Botswana is frequently depicted as a major success story on a continent where political and economic success stories are unfortunately few and far between (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Leith 2005; Samatar 1999; Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001). In many ways, it is. In contrast to many resource-dependent countries, Botswana has avoided civil war, held regular elections, and produced some of the fastest sustained economic growth in the world. Yet, on February 18, 2005, President Festus Mogae declared the country's most famous political scientist, Kenneth Good, a Prohibited Immigrant and gave him 48 hours to leave the country. On May 31, 2005, after losing a legal appeal against this order, Good was held in a police cell for two hours, given 30 minutes to pack, and put on a flight to Johannesburg, South Africa (see timeline below). This article explores the background to Good's deportation and addresses some of the fundamental questions it raises about academic freedom.

An Australian native, Ken Good joined the department of political and administrative studies at the University of Botswana (UB) in 1990. He was principally known as a persistent critic of the Botswana government. While Botswana's economic growth and per capita GDP are impressive, Good highlighted the structural nature of inequality in the country (Good 1992, 90; 1999, 199). He frequently advocated on behalf of Botswana's indigenous San or Basarwa community and consistently condemned the government's discriminatory treatment of this group (Good 1999, 191–92; 2003, 15–20; 2005, 41). Although Botswana regularly held elections, Good emphasized the limits to the country's democracy (1996, 48; 2003, 5–8). He characterized Botswana's seemingly democratic political system as “authoritarian liberalism” and was particularly disturbed by the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president (1996, 29–31; 2003, 9–10).

Good was by no means blind to Botswana's achievements. He observed that the country's first two presidents were “notable for their honesty, pragmatism, and common sense” (1992, 74) and he highlighted the fact that state intervention generally avoided “prestige, non-productive projects” (1992, 94). When I interviewed him in Gaborone for a research project in 2004, upon hearing my line of questioning on Botswana's relative success in avoiding or mitigating the “resource curse,” he immediately referred me to an official in the Botswana government who he felt made the best positive case for Botswana so I would hear that argument. He acknowledged that the rule of law prevailed in Botswana and that the government's authoritarian powers were generally held in reserve and used only on a sporadic basis (1996, 29; 2003, 14). Still, for a government used to hearing its praises sung widely, it is not difficult to see how Good's persistent critiques could anger those in power.

Unfortunately, though, we may never know the exact reason behind President Mogae's decision to declare Good a Prohibited Immigrant. Under Botswana's Immigration Law, the president does not have to explain the reasoning behind any such declaration. At various times, the 72 year-old Good was described as “a threat to national security.” Yet, neither the president, his press secretary, nor the country's foreign minister would elaborate on why someone who had taught political science at the country's national university for 15 years was suddenly being deported.

In the absence of a detailed explanation from the Botswana authorities, speculation has primarily centered on two possibilities. The first concerns Good's links with the British non-governmental organization Survival International (SI) and his criticisms of Botswana's diamonds for development campaign. Attempting to distance itself from consumer concerns over “conflict” diamonds from countries like Angola and Sierra Leone, Botswana began promoting its diamonds as positive engines of development. SI turned this campaign around by initiating public protests at Botswana embassies to draw attention to the country's ill-treatment of its indigenous San/Basarwa community, which it linked to the search for new diamond mines in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (Taylor and Mokhawa 2003). Given the importance of diamonds to Botswana's economy, this is a plausible speculation in that Ken Good's scholarship (2003; 2005) cited a number of SI sources and one of his publications (2003) featured a series of official Geological Surveys Department maps with additional shading on them by SI. This explanation cannot, however, account for the specific timing of the deportation order. It is also problematic in that Good's critiques long predated SI's interest in Botswana and it is difficult to see how deporting him will adversely affect their campaign on behalf of the San.

A second explanation which can perhaps account for the timing of his deportation centers on a co-authored paper that Good wrote with his former UB colleague Ian Taylor. Good was scheduled to present this paper, titled “Presidential Succession in Botswana: No Model for Africa,” to a seminar at UB on February 23, 2005. He began circulating advance copies of the paper 8–10 days before the presentation. The deportation order thus came after copies of the paper began circulating and its 48-hour deadline to leave the country would have prevented Good from presenting it on February 23. As it turned out, Good was granted an interim order enabling him to challenge his deportation in court on February 21. The seminar presentation went ahead as scheduled, after having to be moved twice to larger rooms to accommodate the hundreds of people who turned out after Good's deportation became front-page news in Botswana.

