2. The Opacity Thesis

A central tenet of Kant’s moral philosophy is that an action is morally good or has moral worth only if it is performed from duty, or respect for the law. For example, ‘(morality), moral worth, must be placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for the sake of the law alone’ (CPrR, 5: 81). Accordingly, to appraise an action as morally good, one must judge that it was performed from duty. As Kant says,

Kant does not explain how we can recognize or judge that an action was performed from duty in order to appraise it as morally good. Rather, he expresses scepticism about our ability to make moral appraisals. As mentioned in the introduction, he endorses the Opacity Thesis, the claim that it is impossible for human beings to know whether any action is morally good.

One reason Kant gives for the Opacity Thesis is that human beings cannot experience the presence or absence of the inner, subjective grounds of action.Footnote ³ He claims that ‘we can never, even by the most strenuous examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives’ (G, 4: 407). Consequently, we can never rule out the possibility that inclinations, such as fear of embarrassment or concern for reputation, had an influence on the will: ‘the non-existence of something (and so too of a covertly thought advantage) cannot be an object of experience’ (TP, 8: 284). Thus, even where an action appears as ‘so great a sacrifice’ that nothing

This means one can never be certain that an action is morally good, or has moral worth, because ‘when moral worth is at issue what counts is not the actions, which one sees, but the inner principles, which one does not see’ (G, 4: 407).

Another reason Kant gives for the Opacity Thesis is that human beings have a tendency to deceive themselves in making moral appraisals. In the Religion, he explains that part of the ‘frailty of human nature … [is] its dishonesty in not screening incentives’ (Rel, 6: 37). This prompts ‘so many human beings’ to feel justified before the law so long as their actions do not have ‘evil consequences’ (Rel, 6: 38). Kant claims that this dishonesty with ourselves eventually leads to ‘falsity or deception of others. … puts out of tune the moral ability to judge what to think of a human being, and renders any imputability entirely uncertain, whether internal or external’ (Rel, 6: 38). Self-deception in our moral appraisals of others is also a consequence of the fact that we are partial to ourselves. Kant claims in the Religion that ‘one is never more easily deceived than in what promotes a good opinion of oneself’ (Rel, 6: 68). This, in conjunction with our tendency to compare ourselves to others, explains why we ‘notice the other’s failings more shrewdly than his merits, in order to put him down’ (Eth-Vigil, 27: 678–9), or ‘try to discover … some fault in [others] to compensate us for the humiliation that comes upon us through such an example [of their merit]’ (CPrR, 5: 77).

In sum, our lack of relevant experience and tendency to self-deception imply the Opacity Thesis, that it is impossible to know whether an action is performed from duty, and thus whether it is morally good.

3. Moral Appraisals of Others

Kant’s accounts of moral education, a kind of respect for others, and gratitude each rely on the assumption that we do in fact see or judge others to have acted from duty. In this section, I will review each of these accounts in turn and explain how they appear to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis.

Kant sets out a detailed two-stage method of moral education in the ‘Doctrine of method of pure practical reason’, the second part of the second Critique. He explains that at the first stage, a pupil makes ‘appraisal of actions by moral laws a natural occupation’ in her ‘own free actions as well as [in her] observation of those of others’ (CPrR, 5: 159). She considers whether the actions she observes conform to the moral law, and in doing so, she learns to distinguish between different duties. At the second stage of the method, the pupil considers whether the actions were ‘also done (subjectively) for the sake of the moral law’ (CPrR, 5: 159). She is expected to draw her attention to ‘the purity of the will … insofar as in an action from duty no incentives of inclination have any influence on it as determining grounds’ (CPrR 5: 160).

Whether Kant’s account of moral education stands in tension with the Opacity Thesis depends on how the second stage of the method is understood. This stage must not require a pupil to directly cognize inner motivational states, since that is incompatible with the Opacity Thesis. Perhaps this stage simply requires a pupil to consider the subjective grounds of action in fictional examples. If that were the case, she would not have to somehow discern that actions she observes were performed from duty. Instead, this could be stipulated in advance by an educator presenting examples. Kant’s suggestion that educators should ‘activate their pupils’ appraisal’ by presenting examples found in ‘biographies of ancient and modern times’ as instances of morally good conduct and his own presentation of a quasi-historical example support this understanding (CPrR, 5: 154–7). Nevertheless, the purpose Kant assigns to the second stage indicates that he also expects pupils to recognize that actions were performed from duty in empirical examples. Paul Guyer (Reference Guyer2012: 134) stresses this point, noting that because the purpose of the second stage is to teach ‘the real rather than merely logical possibility of virtue, that is … the real possibility of our freedom to comply with the moral law … it is crucial that this aspect of moral education … employ actual and not just hypothetical examples of human conduct’.

