Criticism arising from disagreement is what advances debate, making scholarship progress. A critical review therefore should leave an author unperturbed—as long as it is honest and fair. Kioumars Ghereghlou's review of my book Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan is neither. Rather than engaging in a serious and substantive discussion of the book's content and argument, it offers a string of innuendo-filled swipes and tendentious statements reflecting a prickly type of modern identity politics. I thus feel compelled to respond.
Ghereghlou begins his review by insinuating that I condescendingly view Iran as a nation of megalomaniacs. This is an absurd suggestion, the distorted distillation of an assembly of quotes cobbled together from all over the book, lifted out of context. To say, as I do, that Iranians are—and see themselves as—the proud inheritors of a great civilization is not the same as proclaiming that they are megalomaniacs with a “myopic collective memory” with regard to the collapse of the Safavids in 1722. Yes, I should have spoken of “modern Iranians” as opposed to “Iranians” in my introduction. And I should have been more careful differentiating between scholars and the general public. Yet I stand by my opinion that, all too often, (modern) Iranians lay the blame for their nation's misfortunes on scheming foreigners, thus forfeiting a clear-eyed perspective on their country's history. And even Iranian scholars often look at that same history as a long sequence of perseverance and its reward, regeneration, in the face of loss and defeat suffered by a noble, culturally superior people at the hands of outside invaders eager to sap its wealth and destroy its culture—from Alexander and the Arabs to the Mongols and the Afghans and, in modern times, the British. It is this narrative that I sought to undermine in my book, by talking about rupture, regional variation, and internal conflict, not to denigrate Iranians but to offer a fresh analysis of the forces that brought down the remarkable empire that the Safavids oversaw.
My reviewer makes it sound as if I claim to be the first to offer a multifaceted explanation of that same fall. I do not. Many have gone before me, among them Iranians, as I point out, but most have emphasized the moral dimension. If it is true that until the late 19th century Iranian commentators have generally identified internal factors, modern Iranians have more than made up for this by emphasizing external forces. Also, Iʿtimad al-Saltana spoke of the complex reasons for the Safavid decline and fall 130 years before I did, but his main source, by his own admission, was the Polish Jesuit Judas Thaddeus Krusinski, whose eyewitness account of the siege and sack of Isfahan in 1722 was available to him since it had been translated into Persian decades before Iʿtimad al-Saltana penned his annalistic account.
Ghereghlou repeatedly puts words in my mouth by neglecting to differentiate between my opinions and the verdict of Westerners visiting Iran after the fall of the Safavids. The “seemed in need of Western tutelage,” for instance, reflects an imperialist mindset that I discern rather than share or endorse, and to conflate the two betrays either ignorance or bad faith. He also accuses me of portraying the demise of the Safavids as a phenomenon of a “civilizational, all-embracing magnitude,” and insists that my work reflects a “deeply biased reading of the declinist paradigm.” Even a superficial reader of Persia in Crisis would see that I do not subscribe to a “rise and fall” scenario based on a presumed golden age followed by a precipitous slide. I use the term “decline” for the Safavids self-consciously, for lack of an alternative term that might convey the indisputable weakening of their state. There are good reasons why the traditional decline theory has been discarded for the Ottomans, but such dismissal simply won't work for the Safavids. Instead, I problematize their “decline,” nuance it, and infuse it with new meaning. I do so by looking at their empire as inherently messy, unruly, and full of dissent and disruption, not just toward the end and not just between Makran and Qandahar, but near the gates of Isfahan. At the same time, I stress time and again that the economic and military weakening of the Safavid state coincided with much cultural efflorescence and even political initiative and entrepreneurial energy. The forces that brought down the Safavids, I contend, were a combination of underlying structural weaknesses (not civilizational ones, to be sure) and contingent factors. In his zeal to expose me as a colonial (neocolonial?) interpreter, Ghereghlou fails to consider how I construct my argument—how I present Safavid monetary policy and its constraints, discuss the issue of landed property, analyze tensions between the center and the periphery, and examine how the decision to pacify the Ottomans in 1639 fatally affected military readiness.
