A reader might well question what Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich's interest in the Suez Canal project had in common with the history of central Europe and why anyone should devote time to the topic when Austria's role in its successful accomplishment was of secondary importance, and Metternich died only shortly after construction of the canal began. The answer is simple: the topic primarily relates to central European rather than near eastern history, in that it reveals Austrian elites’ strong interest in Ottoman and overseas regions in the mid-nineteenth century, and it enhances the revisionist appraisal of the prominent statesman, whose deep involvement in the project over a period of two decades has been seriously neglected by historians.

The construction of the Suez Canal has usually been analyzed in connection with French and British history, in the first case due to the roles of Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin and Ferdinand de Lesseps and the support of Napoleon III, and in the second case owing to Britain's opposition to its construction. In general surveys and biographies on the subject, research on the activities of central Europeans, for example Austrians and Germans, has been very limited in its scope. The only exception s the well-deserved attention paid to the author of the canal's technical plan, Alois Negrelli. Nevertheless, even in scholarly work on this Austrian engineer, the role of the Habsburg monarchy is often introduced in only a fragmentary and at that, sometimes even erroneous, way. As for Metternich, his support is often entirely omitted,Footnote ¹ not only in general surveys on the construction of the canal and in biographies of Lesseps but also in books and articles dealing with Austrian participation, and if he is mentioned, it is mostly for his supportive instructions from 1843 and 1844,Footnote ² while his later role, particularly in the 1850s, has generally been overlooked.Footnote ³ The most striking neglect for that decade was demonstrated by Austrian historian Rudolf Agstner, who accorded prominent roles to only Negrelli, diplomat and Minister of Finance Karl Ludwig von Bruck, and Trieste merchant Pasquale von Revoltella as “the third Austrian in the group,” without mentioning Metternich at all.Footnote ⁴ The latest and certainly excellent overview of Austria's role in the construction of the canal by another Austrian historian, Stefan Malfèr, offers little information on Metternich in the 1840s and glosses over his activities in the following decade by describing him as merely a “partner in the discussions” (Gesprächspartner).Footnote ⁵ This downplaying of Metternich's involvement by Agstner, Malfèr, and other historians mostly results from their omission of relevant primary sources.

The existing state of research fully corresponds with the prevailing lack of interest in the relations between central Europe and the Ottoman Empire around the mid-nineteenth century in general and the former's involvement in the Eastern Question in particular when the Suez Canal project represented a chapter in the history of both issues. Some scholars have recently revealed the significance of Ottoman regions for the economic progress of Austria and the German states from various points of view, for example for the rise of the industrial revolution originally dependent on the import of Egyptian cotton, or for the popular interest in near eastern affairs with strong repercussions on the situation in Germany like the Rhine Crisis of 1840, or for the development of geopolitical views leading to the rise of the concept of Mitteleuropa in the early 1840s. However, they have hardly exploited the information contained in the vast number of archival documents.Footnote ⁶ Consequently, several broad surveys, usually based on secondary sources, overlook the wider dimension not only of the political but also the economic, social, and cultural interrelationship between central Europe and the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ⁷ The same disconsolate state exists even if one limits one's focus on Austria to its extensive interests just beyond its long southeastern border. Of course, excellent books on diplomatic history dealing with the Austrian position during the Crimean WarFootnote ⁸ do exist, and a voluminous monograph on Metternich's near eastern policy has recently been published. However, the latter's narrative ends in 1841, before the canal became a topic at the Viennese Chancellery.Footnote ⁹ As a result, there are many themes and narratives left to explore regarding the numerous and important relations between the Austrian and Ottoman Empires including economic ones, as well as Metternich's interest in the Suez Canal and the steps he undertook before and after 1848. These represented an important part of the broad range of his and Austria's activities concerning the Eastern Question.

The principal objective of this article is to explain the motivation and role of Austrian elites in general and Metternich's in particular in the Suez Canal project. The article's aim is neither to say that these elites played the most important role nor to repeat the well-known story of Alois Negrelli's part in its technical realization. Rather, the aim is to reveal and explain the keen interest they paid to near-eastern affairs, which made Vienna truly a “porta orientis”Footnote ¹⁰ for Germany and shows how Metternich networked with other Europeans and Ottomans as a result. France and Britain were not the only great powers to cultivate close relations with high-ranking officials in Constantinople and Alexandria in the mid-nineteenth century, and it was not to Paris or London but to Vienna where Ottoman foreign minister and reformer Mustafa Reshid Pasha sent his secret project for imposing reforms on the sultan in early 1841Footnote ¹¹ and where Ottoman government ministers made Austrian civil servant Valentin von Huszár their own representative.Footnote ¹² Finally, it was Metternich whom Egyptian Governor Mohammed Ali asked for assistance in achieving independence for Egypt in 1838Footnote ¹³ and from whom the same pasha sought advice in the Suez affair several years later. All of this enabled Metternich to pursue a semi-official policy in the Suez project before his downfall in March 1848 and a kind of personal diplomacy in the 1850s.Footnote ¹⁴ During this decade, the informal nature of his approach corresponded not only with the fact that he no longer held office, but related also to the fact that the whole project and its realization by Lesseps was actually a large private business venture with the Frenchman working for himself and not for France. Although European governments influenced the course of construction, the creation of the canal basically resulted from the activities of private individuals, companies, and societies, and Metternich surely counted among them.Footnote ¹⁵ Last but not least, Metternich's participation in the Suez affair offers further evidence for the revisionist historiography that depicts him as a moderate man whose opinions were often far from reactionary and whose peaceful and consensual near eastern policy offered a certain alternative to the more aggressive and imperialist proceedings of other European powers involved in the Eastern Question, namely Great Britain, France, and Russia.Footnote ¹⁶