Thus rather than merely attending to the presentation of fictional examples of actions and accepting, by hypothesis, that they were performed from duty, the second stage of Kant’s method requires a pupil to consider whether empirical examples of human action were ‘done (subjectively) for the sake of the moral law’ (CPrR, 5: 159). This understanding of the second stage does not yet generate any tension with the Opacity Thesis. Perhaps a pupil is merely required to make some sort of inference that the actions she observes were performed from duty. This is consistent with Kant’s intriguing claim earlier in the second Critique that ‘[a]ctions of others … [may leave] traces suggesting that they were done wholly from respect for duty’ (CPrR, 5: 85). However, there are at least two significant problems with understanding the second stage in terms of making inferences from traces. First, Kant does not elaborate on the notion of traces. In the Religion, he states that ‘we can draw inferences regarding the [moral] disposition only on the basis of actions (which are its appearances)’ (Rel, 6: 70ff.). Any reasonable inference from outer experience of actions to inner motives would be rendered impossible by underdetermination. Thus with regard to one’s fundamental moral disposition, ‘the unavoidable consequence of a rational estimate of our moral state is a feeling of hopelessness’ (Rel, 6: 71). And more generally, ‘it is always doubtful whether [an action] is actually done from duty’ (G, 4: 407). The second problem with this understanding of the second stage is that it is not consistent with the description Kant provides. Kant’s language of ‘observation’ and claim that the ‘second exercise … draw[s] attention, in the lively presentation of the moral disposition in examples’, suggest that something other than inferences from traces is involved at this stage of the method (CPrR, 5: 159–60).

Insofar as the second stage of the method requires a pupil to actually recognize or judge actions to be performed from duty, Kant’s account of moral education does appear in tension with the Opacity Thesis. How can a pupil determine that ‘no incentives of inclination have any influence’ on an action she observes if no one ‘can prove the non-existence of a cause by experience when all it teaches is that we do not perceive one’ (G, 4: 419)? Similarly, how can she attend to ‘the moral disposition’ or ‘an action from duty’ in an empirical example when ‘no reliable example can be cited of the disposition to act from pure duty (G, 4: 406)?

Kant’s account of a kind of respect we give to others stands in similar tension with the Opacity Thesis. Commentators commonly distinguish between two kinds of respect for others in Kant’s ethics.Footnote ⁴ One is recognition respect. It is contained in the maxim not to treat other people as mere means and it is owed to them in virtue of the dignity of their humanity (MM, 6: 450). In Kant’s discussion of recognition respect in the Doctrine of Virtue, he stresses that it is ‘not to be understood as the mere feeling that comes from comparing our own worth with another’s’ (MM, 6: 449). This ‘mere feeling’, in contrast with recognition respect, is appraisal respect. In the second Critique, Kant indicates that the latter kind of respect for others is occasioned by making comparisons with or recognizing another’s moral worth. He claims that I give appraisal respect even to a ‘humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character’ (CPrR, 5: 76–7) because ‘his example holds before me a law that strikes down my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct, and I see observance of that law’ (CPrR 5: 77). Similarly, he states that ‘the law made intuitive by an example still strikes down my pride, the standard being furnished by the man I see before me’ (CPrR, 5: 76–7). We can draw out the apparent tension between Kant’s account of appraisal respect and the Opacity Thesis by asking how our epistemic limitations are consistent with the claim that we ‘perceive’ or ‘see’ others’ observance of the moral law or the implication that we recognize their moral worth.

