Liberalism with Excellence is Matthew Kramer's treatise on perfectionism. As the title suggests, it is in one sense a response to Jonathan Quong's 2010 statement of neutrality, Liberalism without Perfection, though it goes far beyond simply a refutation of Quong's political liberalism. In the book, Kramer proposes a form of aspirational perfectionism, which states that systems of governance (he uses such a term as he believes that perfectionist aims can be pursued at local, national, and transnational level) should be arranged so to promote feats of excellence in sport, the arts, and so on, as this helps foster a sense of warranted self-respect in citizens who feel both direct and vicarious pride in such achievements.

Kramer believes that the distinction between perfectionism and neutrality is not as clean as previously thought. One of his aims is to reconceive the two sides of the debate, and combine different strands of thought from both. As such, his aspirational perfectionism draws on many elements of Rawlsian political liberalism.

The book is split into four parts. The first serves as an introduction to the debate between perfectionists and neutralists. Kramer carefully clarifies the various terms and positions in a debate often wracked with misunderstanding. Two distinctions made by the author are of importance for what follows in the remainder of the book. Firstly, he argues that the hitherto favoured understanding of anti-perfectionism – justificatory neutrality – should be jettisoned in favour of what he calls ‘means-end neutrality’. Justificatory neutrality, as the name suggests, proposes that for a piece of political action to be legitimate, its justification should not invoke any account of the good. The neutrality lies in the reasons appealed to by government actors. This understanding draws on a distinction with neutrality of effect, which Kramer rightly rejects, as most political action will in fact have some effect on citizens’ conceptions of the good. Nevertheless, Kramer argues that neutrality of justification is similarly untenable. He discusses a fictional country, Placatia, where there are an equal number of Muslims, Christians, and Hindus. He imagines a scenario where a group of fundamentalist Muslims will resort to violence if their religion is not given official status. The officials of Placatia decide to cede to the zealots’ demands, not because they believe the doctrines of Islam to be true, but because they believe that this is the best way to guarantee peace and prosperity. According to justificatory neutrality, such a policy does not appeal to any conception(s) of the good. But, Kramer argues, it is patently non-neutral. Thus, he believes that neutralists should instead embrace means-end neutrality, where not only the reasons invoked do not appeal to the good, but also the methods adopted do not favour or disfavour any such doctrine. As I will suggest later, this understanding of anti-perfectionism may be unduly restrictive.

The second key distinction drawn in Part I is that between edificatory perfectionism and aspirational perfectionism. Kramer contends that most modern accounts of perfectionism are edificatory. Indeed, the only other aspirational perfectionist he mentions is Nietzsche (though he is at pains to reject the latter's highly elitist theory). Edificatory theories of perfectionism are direct. They seek to improve citizens’ characters by promoting some conception(s) of the good over others, through government subsidies and the like. Aspirational perfectionism, as I have gestured towards above, is indirect. Rather than attempting to steer citizens towards certain valuable ways of life, the aspirational perfectionist seeks to improve the stature of one's society, which indirectly allows the populace to flourish. In particular, Kramer's aspirational perfectionism seeks to foster the occurrence of outstanding achievements in the arts, science, sport, and so on, which in turn endows excellence in one's society. This excellence gives each citizen a warranted sense of self-respect, which is central to flourishing.

In the second part of his book, Kramer takes aim at liberal neutralist accounts, particularly of the Rawlsian variety. Although he suggests that we shouldn't take his arguments in this part to be a comprehensive rejection of anti-perfectionism, chapter three is particularly forceful. In the chapter, Kramer argues that some of the most fundamental issues with which politics must grapple cannot be resolved without appealing to comprehensive doctrines. He uses the example of the permissibility of allowing women access to abortion procedures. Employing the Rawlsian framework, he argues, correctly, that in order to decide whether access to abortion procedures is permissible, we need to decide upon the moral status of foetuses, which is a foundational matter of justice. If one is going to include foetuses among the class of reasonable citizens, one would be inclined to decide that women should not have access to abortion procedures, whereas, if one does not include foetuses among this class, then she may believe that access is permissible. What is not possible is to prescind from this matter. As such, neutrality is an illusion. Kramer here is endorsing the Aristotelian idea that any account of justice must be informed by a comprehensive doctrine.

In the third part of the book, Kramer goes on the offensive against edificatory perfectionism. His criticisms are twofold. Firstly, edificatory perfectionism does not take the importance of liberty seriously. Secondly, it demonstrates an attitude of overweeningness, which is a weakness on the part of any system of governance. Turning to the first, Kramer argues that edificatory perfectionists ignore the content-independent value of liberty. Taking the Razian autonomy-centred perfectionists as his main target, he demonstrates that such edificatory perfectionists only value liberty insofar as it promotes autonomously-chosen lives. The value of liberty is derived entirely from this end. Any liberty, or set of liberties, which are not necessary to promote autonomy are of no worth. However, argues Kramer, liberty has content-independent value. There is value in having negative freedom entirely independently of what one wills using that freedom. Whilst assessing this latter claim would take me beyond the purposes of this review, Kramer is correct to assert that as perfectionists of this stripe prioritise edification over freedom, they have no principled commitment to the values of liberalism. Edificatory perfectionism could vindicate a whole host of illiberal laws.

Kramer's second criticism of edificatory perfectionism is government-focused rather than citizen-focused. He argues that the edificatory perfectionist has a ‘quidnunc mentality’. He is meddlesome, interfering in areas of people's lives that are none of his business. This overweeningness demonstrates a weakness on the part of a system of governance; coercion or manipulation for the purposes of edification is a failure of self-restraint. Such measures go beyond the limits of justice (more on this shortly) and degrade the system of governance.