To be able to tell the story, it was necessary to bring to light new archival documents housed in the Austrian States Archives in Vienna and the Czech National Archives in Prague that have not been systematically exploitated by historians. No less important was a box containing correspondence on the Suez Canal that was long buried in the library of West Bohemian Chateau Königswart, once owned by Metternich, and completely unknown even to its employees.Footnote ¹⁷

That the creation of the Suez Canal was in the interest of central Europe can be proved by the opinions and activities of Germans in this affair, as well as by their overall interest in the geopolitical and economic affairs of the Ottoman Empire and even more distant world. From the late 1830s, they paid attention to the great powers’ disputes in the empire and became convinced especially after the Rhine Crisis that their geopolitical security also depended on the situation in the near east.Footnote ¹⁸ The same conviction held for their economic welfare, particularly when the industrial revolution moved them to seek new markets and secure commercial routes. The Danube especially became an artery for the export of manufactured goods not only to the Balkans and the Black Sea area but also farther, to Persia and the eastern Mediterranean, and its significance was heightened by the connection of the Danube with the Main and the Rhine in 1846. Its value, and the desire to free its delta from the direct control of the Russians, gave rise to the Mitteleuropa concept, the aim of which was German conquest of the river to the Black Sea.Footnote ¹⁹ The British victory in the Opium War with China in 1842 provoked a similar imperialist reaction: to win their share in the Chinese market, some Germans wanted to follow the British example in economic expansion.Footnote ²⁰ They also dreamed of having their own colonies and a mighty war fleet that would enable them to keep up with other European powers and the United States in global economic competition.Footnote ²¹

All the aforementioned affairs contributed to the popularity of the idea of the Suez Canal in Germany, and it was Austria to whom Germans ascribed a particular and important role in this project. That the Germans gave Austria this important role was a logical outcome of the Austrian Empire's geographical position, its possession of a large merchant navy and a small war fleet, and its extensive commerce with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman market was of vital importance to Austria's commercial shipping, manufacturing, and nascent industry: before the mid-nineteenth century, Austrian shipowners were heavily dependent on coastal navigation in Ottoman seaports. In addition, the welfare of Trieste primarily resulted from Ottoman and Black Sea trade, and Austrian textile factories relied on the import of Egyptian cotton.Footnote ²²

For Metternich, Austria's interests went far beyond central Europe. He strongly supported Austrian economic penetration of the Balkans and into overseas regions. He did his best to improve the navigability of the Danube, concluded a treaty with Russia in 1840 aimed at the improvement of shipping in its delta, promoted overseas trade with Trieste, and unceasingly backed Austrian steam navigation companies on the waters of the Danube and in the Mediterranean Sea.Footnote ²³ He did all this because he thought that such commercial expansion served not only Austrian but also German interests, and he shared the conviction of a considerable number of Germans that Trieste was not merely an Austrian but a pan-German gateway for global commerce. Consequently, he looked forward to connecting Austria's river networks with Germany's through the Rhein-Main-Danube canal and by constructing a railway to Trieste to facilitate the transport of goods between this seaport and the entire German Confederation. Metternich's active participation in the effort to create the waterway through the Isthmus of Suez was a logical continuation of this effort, especially when he also paid attention to commercial opportunities in more remote regions of the Middle and Far East, to which the British victory in the First Opium War significantly contributed.Footnote ²⁴

It was characteristic for Metternich that his support of Austrian commercial development was never followed by an aggressive commercial policy. His interest in navigation on the Danube did not make him a proponent of the Mitteleuropa concept; he also never dreamed of overseas colonies, a topic that was discussed and rejected at the Viennese Chancellery around 1834,Footnote ²⁵ and he was not ready to use force of arms in the interests of Trieste and the Austrian Lloyd. This position corresponded with his conciliatory attitude, pragmatism, and respect for the sovereign rights of other countries, in this case the Ottoman Empire, toward which he always proceeded with considerable respect in economic, political, and religious affairs. In his conduct he often differed from the policies of Great Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the younger generations of Germans advocating conquests on the Danube and in overseas regions. One can conclude that Metternich was an active but moderate player in Ottoman affairs because he did not want to offend the sultan's sovereign rights and provoke pointless dispute, crises, or even wars with other great powers.Footnote ²⁶ It was also how he proceeded in the Suez affair, and the same can be said about most of the Austrian statesmen, diplomats, and consuls who acted under the more-or-less direct influence of the Oriental Academy in Vienna. Officially supervised by Metternich, the Academy contributed to not only the Austrians’ significant interest in Ottoman affairs but also to their respect for the rights and cultures of non-Christians.Footnote ²⁷

Among the Austrian statesmen and diplomats sharing Metternich's interest in world economics and closely cooperating with him in the Suez affair, the following men must be mentioned: Negrelli, Bruck, and Revoltella (named previously); Karl Friedrich von Kübeck (as the head of the Imperial Treasury [Hofkammer]); Internuncios in Constantinople August von Koller and Anton Prokesch von Osten; Consuls General in Alexandria Anton von Laurin and Christian Wilhelm Huber; diplomat and graduate of the Oriental Academy and Negrelli's brother-in-law Victor Weiss von Starkenfels; diplomat Karl von Hummelauer; diplomat and statesman Karl Ludwig von Ficquelmont; and last but not least, the senior official deeply engaged in the development of the Austrian railways and navigation on the Danube, Karl von Czörnig. What connected these individuals was not only their personal contact and relationship with Metternich but also their desire to increase Austria's economic and geopolitical importance in European and world affairs and to make Austria a center of German trade with both the near and far east through technological innovations like the railway connection between Trieste and Germany and steam navigation on the Danube. Of course, sometimes these individuals differed in the extent of their ambitions for Austria—for example, Metternich never inclined to Bruck's imperialist dream of Mitteleuropa—but their differences in opinion played no role in their cooperation in favor of the Suez Canal.Footnote ²⁸

