For the rational study of the law the blackletter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 1897In the late 1990s, a symposium in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) took stock of the dramatic challenges faced by economists as expert witnesses in the courts. Robert Thornton and John Ward, two founding contributors to the development and professionalization of the field of forensic economics, briefly recalled the explosion of tort litigations starting in the 1970s and the dramatic increase of economists witnessing as experts in the three major areas of anti-trust, employment discrimination litigations, and damages calculus. Based on a survey of practitioners, their paper listed the main challenges faced by forensic economists: conflicts of interests, ethical issues, and incompetence of judges and/or of experts. Having established forensic economics as an academic field since the late 1980s, they nevertheless drew a reassuring image of the field, even when its practices could still be improved.
In a short contribution to the JEP symposium, Judge Richard Posner focused on the reforms of the rules of expert witnessing necessary to enhance efficiency, which Posner conceived as the unbiased use of economic knowledge in court. While he recognized the problem that expert witnesses could serve as “hired guns,” Posner emphasized that market incentives, reputation effects, and intense cross-examination—more intense, in fact, than common in academic peer reviews—kept the quacks out of the courts. However, Posner conceded that economic expertise was most problematic “in the areas of economics in which there is no professional consensus” (Posner Reference Posner1999, p. 96). Even “respectable economists” could become either “hawk” or “dove” in the adversarial setting. The contribution by Business Week’s economics editor Michael J. Mantel enforced this sense that economists’ scientific practices face massive and multiple challenges in courts when tremendous amounts of money are at stake.
The issues raised in the JEP symposium—explosion of litigations, need for reform of expert selection, the challenges to the neutrality of science, conflicts of interests, and conflicting expert testimonies—were all but new challenges. The credibility of the actors involved—the supposedly low epistemic competence of the judges, the greed of consultants, the plotting lawyers, and the short-sided and partisan federal agencies—seems a constant in the history of expert witnessing in court. The battle of experts with its consequence for science, the legal system, and society has been raging since at least the eighteenth century. It is part of a larger transformation of the legal system that legal historians have labeled the “adversarial revolution” (Golan Reference Golan1999). Although first raised in the context of English courtroom, “it was in America that the problem of expert testimony reached its fullest expression” where “the putative problem of scientific expert testimony has been chronic for over two centuries” (Golan Reference Golan2008, p. 881). The history of expert witnessing is a story on the continuous reform to improve the standards of admissibility of expert witness testimony (Mnookin Reference Mnookin2007). In the second half of the twentieth century, the arena of expertise in court underwent a clear shift from the scrutiny of the experts’ credentials to the scrutiny of the methods used (Haack Reference Haack2015).
This symposium explores how issues about methods of economic research translate from economics to the courts. The contributions focus on the United States context since the 1970s. The articles offer a narrative of the evolution of economic ideas on and in the courts at the interface of legal history, the history of recent economics, and the history of expertise. The focus is on the interrelation of changing assessments of economic theory, production of evidence, and methods in the US courts from the 1970s onwards.
The two first contributions focus on major domains of economic expertise in the courts: anti-trust and employment discrimination. The last contribution shows how judicial decisions became theorized in economic terms, after two decades of encounters between economists and the court system, sometimes personified by a single person, viz. the career of Richard Posner.
Nicola Giocoli’s paper deals with a change in criteria for the admissibility of expert evidence in US courts after the Daubert decisions in the early 1990s. Daubert changed admissibility criteria of evidence from “generally accepted” within a scientific community (the earlier Frye rule) to “relevant,” “reliable,” and “testable.” Giocoli argues that such a Popperian vision of science may work well for some scientific fields but produced unintended consequences when applied to the evidence of expert witnesses in the social sciences, including economics. Zooming in on antitrust law, the paper shows how the Daubert criteria (and their interpretation) produced a systematic asymmetry between plaintiff and defendant, in which the inherently theoretical nature of expert witness testimony in antitrust cases can be easily put into question on general (methodological) grounds. An unintended consequence of the Daubert rules thus was that the Chicago approach in antitrust cases, while overhauled in the academic domain by game-theoretic-informed approaches, remained the fallback option in litigation cases, implying non-intervention in cases where peer-reviewed economic consensus would go the other way.
The second paper further explores the important role of methods of research in court settings. I examine how economists functioned as expert witnesses in employment discrimination cases from the early 1970s until 1991. Multiple regression analysis, introduced in the early 1970s in the production of evidence, became increasingly used in the 1980s. Investigating Federal Court decisions, the paper shows how in this pre-Daubert world, expert evidence produced by economists was at first skeptically received even though the method was not rejected. In the 1980s, the tools of human capital theory were progressively introduced in the “judicial tool kit”—while academic controversies spilled over to the court. The paper follows in detail how economic and legal discourse interacted in court and questions one of the tenets of economists: that judges simply just “don’t understand.”
Alain Marciano, Alessandro Melcarne, and Giovanni B. Ramello step back from histories of the use of economic methods and theories in court to investigate the history of the economic analysis of judicial decision making. They reconstruct the history of Richard Posner’s famous “What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?” (1993). Their narrative goes back to the early 1970s and to the original purpose of the economic analysis of law. They trace the influence of Gary Becker on Posner and the works of Becker’s students in the early 1970s. Posner’s message was that in a legal context, the optimizing behavior of judges also led to efficient outcomes for the legal system as a whole. Posner’s paper was published the same year as the Daubert ruling; it highlights the essential tension between theory on courts’ practices, especially market incentives, and concrete practices.
We would like to extract the following tentative lessons from this symposium. First, the enactment of legislation and the evolution of evidentiary rules (from the Frye standard to the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence to the 1993 Daubert decision) played a crucial role in shaping the demand for and type of economic expertise in the courts. We can distinguish two different movements: a growing use and scrutiny of evidence and methods from economics from the early 1970s until the early 1990s, and a somewhat more complex situation after Daubert.
Second, the development of economic expertise in and on the courts is closely related to the transformation of economics since the 1970s in what has recently been labeled the “applied age” (Backhouse and Cherrier Reference Backhouse and Cherrier2017) and especially related to the rise of micro-econometrics and quasi-experimental methods in the production of scientific evidence.
Third, while the papers show the importance of economic theories and methods, it must be underlined that narratives about the implication of economic expertise in court are more complex than easy narratives of success or failure. According to Posner, economics was increasingly applied in court since the 1970s because of its power on the market for ideas. This celebration of the value added of economic knowledge to juridical decision making echoes the economists’ self-image identified by Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan (Reference Fourcade, Ollion and Algan2015). The present contributions show that this image does not hold water in practice. There is not a linear history of unchallenged economic expertise conquering the courts and taking over other forms of expertise. The decisions of judges were less the result of expert input as they were the result of the conflicting interests among the various stakeholders involved.