Although the full version of “Presidential Succession in Botswana: No Model for Africa” has not yet been published in an academic journal, it is possible to summarize the main arguments in the paper based on excerpts from it which have appeared in newspapers (Good and Taylor 2005; Mmegi 2005). The paper begins by arguing that Botswana's democracy is highly elitist, power is excessively centralized in the presidency, secrecy and non-accountability in government are pervasive, and there is growing autocracy in Botswana. Much of this builds upon or further develops lines of argument that each author had already pursued individually (Good 1996; Taylor 2003).

Where the paper arguably breaks the most sensitive new ground is in its specific focus on the presidential succession process in Botswana. Good and Taylor argue that the country's two previous presidential transitions in 1980 and 1998 both took place without reference to the wishes of the people and resulted in successors who had no popular constituencies whatsoever. They point out that the country's first president, Seretse Khama, did not enjoy the “rough and tumble” of constituency politics so the constitution was changed in 1972 to allow for the indirect election of the president. Khama's vice president and chosen successor, Ketumile Masire, lost elections in his Kanye constituency in 1969 and 1974 and was re-appointed to parliament by the president. The requirement that the vice president should be an elected member of parliament was abolished, thus opening the way for Masire to succeed Khama without having won an election. The current president, Festus Mogae, was also appointed, not elected to parliament. A constitutional amendment in 1988 provided for the automatic succession of the vice president on the retirement of the president, which is how Mogae took office in 1998. The paper also looks forward to the anticipated transition in 2008 when current Vice President Ian Khama (Seretse's son) is scheduled to take over. It points out that during the October 2004 elections President Mogae publicly announced three times that, if parliament rejected his re-nomination of Ian Khama as his vice president and thus heir apparent, he would dissolve parliament. Good and Taylor portray this as a president without any popular constituency threatening to dismiss a popularly elected legislature. They also worry about Khama's authoritarian tendencies.

The paper concludes by arguing that permanency of tenure and a severe reluctance to leave office are striking features of African politics. Nearly 30% of Africa's rulers have been in power for 15 or more years and a fifth have been in power for 20 or more years. Encouraging Africa's Big Men to relinquish power is imperative, Good and Taylor argue, but if Botswana offers lessons, they are of a very restricted and limited nature. Australian, Botswanan, British, and South African media sources have all speculated that this paper was the spark that led to President Mogae's decision to declare Ken Good a Prohibited Immigrant. Rumors in Gaborone have also highlighted the paper's criticism of Seretse Khama, “the father of the nation,” as being the specific component that most angered government authorities.

What lessons or conclusions can we draw from Ken Good's deportation? There are, I would argue, at least four. First, Ken Good's principled courage should inspire all political scientists just as his expulsion diminishes all of us. Many political scientists employ the rhetoric of “speaking truth to power” but actually live pretty safe and comfortable lives. Ken Good knew the risks he was running. Almost a decade earlier he criticized Botswana's Immigration Act which “allows the president to declare a visitor or foreign resident of Botswana a prohibited immigrant. A person so declared has no right to be heard by a court either before or after the decision, nor the right to demand information as to the grounds of the decision” (1996, 33). Ken Good spoke truth to power and paid a heavy price for doing so. Second, his deportation painfully confirms the validity of many of his arguments about the nature of democracy in Botswana. As the South African publication Business Day (2005) noted, “The ruling may have been in accordance with the law, which gives the president the right to declare a foreign resident a prohibited immigrant without having to give reasons. But it cannot possibly be seen to comply with the spirit of the country's constitution or the government's repeated commitment to uphold the right of freedom of expression.” Third, the complete and utter failure of the University of Botswana to defend one of its professors or academic freedom more generally indicates that one of the answers to Marijke Breuning's (2005, 161) question about the internationalization of the American Political Science Association, “Why and for Whom?”, must be to benefit political scientists in non- or partially-democratic countries whose governments do not respect the concept of academic freedom that many APSA members take for granted. Finally, those of us engaged in the study of African politics need to heed Good and Taylor's (2005) admonition that the time has come for academics “to abandon their uncritical stance towards Botswana and wake up to what is going on there.”