Theological realism is the idea that God exists independently of us and that we can formulate true beliefs about God in support of that view. This is a position the Hebrew Bible routinely affirms. Consider the following verses from Psalms:
Before the mountains came into being, before you brought forth the earth and the world, from eternity unto eternity You are God. Ps. 90:2
Of old you established the earth; the heavens are the work of your hands. They shall perish but you shall endure; they shall all wear out like a garment; You change them like clothing and they pass away. But You are the same, and Your years never end.
The book of Isaiah highlights the cognitive aspect of theological realism and claims that it is a vital feature of God’s relationship with Israel:
My witnesses are you, declares God, My servant, whom I have chosen. To the end that you may know and believe in Me and understand that I am the One: Before me no God was formed and after Me none shall exist.
God’s independent existence is not just a theological corollary of monotheism, it is a fundamental presupposition of the divine-human relationship. Whether one understands the Torah as a divinely revealed document or as a multi-authored text written over many centuries, a core premise of the Torah is that God enters into relationship with humans. Eliezer Berkovits goes so far as to say that “The most wonderful aspect of revelation, then, is not its content, but its possibility: Not the word of God, but the encounter itself.”Footnote 1 For Berkovits, the divine human relationship is constitutive not just of the Hebrew Bible but of Judaism more generally: “Take away the encounter with God, and the existence of the Jewish people becomes inexplicable, its history inconceivable.”Footnote 2 The possibility of a divine-human relationship requires that God exist independently of us and that we can acquire knowledge of God, as theological realism maintains. How, after all, can one have a relationship with a being who is not distinct from oneself and who eludes all knowledge?
While God’s independent existence is foundational to the religious view of the Hebrew Bible,Footnote 3 few scholars take the rabbis to be theological realists, nor has theological realism been widely endorsed by modern Jewish philosophers and theologians.Footnote 4 Scholars commonly depict rabbinic theology as a homiletic discourse that utilizes parabolic, mythical, and poetic forms of language that do not make truth claims about God.Footnote 5 As for modern Jewish thinkers, they have been more interested in limiting our capacity to speak about God than affirming God’s independent existence. Both the homiletic approach to rabbinic theology and the restrictions placed on theological reference in modern Jewish thought are symptoms of the uncertain place of theology within Judaism. The opposition to theology in Judaism has multiple causes that are difficult to untangle. A list of some of the most prominent causes that have destabilized Jewish theology would include: the fact that Jewish theology eschews the dogmatic and systematic features that are purportedly central to Christian theology;Footnote 6 rabbinic statements that privilege halakhah over aggadah;Footnote 7 the minimizing of the authority of aggadah by medieval figures from Saadiah Gaon to Naḥmanides; Moses Mendelssohn’s rejection of revealed truths in Judaism; the presentation of Judaism as a modern religion free of dogma in order to secure Jewish citizenship;Footnote 8 the critiques of metaphysics and theology in modern and postmodern philosophy;Footnote 9 the desire to establish Jewish studies as a legitimate academic discipline that appeals to reason rather than revelation and faith commitments; andFootnote 10 the lack of theological education at rabbinic seminaries.Footnote 11 Additionally, Pew Research polls suggest that the American Jewish community has been highly susceptible to the forces of secularization as evidenced by reduced rates among Jews of belief, prayer, and synagogue attendance.Footnote 12 This accounting of the forces challenging Jewish theology provides only the barest outlines of why theology has long been claimed to be tangential to Judaism. For a variety of reasons, I will leave the vicissitudes of Jewish theology behind and focus squarely on the issue of theological realism. As I intend to argue, an analysis of rabbinic theology and modern Jewish thought guided by the concerns of theological realism has the dual merit of identifying crucial impediments to Jewish theology while also providing resources for invigorating Jewish theological reflection.
According to John Hick, “the debate between realist and non-realist understandings of religious language exposes the most fundamental of all issues in the philosophy of religion today.”Footnote 13 Given the deep-seated reservations about Jewish theology, one might wonder whether concerns about theological realism have the same urgency in Judaism. Although I will argue in Chapter 6 that there exists a vibrant countertrend of theological realists among modern and contemporary Jewish philosophers and theologians, the advocates for theological realism represent a minority position compared to thinkers who restrict Jewish theological discourse. One reason I have avoided giving an account of the status of Jewish theology is that assessing that issue is highly perspectival. If you consider scholarly approaches to rabbinic literature and the major trends in modern and contemporary Jewish thought, one is left with the impression that theological realism has no currency among scholars of Judaism. However, a brief look back to the 1966 Commentary symposium on Jewish theology, “The State of Jewish Belief,” offers a more nuanced perspective.Footnote 14
The symposium presented fifty-five Reform, Conservative, Reconstructionist, and Orthodox rabbis with five questions regarding Jewish belief and practice. The editors received thirty-eight responses from across the religious spectrum. Milton Himmelfarb opens his introduction to the symposium by pointing to the “the death of God” controversy that had famously made its way a few months earlier to the cover of Time Magazine posing the question “Is God Dead?” Himmelfarb writes: “One of the ironies surrounding all the discussion which has recently been taking place over the ‘death of God’ is that, in many intellectual circles at least, God has not been so alive since Nietzsche wrote His obituary almost a century ago.”Footnote 15 Despite Himmelfarb’s optimism about the state of theology, when it comes to Judaism, he argues that theology is not as vital as it ought to be, and he concludes his introduction by saying that Judaism needs more theology “than we are getting.”Footnote 16 Himmelfarb may have been right, but what strikes me about the symposium is how prevalent theological realism is among the responses. Jacob Neusner, for instance, preempts John Hick’s assessment of the centrality of theological realism by more than twenty-five years when he says:
The most serious challenge to Jewish belief is posed by the need to investigate what we mean by that belief, by the use of theological language, however we use it and whatever its specific vocabulary … The issue is not belief or unbelief. It is for those who say they believe, how to contemplate the reality in which they believe.Footnote 17
Neusner was not alone in prioritizing theological realism among the contributors. Eugene Borowitz, who was also a contributor, wrote a subsequent response to the symposium in Judaism. Borowitz argues that the younger respondents distinguished themselves from their older colleagues in the following terms:
God is a real and present reality to them and not just a concept. Their sense of Jewishness comes from living under His commandments in the here and now. These they know from the Tradition and from their personal experience of God’s commanding presence. They are, in various ways, religious existentialists, substituting the new language of person and relationship for the older philosophic languages of ideas, experience or social values.Footnote 18
Borowitz may be correct about a shift in the theologies of the younger respondents, but it is not theological realism that distinguishes the generations. In my estimation, roughly half the respondents adopt realist positions, a group that crosses generational and denominational differences.Footnote 19 While it would be tedious to argue the case of each thinker, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that Jewish theologians have not always been as pessimistic about our knowledge of God as they are today. Although I do not intend to discuss the status of Jewish theology directly, I do hope to shed light on how we have become so skeptical about Jewish theology. More importantly, I seek to recover traditional and contemporary resources for affirming our capacity to refer to and speak truthfully about God.