A third area of Kant’s moral philosophy that appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis is his account of gratitude in the Doctrine of Virtue.Footnote ⁵ He explains that

Not every instance of promoting others’ happiness places them under an obligation of gratitude. In his early lectures on ethics, Kant reportedly claims that one does not owe gratitude to someone who provides help through ‘a scurvy trick’ (Eth-Collins, 27: 261). This also holds for someone who provides help from the inclination of ‘hop[e] for something in return’ (MM, 6: 453). If ‘one show[s] that he wanted to put the other under obligation … it would not be a true benefit that he rendered’ so he would not be owed a debt of gratitude (MM, 6: 453). Kant indicates that gratitude is owed in response to acts of beneficence; it is ‘beneficence [that] … puts others under obligation by it’ (MM, 6: 453). Beneficence is an ethical duty, which means that acts of beneficence must be performed from duty:Footnote ⁶ ‘what counts in … [the case of ethical duties] … is primarily the inner principle of the will, namely that consciousness of this duty be also the incentive to actions’ (MM, 6: 375n.). Insofar as gratitude is owed in response to beneficence, it follows that it is owed in response to help that is provided from duty.

Kate Moran (Reference Moran2016: 337) articulates how this feature of gratitude generates tension with the Opacity Thesis: ‘if what warrants gratitude is a benefactor’s having acted from the motive of duty, then we can never know whether gratitude is warranted. … it would be impossible ever to know to whom these duties are owed’. Since one can never be certain that one was helped from duty rather than a covert inclination of ‘hop[e] for something in return’ one can never be certain that one is placed under an obligation of gratitude.

In what follows, I will show that Kant has the resources to relieve the apparent tension in his account of gratitude and the similar tensions I have pointed to between the Opacity Thesis and his accounts of moral education and appraisal respect. In fact, Kant did not appear to recognize any tension between his claims about our epistemic limitations and his assumption that we make moral appraisals of others. For example, he invokes the Opacity Thesis in the same passage in which he offers a moral appraisal of another’s talents:

We must ask how, in spite of our uncertainty, we represent this individual as having cultivated her talents in a way that reduces our self-conceit, i.e. calls for appraisal respect. More generally, the question that this section has been driving towards is: given the Opacity Thesis, how do we see and judge others’ ‘moral disposition’, ‘purity of the will’ or ‘observance of [the] law’ in order to learn from their example, give them our respect or recognize our obligations of gratitude to them? I begin to answer these questions in the next section.

4. Moral Illusion

In the Anthropology, Kant identifies illusion and deception as two types of delusion (Anth, 7: 149). In the Religion, he defines ‘delusion’ as ‘the mistake of regarding the representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itself’ (Rel, 6: 168). What distinguishes illusion from deception is whether the mistaken representation persists despite one’s knowledge that it is mistaken: ‘Illusion is that delusion which persists even though one knows that the supposed object is not real’ (Anth, 7: 149–50).Footnote ⁷ A helpful example of illusion is found in Kant’s Remarks in the ‘Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime’.Footnote ⁸ One may know that an individual is much less beautiful than she appears while wearing ‘silken eyebrows, a pair of ivory teeth, excellent ringlets, and a few handkerchiefs that … [support] her bosom’, but one will continue to represent her as beautiful (Rem, 20: 181). Because this representation persists in spite of one’s knowledge, it is counted as illusion rather than deception: ‘Make-up; if one knows it, then it is no longer a deception’ (Rem, 20: 168). As an example of deception, Kant cites ‘statues of human beings or animals painted with natural colors’ (Anth, 7: 150). When these statues unexpectedly come into sight, an individual momentarily represents them as real, living beings. Because these representations cease as soon as the individual recognizes her mistake, they are counted as deception rather than illusion.

Although Kant explains illusion in a section of the Anthropology entitled ‘On artificial play with sensory illusion’ (Anth, 7: 149), illusion does not necessarily involve mistaken sense representations. Kant also identifies a kind of illusion that relates to incentives, namely, ‘the inner practical illusion of taking what is subjective in the motivating cause for objective’ (Anth, 7: 274). In other words, this kind of illusion involves a mistake in the way one represents the motives or ends of action. Insofar as it is illusion, these representations persist alongside one’s knowledge that they are mistaken. Kant’s examples of inner practical illusion include the ‘games of the boy in hitting a ball, wrestling, running, playing soldier; later on the games of the man in playing chess and cards … finally, the games of citizen, who tries his luck in public gatherings with faro or dice’ (Anth, 7: 275). Human beings are naturally inclined to participate in these games so that they ‘[do] not lose the feeling of life’ (Anth, 7: 275). Thus the real or objective end of their participation in these games is preserving and keeping active their ‘vital force’ (Anth, 7: 275). However, while playing, human beings represent their ends to be honour, control and money (Anth, 7: 274). The illusion here consists in the fact that human beings persistently represent the ends of their actions to be something that they know, or easily could know, are not their real ends: ‘reason can clearly convince them about [their real ends], if they consider how badly the means chosen by them suit their [imagined] end’ (Anth, 7: 275). The boy playing a game of soldier surely knows that he cannot gain real control over other participants but he continues to represent this as his end while playing. In upholding this illusion, even though ‘nature … really is playing with the human being and spurring him (the subject) to its ends … he stands convinced (objectively) that he has set his own end’ (Anth, 7: 275).

