You have lied! You are a liar! This is one of the most serious moral offences one can be blamed for. Augustine even regards lying as the fundamental moral offence and identifies it with sin and evil in general. For Augustine and Kant, lying is in itself morally reprehensible and not justifiable at all.
On the other hand, lying seems to be omnipresent in our daily life and sometimes unavoidable—or even necessary—in order to survive or to help others. Criticizing a rigoristic prohibition of lying for being inhumane, many authors emphasize the necessity of lying, at least in special cases of altruistic lies.Footnote 1, Footnote 2, Footnote 3 Since the times of Augustine, classical examples of this are, first, the case of the murderer whose victim can only be protected by a lie and, second, paternalistic lies to the sick and the dying in medical practice.Footnote 4
In the case of the murderer, it seems to be impossible at first sight to argue for a rigoristic prohibition of lying. It clearly seems to be not only a right but a moral duty to lie in order to protect someone from being persecuted and killed by his prosecutors. In medical ethics, paternalistic lies were in the past generally justified by the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Paternalistic lying was seen to be a “therapeutic privilege” and thus a part of the professional medical ethos. As such, the practice of paternalistic lying has come under attack since the principle of autonomy has become a fundamental principle for modern biomedical ethics.
At present, the demand for informed consent implies the prohibition of lying, based on the principle of the “respect for [the] autonomy”Footnote 5 of the patient. According to this principle, the patient has to be enabled to make his or her own decision, which is not possible unless he has received sufficient reliable information. Besides, truthful communication between doctor and patient is necessary for the patient not only to decide on medical therapies but also to shape and organize his last phase of life in cases of terminal illness. From the patient’s point of view, being lied to implies a fundamental disregard of his or her person and dignity. The movie Cat on a Hot Tin Roof (1958) exemplifies in a striking manner (more so than the book of Tennessee Williams on which the movie is based) how lying to the sick and the dying is regarded as an inseparable part of the mendacity, hypocrisy, and grand self-delusion in social life, and how it becomes especially problematic if all others, including family members, know the truth except the sick person herself. Thus, awareness of the problem of lying and the importance of truthfulness in medical practice has increased over the last years.
Nevertheless, the actual practice of communication in medical practice is still unsatisfying, and it remains unclear how one is to behave in marginal cases in which the patient lacks sufficient competence for understanding the information and thus is not able to make reasonable decisions in his or her own interest. It may then seem necessary to withhold information, or even to lie, in order to protect the patient from harming himself through his own wrong decisions. But how can such lies be justified? Can they be justified at all? One possible solution could be to adopt a consequentialist account, which regards lying in itself as morally neutral; according to this position, whether lying is morally good or bad depends on the intentions or consequences in singular cases. Another possible argument would be to say that truthfulness, or the demand not to lie, should be regarded only as a prima facie obligation or principleFootnote 6 that, in special kinds of cases, can be outweighed or overridden by other obligations or principles, such as the duty to help or to protect someone from harm.
Both lines of argumentation, in my view, cause a great deal of problems. The most important problem seems to me to be the question of how the criteria of competence can be exactly and indisputably specified. How can we make sure that the permission to lie and to withhold information will not be expanded by an arbitrary and paternalistic interpretation of these criteria? How can an undesirable extension of the permission to lie (a slippery slope) be avoided? Truthful communication between doctor and patient needs much time, patience, sensibility, and training in communication skills. Therefore, under the real conditions of the medical system, the temptation may still be high to avoid these efforts by applying the easy paternalistic argument for the therapeutic necessity of lying with reference to the principle of beneficence.
Solving this problem seems possible only if one reconsiders the basic principles and reasons of ethical argumentation against lying in a (merely) moral as well as legal sense.Footnote 7 For this purpose, I want to defend the rather unpopular position of Augustine and Kant by giving it a more plausible interpretation. First of all, the concept of lying has to be more precisely defined. Apologies for lying often presuppose a much too wide understanding of the concept, whereas the rigoristic positions of Augustine and Kant argue against lying in a much more specific sense. Following this conceptual clarification, I elucidate the ethical arguments for the position of Kant and Augustine, referring to the mostly neglected distinction between the conceptual level of the fundamental ethical principles and the empirical level of the different singular cases to which those principles are to be applied. Finally, I will make the anthropological preconditions of this position explicit with respect to the role of language in truthful communication as well as the implications of this argument for medical practice.