It is easy to understand the motivation for Metternich's positive attitude toward the Suez project but not so easy to determine when his interest began. Some contemporary texts and statements from the 1850s offer indirect evidence that it went back to the 1820s or early 1830s.Footnote ²⁹ In May 1855, Bruck wrote to Lesseps: “I must inform you, moreover, in confidence, that Prince Metternich has been dealing with the Suez question for more than thirty years, always promoting its success, and that even now he is dealing with an interesting memoir intended to clarify everything that has taken place since 1821.”Footnote ³⁰ Three years later, Czörnig dated the first signs of Metternich's interest to around 1830.Footnote ³¹ While this estimate cannot be ruled out, there is no direct proof either of Metternich's earlier or his later interest—allegedly instigated by a debate with Negrelli at the end 1842.Footnote ³² Metternich's deeper interest and active involvement can be assumed to have begun in early 1843, when he received Laurin's December report about Mohammed Ali's intention to create a canal between the Mediterranean and Red Seas, with additional information about the canal design prepared by Louis Maurice Adolphe Linant de Bellefonds and despatched by Laurin to Vienna in February and May 1843.Footnote ³³

Linant gave all consuls general in Egypt his work for their respective governments, but it provoked a positive reaction only in Vienna.Footnote ³⁴ The idea immediately met with the chancellor's approval for the reasons that he gave in his instructions to Laurin on April 25, 1843, and that remained the same until his death. Therefore, his attitude can be summarized with the use of this as well as later sources. He considered the creation of the canal to be one of “the greatest global interests,”Footnote ³⁵ especially for Austria and Germany:

A map possessed by Metternich and dating from 1858 clearly reveals that the route over Suez would shorten the distance between Trieste and India more than from French and British seaports and could mean a greater share for Austria in world trade.Footnote ³⁷ At the same time, Austria would become an important trade route for Switzerland, Germany, Poland, and Russia, which would increase the country's economic and political significance in central Europe. The explicitly expressed opinion that the canal would be useful for Austria, Germany, and all of central Europe was shared in both the Chancellery and the Imperial Treasury, where Metternich forwarded Laurin's December report in January 1843.Footnote ³⁸ With this step he extended the number of individuals involved in the project, of whom the most prominent was Kübeck and to whom the chancellor summarized his opinion in April: “I see it as an international event of the first magnitude, [and] I place it in the series of those events which mark epochs of great developments; I am convinced that a future fitting for Austria will open to her in which the imperial state is called to join the ranks of the most excellent trading countries, and the more I recognise the importance of this issue debated here, and the more I am inspired by it, the more I feel called to devote my serious attention to it.”Footnote ³⁹

That the plan was technologically and economically feasible was for Metternich beyond doubt already in 1843.Footnote ⁴⁰ He also agreed with Mohammed Ali's right to build the canal and collect dues for the ships and goods passing through it; he just insisted on the same conditions for all countries.Footnote ⁴¹ He also shared the pasha's apprehension of Britain's opposition to his attempt to create “an Egyptian Bosporus.”Footnote ⁴² This feeling explains why Mohammed Ali turned to Metternich: he feared British and even French interference in the affair and considered cooperation with Austria and Germany to be less dangerous, claiming that “proposals from German capitalists under the protection of the German powers are all the more likely to be well received.”Footnote ⁴³ His son, Ibrahim Pasha, explicitly told Laurin that the pasha feared “being constantly troubled by the frictions of European rivals and in the end even being robbed of his country.”Footnote ⁴⁴

Metternich considered Mohammed Ali's fears to be well founded because he understood from the very beginning that though the canal was legally an internal affair between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, its success depended on the attitudes of European powers and above all Britain. In his opinion, Britain could raise three questions to the canal: (1) Would it have negative consequences for the British Isles, especially for their connection with their Asian possessions? (2) Would British shipping be compromised? (3) Would Britain's Indian possessions be endangered? The chancellor considered the third question to be the most serious, and all the Austrians involved in the project expected the overall negative reaction of Britain. Consequently, this became an important topic of debate not only between Metternich and his diplomats but also between the Chancellery and the Imperial Treasury.Footnote ⁴⁵ In 1843, Ficquelmont, a former ambassador in St. Petersburg responsible for the negotiations on the navigation on the Danube, summarized where Britain's opposition could lead. Like Mohammed Ali, he considered it possible that after the construction of the canal, “England would like to erect doors there and take the keys.”Footnote ⁴⁶ He predicted that, not as much for economic as for strategic reasons, the British would conquer Egypt to protect their route to India.Footnote ⁴⁷ This concern provoked two fundamental reactions in Vienna. First, it went hand in hand with the desire to promote stronger German interests and ensure the involvement of the two German powers.Footnote ⁴⁸ Second, and more important, the cabinet became convinced that it would be necessary “to place the canal and its use under the guarantee of international law”Footnote ⁴⁹ and in this way protect Egypt and the interests of other countries.

