In Vienna, 1928, Hans Kelsen hosted the regular conference of the prestigious association of German professors of constitutional law (“Staatsrechtler”). At the conference, which took place in a spectacular environment, Kelsen’s talk on constitutional review provoked much attention. That speech, and the whole conference, may be regarded as the pinnacle of his career. Footnote 1
In 1928, Kelsen was under increasing attack by the Christian Socialist press in Vienna because the controversy concerning second marriages had been decided by the Constitutional Court—with Kelsen actively contributing—and had concluded with dispensation(Dispensehe), in the sense that individual administrative acts allowed for new marriages without the dissolution of the first marriage by Church authorities.
An obscene defamatory campaign followed, and Kelsen even had to remove such defamatory posters from his house door in the presence of his children. Footnote 2
Due to the constitutional reform of 1929, his lifetime appointment as judge of the Constitutional Court came to an end. He regarded the reform as the dissolution of democracy by a majority dictatorship. The next year, in 1930, he accepted a call from the University of Cologne and left Austria for Germany. Footnote 3
In this article I focus on this short period of Kelsen’s work—that is, from 1928 to 1930, a period of scholarly glory and political failure. My starting question relates to the branch of the discourse on Kelsen that examines the relationship between his theories of law and theories of democracy. Footnote 4
1.1 The Legal Scholar as Technician of Law
One of the key features of Kelsen’s work is that his views on legality and constitutionality are inextricably linked to his methodological views concerning the necessity of an autonomous legal scholarship. In tight connection to that, another fundamental characteristic of his work is the intentional separation of the roles of legal scholar and policy-maker. Kelsen’s conception of legal scholarship assumes a legal scholar who keeps a distance from political debates on the constitutional order, who interprets positive legal rules independently of moral and political conceptions. The Kelsenian legal scholar examines the law as a scientific object, in the sense of an objective, descriptive natural science. The success of this examination depends on how far she succeeds in cleaning the object of everything that could distort the objective examination. The Kelsenian legal scholar does everything she can to keep the law as examined by legal scholarship distinct from the ever-particular political and ever-subjective moral aspects. What remains is thus the mere form: the structural and formal characteristics of the law. Footnote 5 Footnote 6 Hence, objective legal scholarship for the Kelsenian legal scholar is primarily a general theory of law. This sort of general theory of law has a peculiar relationship to legal doctrine and the substantive conceptions related to positive law, which in turn has two key features. On the one hand, the ideal of objective science held by the Kelsenian legal scholar is incompatible with taking any position in substantive legal debates. Footnote 7 Kelsen was, on the other hand, aware that the requirement of political neutrality does not mean that law, as the object of legal scholarship, can be separated from politics. Both the making and application of the law count as political activities, since they necessarily entail some kind of value judgement. Footnote 8 The problem of the knowledge of positive law is therefore a particularly complicated field for the Kelsenian legal scholar. How could one describe something that is deeply political in nature in a politically neutral way?
According to the solution suggested by Kelsen, the criteria of scholarship require that the legal scholar only analyse and describe the positive rules in showing the possible ways of interpretation. The choice between possible interpretations is beyond the limits of legal scholarship. Footnote 9 When dealing with positive law, the Kelsenian legal scholar uses a special juristic technique, Footnote 10 which does not represent her preferences and value judgements but describes, in an objective manner, how the purposes provided for by the law can be reached by the means provided by the law. When describing positive law, the Kelsenian legal scholar works as a neutral technician of law without getting involved in value choices.
