Over the last few years, “poverty” has reemerged as a public priority and a national political issue in the United States. This is not surprising. Poverty rates have steadily risen over the last four years, and as of 2010, a record 46 million Americans were living below the poverty line. Yet despite the fact that there appears to be widespread agreement that rising poverty is a problem, there is nothing close to agreement on what to do about it. This is the subject of Lane Kenworthy's important and timely book.
Specifically, Kenworthy seeks to determine what types of policies are best able to lift the standard of living among the poor. As in his most recent book on strategies for increasing employment growth (Jobs with Equality, 2008), Kenworthy's recommendations are based on the experiences of 20 affluent democracies, including the United States, over the last three decades. The conclusions reached in this book are driven by the results of a series of analyses that rely on simple scatterplots as well as more sophisticated multivariate methods. Despite its heavy reliance on data analysis, Progress for the Poor is highly readable and engaging (all of the technical details are relegated to a lengthy appendix). The results of these analyses, and the policy recommendations they support, are sure to stir controversy among policymakers and scholars alike.
Kenworthy begins by testing one of the most popular policy prescriptions for alleviating poverty—economic growth. As Ronald Reagan so famously argued to justify his supply-side economic policies, “a rising tide lifts all boats.” Does it? According to Kenworthy, on average it does. When the data are aggregated across all countries, he finds that “an increase of $10,000 in per capita GDP is associated with a rise of about $3,000 in income for a tenth-percentile household with a single person and $6,000 for a household with four persons” (p. 9). However, when the analysis is conducted on a country-by-country basis, there is significant variation in the relationship between growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, for several countries economic growth is at best weakly related to the income levels of the poor. Unsurprisingly, this group of countries includes the United States.
What separates these two sets of countries? To answer this question, Kenworthy takes a closer look at the possible mechanisms through which economic growth might operate to lift the incomes of the poor. The conventional wisdom is that economic growth will “trickle down” to the poor through higher wages and/or increased employment. However, this is not what has happened. Among these 20 affluent countries, economic growth has not led to substantial increases in market income. Rather, where the income of the poor has increased in response to economic growth, it has occurred primarily due to increases in government transfers. As the author concludes, “When growth has trickled down to the poor, government transfers have been the principal conduit” (p. 17).
In the remainder of the book, Kenworthy presents additional evidence to support his primary conclusion regarding the central importance of government social spending in reducing poverty. In the process, he offers an empirical evaluation of several other strategies for poverty reduction. The results of these analyses are equally surprising and challenge the conventional wisdom on both the right and the left. For example, in successive chapters, he concludes that the growth of the low-wage sector is not an impediment to poverty reduction, that targeted rather than universalistic social-welfare programs may be the best strategy for social-welfare investment, and that the progressivity of a country's tax system does little to help the poor.
In the final chapters, Kenworthy addresses two lingering questions that will undoubtedly be raised, given his empirical results. First, what about potential trade-offs? Should we expect greater investment in social programs to slow economic growth? The answer is a resounding “no.” In fact, the opposite seems to be true. Countries that have invested heavily in their welfare state over the last three decades have generally displayed the strongest growth and prosperity. This should come as no surprise to comparative scholars as this finding has been supported elsewhere, including the very thorough analysis presented in Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy Smeeding's excellent book, which covers some of the same ground (Wealth and Welfare States: Is America a Laggard or Leader? [2010]). Not only is social-welfare investment positively related to growth, but it is also associated with a number of other positive social and political outcomes.
While Kenworthy may be able to persuade scholars that greater social-welfare investment is sound policy, convincing voters and elected officials is another matter. Recognizing this potential obstacle, the author addresses the question of political feasibility in the final chapter, focusing his attention on the United States. He recognizes that there are many political obstacles to greater investment in the US welfare state, including its relatively decentralized structure, the lack of a strong left party, and a privatized campaign finance system, among others. Yet he argues that there is a “ray of hope” in that the American public is supportive of “increased government spending on programs perceived to enhance opportunity and economic security” (p. 108). And after all, who would have thought that a successful, bipartisan antipoverty campaign could have been waged in Great Britain? As Kenworthy concludes, “This experience suggests reason for optimism—guarded, to be sure, but genuine—about prospects for the future” (p. 109).
Unfortunately, most scholars of American politics will not share this optimism. In fact, we need only look at the current political environment to confirm a more pessimistic view. Barack Obama is credited with one of the most significant expansions of social welfare-programs in recent history in the form of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). What has been the outcome of this “natural experiment” in social-welfare expansion? Despite the fact that ARRA prevented several million Americans from falling into poverty, and even though the increase in social-welfare spending represented by ARRA was relatively modest compared to other periods of expansion (e.g., Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty), the political backlash among American voters has been so severe that it has helped fuel a new political movement (the Tea Party).
There is little doubt that Americans will support programs that they perceive as “enhance[ing] economic opportunity and economic security,” as Kenworthy claims. The problem is that most Americans do not perceive social-welfare programs in that way, and there is no reason to expect this to change anytime soon. Yet if there is any chance at all of a change in the political climate, it will happen only if the public discourse comes to be characterized more by empirical evidence and reason and less by stereotypes and misinformation. And for this reason, we need more books like Progress for the Poor to receive attention, not just from scholars but from elected voters and elected officials as well.
