James Bradley's most recent bestseller is an attempt to revise the historical evaluation of how the US entangled itself in Asian affairs in the twentieth century. His reputation has been built around the publication of two previous bestsellers – Flags of Our Fathers and Flyboys – that are heroic military histories about the Pacific theater during World War II. He curiously turns to diplomatic history in his newest book and examines the 1905 tour of William Howard Taft and Alice Roosevelt to the Far East. The so-called “imperial cruise,” as Bradley dubs it, visited Hawaii, Japan, the Philippines, China, and Korea, but the book focusses mostly on the mission's diplomacy in Japan and what he calls a “brokered” secret and unconstitutional treaty that encouraged Japanese expansion into the Korean peninsula. This assertion is a misappropriation of the facts. What he calls a “treaty” was nothing more than a memorandum between Taft and Japanese prime minister Katsura Taro. Furthermore, the memo did not commit the US to any diplomatic position in regard to Korea; there were no signatures and no binding contract. The memo was merely a statement of interests in the Pacific and hardly a secret. The US had already publicly stated what the memo outlined: that the Philippine Islands were of strategic value and material interest and that they would be vigorously defended. The Japanese equally stated what had already been public knowledge: that Korea was of similar value. So where is the secret?
While this may just be linguistic flair, the book also draws a historically anachronistic conclusion from these misrepresentations. Bradley concludes that the “imperial cruise” and the Taft–Katsura memo instigated World War II, the success of Chinese communism, and the Korean War; and more, he ultimately rests the blame for these conflicts and the millions of dead at the feet of Theodore Roosevelt. While this is undoubtedly a new angle in the history of US relations in Asia, this theory is just not a sensible one for a variety of reasons. First, the entanglements with Asian nations pre-dated Roosevelt's tenure and can be traced to the acquisition of Hawaii (1898), the Open Door Policy (1899) or perhaps more fittingly Perry's “opening” of Japan (1850s). Second, Bradley discounts the international diplomacy of the 1920s which included multilateral agreements on Pacific security after Roosevelt's tenure. Third, and most importantly, it removes the culpability and role of Asians in these conflicts. The Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans played a central role in their destinies but Bradley resorts to a US-centric view of international relations that has long been replaced by international and transnational approaches to history.
The representation of Roosevelt as a warmonger is also grossly unfair. Regardless of TR's aggressive rhetoric or his imperialist credentials (of which there were plenty), he was one of the strongest presidential advocates of peace through arbitration and diplomacy. Not only did he successfully arbitrate the Russo-Japanese War, but he forestalled World War I through the Algeciras Conference in 1905 – the very year of the “imperial cruise.” Roosevelt also used the International Court at The Hague to resolve disputes in the Caribbean, and concluded the Alaskan boundary dispute, ending the last vestige of Anglo-American animosity. Since publishing Imperial Cruise, Bradley has argued that Roosevelt's Nobel Peace Prize is undeserved and even suggests that Barack Obama was more worthy of the award. The book is quick to point out Roosevelt's faults, but it fails to explain his achievements.
There are other minor distortions, all of which seem aimed at disparaging Roosevelt. He argues that Alice Roosevelt – Theodore's first child – endured a “cold and distant relationship with her domineering father” (13). Alice's autobiography and Stacey Cordery's biography (to which Bradley makes reference) indicate that this is not entirely accurate. Theodore did not speak to Alice about her mother because her death had so affected him, and Alice had undoubtedly had a wild “rambunctiousness” about her, but their relationship was not unloving, nor was TR domineering toward her. Similar narrative slights befall TR's second wife Edith, whom Bradley depicts as a manipulative racist, and TR's southern mother, who is incorrectly credited with inducing his worldview.
The Imperial Cruise is a book intent on capitalizing on the centennial of the Taft–Katsura memorandum and inflating its importance in history. While the Taft–Katsura memo is an important diplomatic event, it was not responsible for World War II. Bradley's book is more a diatribe against Roosevelt, but it does demonstrate one thing: a well-researched study of Taft's 1905 Asian tour – and one that consults international sources – is still much needed.