What Is Lying?
The classical definition of lying originates from Augustine. He takes much effort to define the concept in a sufficiently narrow fashion. Thereby he tries to avoid the possibility of someone who did not actually tell a lie being blamed for this serious sin merely because of an improperly wide definition. First, jokes, or “jocose lies,” are clearly excluded from being considered lies because of “a very evident lack of intention to deceive.”Footnote 8 The intention to completely deceive the addressee is a necessary condition of lying, whereas in the case of jokes it is necessary that they do not completely deceive, because otherwise they could not be recognized as jokes. Second, lying has to be distinguished from a false statement that is believed or assumed by the speaker to be true and so is an error rather than a lie. Thus, a statement may be truthful but not true, and vice versa, and consequently only truthfulness but not truth is contrary to lying. Hence, the essential element for the morally relevant concept of lying, according to Augustine, is not the action of telling a falsehood as such, but the inner attitude of consciously telling it with the intention to deceive. This corresponds to his almost already Kantian conviction that it is not the action as such and its actual consequences that are to be morally judged, but the attitude or will from which the action results—the “Gesinnung,” as Kant says.
As a result of his meticulous analysis, Augustine defines lying as “a false statement made with the desire to deceive.”Footnote 9 According to this definition, lying is a specific linguistic action guided by the underlying mental attitude of what Augustine calls the double heart: “The heart of the liar is said to be double, that is, twofold in his thinking: one part consisting of that knowledge which he knows or thinks to be true, yet does not so express it; the other part consisting of that knowledge which he knows or thinks to be false, yet expresses as true.”Footnote 10
Kant follows this classical definition almost entirely. He describes lying as an “intentional untruthful declaration to another person.”Footnote 11 Thus, Kant draws the limits of the concept narrowly, similarly to Augustine, distinguishing lying from the mere saying of an untruth for the purpose of joking or pleasure. As long as the other person is free to believe or disbelieve what I say, I may perhaps be blamed for misleading her, but I’m not lying. This is also the case with “an untruth from mere politeness,” which is not necessarily a lie insofar as “no one is deceived by it.”Footnote 12 Slightly deceiving others by covering the truth of our real thoughts, mistakes, and weaknesses for the purpose of politeness is even quite positively evaluated by Kant, who says that seeking to seem better than we are may cause us to really become better. For instance, by smiling and speaking in a friendly manner, we may really become more cheerful and friendly than we had been before. Thus, concealing our inner life for the purpose of politeness is to be regarded not as lying but rather as a way of cultivating or civilizing our feelings or emotions.Footnote 13
According to this narrow definition of lying, in the realm of medical practice we have to distinguish carefully between cases of lying and cases of withholding information. The duty to communicate truthfully and not lie does not imply that one should give the patient any and all information without any restriction or hesitation. Giving information that was not asked for by the patient can even imply a paternalistic violation of their autonomy. Nevertheless, particularly in medical practice, withholding information can almost be regarded as a form of lying, because the expectation to get sufficient information is particularly high.
The fact that the definition and thus the prohibition of lying are very limited does not at the same time imply that all “good lies” or “white lies” can be excluded from the extension of the concept. This would be too simple a trick to turn the prohibition into an absolute, and it would neglect the necessary distinction between the conceptual and the empirical level. In the narrow sense specified previously, lying for Augustine and Kant is wrong in itself; that means wrong per se or wrong by definition, independent of good or bad empirical consequences. What does this mean? What are the arguments?