In a brief section of the Anthropology, Kant describes another kind of ‘inner practical illusion’, namely, moral illusion. He claims that human beings ‘adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all’ (Anth, 7: 151). Similarly, in the Doctrine of Virtue, he claims that ‘a beautiful illusion resembling virtue … is also not deceptive since everyone knows how it must to be taken’ (MM, 6: 473). I understand Kant’s notion of moral illusion to constitute representing people’s conduct to be morally good, while knowing that the representations may be mistaken. While playing games, human beings knowingly make the mistake of representing their ends to be honour, control or money; by upholding moral illusion, human beings knowingly make the mistake of representing the ends of actions to be morally good. With the notion of moral illusion, a preliminary answer to the questions raised in the previous section can be articulated. Despite our epistemic limitations, Kant can consistently maintain that we see others’ observance of the law or their moral worth by pointing to the fact that we uphold moral illusion, or represent their actions to be morally good. Consider how moral illusion relieves the apparent tension between the Opacity Thesis and Kant’s accounts of appraisal respect and gratitude in the following examples.

In accordance with the Opacity Thesis, I cannot know whether another person helped me from duty and thus whether she has acted in a way that calls for my respect or places me under an obligation of gratitude. I know it is possible that she helped me from the self-interested anticipation that I will return the favour. Nevertheless, in spite of this knowledge, I persistently represent the helpful act as if it was a morally good act of beneficence (and so, as if it warrants my respect and places me under an obligation of gratitude):

Similarly, we cannot know whether our predecessors helped us from duty but, by upholding moral illusion, we recognize our obligations of gratitude to them. Accordingly, Kant claims that ‘it is thought not improper to defend the ancients … from all attacks, accusations, and disdain’ and ‘to attribute … good will to the ancients’ (MM, 6: 455). By upholding moral illusion, to represent our predecessors as having acted with a good will, we register that they provided us with assistance from duty and that we therefore owe them gratitude.

Moral illusion also provides an explanation for the appraisal respect we give to a talented individual. Though we are uncertain whether the talents were cultivated from duty, ‘we represent a person of talents as the example of the law … and this is what constitutes our respect’ (G, 4: 402).

To adequately develop Kant’s notion of moral illusion, it must be examined in connection with his account of the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being, found primarily in the Doctrine of Virtue. According to student lecture notes on the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant holds that, in connection with the Opacity Thesis, we have a duty to regard others’ actions in a particular manner: ‘it is impossible to judge oneself or others internally … but [this] also creates for us the beneficial duty of taking a very mild view of the specifically illegal acts of other men, and judging them with leniency’ (Eth-Vigil, 27: 704). Kant also reportedly claims that we ‘should frame all our judgements so that we find mankind loveable’ and that ‘it is a duty … to seek out the good that we can discern in [others’] actions’ (Eth-Collins, 27: 451; Eth-Vigil, 27: 704). I will argue that the requirement to judge others’ actions in a positive manner, alluded to in the preceding passages, is part of the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being. In the next section, I examine this duty. The overall argument of the next two sections is that human beings must uphold moral illusion, circumventing our epistemic limitations and appraising others’ actions to be morally good, in order to satisfy the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being.

