Thirty years of spectacular economic growth have produced a sizeable new business class of private entrepreneurs in China. Since the early 1990s, “the number of private enterprises increased by 35 percent annually and now totals over 5 million,” and the private sector now accounts for “66 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 71 percent of tax revenues” (p. 1). After years of debate, in November 2002, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially permitted the capitalist class of private entrepreneurs to become party members.
Against this background, Allies of the State asks three critical questions on the emergence and growth of China's private entrepreneurs and prospects for democratic change: “Do capitalists support fundamental political change toward democracy in China? Why do or do they not support such a change? And how do their political attitudes—such as those toward the party-state and toward democracy—and their institutional connections with the party-state influence their political activities?” (p. 148).
Jie Chen and Bruce Dickson's theoretically informed and empirically rigorous analysis provides answers to the above questions by using a unique dataset obtained in 2006 and 2007 from a representative sample survey of private entrepreneurs in five coastal provinces—Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong—where about 70 percent of China's private entrepreneurs are located.
After providing theoretical and historical contexts for the interplay among economic development, private entrepreneurs, and political change in China (Introduction and Chapter 2), Chen and Dickson analyze the political embeddedness of China's capitalists (Chapter 3). The authors first focus on internal institutional ties between the party-state and the capitalists, that is, private entrepreneurs’ memberships in the party and various levels of governmental institutions. They found that about 38 percent were CCP members (“red capitalists”), about 18 percent were deputies to the National People's Congress or subnational People's Congresses (PCs), and about 21 percent were members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference or its subnational branches. The second dimension concerns the external institutional links through business organizations, both government-sanctioned—e.g., All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), Private Enterprises Association (PEA)—and self-organized. The survey shows that about 78 percent belonged to the ACFIC and/or PEA, while about 39 percent belonged to self-organized associations. Only 19 percent of the capitalists in their survey did not belong to any business associations. These data clearly show that the degree of political embeddedness among China's private entrepreneurs is extremely high, and the CCP has effectively integrated the capitalists into its political system.
In Chapter 4, Chen and Dickson go on to focus on the level and determinants of democratic support. The analysis in this chapter provides a nuanced finding that most private entrepreneurs support multicandidate elections under the one-party system, but they do not support more fundamental democratization such as multiparty competition and the right to demonstrate or form non-governmental organizations. The answer to the first key question above, then, is negative: “China's capitalists tend to be more conservative and status quo oriented and hence are less likely to serve as agents of democratization in China” (p. 151). As for the determinants of democratic support, the authors found that the private entrepreneurs' financial and value connections (e.g., receiving loans from state-controlled banks, belief in the state's leadership role, positive evaluation of government's policy performance, perception of the pace of political reform as appropriate) negatively correlated with the democratic attitudes as measured by support for competitive elections, support for a multiparty system, and the valuation of individual liberty (p. 72).
In Chapter 5, Chen and Dickson zero in on the variation in levels of regime support among the private entrepreneurs by examining their attitudes directly toward the CCP. The main conclusion is that the majority of private entrepreneurs support the existing political system backed by key values and political institutions of the CCP regime. The authors extend the argument by carefully teasing out the factors that affect the variation in levels of regime support. One key finding is that subjective values are the strongest predictor of regime support; life satisfaction and approval of policy performance increased the level of regime support, while democratic values and discontent with corruption decreased support. Another important finding is that, controlling for other variables, political embeddedness does not increase regime support.
In Chapter 6, Chen and Dickson analyze the political activities of China's capitalists as measured by the four clusters of “(1) voting in local PC elections, (2) direct action (contacting officials and engaging in collective action), (3) indirect action (contacting media and submitting petitions), and (4) supporting academic activities” (p. 153). The analysis shows that democratic support does not lead to voting in local PC elections and direct action, while it leads to indirect action and supporting of academic activities.
Chen and Dickson's findings are consistent throughout the book. China's private entrepreneurs do not support fundamental political change toward democracy. This is quite consistent with Bruce Dickson's earlier works, as well as other existing research that has emphasized the mutual empowerment of economic and political elites in the Chinese market transition. Allies of the State, however, breaks new ground in its use of a more comprehensive dataset of large representative samples covering wide regional variation in levels of economic development and various sizes of private enterprises. In addition, their operationalization of key variables including democratic support is more rigorous than in past studies. This book is an exemplar on many counts, and I recommend it without hesitation. Much can be learned from it by scholars working in Chinese politics, political sociology, democratization, and market transition. The book's clear presentation of data, methods, and theory also makes it suitable to the classroom, including courses on methods and research design in sociology and political science, in addition to courses in Chinese and comparative politics.