The political-legal standpoint became significant when Mohammed Ali raised the issue again. Although he was pleased with the positive reaction of the chancellor to his project in 1843, it was not until May of the following year that he repeated to Laurin his intention to build the canal. As he emphasized, however, he would not start the construction until the European powers had guaranteed him possession of the canal, and he asked Metternich for advice.Footnote ⁵⁰ The response was sent from Vienna on August 6. The chancellor repeated his opinion that Mohammed Ali's family's hereditary rule over Egypt entitled the pasha to decide on the construction of the canal and gave him the right of complete control over it. The problem was, as he continued, that in reality the affair was not purely domestic. A guarantee from the European powers would be advantageous for securing the ownership of the canal. However, such a guarantee could be given only to the sultan as the sovereign ruler. Therefore, Metternich advised the pasha to protect the canal against interference from foreign powers through an agreement with the sultan, and then persuade the monarch and other countries to conclude a neutrality treaty. It would recognize the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire, the rights of the owner, equal rights in the use of the canal for all foreign countries, and finally prohibiting the navigation of warships through the new waterway.Footnote ⁵¹ The principle of neutrality contained in the London Straits Convention of July 1841 would then be used on the Suez Canal, which would be placed under the “protection of common international law.”Footnote ⁵² This goal became the essence of Metternich's proceedings, and although in 1843 he had already proposed to learn the attitudes of the other great powers, in August 1844 he openly suggested that the pasha officially request Austria's assistance in the negotiations with them.Footnote ⁵³ If accepted, Metternich would assume the role of mediator between the sultan and the European powers, especially Britain for whom the canal was a “vital matter.” Therefore, as he claimed, it was necessary to deal with Britain in advance and gain its confidence.Footnote ⁵⁴

Italian historian Angelo Sammarco claimed that Laurin's reports from September 6 and 19, 1844, contained Mohammed Ali's consent with the offer that Metternich would assume a role of de facto his and de jure the sultan's advocate, but Metternich never did anything in this respect.Footnote ⁵⁵ Actually, these two reports tell a very different story. The elderly pasha suffered from severe infirmities and was unable to discuss the proposal for some time.Footnote ⁵⁶ On September 8, when he finally reacted positively to Metternich's views, his remarks were more polite than practical in any way. The attending dragoman soon made Laurin understand that the pasha was in such a condition that what he was saying made no sense and let him continue talking without translating his words. When Laurin visited Mohammed Ali again on September 12, the pasha was so debilitated that he was unable to talk about either the technical or legal aspects of the canal. The most that Laurin could learn was that the pasha disliked the idea of the sultan's involvement.Footnote ⁵⁷

With such a reaction, Metternich was obviously unable to start negotiations with other European powers and the sultan on the project. There was one more reason that moved him to support the project in an informal way until his political downfall: the plan to create the canal became known in Europe in 1844 and contributed to the competition of the French and British in Egypt, the former supporting the idea of the canal, the latter trying to prevent it with the project of the railway connection between the Mediterranean and Red Seas.Footnote ⁵⁸ Due to his fear of foreign interference, Mohammed Ali approved none of the plans, and the conflict remained unresolved when he died in 1849.Footnote ⁵⁹ That his fear of England played a prominent role in his inaction can also be proved by a report from early 1845 in which it was said that “fear of England influences the pasha and I have found this fear everywhere.” Metternich underlined this passage and added: “This feeling is very well founded.”Footnote ⁶⁰

The publicity and discord were an unwelcome turn of events for Metternich, who wished to keep his understanding with Mohammed Ali secret and disliked the idea of turning the Mediterranean into a political or economic battleground. He simply did not want to become involved in a matter that assumed the nature of a private enterprise, especially when the initiative was taken by British, French, and German private companies.Footnote ⁶¹ The situation prompted him to write to Laurin on March 27, 1847, to the effect that the attention of European newspapers and merchants had brought too much undesirable interest to the project, turning it from an official government affair into a matter of private business . Although he still regarded the project as important, he instructed the consul general to hold back, not to involve himself in the project in the name of the Austrian government, and not to express his opinion about it in public.Footnote ⁶²

The diplomatic restraint, however, in no way meant the end of Metternich's active support. It merely made it less formal and more interconnected with other Europeans, including the Saint-Simonians. Metternich was contacted by a group of German capitalists led by Leipzig banker Albert Dufour-Féronce, who became involved in the project due to his family ties to French merchant François Barthélemy Arlès-Dufour, a friend of another Saint-Simonian, Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin. Whether Dufour-Féronce and his friends already knew that Metternich supported the project or not remains unclear, but it is certain that they sent him a letter on April 25, 1845, in which they claimed that it was in the interest of not only Britain and France but also Germany to create the canal and that the latter had to obtain the same rights in its use that other countries did.Footnote ⁶³ It is also not clear whether it was this letter from April 25, 1845, or another document that they gave to Alexander von Humboldt, who handed it over to Metternich during a visit at the prince's chateau in Johannisberg at the end of the same year.Footnote ⁶⁴ In any case, the personal involvement of Humboldt completed the circle, because he had already talked with Negrelli on the topic in Geneva in 1840.Footnote ⁶⁵