Ancient Jews, including the rabbis, amplified God’s knowledge, power, and justice by attributing a perfect symmetry to God’s punishment. Jubilees, for instance, asserts that Cain died when his house collapsed. It goes on to say “And he was killed by its stones because he killed Abel with a stone, and with a stone he was killed by righteous judgment.”Footnote 20 The rabbis extend the theologoumenon of God’s “measure for measure” justice by claiming that God, unlike humans, “heals with the exact thing with which he strikes.”Footnote 21 Analyzing rabbinic and modern Jewish thought in terms of theological realism reflects a similar symmetry: acknowledging the collapse of theological realism in our interpretations of the rabbis and in modern Jewish thought provides a pathway to revitalizing Jewish theology. Scholars fashion the rabbis as antirealists by reducing their theology to homiletics, denying their theoretical interests in God, and claiming that the proper theological orientation for the rabbis is trust rather than belief.Footnote 22 On such views, the rabbis engage in theology to edify the laity but not as a means of disclosing the truth about God and the divine-human relationship. In contrast to this homiletic approach, I seek to establish that a realist sensibility that affirms our capacity to make truth claims about God permeates rabbinic theology. This position calls for a fundamental reconsideration of the place of theology within the rabbinic religious life. A parallel effort to chart the major trend lines of modern Jewish thought in terms of theological realism reveals the dominance of antitheological views in which thinkers seek to restrict or eliminate theological truth claims. These approaches have had a grievous effect on Jewish theology resulting in the truism that Judaism has little or no theology.Footnote 23 However, analyzing modern and contemporary Jewish thought in terms of theological realism also draws attention to the realist orientation of thinkers like Franz Rosenzweig, Eliezer Berkovits, and Yehuda Gellman and provides the context for better understanding and appreciating their bold efforts to preserve Jewish theology.
The positive symmetry of a realist approach to Jewish theology has multiple aspects. Art Green describes the Jewish textual tradition as an inverted pyramid with the Torah as the foundation.Footnote 24 From that perspective, the rabbis become the prism through which they reflect their understanding of the Torah and Judaism to those who follow in their wake. Securing the place of theology at this crucial stratum of the Jewish tradition is vital for all subsequent Jewish theological reflection. A realist approach to Jewish theology has the added positive outcome of legitimating contemporary Jewish theological realism by highlighting its ancient roots and continued vitality in the present. Theological realism, then, represents an important corrective to our historical understanding of rabbinic Judaism and lends much needed support to constructive Jewish theology, but that is not the end of the story. From a Jewish perspective, the central issue regarding theological realism is not God’s existence but our capacity to refer to and speak truthfully about God.Footnote 25 Although philosophical critiques of theological language have played a significant role in motivating the opposition to Jewish theology, rarely have Jewish philosophers and theologians utilized developments in the theory of reference to bolster Jewish theology. As I will discuss briefly in this chapter and more fully in Chapter 7, recent work in the theory of reference can provide strong support to Jewish theological realism while simultaneously addressing the most pressing difficulties facing Jewish theology.
Theological Realism and Jewish Theology
If theological realism were merely a claim about God’s independent existence, then the most ardent proponents of natural theology and the most demure adherents of negative theology could both endorse theological realism. Theological realism is, however, much more than a claim about God’s independent existence; it is an inquiry into the power and limits of theological language and our ability to acquire knowledge of God.Footnote 26 While Jewish thinkers have made important contributions to the debates regarding theological realism, overall, they have addressed the topic more obliquely than their Christian counterparts. Michael Scott and Andrew Moore have averred that “the interpretation and relative importance of the various aspects of the realism problem, as well as the types of antirealist opposition, differ with each philosophical setting.”Footnote 27 Similarly, discussions of theological realism have a unique constellation in Judaism where the role of theology has been less secure in the modern period than it is in Christianity.
For theological realism to be more than a claim about God’s independent existence, an additional cognitive requirement is necessary indicating how we come to such knowledge.Footnote 28 Although there will be reasons to qualify this term shortly, I will refer to this as theological realism’s “knowledge condition.” Specifying the parameters of this knowledge condition has been a central concern for theological realists throughout the twentieth century. For instance, Douglas Carver writes in the preface to the 1931 edited-collection Religious Realism:
Religious Realism, as the term is used in this volume means centrally the view that a religious Object, such as may appropriately be called God, exists independently of our consciousness thereof, and is yet related to us in such a way that through reflection on experience in general and religious experience in particular, and without any dependence upon the familiar arguments of epistemological idealism, it is possible for us to gain either (as some would maintain) adequately verified knowledge or (as others would be content to affirm) a practically valuable and theoretically permissible faith not only that that religious Object exists but also, within whatever limits, as to what its nature is.Footnote 29
While in the aftermath of logical positivism theological realists no longer speak of “adequately verified knowledge,” the debate about what constitutes the proper knowledge condition for theological realism persists.