5. Beneficence for Others’ Moral Well-Being

In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant discusses two ends that one is required to adopt and promote, namely, ‘one’s own perfection and the happiness of others’ (MM, 6: 385). The requirement to make the happiness of others one’s end is one and the same as the duty of beneficence mentioned in section 3: ‘to be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one’s means the happiness of others … is everyone’s duty’ (MM, 6: 453). In Kant’s ‘Exposition of Duties of Virtue as Wide Duties’, he divides the happiness of others into two distinct ends: their natural welfare and their moral well-being (MM, 6: 392–4). Before I can set forth the argument that the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being requires us to uphold moral illusion, Kant’s concept of moral well-being must be examined.

Moral well-being (moralisches Wohlsein), like well-being simpliciter (das Wohl), ‘always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain’ (CPrR, 5: 60). This is consistent with the fact that Kant describes moral well-being, and the duty to promote it in others, in connection with the ‘pain one feels from … pangs of conscience’ (MM, 6: 394). He explains that one feels pain from one’s conscience, or ‘bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed [the moral law]’ (CPrR, 5: 38).Footnote ¹⁰ Thus transgressing the moral law, i.e. failing to act in accordance with duty, undermines one’s moral well-being.

In his discussion of moral well-being, Kant characterizes the pain from one’s conscience as ‘a natural effect, like grief, fear, or any other state of suffering’ (MM, 6: 394). This characterization is puzzling. The fact that moral well-being and natural welfare both concern ‘natural’ feelings of pain makes Kant’s division of happiness into these two ends appear redundant. Similarly, it is not clear why he would divide the duty of beneficence into beneficence for others’ moral well-being and beneficence for their natural welfare if each is directed towards the same kind of pain.

Considering not the kind of pain at issue, but the means of preventing or relieving it, explains why Kant makes these divisions. The pains of conscience are of the same kind as ‘any other state of suffering’ but they cannot subside in the same way. Kant holds that, unlike the pain connected with one’s natural welfare, the pains of conscience do not cease unless one performs morally good actions. He makes this evident in the Religion, in his criticism of the practice of summoning clergymen to the deathbed. He explains that the aim of this practice ‘is normally to find in him a comforter, not on account of [one’s] physical sufferings brought on by the last illness or even by the natural fear in the face of death … but because of the moral sufferings, the reproaches of [one’s] conscience’ (Rel, 6: 78n.). However, seeking this comfort in a clergyman is ‘totally contrary to the purpose for which such support given to conscience at life’s end can be held necessary’ (Rel, 6: 78n.). This is because the only means of relieving one’s ‘moral sufferings’ is to perform morally good actions. Kant reportedly makes this claim in his early lectures on ethics: ‘however much remorse a man may display, it is of no avail if he does not perform what is incumbent on him in accordance with the moral law. For even in foro humano, guilt is not assuaged by remorse, but by payment’ (Eth-Collins, 27: 354). This claim is also echoed in the Religion. Kant insists that to relieve the pains of conscience at the deathbed, ‘conscience ought rather to be stirred up and sharpened, in order that whatever good yet to be done … will not be neglected’ (Rel, 6: 78n.).

Recognizing the different means of relieving others’ pain explains why Kant divides the duty of beneficence into beneficence for others’ natural welfare and beneficence for their moral well-being. To fulfil the former duty, I must help others satisfy their inclinations. To fulfil the latter duty, I must help others avoid transgressions of the moral law (to help prevent their pains of conscience) or help them perform morally good actions (to help relieve their pains of conscience). The argument for this conclusion can be quickly retraced:

1. (1) Pains of conscience result from transgressions of the moral law and undermine moral well-being.

2. (2) The only means of relieving pains of conscience is to perform morally good actions.

3. (3) There is a duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being.

4. (4) Thus, to satisfy the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being, one must help others avoid transgressions of the moral law or help them perform morally good actions.

In his discussion of the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being, Kant explicitly recognizes that it requires us to help others avoid transgressions of the moral law. He states that it requires us to ‘refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could tempt him’ to transgress the moral law (MM, 6: 394). Later in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant indicates that the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being also involves positive requirements, specifically, the requirement to help others perform morally good actions by upholding moral illusion. This claim, and the textual evidence supporting it, will be explored at length in the next section. However, a possible objection to it must first be addressed.

One might think that Kant’s moral philosophy cannot accommodate the possibility of helping others to perform morally good actions (and a fortiori the possibility of doing so by upholding moral illusion). This is because Kant holds that it is impossible to make another person’s perfection one’s end. He claims that perfection is something that one can promote only for one’s self, through one’s own conduct. Another person’s perfection ‘consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do … something that only the other himself can do’ (MM, 6: 386).