1.2 The practical importance of the value-neutrality of legal scholarship
That ideal of the technocratic legal scholar is, however, open to objections from several directions. Here, we will only mention two of the most frequent comments. The first emphasises the practical importance of value-neutrality in legal scholarship. Kelsen needed the distinction between legal scholarship and legal policy especially in his criticism of traditional legal scholarship dominated by conceptions of legal doctrine. Footnote 11 His main point against doctrinal theories was their claim to be able to assess the ‘rightness’ of law, as well. Such a claim made these theories, which regarded themselves as scientific, easily accessible to the power games of politics, which for Kelsen was the greatest evil legal scholarship could commit—to become a mere means of politics. Thus, one of the key insights of the pure theory of law was that the legal scholar has to keep away from debates about the ‘rightness’ of law, as well as from the power struggles of politics. According to the pure theory, this is the guarantee of the freedom of legal scholarship. Footnote 12 Yet one should not forget that the formalism of the pure theory of law also has a pragmatic aspect. At the time the theory was developed, different conceptions of law, dominated by different ideologies, were struggling in what functioned as the extension of political struggles. In Austria and other German-speaking regions, it was a period of struggle between and dominance of political Catholicism, Austro-Marxism, Bolshevism, and Nazism. Footnote 13 The Liberal revolutionary tradition of 18th- and 19th-century natural law was clearly on the defensive. Under such circumstances, the main mission of Kelsen’s formalist pure theory of law was to protect the very essence of scholarship (i.e., its freedom) against political power. Footnote 14 The definition of the scientific character of the general theory of law is thus not independent of conceptions concerning the value of legal practice. The rejection of political ideologies trying to colonise scholarship is not value-neutral or independent of world views. Taking the value of freedom and independence of scholarship as her starting point brings the formalist Kelsenian legal scholar close to the Liberal democratic model, under attack from the above ideologies. Footnote 15
A related, but more important, methodological objection is that it is not possible to describe positive law without making value choices—Kelsen could not make this description, either. The struggle between the perspectives of the legal scholar and the policy-maker was related, above all, to the analysis of constitutional issues. In this respect, it seems worth while to re-read Kelsen’s 1928 speech on the essence of constitutional review.
2.1 The justification of constitutional review and the practical importance of legal theoretical arguments
One of the main features of Kelsen’s speech Footnote 16 is that it tried to justify constitutional review with legal theoretical theses developed from the perspective of the legal scholar. Kelsen started by identifying different forms of legality. In the formal conception of legality, the criteria of validity for legal rules are always contained by a higher-level rule. From this conception of legal validity the hierarchic structure of the legal order follows, and from the hierarchic structure of the legal order flows the special importance of the constitution. The third pillar of the formal conception of legality is the idea of the unity of the legal order. In Kelsen’s view, the unity of the legal order can be secured only if the norms that violate the hierarchy of the legal order—and cannot be reconciled with the constitution—can be removed from the legal system. In order for the requirement of unity to be fulfilled, constitutional review and the nullification of unconstitutional legal rules (including Acts of Parliament) is necessary.
Thus, Kelsen explained his thesis that the constitution is the basis and foundation of the legal system, as well as the justification of constitutional review, by bringing primarily legal theoretical arguments to support the above propositions. The hierarchic structure of the legal order, the principle of formal validity, and the thesis about the unity of the legal system are referred to the basic principles of the pure theory of law. Yet even behind his fourth and most important argument aimed at justifying the constitutional court, there is the peculiar legal theoretical conception of the Pure Theory of Law. If unconstitutional legal rules cannot be brought under review, then it follows that the constitution has no binding power. However, Kelsen linked the classic argument justifying constitutional review, Footnote 17 according to which the possibility of annulling unconstitutional legal rules ensures the normativity of the constitution, to a conception of normativity, according to which the binding power of the legal rule is expressed by the threat of sanction. Footnote 18
It seems that Kelsen’s legal theoretical arguments in favour of constitutional review are less than convincing.