Why Is Lying Wrong? Conceptual Reasons versus Empirical Assessment
Contrary to a widely held view, Augustine and Kant do not want to equally condemn all cases of lying, with total disregard for motives, circumstances, or consequences. Sissela Bok’s opinion that “Kant’s view, if correct, would eliminate any effort to distinguish among lies, since he rejects them all”Footnote 14 is untrue, for Augustine as well as for Kant. Their message is not, “Do not lie! Then you remain innocent, and you can wash your hands of any responsibility.” Rather, Augustine distinguishes meticulously between different cases of lying in order to judge them differently. He writes, “All lying is sin, but it . . . is very significant with what intention . . . a person lies. For a person who lies with the intention of helping somebody does not sin in the same way as one who lies with the intention of doing harm.”Footnote 15
Those who lie in order to help, Augustine says, lie unwillingly. The unwilling liar wants neither to harm nor to lie. Unlike a real liar, who loves lying for its own sake, he rather feels compelled to lie by the evildoing of the murderer or by the suffering of the sick and the dying. Therefore, his lie is to be judged as excusable and not deserving of reproof; but this does not imply that lying as such becomes a good deed in these cases. However, if we protect someone from great harm by lying, is this not a good deed? Did not God, according to the Bible, praise the Egyptian midwives who lied in order to protect Hebrew children (and so Moses) from being killed at birth? To this objection Augustine replies: “Not their lying was praised but the salvation of the Hebrew children; because of this merciful action their sin only was excusable, but one does not assume that it was no sin at all.”Footnote 16 Thus, Augustine describes one and the same act as belonging to two kinds or types of actions, and accordingly to two kinds of moral principles. On the one hand, the act of the Egyptian midwives is an act of mercy, and as such it is morally good and to be praised. But on the other hand, as an act of lying, it is an act of injustice, and, as such, it cannot be praised at all, because that would be a conceptual contradiction, as injustice cannot be good under any circumstances. Therefore, lying can be judged as excusable and not deserving reproof, but, because of conceptual reasons, it cannot be justified as good based on a right or even a duty to lie. The fact that the lie was indispensable in order to save the children does not transform the lie into a good deed of justice, because lying as such is an act of injustice undermining confidence, which can never be deemed good.
We need both the principle of justice and the principle of charity in order to describe this kind of situation appropriately. Both principles belong likewise to the conceptual framework of morality and are thus likewise fundamental. There is no way for one principle to outweigh the other and make it ineffective. Otherwise we would not be able to distinguish this special kind of situation as a dilemma or double bind case from the purely good and merciful deed of the good Samaritan.
Let us apply this to the case of paternalistic lies in medical practice. There is a categorical difference between cases of beneficial therapy and help to which the patient has consciously agreed and cases of paternalistic measures taken without or even against the patient’s consent, or through lies. Only in the first case can the action fully be called an action of beneficence and care for the patient. The reason is that real well-being, and therefore real beneficence, necessarily implies respect for the person and her autonomy through truthful communication. Autonomy and truthfulness are necessary constituents of true well-being and good life. Happiness that is enforced against the will of the person is no happiness at all. Lying especially, but in the medical case also the offence of withholding information, means imposing one’s will on the other person instead of enabling her to act and decide according to her own will. Therefore, the principles of autonomy and truthfulness can in no way be outweighed or overridden by the principle of beneficence.
Thus, cases of paternalistic lies may be excusable and not deserving of reproof in very exceptional cases if the physician has strong reasons to believe that the patient cannot otherwise be protected from great harm, and that she will or would agree with thus being protected as soon as she will or if she would be able to do so, but those lies as such cannot be justified at all by any ethical principle as good deeds, or even as a “therapeutic privilege” or obligation. Those cases are exceptional insofar as they are double bind or tragic situations in which we are inevitably doing evil whatever we do.
Thus, the normative meaning of lying as morally bad in itself does not imply that every single lie has (equally) bad consequences and has to be judged in the same way. It only implies the way in which good lies can or cannot be described or justified. This problem is of primary importance to Augustine and Kant, who are concerned with the right understanding and clarification of the concept, not with the empirical question of how special cases or kinds of lying have to be judged. But our right or wrong understanding of moral concepts has implications for our practice insofar as it guides our judgments and actions and can make easier or more difficult our attempts to justify morally bad actions like lying.
One writing of Kant’s in particular has caused him to be charged with defending an inhumane rigoristic position: his short article “Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen” (On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives). Here, Kant reacts to a text written by the French author Benjamin Constant in which Constant argues against the thesis of a “German philosopher” (Kant thinks that Constant means him, but this has never been verified) that even lying to a murderer about the whereabouts of a friend of ours whom he wants to kill would be a crime. Constant argues that insisting on an absolute duty not to lie, even in those cases of lying altruistically, would make human social coexistence impossible. Kant argues that, on the contrary, any limitation of this duty would threaten human social existence and the normative foundation of justice and law.