Metternich agreed with the need for the Germans to participate in the enterprise and remained in contact with them.Footnote ⁶⁶ The most striking aspect of their relationship was the fact that the chancellor was ready to agree with the Saint-Simonians, whose activities he had observed with strong displeasure in the 1830s, for he regarded their social and political views as impractically radical and threatening to peace within the Ottoman Empire.Footnote ⁶⁷ On the other hand, they also hardly considered him to be their political champion, but after the mid-1840s they found a way to deal with the elderly statesman, and Enfantin even donated his philosophical work Correspondance Philosophique et Religion to Metternich in 1847.Footnote ⁶⁸

In this way, Vienna became the unspoken capital of German involvement in the Suez project, especially when Albert Dufour-Féronce's request for support found no response in Berlin,Footnote ⁶⁹ and “the important participation of the most influential statesman in Vienna in the plan”Footnote ⁷⁰ became well known in Germany, where it was acknowledged as being beneficial for not only Austrian but also German trade.Footnote ⁷¹ The opinion of the Bavarian envoy in Vienna, that it was a “magnificent enterprise” and, together with the interconnection of the Rhine and Danube “one of the noblest conquests of modern times,”Footnote ⁷² was shared by other Germans. The importance of Vienna in this affair was emphasized by the fact that when the Société d’Études du Canal de Suez was founded in Paris on November 30, 1846 by men such as Enfantin, Arlès-Dufour, Dufour-Féronce, and Negrelli, it consisted not only of the French and British, but also the (Austro-)German group led by Negrelli and it was located close to the Viennese Chancellery in Palais Modena, Herrengasse 27 (today 7), which was owned by the Austrian state.Footnote ⁷³

With regard to the creation of this society, historians have often pointed out that Negrelli had to take time off to be able to go to Paris and that he negotiated in Vienna as a private individual.Footnote ⁷⁴ In fact, this was simply due to the chancellor's unwillingness to be officially dragged into the affair. At the same time, he did not hesitate to agree with Negrelli's leave, which under the given circumstances must be regarded as an expression of glowing support. Moreover, Metternich and Kübeck did not lose touch with Negrelli,Footnote ⁷⁵ and the closeness of their connection also explains why the engineer wrote a report on the result of negotiations on the same day the society was founded.Footnote ⁷⁶ And although Metternich did not seek to make Austria the predominant influence over either the society or Egypt as has sometimes been claimed by historians,Footnote ⁷⁷ it is easy to presume that Negrelli's position in Paris was improved by the general awareness of Metternich's informal support.

When the society was established, Metternich turned his attention back to Egypt. He approved the journey of Austrian engineers sent by Negrelli in the name of the society in April 1847: they were to examine the part of the territory where the canal could be dug.Footnote ⁷⁸ The chancellor actually did more for them even though their mission had a private status: when he was informed by Negrelli of its existence,Footnote ⁷⁹ he immediately instructed Laurin on March 27, 1847—the same instructions in which he ordered him to desist from official communications on the Suez Canal—to offer them all the necessary assistance and protection and inform the Chancellery about their proceedings. The consuls general complied with his request during their entire stay in Egypt, which included obtaining Mohammed Ali's permission for their work and being received by the pasha.Footnote ⁸⁰ In the meantime, Metternich and Kübeck exchanged numerous reports on the engineers’ proceedings and other issues concerning the canal.Footnote ⁸¹ Finally, at the beginning of 1848, Metternich approved Negrelli's personal journey to Egypt, granting him necessary leave again.Footnote ⁸² Metternich conducted a kind of informal diplomacy and continued to show an active interest in the Suez Canal project throughout the time he was in office.

The March Revolution in 1848 precluded Negrelli from going to Egypt and caused Metternich's downfall. However, it in no way ended either the prince's interest in the Suez Canal or his personal contacts with the Austrians and other Europeans involved in the project. Before his flight from Vienna, he received a visit from Negrelli, for whom he promised to learn the attitudes of the British members of the group upon his arrival in London. The fragmentary sources prove that he had social contact there with some British promoters of the canal from whom he obtained a report and the maps of Suez in 1849.Footnote ⁸³ Metternich also did not lose his connection with Enfatin, preserved through Negrelli, and the Germans around Dufour-Féronce, who did not forget the ex-chancellor's support from the previous years.Footnote ⁸⁴ On October 15, 1848, Dufour-Féronce wrote to Metternich that regardless of “all the political storms” the project still survived, and added: “We hope this simple but sincere reminder of the high level of Y[our] H[ighness]’ participation in the plan we all so valued will prove to You that the feeling that keeps the good in grateful memory has not yet completely faded.”Footnote ⁸⁵

The revolutions in 1848 interrupted the intensive process aimed at starting the construction of the canal for several years. Even more important was the death of Mohammed Ali in 1849, because the subsequent reign of Abbas Pasha caused a hiatus until his own death five years later. One historian has even offered the opinion that the political loss of Metternich and the death of Mohammed Ali meant that in 1854 the parties involved in the project “had to start again from the beginning.”Footnote ⁸⁶ In the case of Metternich, that seems to be exaggerated, but regarding the support he gave to the project before 1848, it is perhaps understandable.