2.2 The relative difference between validity and normativity
In his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen argues that the validity of a legal norm is always grounded in a higher-level norm. It is the constitution that serves as the final basis of validity for all legal rules. The constitution provides that the legislator has to make law with a specific content—yet it also allows that a law with an unconstitutional content can be valid. In the absence of constitutional review, two contradicting legal rules can be valid parts of the legal system at the same time. According to this argument, then, the main function of constitutional review is to protect the consistence of the legal order. Footnote 19
One of the weak points of the argument of coherence is that Kelsen often blurs the line between the concepts of validity and normativity. According to the Pure Theory of Law, the validity of each legal rule is founded by a higher-level legal rule. It follows from this formal conception that substantive unconstitutionality or illegality does not affect the validity of the legal rule. The content of the law is not unconstitutional until a court of justice recognises that contradiction and annuls the law. Consequently, a substantively unconstitutional rule is, from the Kelsenian perspective of formal validity, still valid according to the constitution. Moreover, even in the absence of constitutional review it is the constitution that is the source of validity for the rules of the legal system. In light of the above, constitutional review does not necessarily follow from the functioning of the hierarchy of legal rules. Formal arguments of legal theory do not suffice to justify constitutional review. Footnote 20
But there is an even deeper problem with Kelsen’s formalist justification. The basic tenet of Kelsen’s criticism against naturalism is that law is a normative practice. What exactly this normativity means in Kelsen’s conception is, however, far from obvious. According to Kelsen, a valid legal rule makes the claim to govern human behaviour: that is, “that a norm possesses validity means that individuals ought to behave as the norm stipulates.” Footnote 21 Elsewhere, however, Kelsen emphasises that there is no difference between the logic of law and morals, and the pure theory of law speaks the language of the general logic of norms. Footnote 22
According to the above, the validity and normativity of the law are still different. It is unclear, however, what the normative logic that is the same for law and morals might be, and how it could help to define and describe the specific normative claims of the law. These contradictions in Kelsen’s theory were highlighted, most prominently, by Joseph Raz. Footnote 23 Arguing against Raz, Stanley Paulson claimed that these contradictions can be solved within Kelsen’s theory. It is only a weak conception of normativity that can be reconciled with Kelsen’s concept of science and his neo-Kantian views (i.e., one that is related to the validity of legal norms rather than the citizens’ duties). Footnote 24 Yet if one approaches the Kelsenian interpretation of normativity from the problems related to the separability of the perspectives of the legal scholar and the policy-maker, then the problems seem to be rather systemic. The formalism of the basic norm is linked to the assumption that valid law can also establish duties for the citizens, while problems related to the justification of these duties are excluded from the questions that can be discussed within legal scholarship. Such confusion in terminology has also contributed to the blurring of limits between legal scholarship and legal policy in Kelsen’s theory, despite his warnings that these should be clearly distinguished.
2.3. Neutralising constitutional review and legal policy
Through his formalist approach, Kelsen basically wanted to highlight the legal character of constitutional review, seeking to demarcate it from legal policy considerations. In connection to that, three kinds of policy considerations can be distinguished. First, the political character of the law may become manifest if we look at law as a decision made in a conflict of interests. When Kelsen warns that the law may become a toy of politics, he means that law may be used in these conflicts of interests and party struggles. A second typical expression of the political character of the law is when legal decision-making is based on some kind of a value choice. Finally, due to Kelsen’s moral relativism, value choices can be nothing else but subjective. When applying the law, these establish a space for discretion, which means a certain exercise of political power. Kelsen tried to interpret constitutional review in a way that neutralises its political character to the greatest extent possible.
The material dimension of legality is filled with content by the general legal principles and general fundamental rights and freedoms declared in constitutions. This conception of legality plays no particular role in Kelsen’s justification of constitutional review but rather presents a major challenge to Kelsen, who seeks to neutralise the political character of constitutional review.