However, Kant does not give any practical advice on how to act in the special case of the man wishing to protect his friend from murder. He does not aim at a moral assessment of the singular act of lying, which may not be legally wrong and may perhaps even be morally excusable. This is a case that can only be decided in face of the singular situation and its special circumstances, with the help of the power of judgment (Urteilskraft). It cannot be decided in advance and a priori by pure philosophical thinking. Philosophical ethics can do nothing more than roughly outline the conceptual framework of morality and law, and thereby clarify and guide the moral orientation of our practice. However, it cannot and should not decide singular cases.
As the title “On a Supposed Right . . .” clearly indicates, Kant argues against the attempt to justify so-called altruistic lies by reference to a right or even a duty to lie. On the one hand, he clearly states that “by telling an untruth, I do not wrong him who unjustly compels me to make a statement”;Footnote 17 that means I do not violate the murderer’s rights, because I do not harm him. In a legal sense, Kant says, such a lie is not even a real lie, a mendacium, but a mere falsiloquium. On the other hand, in any case of lying “I commit a wrong against duty generally in a most essential point.”Footnote 18 Thus, Kant, as well as Augustine, clearly distinguishes between the assessment of the single act, which may be different according to the circumstances, and the meaning of lying as such, insofar as it violates truthfulness as a formal duty or duty generally.
Truthfulness in statements which cannot be avoided is the formal duty of an individual to everyone, however great may be the disadvantage accruing to himself or to another. If, by telling an untruth, I do not wrong him who unjustly compels me to make a statement, nevertheless by this falsification, which must be called a lie (though not in a legal sense), I commit a wrong against duty generally in a most essential point.Footnote 19
“Formal” and “general” mean conceptually and in this sense a priori, independent of singular, empirical situations, circumstances, and consequences. The meaning of lying must primarily be understood conceptually, independent of the empirical purposes and consequences of singular acts of lying. The consequentialist position that the end justifies the means is, in Kant’s view, confusing and turns not only the concept of lying but the whole conceptual framework of moral language upside down. If lying, as a violation of justice, could be turned into something good, then truthfulness and justice could be turned into something bad, and we would thus lose any normative orientation.
If the distinction between the empirical and the conceptual level of moral judgment, which Kant emphasizes so much, is carefully observed, it can clearly be seen that his insistence on the absolute or unconditional validity of the duty to truthfulness as a formal duty does not defend any fanatic rigorism regarding singular acts. Rather, he is concerned with the conceptual clarity of the moral principles that constitute the indispensable conceptual frame and normative measure for the judgment and criticism of the empirical social and political practice—and, we can add, of medical practice as well. As such, it cannot and should not be changed in adjusting to this practice, just as a yardstick becomes unusable unless it remains solid and unchangeable. It is in this sense that we are to understand Kant, maintaining against the political writer Constant: “Law must never be accommodated to politics but politics always accommodated to Law.”Footnote 20
It is only with the help of this conceptual moral framework that even a situation that compels us to tell lies, motivated by altruistic or paternalistic reasons, can be adequately understood and described as an exceptional case of moral conflict or dilemma. If lying were a morally neutral act, the decision in these cases would be reduced to a trade-off of good and bad consequences, and its exceptional character could not be comprehended. Usually it is not utilitarianism but Kant who is blamed for neglecting the possibility of moral conflicts, because of his apparently strange, mostly misunderstood statement that “a collision of duties and obligations is inconceivable.”Footnote 21 But, in fact, just the opposite is the case. As Bernard Williams states, within utilitarianism, different claims can be charged up against one another according to the principle of the greatest happiness.Footnote 22 On this assumption, tragic situations or dilemmas—that is, situations in which one is forced to act wrongly whatever one chooses to do—are inconceivable. They cannot be conceived unless different moral duties—for instance, truthfulness and charity—exist that are likewise necessary and obligatory, and that cannot contradict one another conceptually. Under this condition, exceptional situations can be conceived in which empirical reasons prevent us from fulfilling each duty we are bound to: the duty to help my friend by saving him from a murderer because of charity as well as the duty not to lie to any human person because of the principle of justice.