The fourth and final part of the book contains Kramer's positive argument for aspirational perfectionism. He begins by sketching an account of self-respect, which draws heavily on various strands of Rawlsian thinking. This understanding of self-respect has two aspects: ‘(1) a secure conviction in the valuableness of one's own way of life with one's conception of the good and (2) a solid degree of confidence in one's ability to realize one's conception of the good in many if not all of its aspects’ (322). Importantly, however, self-respect is central to flourishing only insofar as it is warranted. Kramer recognises that ‘sheer’ self-respect may be highly misplaced. An individual who has a secure conviction in the valuableness of the sadistic torture of animals is not flourishing. On Kramer's account, warranted self-respect is to be understood as a primary good in the Rawlsian sense of generally being necessary or useful whatever one's concrete conception of the good is.

Kramer argues that taking pride in occurrences of excellence gives citizens a sense of warranted self-respect. Often, individuals take pride in the achievements of members of their community vicariously. However, as Kramer points out, this is not always the case. A football fan may take direct pride in his club's achievements as his support has helped drive his team to victory. Nevertheless, whether direct or vicarious, such pride, says Kramer, boosts one's warranted self-respect. As such, the occurrence of excellence in a society promotes the incidence of the primary good of warranted self-respect for each citizen. Perfectionist subsidies, grants, awards, and the like, should be put in place to encourage such feats of excellence. By offering a grant to an exceptional sculptor to create a beautiful statue in a public place, a system of government can promote a sense of pride in its citizens, thus bolstering their warranted self-respect.

To sum up, Kramer's aspirational perfectionism argues that systems of governance should promote a hardy sense of warranted self-respect in its citizens, as this is central to flourishing. They should enact perfectionist measures to create and sustain the conditions necessary for feats of excellence to occur. These feats, in turn, are necessary to boost the warranted self-respect of its citizens through the latter taking both vicarious and direct pride in such achievements. Unlike edificatory perfectionism, aspirational perfectionism is a doctrine of justice, with warranted self-respect as a primary good. Thus, under the traditional justificatory understanding, Kramer's account is neutral: the objective is to boost the incidence of a primary good. However, as he has rejected justificatory neutrality in favour of means-end neutrality, the account is decidedly perfectionist. Though the objective may be neutral, the means used to reach it are decidedly not.

I have both a focused and a more general criticism of Kramer's arguments. The first concerns the rejection of the justificatory understanding of neutrality in favour of the means-end account. Kramer argues that justificatory neutrality is untenable because of examples like Placatia, where a neutral objective may be secured through troublesomely non-neutral methods. However, through adapting Kramer's own examples, I would like to suggest that means-end neutrality may be similarly untenable. This is because non-neutral means can be used for policies which seem obviously neutral. Kramer gives the example of a far-fetched non-neutral policy where a government chooses to upgrade its highway infrastructure motivated by the aim of benefitting communities in which the dominant pastime is stamp-collecting, and disadvantaging communities in which the dominant pastime is folk dancing (21). Even though the government's ultimate objective (according to the example) is the neutral aim of preserving prosperity, the means taken are emphatically non-neutral. However, suppose that we adapt the example so that the government's ultimate objective is still preserving prosperity through upgrading its roads, but it is motivated by the aim of benefitting both the stamp-collecting and the folk dancing communities, and thus upgrades its infrastructure so that both can travel around freely. Suppose further that these are the only two communities in the area over which the government presides. Here we have a scenario where the end is neutral, but the means are clearly non-neutral. The aim of the government is to benefit the stamp-collecting and the folk dancing community equally. Although the effects are neutral, the means taken are not. However, I would suggest that such a policy is clearly neutral. Through upgrading the highways, the government seeks to provide equal benefits to all its citizens. However, according to means-end neutrality, it is not an anti-perfectionist policy. Similarly, suppose a system of governance awards several grants with the aim of promoting each conception of the good within society. Suppose further that the objective is to help all its citizens prosper. Again, we have a neutral objective, but non-neutral means. Again, I would suggest that such a policy is neutral.Footnote ¹ Although such scenarios may be slightly less realistic than the example of Placatia, they do suggest that means-end neutrality may, at least in certain circumstances, be no more tenable.

A more general concern I have with the book is that Kramer does not explain why warranted self-respect is of fundamental value. Although he provides a detailed and adept sketch of how self-respect is to be understood, and why pride in the achievement of one's fellow citizens is necessary for its realisation, he does not give an account of why self-respect is central to human-flourishing. As I have mentioned previously, he draws together various strands of Rawlsian thought to suggest that warranted self-respect is a primary good, but does not provide an explanation of why it is of use whatever one's concrete conception of the good. Thus, the central tenet of his argument is not going to convince those not already committed to Rawlsianism. Kramer says in his concluding remarks that neutralists ‘readily accept that warranted self-respect is of cardinal importance’ (401). Again, this is unsupported. Even if Rawlsians are committed to this (and a vindication of the value of warranted self-respect is not even given by Kramer in Rawlsian terms), neutralists more broadly are not.

Notwithstanding these concerns, Liberalism with Perfection, is an excellent book that treads new ground in the debate. Kramer proposes a form of aspirational perfectionism which, unlike the elitist Nietzschean tradition, is both egalitarian and liberal. He draws on aspects of both traditional perfectionist theories and contemporary neutralist accounts to offer a thesis that seeks to resolve some of the problems faced by the respective sides in the debate.