When interpreting the constitutional rules concerning general principles and general freedoms, the legal scholar can distinguish between those provisions thoroughly defined in the constitution and those declared in general terms without precision. In Kelsen’s view, the explication of general concepts not clarified in the constitution belongs to the field of legal policy—even courts are better advised to leave the substantive definition of such concepts to the legislator. Yet Kelsen allows and assumes that it is still possible to provide exact rules on principles and freedoms in the constitution—rules which can be not only described by the legal scholar but also enforced by courts. Of course, there is a grey area between the law that can be described by the legal scholar and the law that can be enforced, which therefore belongs to the field of legal policy. Footnote 25 The judge makes a choice between the possibilities provided by the law, and this choice gives an individual legal rule its political character. The question is whether the criteria of the ‘right’ decision can be discerned from the perspective of the legal scholar, as well as how far the decision depends on the value choices and discretionary decisions of legal policy. The interpretation of Kelsen’s relationship to legal policy is made difficult by the fact that in the Pure Theory of Law, he does not distinguish clearly between the political character of legislation and the application of law. Conversely, in his discussion of the rationale of constitutional review, he seeks to make a sharper distinction between the two.
The above remarks are meant to show that one of the main aims of Kelsenian legal theory—the separation of legal scholarship and legal policy—has brought a rather controversial result. The difficulty of keeping policy considerations aside becomes particularly visible in the explanation of the rationale of constitutional review. Kelsen’s legal theoretical arguments for the necessity of constitutional review are either at odds with other arguments he developed elsewhere or too fragmentary to be convincing. The contradiction in his use of legal theoretical arguments may be related to the practical problems he attempted to conceptually analyse as a legal scholar. In this sense, scholarly analysis has a practical horizon. As far as space permits, I shall now highlight three practical aspects that influenced Kelsenian theories.
3.1 Constitutional monarchy vs constitutional democracy
In the constitutional life of the first Austrian republic, as well as in Kelsen’s work, the distinction between democracy and autocracy is of key importance. In the beginning, the criticism of constitutional monarchy played an important role, as did the later rejection of militant autocratic aspirations. In Kelsen’s works it is primarily his criticism of Laband and Jellinek that shows the importance of that distinction—which also plays an analytic role in his speech on the Constitutional Court. Footnote 26 Here, Kelsen keenly refers to the difference between the concepts of constitutionality in a constitutional monarchy and a constitutional democracy, respectively, and between the legal theory of the state and the legal theory of constitutional democracy:
The constitutional monarchy developed from absolute monarchy, and its doctrine is therefore often guided by the aim to make reduction of power that formerly unlimited monarch had suffered as a result of the change of constitution appear as small or insignificant as possible, or even to veil it altogether. Even in an absolute monarchy, it is theoretically possible to distinguish between the levels of the constitution and that of the statute. But this distinction is practically insignificant…. Footnote 27
Kelsen later defined the concept of constitution in a way that made the distinction of constitution and statutes necessary, even for a formal interpretation. Thus, Kelsen excluded the practice of constitutional monarchy from the relevant practices, even at the level of general conceptual definitions. For Kelsen, the ‘actual’ and ‘original’ conception of the constitution was based on a conceptual distinction between the constitution and statutes. That is far from obvious, unless one takes the revolutionary democratic constitution of the young Austrian or German republic as the basis of a legal system.