A helpful first step in assessing alternative accounts of the knowledge condition is to look at the critics of theological realism, and their claims about what cognitive support would be necessary to uphold a realist position. Merold Westphal, in his essay, “Theological Anti-Realism,” writes:
The crucial issue in the realism/anti-realism debate is epistemic not metaphysical. To define a realism that is incompatible with Kantian anti-realism we will require a double thesis, first metaphysical and then epistemic. Realism is the view (a) that the real is and is what is independently of what, if anything, we may think or say about it, and (b) that we human knowers are capable of knowing it as it is in that independence, mirroring it without distortion. Theological realism, our present concern, would be the special case of this double thesis applied to God.Footnote 30
Westphal believes realism to require perfect knowledge of God’s independent existence, a criterion so demanding that the knowledge necessary to secure theological realism would be identical to God’s self-knowledge. Peter Byrne rejects the idea that theological realism requires a “God’s-eye view of all of the facts”Footnote 31 and instead offers a more modest knowledge condition that emphasizes the “accumulation of reliable belief.”Footnote 32 Byrne argues:
Beliefs which are the product of rational procedures are to be explained differently from those which are not. If a system of thought shows no evidence that it has been open to the truth, that is a strong indication that is not the product of genuine rational procedures. That such a system of thought has been closed to the truth, and with it real-world influences via truth-indicators, is in turn indicated by the absence of accumulation of insight and discovery in it.Footnote 33
In Byrne’s view, religious beliefs are not produced in such a manner that there has been an increase in our knowledge of God. He says of the Christian tradition that over its entire history “the stock of reliable beliefs about the Christian God, about its attributes and plans, has not increased one iota.”Footnote 34 Accordingly, Christianity, and presumably other religious traditions along with it, is not a form of realism.Footnote 35
Despite such criticisms, proponents of theological realism have yet to produce a widely accepted knowledge condition nor is there agreement that such a condition is necessary. John Hick, for instance, defends what he calls a “critical realism” modeled on Kant’s philosophy. In Hick’s view, all religions refer to the same ultimate reality but do so through the conceptual framework of their specific traditions. According to Hick, this ultimate reality is a noumenal being that we cannot know in itself. For Hick, the truth of religious beliefs is not assessed according to their correspondence with reality but rather by their effectiveness in moving the practitioner from self-centeredness to God-centeredness.Footnote 36 Since our religious language fails to capture the truth about God, there is no role for a knowledge condition in Hick’s account.Footnote 37
The analytic philosophers of religion associated with Reformed epistemology are also theological realists, but here, too, the term “knowledge condition” is not entirely fitting. Following Thomas Reid, reformed epistemologists reject the internalist criterion that we should have cognitive access to that which secures our beliefs. In their view, this is not how we come to hold the majority of our beliefs. For the reformed epistemologists, we have no alternative but to rely on our standard belief-forming practices, even within the precinct of religion. Alvin Plantinga embraces Calvin’s notion that we have an innate source for the formation of religious beliefs, the sensus divinitatis, which can produce “properly basic beliefs,” that is, beliefs that have warrant and are not inferred from or dependent upon other beliefs.Footnote 38 William Alston defends the contribution that mystical perception makes to our religious beliefs, and to do so he brings together Reid’s common sense philosophy with Wittgenstein’s work on forms of life. For Alston, it is rational for us to rely on our “socially established” belief-forming practices, among which he includes “Christian mystical practice,” so long as we have no reason to believe those practices to be unreliable.Footnote 39
Westphal is correct to see theological realism as consisting of both metaphysical and epistemological issues, but some advocates of theological realism also highlight a third semantic component that affirms our capacity to refer to and make truth claims about God. Andrew Moore brings these points together when he defines realism along the following lines:
The philosophical doctrine known as realism can be expressed in terms of three characteristic claims. Ontologically, the realist holds that there is a reality independent of and external to human minds and that its being what it is does not depend on our conceptions or sense experiences of it (as idealists hold); reality is there to be discovered as it objectively is rather than subjectively invented, constructed, or projected. Epistemologically, the realist holds that reality can be (approximately) known as it is and not just as it appears to us to be. Semantically, the realist holds that it is possible to refer successfully to reality and so make (approximately) true statements about it.Footnote 40
Transferred to the religious context, theological realism makes three principal claims: 1. God exists independently of us; 2. we can acquire knowledge of God; and 3. human language is capable of expressing truths about God.Footnote 41 Including a semantic component within theological realism illuminates the profound implications realism has for how we understand theological language. For those who embrace the semantic component of realism, theological realism entails an affirmation of our theological language and our ability to know God. Indeed, it is the support realism brings to theological language that motivates many realists.
The connection between realism and theological language is evident from two perspectives, experientially in the cultivation of the divine human relationship and as a force to guide individual and collective action. Speaking of Christianity but in terms that could easily be extended to Judaism, William Alston makes the following connections between realism and religious experience:
The basic point is that it is fundamental to traditional Christian understanding that we interact with God in various ways, both here and hereafter. This interaction can be initiated from either side. From the divine side God is portrayed as active in human history, shaping the destiny of people and peoples in accordance with His master plan for His creation – selecting the Hebrews for a special mission and destiny, communicating His will to us through them, rescuing them from bondage in Egypt, seeking to influence them through the prophets, becoming incarnate in order to release us from sin and death and initiate a new covenant, guiding the church through its history, and so on. From our side we enter into dialogue with God in prayer, and we respond, or not, to His actions and messages. Thus God is taken to be a real presence in the world, a supreme personal being with whom we can enter into personal relationships, a being Who, to understate it, enjoys a reality in His own right, independently of us and our cognitive doings.Footnote 42
According to Alston, the Christian religious life requires understanding God as an independent being whom we interact with in various ways and about whom much is known and said. In his view, these are fundamental requirements of the divine-human relationship. Alston’s position mirrors that of Eliezer Berkovits, discussed above, who claims that “without the encounter there can be no Judaism. Without it, there is no religion.”Footnote 43
Moving away from matters internal to the religious life, Roger Trigg offers an alternative defense of theological realism that also takes the semantic issues of truth and reference seriously. When religion is construed as private and subjective, it loses its claim to truth and its place in public discourse. As Trigg says, “what is subjective merely relates to individuals. What is objective, and independent of all our conceptions, is of concern to all. Realism must in the end be a philosophy about public religion, and it must make all religion, true or false, a fit subject for public reasoning.”Footnote 44 It is only when God exists independently of us, and we have the capacity to make truth claims about God, that theology earns a place in discussions of important social consequence.