My contention is that influencing others to perform morally good actions is consistent with this because, though it incidentally promotes their perfection, it involves making their moral well-being but not their perfection one’s end. In other words, one directly aims to relieve others’ pains of conscience rather than directly aiming to make them morally better. Kant makes an analogous point regarding incidentally promoting one’s own happiness for the end of one’s own perfection. It is impossible to make one’s own happiness an end, but this is compatible with incidentally promoting it for the sake of one’s own perfection: ‘the end is not the subject’s happiness but his morality, and happiness is merely a means for removing obstacles to his morality … then it is not my happiness but the preservation of my moral integrity that is my end and also my duty’ (MM, 6: 388). Analogously, I claim that even though an individual cannot make others’ perfection her end, she is required to incidentally promote it for the sake of others’ moral well-being. In doing so, it is not others’ perfection but their moral well-being that is her end and also her duty.Footnote ¹¹

6. The Requirement to Uphold Moral Illusion

Two concrete examples in the Doctrine of Virtue illustrate that the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being positively requires us to help others perform morally good actions by upholding moral illusion. First, Kant claims that it is ‘a duty of virtue … to throw the veil of benevolence over [other human beings’] faults … for examples of respect that we give others rouse their striving to deserve it’ (MM, 6: 466). In other words, upholding moral illusion to represent other people’s faultsFootnote ¹² as morally good actions – and giving them the consequent appraisal respect – influences them to actually perform morally good actions and deserve this respect. This exact point is reiterated in the section of the Anthropology concerning moral illusion: ‘even the illusion of good in others must have worth for us, for out of this play with pretenses, which acquires respect without perhaps earning it, something quite serious can finally develop’ (Anth, 7: 153).

The second example of how moral illusion helps others perform morally good actions, thus positively satisfying the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being, is found in the appendix to the Elements of Ethics entitled ‘On the Virtues of Social Intercourse (virtutes homileticae)’ (MM, 6: 473–4). Here Kant claims that one ought to ‘use one’s moral perfections in social intercourse (officium commercii, sociabilitas)’ (MM, 6: 473). Instead of isolating oneself, one is required to demonstrate ‘Affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and gentleness’ in public (MM, 6: 473). In doing so, one ‘cultivate[s] a disposition of reciprocity’ (MM, 6: 473) i.e. influences or ‘binds’ others to adopt the same manners: ‘By … the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse, one binds others too’ (MM, 6: 474).Footnote ¹³ Reciprocating the manners one demonstrates in public does not yet mean that others are performing morally good actions. Kant claims that what they reciprocate are only ‘tokens’ of virtue rather than genuine virtue. Thus demonstrating one’s manners in public does not directly ‘promote as the end what is best for the world’ (MM, 6: 473). It does, however, ‘[lead] indirectly to this end’ (MM, 6: 473). Demonstrating one’s manners in public leads others, indirectly, to perform morally good actions through the use of moral illusion. By representing the ‘tokens’ that others reciprocate as being morally good, we ‘promote the feeling for virtue’ in others who will then ‘striv[e] to bring this illusion as near as possible to the truth’ (MM, 6: 474). Kant’s Anthropology also reiterates this point: ‘when human beings play … [virtuous] roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition’ (Anth, 7: 151).

The above examples indicate that upholding moral illusion satisfies the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being. If a colleague is pained because her parental responsibilities prevent her from going to a conference, one can satisfy the duty of beneficence for others’ natural welfare by agreeing to babysit (from duty) while she is away. If her conscience subsequently pains her for transgressing her duty to show the beneficent babysitter gratitude, one can satisfy the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being by representing her faults, manners or the faults and manners of a third party as being morally good.Footnote ¹⁴ This is because upholding this moral illusion influences her to actually perform morally good actions, and this is the only means of relieving the pains of conscience.Footnote ¹⁵

In this paper, I will not attempt to completely answer the question of the extent to which we must uphold moral illusion. Kant identifies the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being as a wide duty: ‘this concern for others’ moral contentment does not admit of determinate limits being assigned to it, so that the obligation resting on it is only a wide one’ (MM, 6: 394). A wide duty does not prescribe specific actions but leaves choice regarding the way and extent to which one fulfils it. Thus the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being would not require us to represent every action which transgresses or conforms to the moral law as being morally good.Footnote ¹⁶ It is only with respect to our own actions that we are absolutely prohibited from upholding moral illusion: ‘it is only the illusion of good in ourselves that must be wiped out without exemption, and the veil by which self-love conceals our moral defects must be torn away’ (Anth, 7: 153).Footnote ¹⁷

A question I will attempt to answer in greater detail is how moral illusion has the influence that Kant imputes to it. In other words, how does representing others’ actions to be morally good help them to actually perform morally good actions?

