The first wave of academic writings on Islamists emerged in the Arab world after the war of June 1967 and the subsequent resurfacing of religious ideologies and religiously inspired social and political movements. Examples in this first wave include works by the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm, the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi, and the Moroccan historian ʿAbdullah al-ʿArawi.Footnote 1 These writings advanced three insights. First, the rise of “religious movements,” “religious currents,” and “religious ideologies”—the term islāmī or Islamist was yet to be coined—was seen by some writers as a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the secular state and the secular idea of Pan-Arabism. Second, other writers accused Arab ruling establishments in modernizing countries—the reference was primarily to post-1967 Egypt—of using religious currents and ideologies to enhance the state's popularity and legitimacy in times of crisis. Third, Wahhabism and petrodollars were held responsible by some for the resurfacing of religious currents and their increased appeal in the contest with secular ideas. Most of the writings of the first wave were Egypt centered and were clearly inspired by an antireligious sentiment that saw religious movements and currents as representing an existential threat to secular modernization and progress.
A second wave of academic writings emerged after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981. This wave was distinctive in two ways. First, it introduced new terms, such as islāmī and uṣūlī (fundamentalist). These terms, while used systematically in the writings, had multiple meanings and connotations ranging from rejectionist attitudes toward modernity to true adherence to the principles of Islam. Second, in contrast to the first wave, which was led by philosophers, the second wave was dominated by scholars in the social and political sciences. Examples include the Egyptian sociologist Saʿad al-Din Ibrahim and the Sudanese sociologist Haydar Ibrahim ʿAli.Footnote 2
The second wave also saw strong elements of continuity with the first. Apart from a few empirical studies—such as Ibrahim's analysis of the Egyptian al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad GroupFootnote 3—the contributions of social scientists did not disrupt the focus on Islamist discourses and the conceptions of religion, state, society, and citizenship embedded in them. As a result, hardly any insights were offered with regard to what religious movements—now dubbed Islamist movements—do on the ground, whether in terms of their proselytizing activities or their social and political activism. Furthermore, although a few Islamist voices as well as religious scholars began to participate in the debate,Footnote 4 the anti-Islamist sentiment continued. Islamists, whether the al-Jihad Group or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, or Jordan, were reduced in most writings to proponents of antimodernist (irrational) currents or violent ideologies that threatened to destabilize Arab societies and disrupt their progress. Only scholarship such as Ibrahim's aforementioned study of Egyptian Islamists, which focused on the actual activities and ideas of the movements, was inspired by the life-cycle approach and attempted to offer empirically substantiated insights into the dynamics of Islamist social activism and politics.
The third, and ongoing, wave of writings on Islamists started in the first half of the 1990s. It has been inspired by civil society and democratization debates and by the limited political openings in some Arab countries through which Islamist parties and movements started to contest elections. Various edited volumes have compared Islamists in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, and Kuwait, among other countries. Substantiated by empirical insights, election analyses, and public opinion surveys, the current wave focuses on (a) the dynamics and evolution of Islamist electoral participation and its impact on Islamist parties and movementsFootnote 5; (b) the elements of Islamists’ representation in parliaments: for example, their platforms and patterns of interaction with ruling establishments and nonreligious opposition forces and the successes and shortcomings of their participation in parliamentsFootnote 6; (c) the sociological profile of different Islamist constituencies in various Arab countries, a component that challenges the traditional association of Islamists with the poor, marginalized, and irrationalFootnote 7; (d) the linkages between and impacts of Islamist political activism and Islamist proselytizing and social activitiesFootnote 8; and (e) continuity and change in Islamist discourses on religion, state, and society along with the positions of Islamist parties and movements on key social, economic, and political issues.Footnote 9
Recent writings by scholars in the Arab world have emphasized the local specificities of Islamist movements and have taken into account the different contexts in which Islamists operate, avoiding imposing an Egypt-inspired model on other cases. They have also avoided overpoliticizing Islamism and reducing Islamists simply to political actors. Contemporary Arab analysis has instead offered informative and substantiated insights into the dynamics of electoral participation of Islamists and their constituencies. Questions of ideological moderation in Islamist parties and movements, how moderation relates to patterns of participation in politics and social activism, and the impacts of inclusionary and exclusionary treatment of Islamists by ruling establishments—all inspired to an extent by Western writings—have clearly structured these writings.
Although Arab scholars of Islamism have done increasingly well in moving beyond the normative anti-Islamist sentiment of the early stages of literature on the subject—analyzing the political components of Islamism, understanding how Islamists promote the interests and values of their constituencies, and focusing on how the political and nonpolitical components of Islamist activism interact and affect each other—Arab writings still betray some critical gaps. First, the linkages and interrelations between Islamists and other religious groups such as Salafi and Sufi movements have only rarely been explored.Footnote 10 Second, Arab scholars are only beginning to grasp how the discursive shifts and tactical maneuvers of Islamist parties and movements relate to the dynamics of the wider public and political space. Third, Arab writings have not exhausted the life-cycle approach, which has been limited primarily to the different Muslim Brotherhoods across the region.