If, as Alston argues, realism plays a crucial role in conceptualizing and fostering the divine-human relationship, and, as Trigg claims, realism secures religion’s place in public discourse, why have Jewish philosophers and theologians been reluctant to adopt realist approaches to Jewish theological language?Footnote 45 This is a complicated story that can be told in different ways. In my view, there is a pronounced antitheological trend in Jewish studies. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, many modern Jewish thinkers claim that whatever Judaism has to say about God is reducible to morality, ethics, halakhah, or to a way of life and Jewish apophaticists hold that theology is an idolatrous discourse that must be eliminated. Often accompanying these views is the idea that the diminished importance or even absence of theology within Judaism distinguishes Judaism from Christianity and elevates Judaism above it. From this perspective, theology is simply not a Jewish endeavor and, so, Jewish theological realism is a non-starter. Given the prevalence of such views, it is hardly surprising that theological realism has found few adherents among Jewish philosophers and theologians.
Theological Reference and Jewish Theology
One important outcome of approaching modern Jewish thought from a realist perspective is the realization that aversion to realism among Jewish thinkers does not stem from a challenge to God’s independent existence but rather from a concern about our ability to refer to God. Can we as finite beings refer to and make truth claims about an infinite being? Does not God’s transcendence preclude human knowledge about God? Along such lines, critics typically question the status and function of Jewish theology arguing either that we lack the epistemological and linguistic capacities to speak about God or that Jewish theology serves some end other than theoretical knowledge about the divine.
One might expect that if theological reference is particularly problematic in Judaism, then Jewish philosophers and theologians would avail themselves of the philosophical resources for addressing this issue. With only a few exceptions, Jewish thinkers have ignored developments in philosophy of language regarding the theory of reference. For instance, for the first part of the twentieth century the theory of reference followed Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Other than the limited areas where we have acquaintance such as sense data, memories, introspection, and universals, reference was taken to occur through definite descriptions that uniquely pick out their objects. In the 1960s scholars such as Ruth Barcan Marcus, Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke, and others began arguing for a causal or direct form of reference that occurs through an “initial baptism” in which a name is first designated.Footnote 46 On this view, names function as tags or rigid designators, which after the initial baptism can be transmitted from one person to the next.Footnote 47 As Christian philosophers and theologians were quick to recognize, an approach to reference that does not require a uniquely identifying definite description is advantageous for theology. Among Jewish philosophers and theologians, Yehuda Gellman has made significant contributions to the discussion of direct reference, but the topic has been of limited interest to other scholars working on Jewish theology.Footnote 48 The disconnect between discussions of reference in Judaism and advances in the theory of reference persist. This is unfortunate as recent work on the theory of reference provides resources for addressing long-standing difficulties in Jewish theology.
A good starting point for assessing these resources is the theory of reference developed by John Perry and Kepa Korta. Perry first set forth the theory in his 2001 monograph, Reference and Reflexivity, and further developed it with Korta in the 2011 monograph, Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry into Reference and Communication.Footnote 49 Perry and Korta synthesize elements of descriptivist and direct theories of reference but seek to push past both by focusing their theory on the roles of cognition and communicative intention. In his earlier work, Perry argues that reference is part of a collective and public exercise that occurs through what he calls “notion networks.” He describes the accumulation of notions around a single referent as the process of assembling a file. On Perry and Korta’s view, the goal of reference is not to pick out objects; rather, reference is the means by which we convey beliefs and attitudes. According to Perry and Korta,
the use of a definite description does not imply that the speaker refers to the object in question, but that he designates the object in question with the intention of imparting a belief with a referential cognitive fix. It is not a matter of the speaker referring, but a matter of the speaker designating with a target intention of imparting a referential belief.Footnote 50
Using a suggestive metaphor, Perry and Korta say of a medical file that “the importance of the accuracy of the information in the file is not to secure reference to the object, but to enable appropriate treatment of the patient it is a file of.”Footnote 51 Their theory marks a shift away from concerns about how language hooks onto reality to how we communicate our beliefs. Because the problem of how the language of finite beings can capture the transcendent has proven so vexing for Jewish philosophers and theologians, an account of reference structured around the communication of referential beliefs rather than the picking out of objects is a welcome advance. Embracing Perry and Korta’s approach means we no longer have to construe theological reference as the struggle of a lone individual to haltingly capture the transcendent in thought and words. On the contrary, theological reference is a collective endeavor to produce, evaluate, and transmit ideas about God.
Perry and Korta’s theory contains additional features beneficial to the study of Jewish theology. Importantly, their account of reference does not require individuals to hold particular theoretical views in order to successfully refer. All that is necessary is that the person have access to the “notion network.” As Perry and Korta point out, “we can use names to ask the most basic of questions about what they stand for, and to make statements about them that reflect ignorance of the most basic facts about what they are or who they are.”Footnote 52 The idea that reference can succeed in non-ideal circumstances allows for an approach to theological language that does not privilege the elite over the laity. In my view, there is much to be gained by adopting philosophical positions that support the laity’s ability to think and speak about God. The revitalization of Jewish theology, and its integration into Jewish religious life requires wide participation in theological reflection rather than a discourse limited to intellectual elites.Footnote 53 Another benefit of their theory is that conceiving of reference as the building of a file lays the groundwork for a response to criticisms that Jewish theology is neither systematic nor dogmatic. According to Perry and Korta, files undergo a buffer stage in which beliefs are accumulated, sorted, contested, and merged. On my reading, rabbinic and kabbalistic literature resemble quite closely this process of constructing a file about God through the amassing of alternative conceptions of the divine.Footnote 54 Perry and Korta’s theory of reference also provides resources for thinking about the rabbis’ penchant for figurative language. Their theory affirms the possibility of successful communication even when the speaker “use[s] a description that neither the speaker nor hearer thinks accurately picks out the speaker’s intended referent.”Footnote 55 In words that I think reflect the communicative intentions behind the rabbis’ use of figurative language, Perry and Korta speak of such linguistic acts as “an invitation for the hearer to come up with an alternative description, or identifying condition, in the course of figuring out the speaker’s intention.”Footnote 56 They see no inherent problem with the fact that sometimes we say something false in order to convey something true.