3.2. Kelsen as a Liberal activist constitutional judge
When Robert Walter’s short monograph on Kelsen’s work as a constitutional judge came out, Footnote 28 many were surprised by the picture emerging from it. The fervent formalist scholar, when acting as a constitutional judge, represented an extremely active Liberal stance in the protection of rights and was not afraid of some activism for a more efficient protection. Kelsen consistently fought censorship, arguing in debates within the court that the prohibition of censorship also applies for theatres. Footnote 29 He held the position that the right to property is a human right, rather than one of citizens. Footnote 30 When ruling that prohibiting women from driving taxi violates the principle of equality, Footnote 31 the court adopted Kelsen’s argument that the discrimination of women is admissible only if justified by differences related to sex. Footnote 32
In matters related to the freedom of religion and conscience, Kelsen too advocated the expansionist view. In a case where the issue was whether a child under seven years remains within a religious community if her parents leave the same community and thus become legally non-religious, Footnote 33 the ministry argued that the parents’ decision does not affect the religious affiliation of the child, and therefore the latter does not become non-religious. However, the judges, sharing Kelsen’s view, held that the ministry violated the parents’ freedom of religion by keeping the child in the religious community by state power. Footnote 34 According to Kelsen, another violation of the freedom of religion was prohibiting children between 7 and 14 years from changing their religion. Footnote 35
In a case related to the freedom of speech, the Ministry of Education had forbidden one of their officers to take position on the ministry’s policies in a lecture. Footnote 36 The court ruled that this was a case of violation of the freedom of expression, but the votes were split as to whether political rights were violated as well. Kelsen advocated a broad interpretation of political rights, to include the freedom of expression alongside the right to vote. Footnote 37 In separate dissenting opinion, Kelsen argued that a misapplication of the Associations Act always meant a violation of the freedom of association. Footnote 38
The aforementioned judgements show that Kelsen had a rather clear view (albeit one which did not appear in his scholarship) on what direction substantive constitutional interpretation should take. Examination of his judicial practice is also interesting because it nuances Kelsen’s repeatedly expressed mistrust of the interpretation of general principles in the constitution. Footnote 39 Yet the latter means rather that these general principles should be formulated sparingly in the constitution, since the scope of discrimination thus obtained may give too much weight to the constitutional court against Parliament. As the above examples show, however, this does not mean that Kelsen would not accept a practice of expanding rights and their protection in terms of constitutional freedoms. As can be observed in the much-debated case of the Dispensehe, Kelsen did not hesitate to appear as an activist if the strengthening of individual rights protection was at stake. Footnote 40
The problem of the marriages concluded on dispensation resulted from Sect. 62 of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB), according to which Christians could not re-marry. The possibility of separation “from bed and board” did not mean the dissolution of the marriage. Consequently, a second marriage would be invalid. Sect. 83 of the ABGB, however, allowed for the conclusion of a second marriage on exceptionally important grounds. Decisions on such dispensations belonged to the administration of the federal states. After 1919, the exceptional clause came into general use. In particular, the head of the government (Landeshauptmann) of Niederösterreich and member of the Social Democratic Party, Albert Sever, issued huge number of such dispensations from the impediments of marriage. Footnote 41 The legal confusion was due to the fact that courts started to declare these administrative acts invalid. This happened primarily in cases in which the court did not find it proven that the first marriage was dissolved with full consent of the parties. Yet Sect. 68 of the Austrian General Administrative Procedure Act (AVG) provided that administrative acts could be declared invalid only by superior administrative organs. The debate focused on the issue of whether a judicial decision declaring an administrative act unlawful had any effect on the binding power of that act. It was far from obvious, however, whether the constitutional court was authorised to adjudicate on that question. At first, the constitutional court was reluctant to interpret the debate between the court and the administration as a competence conflict. Kelsen, however, did not agree and argued that there was in fact an indirect conflict of competencies. He managed to win a majority for his position, according to which the constitutional court could decide that it had the competence to adjudicate upon the debate. From Kelsen’s memoirs we know that he was approached by one of his former pupils, a solicitor, who asked for his advice on the problem of Dispensehe. The solicitor had several clients whose dispensations were declared invalid by the courts. In these cases, the possibility of judicial review meant a serious blackmail potential for the ex-spouses, thus bringing newly-wed couples into a rather precarious situation. Kelsen suggested that the solicitor should make a complaint, interpreting the case as one of competence conflict, and promised that he would try to win the majority for that position. Footnote 42 So it happened. The constitutional court overruled the court decision in the respective case, declared the administrative act as valid, and consequently that both the dispensation and the second marriage were valid. Footnote 43
Kelsen’s opinion provoked wide legal and political controversy. Many thought that his position on the indirect competence conflict was unconvincing, as the constitutional court had no authority to adjudicate on the question. Footnote 44 This was nothing else than competence-activism: by no means a formalist practice, but rather, as the judges supporting it called it themselves, some kind of a “creative interpretation.” Footnote 45 Although Kelsen kept on referring to the importance of the unity of the legal system, his memoirs seem to suggest that he regarded the case as a latent fundamental-right issue. What he tried to remedy—to some extent at least—in such cases was the lack of civil marriage, seeking to show the way towards the recognition of the right to marriage.