With the accession of Mohammed Said as the governor of Egypt in 1854, plans were set in motion again, and it was Ferdinand de Lesseps who became the most active in the affair. He exploited his old friendship with the new pasha to obtain permission to create the canal in November. He proceeded independently from the society, but as he tried to win political support in Europe, which he also obtained from the Viennese cabinet, he came into contact with Bruck and Negrelli.Footnote ⁸⁷ The latter even became a member of his new society, Commission Internationale du Canal Maritime de Suez, which was founded in 1855.Footnote ⁸⁸ Consequently, when the personal network established already before 1848 brought Lesseps into contact with Metternich, the prince had no reason to refuse Lesseps the support that he had earlier given to Dufour-Féronce, and he met Lesseps several times after the mid-1850s. The ex-chancellor continued to be involved in the affair either through his direct relationship with the Austrian bureaucrats and diplomats or through intermediaries such as Negrelli with Dufour-Féronce, Arlès-Dufour, Enfantin, or, most significantly, through both channels with Lesseps.Footnote ⁸⁹ There was, however, a second very important person who tried to win the elderly statesman's attention and succeeded in doing so: Mohammed Said. Although the relationship between Metternich and Lesseps is not entirely unknown, the one between the prince and pasha has been completely overlooked though it was no less significant. The three men formed three corners of a triangle and were all heading to the same goal: the construction of the canal.

Metternich's interest in the Suez affair from 1854 to 1859 was no less intensive than in the previous decade. The numerous texts including booklets, newspaper articles, and maps on the topic, still preserved in the Chateau Königswart, easily prove it.Footnote ⁹⁰ Some of them even bear the dedications of their authors to the prince,Footnote ⁹¹ including one from Lesseps.Footnote ⁹² That Metternich read at least some of them is obvious from his personal remarks in the margins or the lines he marked off, such as those in the text given to him by LessepsFootnote ⁹³ or in various press articles.Footnote ⁹⁴ This collection also clearly demonstrates his active involvement, which can be divided into three regional levels: Austrian, European, and Ottoman/Egyptian. Of course, this is a necessary simplification because all three spheres were closely interconnected, especially by the most important issue that Metternich tried to solve, namely Britain's hostility toward the canal, and in which he served as an unofficial adviser. In Austria he also counseled statesmen and diplomats on economic issues, in particular Bruck, Negrelli, Czörnig, but even Hummelauer, who personally visited him in Königswart for this reason in August 1855.Footnote ⁹⁵ That he was asked for his advice shows that he was still regarded as an authority in this affair, an evaluation that can be further supported by the Austrian Ministerial Council in June 1858. It was there that Foreign Minister Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein clearly did not want to upset the British government by actively promoting the canal.Footnote ⁹⁶ The ministers discussed Lesseps's request for Austrian diplomatic support in Constantinople. During the debate, Metternich was mentioned several times with respect, although Buol was able to enforce his argument that the international situation had changed and it was therefore impossible to promote the project even if the canal was beneficial for Austrian and world trade.Footnote ⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Metternich's unceasing support seemed to ensure at least that although Prokesch von Osten was instructed in Constantinople not to formally assist Lesseps, he was also told not to oppose his efforts.Footnote ⁹⁸

One of the topics debated at the Ministerial Council was the neutrality of the Suez Canal, which Buol regarded as pointless because it could not be enforced but which Metternich continued to advocate.Footnote ⁹⁹ According to the ex-chancellor, it was the only way to overcome the opposition of Britain with objection to the prospect of foreign warships passing through the Suez toward India. His idea was, if not adopted, then at least shared by Lesseps who wanted to use the Parisian Peace Conference after the Crimean War in early 1856 to solve this problem. The Frenchman proceeded in accordance with Metternich's viewsFootnote ¹⁰⁰ and prepared the text that was to be signed by the conference participants, of which the most important part stipulated that “the signatory powers guarantee the neutrality of the Suez maritime canal at all times. No commercial building can ever be seized either along the canal or four leagues from the entrances to the two seas. Warships can only pass with the consent of the territorial government.”Footnote ¹⁰¹ Backed by Metternich, Lesseps asked Buol to take the initiative at the conference and submit this proposal.Footnote ¹⁰² Although the foreign minister was ready to comply with Lesseps's request, in the end, he did not dare to put it on the agenda for fear of a hostile reaction from the British, and the issue was never discussed during the peace talks.Footnote ¹⁰³

Even after its failure in Paris, Metternich did not abandon the attempt to establish the neutrality of the canal. In the summer of 1856, he told Lesseps that it was to be negotiated in Constantinople, where Mohammed Said would be backed by the sultan, dividing the problem into the internal question of the canal's construction and the external one of its international status. Lesseps was able to proceed in both independently and solve at least the former problem faster.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ According to French historian George Edgar-Bonnet, “The authority of the old minister accords fairly high esteem to his opinion. Lesseps is moreover fully in agreement on the necessary separation of the two sorts of different ideas.”Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Even this plan finally failed because Britain did not want the canal and was not ready to make any compromises, and Buol withdrew even his mild support of the project soon after the Crimean War.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Despite all that, Lesseps was grateful for the role Metternich played in the effort to overcome British opposition,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ and Enfantin praised this “eminent man”Footnote ¹⁰⁸ for this endeavor; the old Saint-Simonian ended it with these words: “The active involvement of Prince Metternich gave me great joy. It is glorious to crown this great political life with the peaceful and commercial work which is a magnificent symbol of the politics of the future.”Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Because Metternich had been well informed about the situation in the Ottoman Empire for decades and personally knew some Ottoman dignitaries, he also became a source of information for the Austrians and other Europeans in this respect.Footnote ¹¹⁰ This was useful since everything possible was needed to overcome the Ottoman government's reservations about the Suez Canal, resulting primarily from the fear of Britain, which in Constantinople was seen as a necessary ally against Russia during as well as after the Crimean War. As Baron Jules Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire admitted to Negrelli in January 1858, “I am very happy with Prince Metternich's opinion on the new Grand Vizier. It was what I had hoped for, and I am proud to see my own opinion confirmed by the judgement of a man whom I regard in this matter as wisdom personified, not to mention a source of inexhaustible goodwill.”Footnote ¹¹¹ Negrelli then told Metternich about the letters from Constantinople and Paris writing, “Y. H. will see from this how in every phase of this international affair Your advice is guiding and authoritative.—I will answer Mr Lesseps.”Footnote ¹¹²