Francois Recanati also conceives of reference as a system of files, and his 2013 monograph, Mental Files, offers further resources for understanding Jewish theology.Footnote 57 In Recanati’s view, one advantage of thinking of reference as a file system is that it allows different forms of reference to function together. Each file is linked to its referent based on acquaintance relations that are “epistemically rewarding” in their own way.Footnote 58 Thus, reference based on perception, communicative chains, or indexicals can work together. According to Recanati,
mental files are “about objects”: like singular terms in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. They are, indeed, the mental counterparts of singular terms. What they refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by information – or misinformation – in the file), but through the relations on which the files are based.Footnote 59
What makes the file account of reference so flexible is that reference does not depend on descriptions that the object must satisfy. Instead, reference succeeds when the file is in the right epistemic relation to its object. Recanati’s theory permits a range of epistemic relations, what he refers to as “multiple anchors.”Footnote 60 This position is consonant with my account of Jewish theological language, JTP, that depicts Jewish theology as consisting of multiple forms of theological language each arising out of distinct belief-forming practices. Similar to Perry and Korta’s theory, Recanati advances an epistemically egalitarian account of reference that would serve religious purposes well. The individual using a file does not have to possess reflective knowledge on the relevant epistemic relation for reference to succeed; all that is required is that the file have the right relation to its object.Footnote 61
Despite the exciting resources the new theories of reference bring to Jewish theology, my purposes in highlighting these developments will only become apparent in Chapter 7. There I will make proposals about how a realist orientation to Jewish theological language supported by these new theories of reference can advance Jewish theology. I hold my constructive work until the conclusion because appreciating the benefits of Jewish theological realism requires that I demonstrate that the dominant approaches to Jewish theology have been antithetical to realism and reference. To that end, in the following section of this chapter, I address how scholars read the rabbis from antirealist and nonreferential perspectives. This discussion will provide context for my defense of realism and theological reference in rabbinic thought in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapters 4 and 5, I explore the various ways modern and contemporary Jewish thinkers have sought to restrict theological reference. In Chapter 6, I argue that despite the prevalence of antirealism in modern Jewish thought, there exists a powerful current of theological realism that is best exemplified in the work of Franz Rosenzweig, Eliezer Berkovits, and Yehuda Gellman.
Realism, Reference, and the Problem of Rabbinic Theology
That scholars often read the rabbis in ways that minimize their theological concerns is a topic I have touched upon elsewhere, and I see no need to repeat those discussions in full here.Footnote 62 All that is necessary for the present argument is to document the fact that scholars routinely read the rabbis in ways that dismiss the theoretical component of rabbinic theology and, thus, undermine theological realism and theological reference. It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive account of how scholars have interpreted rabbinic theology. There are large bodies of secondary literature on the topic, a full presentation and analysis of which would delay my critical and constructive efforts and needlessly burden the reader. Readers who are inclined to agree that theology has been marginalized in Jewish studies, and that this is particularly evident in presentations of rabbinic theology can confidently skip forward to Chapter 2. For those who remain uncertain about those points, I will now try to make that case in a manner that seeks to be both brief and persuasive.
A complex set of issues are at play in scholarly attitudes to rabbinic theology that range over the nature of rabbinic literature and its forms of theological reflection as well as contemporary philosophical and theological prejudices.Footnote 63 A helpful entry point into these challenging issues is to consider scholars’ assessments of the form and function of rabbinic theology. Perhaps the most widely agreed upon fact about rabbinic theology is that the rabbis eschewed systematic and dogmatic theology.Footnote 64 Solomon Schechter, for instance, says: “the old Rabbis seem to have thought that the true health of a religion is to have a theology without being aware of it; and thus they hardly even made – nor could they make – any attempt towards working their theology into a formal system, or giving us a full expression of it.” Schechter goes on to add that the rabbis “show a carelessness and sluggishness in the application of theological principles which must be most astonishing to certain minds which seem to mistake merciless logic for God-given truths.”Footnote 65 More than forty years after Schechter published Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, Max Kadushin made a similar point when he distinguished rabbinic theology and philosophy:
[W]hen we employ the terms of classical philosophy even in an attempt to clarify Rabbinic ideas, we are no longer within the rabbinic universe of discourse. Rabbinic statements about God arise as a result of interests entirely different from those of philosophic thought, represent human experiences that have nothing to do with speculative ideas. In other words, unless we emancipate ourselves from philosophic influences, we shall struggle in vain to comprehend what the Rabbis said or felt about God. Or, to put it more fairly: Only on the occasions when we are free from philosophic influences can we sense the authentic rabbinic experience of God.Footnote 66
For Kadushin, it is not simply that the rabbis did not adopt a systematic approach, philosophical analysis distorts the experiential concerns that motivate the rabbis’ theology. Herein lies an important point. The identification of rabbinic theology as antisystematic or antiphilosophical is often taken to entail that rabbinic theology is not a theoretical discourse, that is, it is not the purpose of rabbinic theology to disclose the truth about God.
