian children) who attends Serbian school. These stipends provide an incentive for some families to keep their children enrolled in the Serbian system.
4.2. Gender and Health Specific Issues
Romani girls and women’s equal access to services remains a problem. According to Shpresa Agushi, Director of the Network of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Women's Organizations of Kosovo, a quarter of young Roma girls and women in Kosovo are illiterate, few succeed in finishing high school, and even fewer make it to university. Early marriage, poverty, and unemployment dramatically and disproportionally affect Romani girls and women compared with their non-Roma peers.
The political and economic instability of the country, the consequences of the recent war, and the poor educational system have a significant impact on the quality of health care available to the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian population. The fact that all medicines prescribed must be privately paid for aggravates the health care deficit. Vulnerable members of the community, including young children, girls and women needing reproductive health, and disabled and elderly members of the community, are at particular risk. The most significant factor driving health care scarcity is pervasive poverty fuelled by the dire employment situation: over 90%47 of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian population are unemployed. The health difficulties confronting recent returnees from the EU are amongst the most severe. Milena Tmava and Adem BehaReference Tmava and Beha48 describe the circumstances of a returnee from Germany with diabetes and two deaf and dumb children. Whereas these family members were guaranteed health care under German law, their access to services in Kosovo was severely curtailed by their inability to pay. Deportation in such circumstances raises significant human rights concerns, including whether the removal violates the European Convention on Human Rights prohibition on inhuman treatment and right to respect for one’s family and private life.49
Not all material circumstances concerning the Kosovar Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities are as grim as those just described. The authors found some examples of efficient interventions in the course of their investigations. In several Roma Serb communities, such as the Roma Mahala in Mitrovica, Plementina, and Gracanica, housing, education, and local employment measures addressing the needs of the minority community appeared to function reasonably well and in an integrated fashion. In Gracanica, for example, thanks to the support of a local NGO, the Balkan Sunflowers, the number of children (particularly girls) enrolled at primary school and high schools increased over a 14-year period.50 Further evidence of improved access to and interest in education is provided by the increased popularity of the Voice of Roma organization’s scholarships that support Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian high school and university students. Isak Skenderi, the director of Voice of Roma, explained that four years ago the organization was not able to find enough young people to fill 150 scholarships, but for the academic year of 2013–2014, they had a pool of 280 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian applicants.51
5. Political Sensitivities
EU negotiations and the presence of international organizations in Kosovo have created a potentially useful advocacy opportunity for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society organizations and community leaders. This is the right time for this constituency to advance an inclusive agenda, starting with a frank and well-informed conversation on the relative merits of common versus separate communities. At present, the impetus for a discussion of these critical issues in Kosovo is being driven by the international community. By contrast, the Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian communities remain fragmented, with poor communication between their leaders and a sense of enduring frustration and confusion over common goals following a contentious recent history. Describing the Roma community’s situation prior to and during the war, Shahira Gashi, a member of the Roma community in Obelic near Pristina whom the authors interviewed commented: ‘The Roma community in Kosovo were between two fires because they were … treated like Serbs by Albanians, and treated like Albanians by Serbs.’ The Kosovo Government’s decision to institutionalize the dual system after the conflict effectively imported into the territory the pre-existing borders and prolonged the divisions, enmities, and sufferings of the war.
Several leaders interviewed by the authors indicated a preference for a political separation of the three groups. This is a view mirrored by some academics, including Rubin Zemon, an Egyptian ethnologist, who speaks of the historical ethnic differences between the groups. He argues that the presence of Egyptians in the region predates the arrival of the Roma, and describes Kovoci (blacksmith) and Ashkali (coal-maker) craft and professional sub-groups names as Egyptian, not Roma. Zemon does not address the relation between Egyptian coal-makers and the Ashkali community, but he does connect the presence of the Kovoci blacksmith group in both Roma and Egyptian communities, with the rejection faced by Roma arriving in the Balkans. Zemon argues that in order to counter rejection, the Roma called themselves Egyptians (the name from which the term Gypsies derives), taking advantage of the similarity of their skin color to that of the Egyptians, already present in the region.Reference Zemon52 The English term Gypsy, which was used during the Middle Ages in Britain and other parts of Europe to describe the Roma, is associated with the assumption of Egyptian origins as well.53 Terms used for Roma in the Balkans were tiganksi or tigan, and the roots of these terms are traced back to Greek athinganoi (‘untouchable’).Reference Torado54 There is a need for in-depth analysis of the history of these groups, an enquiry that is beyond the scope of this paper. Although in the case of Egyptians there are academics and activists involved in research, we are not aware of comparable historical or archival work on the history and cultural heritage of the Ashkali community. The conflicting histories associated with the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities compound the unspoken tensions and questions in the struggle for identity in Kosovo.