Christian Socialists were deeply upset by this practice of the constitutional court, and Kelsen, together with the majority of judges now labelled as Social Democrats, found himself in the role of scapegoat. Footnote 46 It was partly due to that affair that the 1929 constitutional amendment changed the rules of appointing constitutional judges, in the spirit of “depoliticisation.” Judges previously appointed for life, including Kelsen, lost their post. Footnote 47 Kelsen was not appointed member of the new Court, and he left Austria in 1930, when he moved to Cologne. Footnote 48
3.3 Legal theoretical problems of constitutional criticism
One of the biggest challenges when trying to separate the roles of the legal scholar and the policy-maker is the formulation of concerns against the substantive lawfulness of a constitutional amendment. On occasion of the 1929 amendment, Kelsen had to face such a challenge, not only because he was the main target of the changes made by the constitution-making majority to the provisions related to the constitutional court, but also because these changes affected the very character of the constitution. Footnote 49 To Kelsen, however, that formal constitution-amending majority had no legitimacy. In his view, one of the most important features of the 1929 reform was the rejection of the principle according to which constitutional amendments had to be grounded in a consensus between the majority and the minority. Footnote 50 What makes this remark of Kelsen interesting is that formally, there was a consensus, with the Social Democrats voting for the constitutional amendment. Yet Kelsen’s point was that the consent was not the result of a free decision, but rather the exploitation of power imbalance. The Social Democrats’ consent was, on the one hand, not independent of threats received from the Heimwehr. On the other hand, the constitutional amendment clearly served the purpose of power maximisation. The Christian Socialist majority tried to rescind and limit the power and influence of the Social Democrats in Vienna. The modification of the federal system, by which Vienna basically lost its autonomy that had been equal to the other federal states, served that goal. Footnote 51
The constitutional reform meant the ‘Weimarisation’ of the Austrian constitution, with the Federal President being the main beneficiary of the changes. Yet what mattered for Kelsen was not the formal rearrangement of the institutional system, but rather the fact that all the changes were motivated by the efforts of the Christian bourgeois parties to make the most of their majority support. These efforts were crowned by the amendments abolishing minority veto against constitutional amendments, making it possible to amend the constitution by a simple majority (instead of two thirds). Footnote 52
In Kelsen’s view, these provisions eroded democracy itself, not just parliamentarism. A fake parliamentarism—one similar to that of the Horthy regime in Hungary—was emerging, intended as a facade for the majority dictatorship. Footnote 53 The essence of democracy, for Kelsen, was the continuous compromise between majority and minority. Footnote 54
In his speech on constitutional review, Kelsen argued that the unconstitutionality of an act of parliament can be eliminated if it is passed as a constitutional amendment. Elsewhere he writes that it is a condition of the validity of the constitution that we regard it as an act of legislation. This is what we find as a formal requirement, and in case of the 1929 amendment there can be no doubt that it was, in the formal sense, a legislative act. In the conceptual world of the legal scholar, that seems to be a logical conclusion.
However, Kelsen’s texts also allow us to reconstruct another substantive requirement, one that is linked to the concept of democratic constitution. According to this, a constitutional amendment that is aimed at the oppression of the minority cannot qualify as part of a democratic constitution. Such a conclusion is of importance for the Kelsenian legal scholar, as well, since we have seen that the legislation-centred theory of the Pure Theory of Law is only relevant under a democratic constitution.