A common explanation for the rabbis’ lack of systematic theology is to highlight the importance of Torah and its interpretation in Judaism. Gershom Scholem succinctly addresses this topic by saying that from the rabbinic perspective “Not system but commentary is the legitimate form through which truth is approached.”Footnote 67 Ismar Schorsch provides a helpful expansion of this point:
The traditional form of Jewish thinking, as shaped in the rabbinic period, tended to be exegetical; commentary became the quintessentially Jewish genre of intellectual expression. A sacred text called for explication, application, and renewal, and midrash evolved into a mode of cognition, an expression of piety, and a vehicle for revitalization. But textually oriented thinking is essentially concrete, circumscribed, and episodic. Its very specificity induces a minimal level of abstraction and a bewildering absence of systematic analysis.Footnote 68
Scholem and Schorsch are undoubtedly correct to point to the role of scripture and its interpretation in attempting to understand the non-systematic nature of rabbinic thought. However, even a heightened attention to the dynamics of scriptural interpretation in rabbinic Judaism is not an antidote to the prejudice that links systematicity and theological acumen. David Weiss Halivni, one of the greatest scholars of Talmud in our generation, says in his classic work on the fundamentals of rabbinic interpretation, Peshat & Derash:
Any attempt to outline precisely and systematically the governing principles of rabbinic theology must confront the reality of rabbinic texts which lend themselves neither to theological precision nor systematization … The rabbis of the Talmud were sophisticated legalists but not systematic theologians, and their attempts at theology were often quite expressive and intuitive but rarely methodical.Footnote 69
Simply put, prominent scholars continue to insist that the rabbis do not express their theological views systematically, and this fact is often taken as an indication of their limited interest in theological reflection.
The argument that rabbinic and later forms of Judaism lack systematic and dogmatic theology extends back to the Enlightenment and became a rhetorical theme for Wissenschaft scholars pushing for the political emancipation of German Jewry.Footnote 70 From this vantage point, Judaism’s minimal theological commitments renders it a rational religion thus making the Jewish people ideal candidates for inclusion in modern civil society.Footnote 71 It is worth noting the success of this rhetorical effort minimizing Jewish theology. It is no longer just Jews who see Judaism as resistant to theology. Christian theologians also distinguish Judaism and Christianity along similar lines. John Hick, for instance, writes:
Whilst there have been major Jewish philosophers – one need only mention Maimonides – there has been little interest in the creation of theological systems. The assimilation of revelation has taken place in the Talmudic interpretation of the Torah and in the development of religious observances, both within the ordinary fabric of daily life and on the sabbath and on the high holy days.Footnote 72
Hick’s embrace of the antitheological view of Judaism should come as no surprise as this understanding of Judaism is the one Jewish scholars have proffered for the last hundred years.
While few scholars have departed from the antisystematic reading of rabbinic theology, there have been prominent efforts to identify structure within rabbinic thought.Footnote 73 Max Kadushin, as I noted, firmly distinguishes the rabbis from ancient philosophy, nevertheless he argues that there is a coerence to rabbinic theology that surpasses systematic thinking. According to Kadushin, rabbinic thought is organized around “value-concepts” such as God’s love, God’s justice, Torah, and Israel.Footnote 74 He argues that the value-concepts are “dynamic” and that “they cannot be organized into a static system because the concepts are single words or terms, not propositions.”Footnote 75 Kadushin claims that the rabbinic value-concepts operate as an “organismic complex” that exhibits a “conceptual organization far more subtle than is to be found in any ‘system,’ one that is inherent in value-concepts and in them alone.”Footnote 76 As I will discuss in Chapter 5, Kadushin’s approach to rabbinic theology has profound implications for theological reference. Value-concepts cannot be defined, and as a result they are connotative rather than denotative, meaning they are not referential.
If rabbinic theology is not a theoretical discourse about God, then what is it? One common response to this question is that rabbinic theology is a homiletic discourse, a view that addresses both the form and function of rabbinic theology. The idea that the rabbis engaged in theology for the purpose of edifying the laity with their sermons appears to find support in midrashic collections like Leviticus Rabbah, Pesikta Rabbati, and Pesikta de-Rav Kahana that are organized around the liturgical readings and calendar. In addition, one form of pericope in these and other collections called the “petiḥah” starts with a verse remote from the liturgical reading but finds creative links to the first verse of the Torah portion with which it concludes. The petiḥah, thus, appears to have the form of a sermon that introduces the Torah reading through creative circuity. With few competing theories about the form and function of rabbinic theology, the homiletic interpretation has become the default approach.
Max Kadushin serves, again, as a good example as he has a highly developed account of rabbinic theology as a sermonic literature. On this subject he writes: “Because of the intimate relation of the Rabbis to the folk, rare among creators of written literature, the sermons of the Rabbis as preserved in the Haggadah constitute a unique literature. Informed by the value-concepts common to the whole people, these sermons reflect the manner in which the value-concepts functioned in everyday speech and action.”Footnote 77 A crucial aspect of Kadushin’s presentation of rabbinic thought as “organismically” structured around value-concepts is that the value-concepts are common to the rabbis and the laity. As Kadushin says, “every normal person in the community knew and used those concepts and hence such use involved a common mental habit.”Footnote 78 According to Kadushin, what the aggadic sermon accomplishes is helping people become more fully aware of these shared values.
From the perspective of theological realism, Kadushin’s account is problematic because it attributes to rabbinic theology (“Haggadah”) the status of an opinion rather than a claim to truth.Footnote 79 Like the value-concepts that are connotative rather than denotative, Kadushin says that the ideal form of rabbinic theological belief is “indeterminate.” For instance, discussing a midrash on the destruction of Gomorrah, Kadushin says “Stories and episodes like these were obviously not crystallized beliefs, but neither were they told with tongue in cheek. Generated in an attitude of indeterminacy of belief, they were received with the same attitude.”Footnote 80 While Kadushin is certainly correct that the parabolic and anthropomorphic nature of much rabbinic theology requires interpretive finesse, it does great injustice to rabbinic theology to identify the entire body of aggadic literature with indeterminate belief. Resources in the new theories of reference that allow for utilizing knowingly false claims to say something true do a better job of preserving the rabbis’ theological truth claims. The hermeneutic philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, argued that preserving the truth claims of a text was a fundamental condition of interpretation.Footnote 81 In my view, we become better readers of rabbinic literature when our approaches to theological language and theological reference do not compel us to reduce rabbinic theology to a non-theoretical discourse.