Kant’s position could be summarized by the following thesis: The fact that exceptional situations of emergency and moral conflict may compel us to act unjustly should not tempt us to regard or interpret such a violation of justice as a just and justifiable act. The general insight is that there cannot be general rules for exceptional cases; otherwise they would not be exceptional. “Necessity has no law,” Kant says, “yet there could be no necessity that would make what is wrong conform with law.”Footnote 23 Any attempt to regulate emergency cases by law would turn them into normal cases. If the awareness of the moral wrongness of lies gets lost, well-intentioned—but mostly not really good and dispensable—lies tend to become bad normal practice instead of being confined to exceptional cases. Kant describes this danger very clearly in his Lectures on Ethics, referring to the concept of “the necessary lie, which is a very critical point for the moral philosopher. For seeing that one may steal, kill or cheat from necessity, the case of emergency subverts the whole morality, . . . since the ground here is not determined, as to where emergency arises, the moral rules are not certain.”Footnote 24 Kant’s argument here appears to be a kind of slippery slope argument at first sight. If one step is made in the direction of making exceptions to the rule, then ensuing steps that undermine morality as such seem to be irresistible. But this argument cannot be regarded as a purely empirical argument; rather, it is first of all a conceptual argument on principle. If the fundamental concepts become unclear and uncertain, and if unjust acts such as lying are regarded as right, then those acts have the result that declarations “in general find no credence, and hence that all rights based on contracts should be void and lose their force.”Footnote 25
So far, I have described Augustine’s and Kant’s concern as a clarification of the fundamental moral concepts or principles. But how are these principles, especially their universal and unconditional validity, to be justified or founded? In this regard, the anthropological dimensions of Augustine’s and Kant’s argumentations, and particularly their argument referring to lying as a linguistic act, have to be considered.
Anthropological Reflection: Human Dignity and the Argument of Language
Ethical principles such as justice, autonomy, dignity, or beneficence are conceptual instruments that philosophical thinking has developed over centuries in order to make explicit, reflect on, and possibly criticize the moral orientation that is guiding our individual, social, and political practices, including medical practice. Unlike rules or norms, which determine particular practices, moral or ethical principles constitute the entire practice of human existence and its moral orientation as a whole. Therefore, they cannot be appropriately understood and justified unless their close connection to the fundamental conditions of human existence has been considered.
At the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy we find such anthropological considerations. Kant admittedly, and for good reasons, rejects any attempt at an anthropological foundation of morality based on extramoral empirical or metaphysical facts. But moral practice itself presupposes a self-understanding of the moral agent as a human being that has to be made explicit and critically reflected on by moral philosophy. Preparing the second formulation of the categorical imperative, in which he implies his conception of human dignity, Kant says, “The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence.”Footnote 26 Existing as an end in itself means existing as a person and agent leading one’s own life according to one’s own conceptions of a good life, and according to common norms and principles that one can agree to on reasonable grounds. Thus, the violation of moral principles and duties implies a violation of the dignity of others as well as a violation of one’s own dignity through acting in contradiction to the underlying self-understanding as a rational human being that one necessarily shares with any other human being. As an aside, Augustine’s conception of the double heart could perhaps be better understood in this conceptual and existential sense than in a purely psychological sense. The following two quotations from Kant illustrate this point: “By a lie a human being throws away and . . . annihilates his dignity as a human being.”Footnote 27 “A lie always harms another; if not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally.”Footnote 28
Thereby, Kant is arguing against the proposal to constrain the prohibition of lying to those persons who have a “right to the truth,” that is, to those who do not use it to injure others. The murderer, on this condition, has obviously lost this right. Kant, on the contrary, maintains that a criminal may lose his legal rights as a citizen and be punished by the state, but he can by no means be deprived of his fundamental moral rights and dignity as a human being.Footnote 29 “The duty of truthfulness . . . makes no distinction between persons to whom one has this duty and to whom one can exempt himself from this duty; rather, it is an unconditional duty which holds in all circumstances.”Footnote 30
Here, the distinction has to be observed between two concepts of the person and of dignity. On the one hand, persons are to be regarded as empirical individuals, who can lose rights and respect through immoral behavior; in this sense, the ascription of dignity depends on moral qualities and merits. On the other hand, persons are to be regarded as subjects of inalienable rights who unconditionally deserve the respect of their dignity, even in the case of serious moral failures. In this sense, the criminal has the same fundamental human rights as the most virtuous man.