But instead of finally getting down to analyzing the book's content and argument, my reviewer next accuses me of handling the term Garmsirat carelessly and of failing to consider Qandahar. It should be clear to any reader that, by Garmsirat, “hot lands,” I really mean the Persian Gulf littoral, which, I maintain, was never really integrated into the regimes of the plateau, from the fall of the Sasanians until the early 20th century, modern Iranian sensitivities about the region's integral role in the nation's history notwithstanding. Nor do I think I “overgeneralize the perceived importance of the political north.” I pay ample attention to Kerman and Bandar Abbas, two southern towns and regions for which we have adequate source material. And I do not then go on to focus my attention on early modern Iran's “administrative bankruptcy” and “backwardness”—two terms used, not by me but by Europeans who visited the country in the early 1800s. Safavid Iran was structurally weak, yes, and relatively harder to manage than the adjacent states, mostly for the economic and environmental reasons that are at the heart of my analysis. All this griping, it seems to me, says more about modern Iranian touchiness than about the reality of early empires—all early modern empires—ruled by elites with deficient control mechanisms at their disposal.
My reviewer's next point, that my treatment of the Qizilbash and the ghulāms reduces their differences to ethnic conflict, is demonstrably false. The meaning and relevance of his statement that the ghulām system was “all-inclusive and aimed to function primarily as a conduit for upward career mobility” in this context frankly elude me. Insinuating that I did not use Persian-language sources, he further chides me for not paying attention to a multivolume collection of waqf documents published in 2009. This collection is not listed among the more than sixty primary Persian-language sources in my bibliography because it escaped my attention. Do I have to respond to the canard about Safavid archives? Where are the Safavid archives? As for religious endowments, waqf deeds are about intent, not outcome. Beyond showing an increase in outward religiosity, the proliferation of religious endowments in the late 17th century might actually corroborate my conclusions about the dissipation of (productive) wealth.
Where, finally, do I imply that trade conducted by European “colonialists”—a telling yet wholly anachronistic term here—had a “soothing and civilizing impact” on Iran? This seriously misrepresents my actual words, as well as my intent. If Ghereghlou means that, at times, oppressed merchants turned to anyone, including foreigners, who might protect them from rapacious governors by interceding on their behalf, this represents the documented truth, yet says nothing about the “civilizing influence” of European merchants. The Dutch and the English were in Iran exclusively to make money, not to “soothe” or “civilize” anyone.
Ghereghlou's conclusion—that, in spite of it all, Persia in Crisis is an “essential addition to secondary literature on social and political history of early modern Iran”—is just disingenuous. There's nothing in the review that appears to warrant the label “essential addition.” One expects a more dignified assessment of one's prize-winning work from a serious scholar.
Criticism arising from disagreement is what advances debate, making scholarship progress. A critical review therefore should leave an author unperturbed—as long as it is honest and fair. Kioumars Ghereghlou's review of my book Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan is neither. Rather than engaging in a serious and substantive discussion of the book's content and argument, it offers a string of innuendo-filled swipes and tendentious statements reflecting a prickly type of modern identity politics. I thus feel compelled to respond.
Ghereghlou begins his review by insinuating that I condescendingly view Iran as a nation of megalomaniacs. This is an absurd suggestion, the distorted distillation of an assembly of quotes cobbled together from all over the book, lifted out of context. To say, as I do, that Iranians are—and see themselves as—the proud inheritors of a great civilization is not the same as proclaiming that they are megalomaniacs with a “myopic collective memory” with regard to the collapse of the Safavids in 1722. Yes, I should have spoken of “modern Iranians” as opposed to “Iranians” in my introduction. And I should have been more careful differentiating between scholars and the general public. Yet I stand by my opinion that, all too often, (modern) Iranians lay the blame for their nation's misfortunes on scheming foreigners, thus forfeiting a clear-eyed perspective on their country's history. And even Iranian scholars often look at that same history as a long sequence of perseverance and its reward, regeneration, in the face of loss and defeat suffered by a noble, culturally superior people at the hands of outside invaders eager to sap its wealth and destroy its culture—from Alexander and the Arabs to the Mongols and the Afghans and, in modern times, the British. It is this narrative that I sought to undermine in my book, by talking about rupture, regional variation, and internal conflict, not to denigrate Iranians but to offer a fresh analysis of the forces that brought down the remarkable empire that the Safavids oversaw.
My reviewer makes it sound as if I claim to be the first to offer a multifaceted explanation of that same fall. I do not. Many have gone before me, among them Iranians, as I point out, but most have emphasized the moral dimension. If it is true that until the late 19th century Iranian commentators have generally identified internal factors, modern Iranians have more than made up for this by emphasizing external forces. Also, Iʿtimad al-Saltana spoke of the complex reasons for the Safavid decline and fall 130 years before I did, but his main source, by his own admission, was the Polish Jesuit Judas Thaddeus Krusinski, whose eyewitness account of the siege and sack of Isfahan in 1722 was available to him since it had been translated into Persian decades before Iʿtimad al-Saltana penned his annalistic account.
