The monograph discussed here addresses a turbulent field of European history immediately after the Great War, namely the widespread phenomenon of paramilitarism. The author, a distinguished Serbian military historian with a pronounced international research profile and career path, has already previously published on this topic with emphasis on Serbia and provides us with a suitable definition of paramilitarism in the introduction to his book: “As in contemporary Europe after the Great War, the paramilitarism in the Balkans can be defined as ‘military or quasi-military organizations and practices that either expanded or replaced the activities of conventional military formations… paramilitarism in the Balkans, as elsewhere in Europe, had its roots in the state's incapacity to function normally, in weak state institutions, in a legal vacuum, in corrupt political and dysfunctional security systems” (1–2). This statement is helpful because it indicates the European dimension of this phenomenon, which, on the one hand, peaked in the temporary establishment of the Bavarian and Hungarian Soviet Republics immediately after the Great War. On the other, the author elaborates some characteristics of a strong and specific paramilitary culture in the Balkans, which are related to the region's history. In his eyes, modern paramilitarism in the Balkans was closely linked with already existing traditions originating from the period of armed struggle against Ottoman rule and state building projects over the course of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries—starting with the Greek uprisings in the early nineteenth century and ending with the Albanian struggle for independence shortly before the two Balkan Wars.
The author does not include the whole post-Ottoman panopticon, however, leaving out the Greek case and focusing on southern Yugoslavia (that is, Serbia), Albania, and Bulgaria—a block of countries with sufficient similarities that make a comparative study of paramilitarism feasible. He chooses these countries not arbitrarily but because paramilitarism in this area was strongly related to two problems that remained unsolved after three wars (two Balkan Wars and the Great War): the Macedonian question that was shared by Serbia/Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (and Greece!), and the Kosovo-Albanian question that was shared by Serbia/Yugoslavia and Albania.
Whereas the geographical extension of the present study is reasonably justified (except the non-inclusion of Greece), the temporal focus on the period from 1917 to 1924 is not self-evident. Whereas the reader would expect the First Balkan War as the logical point of departure for modern paramilitarism, the author suggests the Serbian Toplica Uprising against Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian occupation in Serbia in 1917 as beginning of his historical scenario. 1924 was taken as the end of the period “because during that year in Albania happened a final coup d’état which ended the period of post-Great War instability in that Balkan country marked by a series of coups and countercoups” (viii).
Although the author's main narration starts with the mentioned uprising, the first chapter (Origins) opens with the participation of Balkan paramilitaries in the two Balkan Wars. In the First Balkan War, for instance, there were between 2,000 and 4,000 chetniks, consisting of members of the Gendarmerie and Border Troops, but also civilians such as high school and university students, Macedonian refugees, and seasonal workers who were included in Serbia's regular army. The second chapter (Demobilization vs. Mobilization) demonstrates how paramilitary organizations came into being after official demobilization. In Bulgaria, for instance, the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) was adapted to the context of defeated Bulgaria and started to continue with its struggle for the unification of Macedonia and Bulgaria. Another aspect was that the official Bulgarian army had to be reduced (imposition of the victorious powers) and officers released. Many of them joined the Military or Officers League, which initially constituted a secret organization that established its own political agenda. Organizations like the previously mentioned ones should play important roles in domestic politics—not just in Bulgaria but also in Yugoslavia and Albania.
In the chapters that follow the author discusses various crisis situations in the three countries until 1924. These domestic crises are well known to the reader, who is familiar with Balkan history. The author's emphasis, however, on the role played by paramilitary organizations in these various crises’ contexts is new and innovative.