Although there is no multilateral treaty regulating the identity of governments and their recognition by states and international organisations (IOs) in international law, this book, authored by Niko Pavlopoulos (a legal officer at the International Court of Justice), provides a detailed doctrinal study of these issues. It not only identifies that customary international law (CIL) offers an objective framework for determining the identity of a state’s government but also positively affirms that states do not have unfettered discretion in deciding whether to recognise a particular entity as the government of another state.

Chapter 1 underscores the book’s essence by situating it within the existing literature on the subject. Chapter 2 provides a detailed conceptual study of what constitutes the “government” of a state, who can represent it before the states and the IOs, and what its importance is in international law and politics. Chapter 3 examines the issue of government recognition, including its nature, modes, and meaning, and outlines the significance of the institution of government recognition. The most interesting part of this chapter lies in its analysis of the legality of practices concerning the recognition of governmental status. Chapter 4 assesses the criteria for governmental status in international law. These criteria include a claim to governmental status, autonomy (or effective control over territory and population), constitutionality, democratic representativity, and willingness or ability to ensure compliance with international law. Chapter 5 addresses the representation of a state through its government before the IOs. It identifies the relevant practices of IOs concerning the recognition of the government and the limitation on the state’s participation.

Although the book appears to have made a significant contribution by clarifying some of the ever-unresolved and even untouched issues (at least untouched by the International Law Commission in its efforts towards “progressive development of international law and its codification”) concerning government recognition, this book lacks the doctrinal insights necessary to address the structural problems associated with the issue of government recognition. These structural problems hinge on the tension between states’ discretion to decide whether or not to recognise a particular government and the extent to which international law circumscribes such discretion. Although international law does not regulate this discretion, it certainly governs the international legal consequences that may arise when states exercise it, including the decision to either recognise a government or deny governmental status to such an entity.Footnote ¹ In the absence of a treaty and well-defined rules of CIL regulating the issue of government recognition, the book could have proposed – given the existing grey area – how the current legal doctrines might be used to negotiate a framework convention on government recognition. Such a framework convention could assist states in determining which entity should be recognised as a government when two competing claims are presented. Instead of addressing this issue, this book argues that, unlike a constitutional claimant, an unconstitutional claimant attains governmental status only when it enjoys effective control over the state’s territory and population. Furthermore, the book concludes that the elements of democratic representativity and the willingness or ability to ensure compliance with international law do not constitute the criteria for a government to qualify for governmental status in CIL. While these findings may be grounded in the select international legal practices, they fall short of addressing the issues concerning “adverse international consequences” that may arise if both the constitutional claimant in exile and the unconstitutional claimant exercising effective control claim to be the government of a state. This issue becomes particularly pressing when the unconstitutional claimant (for instance, the Taliban government in Afghanistan or the military junta in Myanmar) continues to violate international obligations of erga omnes or jus cogens nature, such as the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable sections of society. Therefore, the existing and potentially emerging legal doctrines on government recognition must be codified, just as the uncertainties relating to the concept of state recognition were clarified through the codification of states’ rights and duties in the Montevideo Convention of 1933.