All this explains why Metternich gave his advice on how to deal with grand viziers Mustafa Reshid Pasha and Mehmed Emin Aali Pasha, yet he simultaneously also counseled these Ottoman dignitaries. How much they respected his opinions is impossible to learn without visiting Turkish archives, but European documents indicate that the grand viziers took them into account. In 1855, Koller used the longstanding relationship between Reshid Pasha and Metternich in his attempts to convince the former of the benefits of the canal with a supportive letter from the prince.Footnote ¹¹³ During a conversation with Lesseps, Aali Pasha recalled the debate “which he [Aali Pasha] cultivated with Prince Metternich on the Suez Canal, and that he considered the enterprise to be very advantageous for the Ottoman Empire.”Footnote ¹¹⁴ The principal problem was that, even if Reshid seemed eventually to favor the project, he died in January 1858, while Aali was too fearful of Britain to continue to support it.Footnote ¹¹⁵

In Alexandria, Metternich's voice resonated even louder due to his personal relationship with Mohammed Said, and the two men even exchanged private letters, which had never happened between the prince and Mohammed Ali. The first one was written by Said on August 28, 1854. The new pasha remembered how he had met Metternich in Vienna in 1852, and it was at this personal meeting where the source of Said's cordiality may have originated: they met when Said felt threatened by Abbas Pasha, but he received advice from the prince for which he remained grateful; what this advice actually was is not known.Footnote ¹¹⁶ The flattering letter ended with this plea: “I hope that You will not refuse to lend me, on occasion, the benefit of Your advice and Your experience, to guide me in the so difficult art of governing.”Footnote ¹¹⁷ Metternich answered on October 25: he expressed his satisfaction with meeting Said personally and assured him of his readiness to give advice.Footnote ¹¹⁸

The Suez Canal was mentioned by Said for the first time on March 19, 1855, when he personally informed Metternich about his agreement with its construction; because Said knew about Metternich's support of the project and the high esteem the prince enjoyed at European cabinets, he wrote: “I come to ask You to kindly give me the benefit of Your powerful influence to neutralise the effect of certain manoeuvres which are aimed at hindering the success of this great and useful enterprise, and to smooth out, as far as possible, the difficulties which narrow and egoistic views put in the way of its execution.”Footnote ¹¹⁹ Metternich responded on May 22 with his statement that he had never ceased to be interested in the project, he recommended Bruck as a reliable man with the same concerns, and advised Said “to hold firm to the idea of an enterprise in which the most obvious interests of international relations are met and to wait in perfect agreement with the Imperial Court of Austria for the moment which must come, when the agreement may be utilised.”Footnote ¹²⁰

The existence of a certain kind of intimacy in their relationship can be derived from Said's reaction to the information that Metternich intended to visit Egypt, concerning which the pasha expressed his unconcealed joy. He was moved to write a personal letter in May 1856 promising the prince's friendly reception in Egypt.Footnote ¹²¹ Lesseps had already written to Negrelli informing him about Said's

It is probably not necessary to add that this journey, if ever really planned, never materialized, due to Metternich's advancing age.

From mutual correspondence and other testimony, it is possible to conclude that Said's requests for Metternich's advice, his reading of Metternich's letters, and demonstrations of his own satisfaction were expressions of sincere respect for the elderly statesman.Footnote ¹²³ This had two practical outcomes. First, Metternich took advantage of the situation to provide his friends with letters of recommendation, for example in the case of Negrelli, who traveled to Egypt in the autumn of 1855 and was warmly welcomed by Said. Negrelli’s visit was important for the acceptance of his technical solution to the construction of the Suez Canal in the following year.Footnote ¹²⁴ When the prince recommended Revoltella in March 1858, Said answered personally, promising to welcome him, and assuring the prince that “I am glad to see that my views on the great enterprise in which Your Noble Highness is willing to take an interest are in agreement with Your own, and I am determined not to stray in this matter from the prudence and circumspection essential to its success,” and he ended the letter “with the expression of my high esteem, the tribute of my respectful devotion.”Footnote ¹²⁵

Another practical outcome of the two men's understanding was Said's agreement with what Metternich proposed and Lesseps delivered to him. Regardless of the failure of the neutrality plan at the Parisian peace conference, Lesseps continued to seek advice from “the illustrious doyen of diplomacy”Footnote ¹²⁶ and used it to draft a note for the pasha on July 8, 1856. It advised obtaining the consent of the sultan despite the fact that the pasha was entitled to proceed without it. If he did so, Egypt would improve its position toward the European powers, who then would instruct their diplomats in Constantinople to sign a conventionFootnote ¹²⁷ on the “lasting neutrality of the Suez Canal.”Footnote ¹²⁸ Lesseps reported through Negrelli to Metternich that “the Viceroy of Egypt has taken the advice about the political solution to the Suez question given by Y. H. to such an extent that he wants to go to Constantinople personally to settle it accordingly.”Footnote ¹²⁹ In the following months, Said and Lesseps proceeded according to this plan with the aim of obtaining the consent of the sultan and the international guarantee of neutrality. Lesseps visited Constantinople and informed Grand Vizier Aali Pasha about it.Footnote ¹³⁰ Aali Pasha told Prokesch that Metternich's ideas deserved his special attention and he was in agreement with their practical value; he even requested them in a written copy.Footnote ¹³¹ Afterward, nothing further happened in Constantinople or in Vienna, where Lesseps tried in vain to win Buol's backing with reference to this plan.Footnote ¹³² As the whole initiative came to a deadlock, Said abandoned the idea of visiting the sultan.Footnote ¹³³

