In Statecraft and Salvation: Wilsonian Liberal Internationalism as Secularized Eschatology, Milan Babík has written a fascinating and very well researched examination of the connection between secular political thought and its often forgotten religious foundation. Beginning with a discussion of various secularization theories, he moves on to a close examination of how the various theories shed light on the religious foundations of many modern secular political movements. The specific case study in this book is the policies of Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth president of the United States.
Statecraft begins with a primer on the intellectual foundations and conflicts that undergird secularization theory. Babík does an excellent job of providing background to some very complex theories in ways that a person unfamiliar with that field of scholarship would be able to understand. These theories are an essential precursor to his later argument about the religious nature of Woodrow Wilson's international policies.
There is perhaps no other concept as fundamental to modernity as the idea of progress. Descartes, Hegel, Darwin, Marx, and nearly all of the philosophers of modernity agreed with the optimistic millennial assessments of religious people like Henry Ward Beecher or Jonathan Edwards. On this idea, secular and religious thinking agreed. While they did not agree on the idea of a religious millennium, they did agree on the millennialist idea that the world would get progressively better. By the late nineteenth century there was little difference between the social progress portrayed by Edward Bellamy in his Looking Backward, the social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch, and Charles Sheldon's In His Steps. Progress, the idea that the world was inevitably getting better and that humanity must out of necessity work toward that goal, was a foundational idea that seemingly everyone agreed upon—even if they disagreed on what that progress would actually look like. Babík makes an excellent case that this concept is profoundly tied to the religious idea of the millennium, God's kingdom come to earth, St. Augustine's “city of God” becoming conflated with the “city of man.”
The connection between secularization theory and totalitarian movements that Babík makes in this book is particularly interesting. As these movements build secular, social, and political structures on the religious impulse to progress, they are faced with a dilemma. Without an appeal to gods they must in some sense become gods. Reforming political movements become focused and excessive as they become increasingly intent on creating the perfect society. They pursue these ends with a confident religious zeal. A number of thinkers, including Raymond Aron in his 1957 work The Opium of the Intellectuals, are mentioned. Aron's work, with the title that plays on Marx's idea of religion as an opiate, argues that “despite its surface rationality and atheism, [Marxism's] foundations were theological” (65).
As the book's focus moves from the theories to a more specific look at US foreign policy, Babík understands that the United States had developed an exceptionally virile strain of this millennialist view. In the US it was not merely intellectual elites that were involved—these ideas were popular and flowed almost seamlessly between religious and secular thinkers. Statecraft echoes and reinforces the notion put forth by historian Andrew Preston and others that the American ideas of Progress and Manifest Destiny are deeply rooted in the American Protestant optimistic millennialist impulse. The United States, owing to its unique history, was able to develop a largely undisturbed Reformational society. Even as the United States secularized and became more plural, the leaders of the new society had to build upon the template that already existed, in the same way that modern secular thinkers had to build on the religious template that had preceded them.
Finally we get to Woodrow Wilson himself. Babík has built a very strong foundation for his argument. This religious/secular progressive reforming optimism was a Hegelian Geist seiner Zeit, “the spirit of the time.” It is odd, in light of the obvious religious motivation of the twenty-eighth president, as well as how often he explicitly said that he was motivated by his faith, how dismissive historians and political theorists have been of the religious underpinnings of Wilsonian idealism. Babík is the latest in a line of scholars to reexamine those foundations and he does it quite well. Readers of this review are encouraged to read this book closely.
One possible criticism of the book concerns the section discussing the influence of George D. Herron (178–89). Herron was a rather quirky thinker who at one point caught Wilson's attention. Babík seems to make more of Herron's influence on Wilson than is warranted. Wilson had casual contact with Herron, read and initially enjoyed his writing, had some correspondence with him, but eventually came to distrust and avoid Herron. Knowing the way that Woodrow Wilson thought during the time leading up to and concluding the Peace Conference, when his contact with Herron took place, it is hard to make the case that anyone of Herron's outsider status made much of an impact on the president. By this time Wilson had retreated to a reliance on himself alone. He was in declining health, growing increasingly paranoid about spies and outsiders, and reeling from the presumed betrayal by his close friend and advisor Edward M. House. The evidence from this period seems to preclude any strong influence on Wilson by an outsider like Herron.
But the Herron evidence retains a significance aside from this that makes it an important addition to the book, and Babik's argument. The fact that Wilson, before meeting Herron, was impressed by his views shows the way that Herron's religious millennialist ideas were complementary to Wilson's thinking. I myself have used Abraham Kuyper to show how the religious Dutch theologian/politician's views corresponded closely with Wilson's. Thus, the Herron section adds to the overall argument in the book, even if direct influence seems overstated. Wilson certainly saw the outline of his own thinking in Herron's writings and Herron was able to predict Wilson's actions on the basis of his own view of the way the world should be.
This book adds greatly to the study of international history by placing yet another foundation stone in the scholarly understanding of the relationship between theology and political thought. It is a welcome addition to the scholarship of international history.