It is imperative to acknowledge that the homiletic approach is not a vestige of Wissenschaft des Judentums that no longer plays a decisive role in our understanding of rabbinic Judaism. David Weiss Halivni also adopts a homiletic approach to aggadah. In the previously cited quotation from Halivni, with my ellipsis I bracketed the following assertion:
Rabbinic theology is not categorical nor easily categorized, and is more prone to homiletical discourse than to carefully groomed, neatly disciplined speculation. Rabbinic theology is often packaged and shrouded in aggada, within a folkloric context, functioning more as hortatory and pedagogic than as speculative literature.Footnote 82
While one could imagine that a Talmud scholar whose principal focus is halakhah might adopt a homiletic account of rabbinic theology, it is surprising that even scholars working on rabbinic theology continue to view their subject on homiletic terms. Dov Weiss, in an excellent book on rabbinic protest theologies, says “The life setting in which post-tannaitic Midrash originated helps to explain the frequency of protest literature in late rabbinic literature. To excite the masses and to hold their attention, ancient Jewish preachers might have produced bold encounters between biblical characters and God.” Weiss goes on to add that “Beyond entertaining the synagogue audiences, rabbinic protest narratives also serve to bolster rabbinic authority.”Footnote 83
The unrelenting grip that the homiletic interpretation of rabbinic theology holds on the scholarly imagination becomes more perplexing when one considers the mounting historical evidence that counts against it. With extraordinary prescience, Abraham Joshua Heschel wrote in the beginning of Torah from Heaven “we must refute the assumption of those scholars that aggadah developed only to supply subject matter for the preachers in their pulpits and that its end goal was to nourish the congregation.”Footnote 84 Heschel’s efforts to defend the integrity and importance of rabbinic theology have in the last several decades received considerable historical and textual support. The historical sophistication that Jacob Neusner brought to the study of rabbinic literature ushered in developments from other scholars in the 1980s and 1990s that have profoundly changed our understanding of the rabbinic movement. Whereas scholars once took at face-value rabbinic claims to have preserved Judaism after the destruction of the temple, current scholarship sees the early rabbinic movement as a small and insular group with little social authority.Footnote 85 Shaye Cohen, for instance, studied the epigraphs of ancient synagogues and determined that the rabbis were not synagogue leaders.Footnote 86 Catherine Hezser analyzed the social structure of the rabbinic movement and concluded that the early rabbis were organized around small loosely associated circles of sages and their students. According to David Levine, the rabbis did not possess a monopoly on knowledge of Torah or synagogue preaching.Footnote 87 Given this new perspective on the rabbinic movement, it seems unlikely that aggadah is best understood as a homiletic discourse. On the contrary, it is far more likely that aggadah was an internal discourse within the rabbinic community.Footnote 88 This position receives significant support from detailed studies of the homiletic midrashim by Richard Sarason and Burton Visotzky, which argue that the homiletic midrashim are scholastic works rather than collections of sermons.Footnote 89 That the homiletic approach to rabbinic theology persists despite the revisions to our understanding of the rabbinic movement and its literature can only be explained as the result of antitheological prejudices that refuse to accept that aggadic theology held a central place within the rabbinic religious life.
Scholars’ difficulty in assimilating aggadah into rabbinic religious life is understandable. Aggadah is a grab-bag term for all the rabbis’ non-legal discourse including folktales, legends, and much else alongside theology. Furthermore, when the rabbis do discuss God, they often use figurative language and ascribe to God human qualities and emotions that are at odds with some contemporary theological sensibilities. Given the literary and anthropomorphic features of much rabbinic theology, many scholars claim that aggadah is akin to poetry.Footnote 90 Like the homiletic approach, the notion that rabbinic theology is poetic is widely held and endorsed by scholars who are deeply engaged with Jewish theology. Louis Jacobs, for instance, says in his essay “Is There a Jewish Theology?” that “the Rabbis were not poor philosophers … They were not philosophers or systematic theologians at all, their activity in matters of Aggadah … being much closer to the activity of the poet or dramatist.”Footnote 91 That the homiletic and poetic accounts of rabbinic theology are compatible is evident in Max Kadushin’s comments on the relationship between aggadah and poetry:
The attitude toward haggadic teachings was characterized by indeterminacy of belief, an attitude fairly analogous to the frame of mind in which the metaphors in a poem are today apprehended. As we have shown elsewhere, Haggadah and poetry are but different modes of one great category, the category of significance, Haggadah communicating valuational significance, and poetry, esthetic significance.Footnote 92
For Kadushin, poetry and aggadah are ways of discussing topics that cannot be expressed in a logical form. Aggadah is like poetry in that it allows the rabbis to communicate about values in a manner in which the cognitive limitations of the form of discourse match the cognitive limitations of the subject. Yochanan Muffs adopts a similar position when he says, “Yet the rabbis certainly knew what they were doing when they divided their time between poetry and law, for these are the two indispensable poles of reality: rationality and feeling, form and freedom, outer action and inner action.”Footnote 93 Going beyond Jacobs’ claim that rabbinic theology is not systematic but sharing Kadushin’s views on the limited cognitive status of aggadah, Muffs asserts:
Those who say Judaism had no formal theology before the Middle Ages are probably right; all we have are legal statements that are binding and poetic statements about the world, that in the main, are not. Even though certain actions were made normative, the subjective reactions were not fixed: Midrash is the subjective, evocative, nondeterminate, personal reaction to the law. Theologies, on the other hand, are rational and clear – and as normative for belief as law is normative for action.Footnote 94
Muffs expresses a view shared by many scholars of Judaism that stands as a principal justification for the marginalization of Jewish theology: the notion that theology is necessarily dogmatic. His claim that midrash is “subjective,” “evocative,” and “nondeterminate” undermines the truth-seeking and referential aspects of rabbinic theology. In Chapter 7, I argue that the new theories of reference allow us to jettison the ideas that theology is subjective and that we lack the capacity to make truth claims about God and, instead, see Jewish theology as a collective endeavor rooted in religious practices to develop, assess, and transmit beliefs about God.
