When do we judge a revolution? At the moment of liberation, when one regime is toppled? With the foundation of the first new government, so often a hopeful but unstable effort? During the period when the former opposition consolidates its new role as state authority with the tempting monopoly of state force? A generation later, when a new leadership and often a new regime have usurped the leadership role? During a period of reaction, or a period of renewal? After a week, a month, a year, one generation or several, or centuries? These are not idle questions for the student of revolution, as distinct from anticolonial liberation movements (no matter how inspiring or disappointing, whether American or Algerian) or political coups or popular overthrows of government, no matter how violent or benign. Revolutions, social and political movements that cohere a national population and challenge both the state and the naturalized order of society, do not happen often, and they are significant far beyond their national borders. Can we now judge the French Revolution a success or the Russian a failure? At what point did they definitively succeed or fail? At what point did we decide that we could adequately judge?
These questions are inextricable from Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson's new book on Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. The authors take it as a given that the Iranian Revolution was not only a failure but a disaster, and they, therefore, are appalled that Michel Foucault wrote excitedly about it while it occurred, during 1978 and early 1979. The book is basically organized into two sections: the authors' interpretive writings on Foucault's work and an appendix that includes the first English-language collection of Foucault's writings on the Iranian Revolution, along with a selection of his contemporary interlocutors and critics. For this appendix alone, the book is invaluable. Most of Foucault's observations on events in Iran were originally published in the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera and have been available in French in the collection Dits et Écrits, Vol. III, 1976–79 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994). However, this is the first effort to make them widely available in English.
Written as short, journalistic accounts of immediate events, the articles have a freshness and urgency that remains fascinating. Foucault himself believed he was observing the concrete manifestation of the “political myth” of revolutionary “collective will,” and he acknowledges that it is a shocking experience. “I thought that the collective will was like God, like the soul, something one would never encounter … Well, you have to salute it; it doesn't happen every day” (p. 253). Foucault is overgeneralizing; even in 1978, there was factionalism and dissidence within the Iranian revolutionary movement. He has a point, though. Like the French and Russian Revolutions, the Iranian Revolution made manifest the success of a new radical ideology in forging national consensus to uproot an internal regime while challenging the existing social order. Like those other two great, tragic revolutions, the Iranian Revolution made widely relevant the hope and threat of its radical ideology, in this case political Islam. If the Iranian Revolution was doomed to fail its utopian promise, it also provided for a new form of revolutionary possibility. In this sense, events in Iran were fundamentally different from events in Nicaragua or Poland, the two national examples with which Afary and Anderson wish to make comparison. Foucault was right: the brief utopian incandescence of a new revolutionary movement does not happen every day.
Revolutions are miserable to live through, particularly once the glorious moment of popular liberation has been achieved and the revolutionaries must set themselves the task of both consolidating and dividing state power. This is Hannah Arendt's theory of revolution: that the successful revolution must encompass both liberation and foundation and that foundation is actually the more difficult project. A social and political revolution must reconstitute effective governmental structures and social values, and the most dangerous temptation is always toward the limitless proof of pure revolutionary zeal. Thanks to Arendt's analysis, we can recognize Foucault's enthusiasm for the liberationist potential of the first stage of the Iranian Revolution during 1978 and also identify the extent to which the darkening tone of his writings during 1979 coincides with the failures of the second, state-founding stage, when the national coherence of the collective will began to give way to authoritarian internal repression sponsored by a faction of the clerical elite.
In their own analytical essays (which make up nearly two thirds of the book), Afary and Anderson are hugely critical of Foucault, not only for his Iran writings but for his poststructural theories in general. Characterizing him as a romantic antimodernist with orientalizing tendencies, they link Foucault's sympathy for the mass popular uprising that overthrew the autocratic regime in Iran with his analysis of the intersections of sexual and political culture in the Athenian polis, first published in France in 1984 and then in English as The Use of Pleasure, Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality (New York: Vintage, 1985). Inexplicably, the authors get the title wrong (they add an extra s), but their interpretation is disconcerting in other ways as well. Afary and Anderson describe Foucault as endorsing the rigidly hierarchical nature of Athenian sexual relations while ignoring the problem of inequality and suggest that nostalgia for premodern forms of (sexual) authority carried over into enthusiasm for Iran's new form of (theocratic) oriental despotism. This is an odd misreading of Foucault's argument. The Use of Pleasure is a deconstruction of political subjectivity, sexual objectification, and democratic citizenship—an analysis of the process through which the structured inequality of Athenian male same-sex erotic relations was intended to transform itself into philia, the bonded mutual friendship of democratic equals. This two-stage evolution was especially difficult for the objectified partner, and like the two-part dynamic of revolution itself, it was a process that did not always succeed. Foucault does understand this as a fraught process, as evidenced even in his chapter titles. Yet, Afary and Anderson insist on a static reading, whether of Athenian sexual politics (trapped in inequality) or of the Iranian Revolution (fixed as a failed model of Islamic repression). Other readers can find that the same material offers critical insights into the dynamics of informal forms of power, whether on the street or in more intimate, private spaces.
It is a testament to the profundity of both the Iranian Revolution and Foucault's social theory that they are open to emphatically different interpretations. Afary and Anderson have done an important service to the scholarly community by publishing this book. Foucault's essays on the Iranian Revolution are critical reading for anyone interested in Foucault's politics, the general question of revolution, or the specific subject of Iran. Despite our differences of interpretation, I welcome Afary and Anderson's important contribution to the debates on these subjects, which will continue for some time to come.