7. Emulation

Kant does not devote much attention to the question of how moral illusion helps others perform morally good actions. However, an answer can be found in his very early lectures on ethics:

In other words, moral illusion influences others to perform morally good actions because it provides them with an example they will seek to emulate. Kant’s later lectures on the Metaphysics of Morals indicate that he retains this view and provide a more detailed explanation of emulation. Kant reportedly claims that emulation is part of the natural constitution of human beings: ‘providence has implanted in mankind an impulse to mutual emulation among themselves’ (Eth-Vigil, 27: 678). He explains that emulation leads one to make comparisons with others and, when one perceives relative inferiorities, it ‘prompt[s] the activity of making oneself equal to the other in every respect’ (Eth-Vigil, 27: 695). As in the passage from the Collins notes quoted above, in these later lectures Kant holds that emulation serves a moral purpose: ‘the purpose of emulation really lay in inciting men to constant cultivation of greater perfection in themselves, by comparison with others’ (Eth-Vigil, 27: 678–9).

There are few explicit mentions of ‘emulation’ in Kant’s published works, but these works also reflect the idea that, through emulation, representations of morally good conduct influence others to perform morally good actions. For example, in the Groundwork, Kant’s reply to Sulzer in a well-known footnote contains the claim that:

Similarly, Kant claims that ‘we represent a person of talents … as the example of a law (to become like him in this by practice)’ (G, 4: 402n.).

So far, I have suggested that moral illusion influences others to perform morally good actions through emulation of other sensible or natural beings. But Kant also indicates that moral illusion can have this effect through emulation of one’s intellectual or noumenal self.Footnote ¹⁸ The idea that one can think of one’s self in two entirely different senses is a central feature of Kant’s philosophy. Kant holds that recognizing the necessity of the moral law leads one to become aware of one’s freedom which is, negatively, the ‘power … to tear himself away from all sensible attachments so far as they want to rule over him’ (CPrR, 5: 152). Awareness of one’s freedom reveals to the human being a life independent of sensible influences, including the influence of any inclination on the will. Thus ‘freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world in virtue of which, if I were that alone, all my actions would always conform with the [moral law]’ (G, 4: 454). Kant explains that we are led to consider freedom and, consequently, our intellectual self when we are presented with examples of morally good actions: ‘by such an example [of compliance with duty] … we can convince ourselves, in it, that human nature is capable of so great an elevation above every incentive that nature can oppose to it’ (CPrR, 5: 158). Insofar as moral illusion provides us with representations of actions that are morally good, it leads us to consider our intellectual self. Interestingly, Adam Smith, one of Kant’s early influences, presents a version of this idea in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:

Kant indicates that when we consider our intellectual self, emulation prompts us to make a comparison with it and to strive to become morally good. For example, in the lecture notes on the Metaphysics of Morals and in the Religion, respectively:

To summarize, moral illusion leads us to consider our intellectual self, the self we ought to be. Due to emulation, we then compare ourselves to it and strive to equal its worth. Thus moral illusion influences us to perform morally good actions through emulation. This idea can be read back into a well-known passage of the third section of the Groundwork. Kant claims that ‘even the most hardened scoundrel … when one presents him with examples of probity of purpose, or steadfastness in following good maxims, of compassion and of general benevolence … wish[es] that he too might be so disposed’ (G, 4: 455). Moral illusion provides the scoundrel with representations of morally good conduct, allowing him to consider the ‘better person he believes himself to be when he transfers himself to the standpoint of a member of the world of understanding’ (G, 4: 455). Emulation then prompts the scoundrel to perceive his lack of worth in comparison to this ‘better person’, i.e. his intellectual self, and influences him to strive to equal its worth by performing morally good actions.