The Sudanese religiopolitical activist Mahmud Muhammad Taha is best known for his controversial thesis called in English The Second Message of Islam. In Quest for Divinity, Mohamed A. Mahmoud provides us many more details of Taha's thought and career, cut short in January 1985, when President Jaʿfar Nimairi of Sudan publicly hanged him (ostensibly for apostasy). After an introductory section on Islam in Sudan, the first chapter of the book provides useful information regarding Taha's family and education and his subsequent role as a public intellectual and political activist. Chapters deal with Taha's highly mystical theory of prayer and worship, Qurʾanic hermeneutics, views on determinism versus free will, science, evolution, ḥudūd punishments, fine arts, and his social message—the so-called “second message” of Islam. Mahmoud thus canvases a wide range of topics in connection with Taha's career to provide us, as he states, “with a fuller view of his thought and the scope of his reform project” (p. xii).
Taha emerges from this portrayal as a man who defies pigeonholing. Mahmoud applies several labels to him, most consistently “modernist” and less frequently “neo-Islamist,” neither of which appears to be a complete fit. Aspects of Taha's thought appear to be all over the map, ranging from traditionalist on certain women's issues, liberationist and nationalist on political issues, almost antinomian in regard to performance of religious duties, “fundamentalist” in regard to the application of ḥudūd punishments, but modernist-reformist on the nature of the shariʿa and views on jihad. His methodology of scholarly inquiry and Qurʾanic hermeneutics also seem rather eclectic and inconsistent.
What comes across more consistently is Taha's intense sense of being in direct communion with God. The author suggests that Taha was influenced by the writings of early Sufi scholar al-Bistami and later Andalusian Sufi author Ibn ʿArabi, although there is no direct evidence for that in his writings. Mahmoud interprets Taha's claims of communing directly with God as an attempt to claim a normative authority for himself independent of prophetic authority. Taha clearly had an exaggerated sense of his own importance in the scheme of things, regarding himself as a near messianic figure, a proclivity he shared with another controversial religiopolitical activist of the 20th century, South Asian Abul ʿAla Mawdudi (d. 1979). Mawdudi, however, was content to view himself (merely) as the centennial renewer (mujaddid) of his time. Taha went a little beyond and intimated that he could be “the authentic one” (al-aṣīl), a status reserved for only one person who, according to Sufi conceptualization, was the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil). I am not sure such self-idealization necessarily meant that Taha was inclined to dispense with prophetic authority altogether, as suggested by Mahmoud. He may have seen himself more as initiating a complementary, perhaps even competing, authority on the strength of his mystical access to the divine will.
What continues to guarantee Taha a footnote or two in contemporary Islamic thought is his provocative Second Message of Islam. According to this thesis, Taha considered the Medinan verses of the Qurʾan to be essentially abrogated on the assumption that their purview was historically contingent and their applicability circumscribed. In contrast, the Meccan verses embody the universal and enduring message of Islam. By proclaiming this “second message,” Taha saw himself turning the tables on some of the premodern exegetes who had tended to privilege certain Medinan verses over certain Meccan ones. The obvious problems for effecting sociopolitical reform in Muslim-majority societies that are created by such a drastic measure seemed to have eluded Taha. It is after all a Medinan verse (2:256) that states categorically that “there should be no compulsion in religion,” and it is in the Medinan revelations that women acquired legal personhood and specific inheritance rights. Abrogation of such verses would have severe consequences for the promulgation of basic human rights, such as freedom of conscience and women's legal agency, in the Islamic milieu. It is of course a far more exacting task to read the Qurʾan holistically in order to retrieve its overall weltanschauung and thus to more coherently and rigorously fashion a hermeneutic approach to it, as other more profound modernist-reformist thinkers, like Muhammad ʿAbduh, Fazlur Rahman, and Abdul Aziz Sachedina, have attempted to do. It is much easier and simpler to reactively pick and choose among the Qurʾanic verses to justify a particular programmatic goal. In the deployment of the principle of abrogation in this manner, Taha is surely following in the footsteps of some of the very same premodern exegetes he critiqued for their obtuseness.
Although some have claimed to be impressed by the originality and boldness of Taha's interpretation of the Qurʾan, one is entitled to ask if such traits confer or should confer credibility on a hermeneutic enterprise and ensure its longevity. The author in his conclusion appears to think they should. The present reviewer is far more skeptical. Taha was not a deeply trained scholar in the religious sciences. Against the backdrop of tumultuous political circumstances he related emotively to the Qurʾan, from which he proceeded to extract not exactly a new dispensation but certainly a maverick new reading of an old dispensation.
As a public figure, Taha wedded personal charisma to a fervor for religious and political change. However, change would have to be selective to fit his agendas. Thus, for example, he was almost archconservative on women's issues but reformist with regard to the classical laws on jihad and relations with non-Muslims. On a methodological level, he was thus not that different from the advocates of political Islam, such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, who similarly read their religiopolitical proclivities piecemeal into the Qurʾanic text. Real, profound, and durable change does not ensue from such idiosyncratic and shallow engagements with a religious tradition. Mahmoud's analysis of Taha's writings and thought reveals him to be both methodologically and ideologically inconsistent; his reformist zeal appears to have been propelled more by almost a new-age spirituality and hubris than either scholarly rigor or intellectual depth. The relative obscurity of Taha's thought and its limited appeal today are certainly due to this prevailing perception.