After this defeat Lesseps gave up the idea of neutrality but not his desire to build the canal nor his relationship with the prince. Despite the opposition of Britain and without the sultan's formal consent, Lesseps finally started the construction works on April 25, 1859.Footnote ¹³⁴ On his way to Egypt, he visited Metternich in Vienna on February 21, and they discussed the canal.Footnote ¹³⁵ Although their conversation was not recorded, from fragmentary information it is possible to conclude that Metternich—well known during his long career for circumspection—agreed with Lesseps's intention to start the construction works regardless of the attitudes of the Ottoman government and Great Britain, since it was obviously impossible to change them at that moment. With this position Metternich showed how much he wanted the task to be accomplished. Lesseps himself noted that Metternich “wished me luck on the ‘manipulation of the Suez enterprise,’ which are his own words; he added that the success of the enterprise is assured by the irresistible force of truthfulness if one proceeds with caution and without delay. Incidentally, I will record the conversation with him in writing, which under the current circumstances has been extremely interesting.”Footnote ¹³⁶ After his arrival in Alexandria, Lesseps told Austrian Consul General Gustav von Schreiner that during their February meeting Metternich had approved the beginning of the work on the canal.Footnote ¹³⁷ This also was the prince's final involvement in the affair, given he died on June 11, 1859. It was not until October 29, 1888, that an international treaty was signed in Constantinople in which the signatories committed to the absolute neutrality of shipping in the canal in times of peace and war, although in contrast to Metternich's original idea not only commercial vessels but also warships had the right of passage.Footnote ¹³⁸

Despite the fact that Metternich's involvement in the plans for the Suez Canal is hardly remembered today—and though the persistence of his efforts over a long period of time is virtually unknown—his contemporaries ascribed great merit to him for his lasting and unceasing support: he was acclaimed in various texts and public toasts even before his death. Ernest Desplaces wrote in 1858 that “as for Austria, who does not know of her ardent sympathies for the Suez Canal project? As the Gazette de Vienne once reminded us, Metternich has been involved with the opening of the Suez Isthmus for more than thirty years, and it will not be one of the least glorious memories of the illustrious career of this statesman. His successors, faithful to his ideas, sometimes even inspired by his advice, have followed this wise policy, which Austria commands in the interest of Trieste and her navy in the Adriatic.”Footnote ¹³⁹ In a report on the state of construction works on the canal written in Trieste on November 10, 1859, it was mentioned that it was Metternich “who was the first who raised the issue, and who until his death (had expressed himself) in favour of the same, saying indeed that the deal is worth a war.”Footnote ¹⁴⁰

In retrospect, it is possible to agree with these contemporary assessments. Metternich was certainly the first European statesman involved in the project, and one who remained committed to it for almost two decades. He never deviated from his conviction that the canal would open the door to modernity and prosperity and not only for Austria and central Europe. This shows that he was deeply involved in economic affairs, affairs that he evaluated not only in their Austrian and European but also in their global dimensions. He participated in many ways, often informal ones, which resulted before 1848 from his political circumspection and afterward from the fact that he was just a private individual. As in other near eastern affairs, he wished to avoid pointless and dangerous competition among European powers, but his conciliatory attitude and caution did not preclude him from agreeing with Lesseps's bold decision to start the construction of the canal in 1859, which confirms how important the whole project was for the elderly statesman.

What the affair further discloses is how accessible Metternich was to all the men involved regardless of nationality, political affiliation, or religion, which brought him into contact with Europeans as well as Ottomans, and conservatives as well as liberals and even Saint-Simonians. The relationship with the last group offers further evidence that, despite his conservative principles, he was a moderate and pragmatic man capable of negotiating with people who stood on the other side of the political spectrum: even before his political downfall, his opposing views with Saint-Simonians on political and social issues played no meaningful role. Last but not least, the whole affair confirms that he was a man with analytical skill and experience. The perception that he was able to anticipate possible difficulties in the Suez affair led even German historian Wilhelm Treue to refer to him as “brilliant Metternich.”Footnote ¹⁴¹

From a central European perspective, Metternich's involvement is even more interesting: the Germans generally considered the Ottoman territories to be of the utmost economic and geopolitical importance, which resulted in a strong interconnection between the German Confederation and the Ottoman regions. That is why so many prominent Austrians paid great attention to them and established an important network with Metternich at its head. It was because of the chancellor that Vienna became the capital of German interest in the creation of the canal. That Metternich's plans often failed arguably changes nothing in this respect. It is more important that he created a platform on which it was possible to carry out technical projects and that he helped to connect the people involved in them, Lesseps being just one example but certainly the most important one in the 1850s. That the Frenchman himself was always grateful for Metternich's advice and encouragementFootnote ¹⁴² can also be deduced from his founding of the Suez Canal joint-stock company in late 1858: he prepared a list of the company's honorary presidents and promoters from among the Europeans who had supported him. The latter title was offered to Metternich. This honor to a man no longer in office serves as evidence of the role Metternich played in the realization of the Suez Canal project and how Lesseps himself evaluated it.Footnote ¹⁴³