If this is true in the classical case of the murderer, it is all the more true in the case of the addressee of paternalistic lies, as, for example, in medical practice. Because of a lack of mental capacities, the patient may have lost legal rights such as the right to conduct his financial or other personal affairs. In this respect others are supposed to act for him as advocates of his interests. But such a loss of capacities and legal rights does in no way imply the loss of fundamental moral rights such as the right to truth and autonomy. Contrarily, others, as advocates, have to respect these very rights in communicating as truthfully as possible with the patient or with others about the patient, and by acting as carefully as possible according to the assumed will of the patient. Otherwise, without the unconditional acknowledgment of the patient as a human person and moral subject, he would become a mere object of medical measures and thereby lose his dignity. It is, in my view, one of the most serious mistakes of current bioethics to think that the moral status of a person and the application of moral principles such as dignity and autonomy are dependent on mental capacities (“competence”), and to identify respect for autonomy with respect for actual capacities of autonomous choice.Footnote 31, Footnote 32, Footnote 33
The human self-understanding, which is the basis of human dignity, is constituted by our commonly shared autonomy and reason. Insofar as reason and autonomy do not and cannot exist apart from the linguistic practice of expressing and communicating one’s thoughts as well as one’s intentions, wishes, and so on, language, along with reason, is one essential feature of the human condition. This rather modern insight is nevertheless to be found in ancient philosophy as well as in Augustine’s and Kant’s argument for their conception of lying as a misuse of language. Augustine says, “Words were surely instituted not so that people could deceive each other with them but so that each person could make his thoughts known to another. So, to use words for deception, and not for what they are instituted, is a sin.”Footnote 34 Kant formulates this argument in a similar way when he says,
Communication of one’s thoughts to someone through words that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks of the subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to communicate his thoughts, and is thus a renunciation by the speaker of his personality, and such a speaker is a mere deceptive appearance of a human being, not a human being himself.Footnote 35
This argument cannot be appropriately understood if one presupposes an understanding of speech or language as a mere object or instrument of human thought and action. It is undeniably true that language can be regarded and used in this way in our everyday practice as well as in science. But the conception of language presupposed by Aristotle, Augustine, or Kant is quite different and more fundamental. It could be characterized as praxis in an Aristotelian sense—that is, as speech containing its end in itself, not being a mere means for some other end—and as comprehending a basic conceptual framework that constitutes, structures, and orientates human thinking and action in general, everyday communication as well as scientific communication. Language or speech in this fundamental respect cannot be found in the world as an objective fact apart from ourselves. Rather, we find ourselves within the linguistic practice of communication with others and with ourselves. Language is, as Heidegger puts it metaphorically, the “house of being” that we cannot leave. Our relation to the world, to other persons, and to ourselves is necessarily mediated by our thinking in the widest sense, and thinking itself is mediated by the medium of language and speech.
Only if we consider this outstanding and fundamental meaning of language and speech as constituting successful, fulfilling, and flourishing human practice and communication are we able to grasp the importance of truthfulness in medical practice. Truthfulness should not be restricted to the reliability of information as a precondition of legally valid informed consent and of autonomous choices or decisions by the patient. We tend to regard medical practice as a mere means for regaining our health. Thus we forget that it is a form of human existence—of mutual help and assistance between human beings, just as illness, suffering, and dying are inseparably connected to human existence. If we consider the ethical and anthropological meaning of medical practice more thoroughly, we are able to comprehend the great, but mostly neglected, importance of successful communication, which is characterized by mutual respect for the dignity and autonomy of persons. Truthfulness, honesty, veracity, and mutual confidence in a wide sense are necessary conditions for such communication. Lying, in the specified sense, is the greatest threat to it and the most serious kind of violation of human dignity. Mendacity, hypocrisy, and grand self-delusion in medical practice are a mirror of the condition of social life in general, as the movie Cat on a Hot Tin Roof shows. Under conditions of modern medicine, it is not only the communication between doctor and patient that is at stake, but communication between all involved persons and professions and, especially, communication about patients (i.e., persons who are temporarily or permanently not able to participate). It is an entire culture of speech and communication that has to be investigated and evaluated from an ethical point of view.