Some Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society advocates and leaders attribute the fissiparous identity politics of the community to the struggle for survival after the war. They argue that Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian distinctions are a survival strategy against Kosovar Albanian or Serbian post-war hatred of the Roma community. During the war the participation of some Kosovar Roma in Serbian institutions and political structures contributed to resentment from Kosovar Albanians.55 Moreover, some Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians were coerced to perform jobs, such as grave-digging, and forced to join Serbian security forces.56 These activities would later serve as evidence that Roma were ‘Serbian collaborators,’ and were used to justify violence against Roma and Egyptians by Kosovo Albanians following the conflict. As a result, following the end of the war, many Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians faced violence and discrimination by ethnic Albanians and were killed in retribution. According to some Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian leaders, these violations pushed the Roma community into a strategy that involved rejecting their Roma identity. Being an Ashkali, for instance, is immediately associated with the Albanian language and therefore diminishes the risks of being perceived as a Serbian collaborator and being punished for that affiliation.
Some leaders would prefer a complete separation of the three groups at policy and project levels; others are disappointed by the lack of unity, blaming the war for what they consider unjustified separations. Clearly these issues have to be carefully discussed and resolved within the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. Delicate questions that still need to be addressed include whether the division is about an authentic re-construction of identities; whether these identities have to be built separately; and, most importantly perhaps, what can effectively bring the communities together in a mutually supportive grouping. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities and leaders will exercise their rights to self-identification or freedom of association by progressively engaging these questions. Some argue that the recent wounds of conflict make this conversation premature, with the likelihood that recriminations will still impair arguments. Others, however, are concerned that maintaining an artificial common agenda without genuine resolution of the issues slows down the overall advocacy process and related results.
Whether or not the time has arrived for a Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian group settlement, one might at least work towards the pragmatic goal of jointly advocating for minority communities’ fully fledged inclusion into Kosovo. In this connection it is significant that a new anti-discrimination law and a new national strategy for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian inclusion are currently being drafted. In addition, as already noted, the prospect of EU negotiations is likely to afford an opportunity for revising other laws and policies and drafting new ones. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian leaders, as well as the leaders of other minority groups in Kosovo, have a window of opportunity to discuss a common agenda that moves beyond North and South interests. They have a chance to take responsible advantage of the prospect of ongoing EU negotiations to prioritize the respect for human rights and the promotion of social inclusion of all their groups.
To date, Government and civil society dialogue in regard to the situation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians has been limited. There are few civil society actors, both among the minority communities and among the majority population, who publicly engage the situation of the three communities during and after the conflict.57 The absence of a strong Roma civil society, a very small educated Roma elite58 and, closely related to both these, the lack of an expansive vision of future possibilities and legal rights enforcement, are all relevant factors that account for this paucity of effective and visionary leadership and social mobilization and a general lack of knowledge about existing laws.
Despite this somewhat bleak overall picture, it is important not to overgeneralize. Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian civil society participation varies by region. In most of Kosovo, widespread marginalization and poor self-organization have led to limited engagement with civil society and institutional processes.59 As a result, in the majority of the country, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities are underrepresented in institutions and in influential circles governing educational, social, economic, or political life.60 By contrast, in the southern part of Kosovo, in and around the city of Prizen, the Roma community is on the whole well-integrated and participates in formal and informal inter-community activities. Here a strong and long-standing Roma presence has contributed to the community being well-known for its active cultural life and its friendly relations with Kosovar Albanians and other communities.61
With a Government tempted to follow other EU countries in ticking boxes to demonstrate its bona fides in regard to minority rights and policies, this would seem to be an opportune time for political mobilization by the Kosovar Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities. Ideally, civil society organizations and leaders will take advantage of moves to strengthen peace and the prospect of EU access to develop a Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian agenda that moves beyond North and South interests, and instead prioritize the urgent need for respect for the human rights of the whole community.