4. Conclusion
It is now time to pull together and formulate some conclusions. In this paper I tried to argue that Kelsen did not succeed in separating the perspectives of the legal scholar and the policy-maker in his theory in a consistent manner. His scholarly project is directed not only to the description of legal practice, but is also influenced by substantive criteria of justification, when interpreting and selecting the concepts used. I have shown three arguments to support that claim:
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(1) Kelsen’s theory is not as general as he claims: the autocratic state is not an object that can be described by it, but a target of substantive criticism.
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(2) In Kelsen’s view, legal formalism can be sacrificed if the substantive goals of law so require.
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(3) In Kelsen’s political conception, legal formalism is valuable only if there is an underlying democratic compromise.
There are interpretations that seek to eliminate the contradictions between Kelsen’s theory of law and his theory of democracy within a coherent substantive theory. Such a theory would show the outlines of a utopia of legalism based on the recognition of the principle of equality before the law to the greatest extent possible. That might even be a certain kind of political legitimacy. Footnote 55 In this paper, however, it was not my aim to argue for such a substantive interpretation. What I wanted to emphasise, instead, was that conceptual contradictions, unanswered questions, and suppressed substantive assumptions in Kelsen’s work point out the fundamental weaknesses of the Pure Theory of Law, and that these are related to an untenable conception of legal scholarship.
My attempt at interpreting Kelsen was based on the insight that the hermeneutical situation that makes any scholarship of public law possible has a decisive influence on the conceptual framework of legal theories aimed at grounding the legal arguments related to positive public law. The theories concerned are not only doctrinal ones, but also conceptual theories examining the general characteristics of the state or the general binding power of the law. Behind the constructs of legal theory, there is always a practical problem that needs to be responded to. To be able to understand the meaning of theoretical constructs, one needs to clarify the basic questions of legal practice that were meant to be answered by those theoretical constructs. In my view, the protection of the democratic constitution against the continuous post-monarchic and autocratic solutions of public law played such a role in shaping Kelsen’s theory. Another constant challenge was to find generally acceptable public-law solutions for a society that had been deeply divided politically as well as in terms of world views. The case of the Dispensehe is a typical example of that general problem of public law. The controversy about the constitutional amendment of 1929 was part of the final stage in the history of the first Austrian republic. Here, the fundamental question is what the perspective of the legal scholar has to offer in a situation where the foundations of the constitution are under a cross-fire of criticism. Is it possible to distance oneself from political debates in such a situation? In respect of these questions, I tend to accept the following statement of Ronald Dworkin, referring it to Kelsen’s theoretical efforts: ‘a general theory about how valid law is identified […] is not a neutral description of legal practice, but an interpretation of it that aims not just to describe but to justify it—to show why the practice is valuable and how it should be conducted so as to protect and enhance that value’ Footnote 56 Joseph Raz does not go that far, but he acknowledges, too, that ‘one can defend the doctrine of nature of law itself without using evaluative (though not necessarily moral) arguments.’ Footnote 57 Although Raz’s and Dworkin’s views point to the same direction, it is important to note that Raz does not think that evaluative considerations of general theories were necessarily related to the justification of practice. Footnote 58
It does not seem particularly difficult to show that Raz’s insights also apply to the conceptual framework of Kelsen’s general theory. Dworkin’s point, which I adopt for the sake of argument, may be more challenging: Kelsen’s theory does not only serve to describe a practice, but it also assumes the substantive justifiability of that practice. It has to be emphasised, however, that the traces of requirements of substantive justifiability are to be regarded rather as the weak points of Kelsen’s legal theoretical efforts, however respectable they seem for us. Moreover, they lead us to a methodological insight that emphasises the interpretive character of lawyers’ knowledge. Footnote 59
Kelsen did not succeed in keeping the roles of the legal scholar and the policy-maker apart. Yet it is not sure that that can be done. As Christoph Möllers pointed out, it is one of the main characteristics of public law scholarship that descriptive and evaluative statements are difficult to distinguish. In public law debates, even descriptive statements can be used to advocate a view. Footnote 60 This insight also applies to Kelsen’s efforts.