Ghereghlou repeatedly puts words in my mouth by neglecting to differentiate between my opinions and the verdict of Westerners visiting Iran after the fall of the Safavids. The “seemed in need of Western tutelage,” for instance, reflects an imperialist mindset that I discern rather than share or endorse, and to conflate the two betrays either ignorance or bad faith. He also accuses me of portraying the demise of the Safavids as a phenomenon of a “civilizational, all-embracing magnitude,” and insists that my work reflects a “deeply biased reading of the declinist paradigm.” Even a superficial reader of Persia in Crisis would see that I do not subscribe to a “rise and fall” scenario based on a presumed golden age followed by a precipitous slide. I use the term “decline” for the Safavids self-consciously, for lack of an alternative term that might convey the indisputable weakening of their state. There are good reasons why the traditional decline theory has been discarded for the Ottomans, but such dismissal simply won't work for the Safavids. Instead, I problematize their “decline,” nuance it, and infuse it with new meaning. I do so by looking at their empire as inherently messy, unruly, and full of dissent and disruption, not just toward the end and not just between Makran and Qandahar, but near the gates of Isfahan. At the same time, I stress time and again that the economic and military weakening of the Safavid state coincided with much cultural efflorescence and even political initiative and entrepreneurial energy. The forces that brought down the Safavids, I contend, were a combination of underlying structural weaknesses (not civilizational ones, to be sure) and contingent factors. In his zeal to expose me as a colonial (neocolonial?) interpreter, Ghereghlou fails to consider how I construct my argument—how I present Safavid monetary policy and its constraints, discuss the issue of landed property, analyze tensions between the center and the periphery, and examine how the decision to pacify the Ottomans in 1639 fatally affected military readiness.
But instead of finally getting down to analyzing the book's content and argument, my reviewer next accuses me of handling the term Garmsirat carelessly and of failing to consider Qandahar. It should be clear to any reader that, by Garmsirat, “hot lands,” I really mean the Persian Gulf littoral, which, I maintain, was never really integrated into the regimes of the plateau, from the fall of the Sasanians until the early 20th century, modern Iranian sensitivities about the region's integral role in the nation's history notwithstanding. Nor do I think I “overgeneralize the perceived importance of the political north.” I pay ample attention to Kerman and Bandar Abbas, two southern towns and regions for which we have adequate source material. And I do not then go on to focus my attention on early modern Iran's “administrative bankruptcy” and “backwardness”—two terms used, not by me but by Europeans who visited the country in the early 1800s. Safavid Iran was structurally weak, yes, and relatively harder to manage than the adjacent states, mostly for the economic and environmental reasons that are at the heart of my analysis. All this griping, it seems to me, says more about modern Iranian touchiness than about the reality of early empires—all early modern empires—ruled by elites with deficient control mechanisms at their disposal.
My reviewer's next point, that my treatment of the Qizilbash and the ghulāms reduces their differences to ethnic conflict, is demonstrably false. The meaning and relevance of his statement that the ghulām system was “all-inclusive and aimed to function primarily as a conduit for upward career mobility” in this context frankly elude me. Insinuating that I did not use Persian-language sources, he further chides me for not paying attention to a multivolume collection of waqf documents published in 2009. This collection is not listed among the more than sixty primary Persian-language sources in my bibliography because it escaped my attention. Do I have to respond to the canard about Safavid archives? Where are the Safavid archives? As for religious endowments, waqf deeds are about intent, not outcome. Beyond showing an increase in outward religiosity, the proliferation of religious endowments in the late 17th century might actually corroborate my conclusions about the dissipation of (productive) wealth.
Where, finally, do I imply that trade conducted by European “colonialists”—a telling yet wholly anachronistic term here—had a “soothing and civilizing impact” on Iran? This seriously misrepresents my actual words, as well as my intent. If Ghereghlou means that, at times, oppressed merchants turned to anyone, including foreigners, who might protect them from rapacious governors by interceding on their behalf, this represents the documented truth, yet says nothing about the “civilizing influence” of European merchants. The Dutch and the English were in Iran exclusively to make money, not to “soothe” or “civilize” anyone.
Ghereghlou's conclusion—that, in spite of it all, Persia in Crisis is an “essential addition to secondary literature on social and political history of early modern Iran”—is just disingenuous. There's nothing in the review that appears to warrant the label “essential addition.” One expects a more dignified assessment of one's prize-winning work from a serious scholar.