6. Reflections
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which entered into force in June 2008, Kosovo is a ‘multiethnic’ society where ‘all individuals are equal before the law and where the rights of communities are respected.’62 Yet political scientists such as John Mearsheimer remain skeptical: ‘Does anyone seriously believe that the Albanian Kosovars and the Serbs can live together after all the bloodletting that has taken place?’Reference Mearsheimer63
The reluctance to embrace multiculturalism at a policy level is evident in the ongoing separation of administrative systems across key areas of public service and protection. This bifurcated system has implications for Roma identity, both cultural and legal. The decision to persist with different education systems reflects the community’s skepticism about the protective capacities of the new inclusive order. But the dual system is not value neutral. It perpetuates different affiliations, loyalties, and attitudes. A national symbol that to one community is a sign of safety and reassurance evokes hostility and threat to another. Enduring separation of this sort prolongs the entrenchment of dichotomous identification and exacerbates the post-conflict challenges for the construction of the multicultural society that Kosovo aspires to be. It weakens the prospects of constructing a robust Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian collaboration capable of crafting a common minority rights agenda or developing a unified political voice in post-war Kosovo.
On a practical level, we are concerned about the impact on the next generation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Kosovars of maintaining the parallel education systems. As already noted, a lack of familiarity with Albanian, the national language and means of communication of the vast majority of the population, is likely to seriously impair Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian youth in their future employment prospects. While acknowledging that post-conflict wounds and hatreds take decades to heal, we nevertheless wonder whether adoption of bilingual education might be a reasonable solution for the Serbian-speaking Roma community. A policy shift along these lines would involve developments in terms of teacher trainings, manuals, and curricula, all of which could be considered in the context of the First Agreement implementation.
More generally, robust policies and projects to support Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian access to equal education are urgently needed. Learning Centers run by NGOs in Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities that offer community engagement, afterschool programming, aspirational mentoring, and imaginative leisure time programs for children have proven successful at lowering dropout rates and increasing enrollment rates at the kindergarten and primary education levels. At present, these services are limited and hamstrung by short-term funding, and barely feature in local, national, and regional policies. Yet much can be achieved by engaged local municipalities, especially if they collaborate with experienced NGOs in their area to implement these schemes on a longer term basis. Grassroots policies once proven can then be usefully scaled to regional and national level. Essentially, policies that have worked for disadvantaged sections of the majority community can be adapted for use in these communities, provided the political will and resources are available. For example, given the low participation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian adolescents, especially girls, in secondary and tertiary education (less than 1.4%),Reference Tmava and Beha64 scholarship and mentorship schemes designed specifically for these communities are an urgent priority both at local and national level.
Looking ahead more broadly, it is clear that development of respect for a culture of non-discrimination and human rights is an urgent work in progress. Formal norms and regulations, at national and local level, need to be debated, implemented, and monitored across communities to enhance a sense of confidence in the prospect of peaceful coexistence. Members of majority and minority communities need to develop the confidence to lodge complaints against discriminatory individuals or organizations and to rely on their public servants for equitable redress. In Kosovo, a post-war society where the majority population often still feels oppressed by the huge international presence and the shadow of Serbia, the populace may prove in fact to be more understanding and receptive towards the importance of the rule of law and implementation of human rights standards than in other regions. With enlightened and bold leadership, this might pave the way for both majority and minority communities to contribute to the development of a viable foundation for inclusive human rights for all citizens.
Glossary/Abbreviations
ECHR: European Court of Human Rights
EU: European Union; FRA
Fundamental Rights Agency
MS: Member State-
NGO: Non-Governmental/non-profit Organization
UN: United Nation
SAA: Stabilization and Association Agreement
The First Agreement: The 2013 First Agreement on the Principles Governing Normalization
UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Margareta Matache is a Roma rights activist from Romania. In 2012, she was awarded a Hauser Post-Doctoral Fellowship at the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights. She has worked on Roma and minorities issues since 1999. From 2005 to 2012, Dr Matache was the Executive Director of Romani CRISS, a leading Roma NGO based in Romania.
Jacqueline Bhabha is Director of Research at the FXB Center, Professor of the Practice of Health and Human Rights at the Harvard School of Public Health, the Jeremiah Smith Jr. Lecturer in Law at Harvard Law School, and a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School. From 1997 to 2001 she directed the Human Rights Program at the University of Chicago.
Carrie Bronsther was a Research Assistant with the FXB Center and Global Health Fellow at Weill Cornell Medical College in New York City. She received her BA degree in Government from Cornell University and was a Fulbright Scholar. She is currently a Program Officer at the Columbia Global Centers | South Asia.