Pinning down the cognitive implications of the poetic approach to rabbinic theology is challenging for obvious reasons. For the poetic approach to resolve fundamental questions about Jewish theology, scholars would also need to provide a theory of poetic language, a task they avoid. Yochanan Muffs, for instance, concludes The Personhood of God by stating that “if the divine projections are not quite ontology, they may be more than mere poetry.”Footnote 95 That is a hopeful admission considering the identifications of aggadah and poetry that precede it, but it does little to illuminate the relationship between poetry and truth. Similarly, Art Green says in Radical Judaism:
I am also one who knows that religious truth belongs to the language of poetry, not discursive prose. I recognize fully and without regret that theology is an art, not a science. We people of faith have nothing we can prove; attempts to do so only diminish what we have to offer. We can only testify, never prove. Our strength lies in grandeur of vision, in an ability to transport the conversation about existence and origins to a deeper plane of thinking. My faith, but also my human experience, tells me that this shift profoundly enhances our understanding of our own lives and of the world in which we live. Opening our minds, and ultimately the mind of our society, to the truth accessible from that inner “place” constitutes our best hope for inspiring change in the way we live on this earth. There is nothing mere about poetic vision.Footnote 96
For Green, it does not diminish religious truth to construe it in poetic terms. Whatever religious truth is, it is something we can only know subjectively and through non-rational forms of expression.Footnote 97 In my view, it distorts religion in general and Judaism in particular to render it in such subjective terms and to depict religion and reason as necessarily oppositional to one another. Why are art and science the only options for how to understand religious language? Surely there must be forms of reason that are compatible with religious belief and experience. In any event, it remains unclear what it means for religious truth to be more than “mere” poetry.
Howard Wettstein also offers an account of Jewish theology that likens biblical and rabbinic theological language to poetry. Wettstein seeks to bring Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy to bear on Jewish theology but ultimately arrives at a poetic account of theology that wrestles with similar difficulties as other proponents of the position. The student notes from Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Religious Belief describe religious beliefs as pictures that guide our lives rather than theories that require rational support. Following along these lines, Wettstein says of classical Jewish literature that “The primary religious works speak of God impressionistically. Their mode of description is as remote from definition as poetry is from mathematics. Their imagery is strikingly anthropomorphic.”Footnote 98 He goes on to say:
When one scans this panoply of images, doctrine seems far away. Many of the images fail to yield anything like a characterization of God that could figure in doctrine. Among the images, moreover, are striking dissonances, hardly a doctrine-friendly phenomenon. Clearly, conceptual refinement and coherence is not a high priority in the Bible and Aggada. One has the sense that one is dealing with something more like poetry; sometimes poetry per se, as in Psalms, other times poetic, image-laden prose.Footnote 99
In Wettstein’s view, the desire to reduce Jewish religious beliefs to propositions comes through the influence of Greek philosophy in the Middle Ages and is a corruption of Judaism’s original modes of religious expression. An important feature that distinguishes Wettstein’s poetic account of Jewish theology from other proposals is that he does not abandon belief altogether. He notes that “likening biblical/rabbinic remarks to poetry certainly does not imply or even suggest that these remarks involve no beliefs, no real commitments; that they are, as one might say, ‘just poetry.’ For such commitment-neutrality is surely not true of poetry itself.”Footnote 100 What Wettstein does not provide, however, is an explanation of what it means for Jewish theology to be poetry in the strongest possible terms. Most importantly, how do Jewish theological claims refer to God and what is their truth status? As with many of the poetic approaches to rabbinic theology, Wettstein embraces the ambiguity that surrounds poetry. He says: “If religion is more like the poetry of one’s life, if it is prompted by a unique kind of responsiveness to life – related but not reducible to aesthetic and ethical responsiveness – then it is predictable, even plausible, that it involves tensions that are not to be resolved.”Footnote 101
Conclusion
For a host of reasons, both philosophical and political in nature, Judaism has distanced itself from theology. This is unfortunate. Minimizing the contribution theology makes to Judaism distorts our understanding of Jewish history. Were the rabbis deeply invested in understanding the divine-human relationship or did they only engage in theology to satisfy the spiritual needs of the laity? How one decides this issue produces sharply different accounts of the rabbinic religious life and the place of theology within it. A second reason the marginalization of Jewish theology is deleterious is that it deprives contemporary Jewish thinkers of the resources to sustain and renew Jewish conceptions of God and the divine-human relationship. Revitalizing Jewish theology will take a concerted and collective effort that addresses the forces that have sought to suppress it. In support of that effort, I seek to remedy two common challenges to Jewish theology. The first challenge is the persistent claim that the rabbis were not theologically minded and that whatever theological claims they made are best understood on homiletic, poetic, or other non-theoretical terms. Such approaches negate the realist sensibilities that underlie rabbinic theology and cast doubt on our capacity to successfully refer to God. The second challenge to Jewish theology is the widely held belief that the health of Jewish theology is contingent upon placing tight restrictions on our theological language. On this view, the less we allow ourselves to say about God the more secure Jewish theology will be.
Part of what motivates antitheoretical accounts of Jewish theology is the epistemological argument that humans do not possess the cognitive equipment to speak about God. The account of theological realism I propose in Chapter 7 embraces the semantic criteria that links realism and reference by defending the human capacity to refer to and make truth claims about God. There I suggest that Jewish theology can get by with a simplified approach to theological realism that rests on two basic criteria: 1. God exists independently of our thought about God, and 2. we have reasons to believe God’s independent existence to be true. To my mind, there is no non-cognitive alternative to Criterion 2. What other than reasons could support the belief that God exists independently of our thought? Religious experience could make a contribution but not independent of belief altogether.
In truth, it is Criterion 2 that fulfills the promises of theological realism. The advantage of a realist approach to Jewish theology becomes evident when one considers realism about the physical world. The principal benefit of realism is not our gaining certitude that the world exists but the fact that we can acquire knowledge about the world that guides our actions and enriches our lives.Footnote 102 Similarly, theological realism provides the cognitive orientation necessary to establish and sustain the divine-human relationship.Footnote 103 It is only when God exists independently of us and we have reasons to support that fact that we can enter into relationship with God.Footnote 104 Having reasons in support of God’s independent existence requires that we possess the ability to refer to God. Given scholars’ resistance to conceiving of rabbinic theology as a theoretical discourse, a realist approach to rabbinic theology faces a significant burden of proof. It is to that task that I turn in the next two chapters.
