The relocation of Europeans across the North Atlantic during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century was the culmination of the longest-lived and most widely documented transoceanic migration of modern times. This enormous population transfer was a great human drama, a major international demographic shift, and a massive historical experiment in cultural transformation during a period of unprecedented globalization. This migration was also a complex and powerful travel business containing both risks and rewards for its three fundamental participants: the movers, the moved, and the sovereign authorities on either side of the borders being traversed. Prior studies have not adequately explained this business nor appreciated the extent to which the various strategies for dealing with its associated risks were crucial, largely congruent, and self-reinforcing elements of the overall migration process.
The mechanisms underlying mass migration across the North Atlantic from 1900 to 1914 incorporated accumulated experience and development built up over a “long nineteenth century” of relative political stability, rapid technological change, and persistent economic expansion. Between 1900 and 1914, the motivations for considerable human movement from a heavily populated Europe to a labor-scarce United States were strong and stable, while political and cost barriers to such movement were relatively predictable, stable, and low. This favorable environment for self-selected voluntary relocation on a massive, ethnically diverse, geographically broad, and transparently documented scale, makes the period and region excellent loci for isolating and explicating the essential causes of modern international mass migration.
The goal of this dissertation is to help improve our understanding of the general factors and processes shaping international migration, by comprehensively and systematically spotlighting the one indispensable common denominator of market-mediated mass transatlantic migration a century ago: the commerce in the physical relocation of people in large quantities across what was then regarded as vast distances.1
Other “businesses of migration” less vital or ubiquitous across the overall relocation (such as inland rail travel services and the activities of booking agents, labor agents and other intermediaries) are treated selectively in this study, whenever they strongly overlap with the business of the oceanic crossing.
Five and a half million crossings eastward and two and a half million westward were made by European migrants who had previously made an (initial) westward crossing.
Although relocation to America offered clear, substantial, widely recognized, and readily accessible economic advantages and was almost completely unrestricted during this period, most Europeans chose to stay in Europe. Previous analyses have suggested that costs were the principal constraint on this migration, that outlays for oceanic travel dominated such costs, and that transport companies' strategies were mainly based on competing for migrant passengers on price, or colluding to overcharge them, or economizing on costs by packing westbound migrants into the vessel space emptied of eastbound bulk freight exports. This dissertation presents evidence contradicting these assumptions and reveals a hitherto underappreciated set of interrelated risk management strategies.
Traditionally, the causes of migration have been cataloged as “pushes” and “pulls,” which roughly means the benefits of moving out of one area and into another. Costs of migrating have received far less attention in previous historical literature. But even a full treatment of costs and benefits yields only a kind of “expected return,” not an indication of the variation in that return. By looking at mass migration as a business, and focusing on the strategies of its key participants (migrants, shipping companies, and government regulatory agencies), it becomes evident that this was an inherently risky activity for those involved with it. Containing those risks was crucial to their strategies for dealing with the migration. The most important forms of such risk amelioration were congruent and cooperative measures amongst and between the transporters, the transported, and their regulators.
This study is the first to make systematic use of both shipping and migration sources from both sides of the Atlantic and to comprehensively examine the entire migration between Europe and the United States in its peak years before the First World War. As a consequence, a number of prior assumptions about migration and transport during this period come out in need of substantial revision.
Scrutiny of a multiplicity of quantitative and qualitative, and macro- and micro-level primary sources yields conclusions not always consistent with popular assumptions about migration. Statistics on passenger fares, for example, show—consistently across several major shipping lines—that passage rates were in a gradual upward secular trend over the period (somewhat similar to trends in costs), and were generally positively, not inversely, related to migrant passenger flows (because fare-cutting was more likely during recessionary periods when migration flows slumped). This is quite different from what was going on with freight rates in the nineteenth century, for example.3
This should not be surprising, however, because migrants differ radically from sacks of flour, for example.
Such interchanging, one of a number of measures shipping lines took to boost capacity usage rates, took place mostly in the intermediate “second class.” Comprehensive analysis and integration of shipping passenger and immigration figures show that, on average, about one-quarter of second-class passengers were American tourists and three-quarters were European-born migrants (or “remigrants”). The migrant flow peaked westward in the late spring when most tourists were heading east. This interchange of passengers was more important at least in this period of massive 700 foot long, and longer, passenger steamers with cavernous cargo-only holds taking “fine freights,” and a growing incidence of freight-only vessels and freight-only lines available to handle much of America's bulk commodity export volume to Europe.
Detailed inspection of vessel procurement and deployment patterns, considered in tandem with vessel data, shows that providing reliable regular ship departures with more than adequate booking availabilities to house upper-class tourist passengers took precedence over cost-minimizing schedule curtailment during recessions. This, however, had no great adverse impact on the long-term profitability of migrant traffic, because migrants preferred the same modern, spacious ships towards which tourists were partial. Those fast, vast, “floating palaces” atop migrant hostels also allowed shipping companies the benefits of substantial scale economies (which the analysis of vessel expenses in this dissertation also confirms). A review of deck plans and contemporary newspaper accounts indicates that one reason migrants liked these newer ships was that they increasingly offered improved travel conditions, represented most notably by a growing availability of more modern, more private, more hygienic, and less uncomfortable enclosed rooms, as older bunkroom-style “steerage” quarters were gradually phased out on the newer steamers, particularly on the northern European routes favored by tourists. Enclosed rooms were a prerequisite in vessel compartments used to house migrants journeying in one travel direction and tourists in the other.
An examination of the agreements, records, and operations of the North Atlantic passenger shipping conferences (cartels), which became more widespread and effective over the period, shows that they were neither designed for, nor did they have the effect of, significantly limiting the entry of new shipping lines or of regulating the capacity growth of existing transport firms. Their primary goal and role was to provide disincentives for the outbreak of fare wars, which were guaranteed to lower the passenger segment profits of all carriers effected by any such deep cuts in ticket prices.5
Fare wars would have lowered profits because overall migrant volumes were relatively insensitive to changes in oceanic fares.
Cyclical variations were a top concern for shipping executives because of the very high percentage of costs (for both maintaining and operating oceangoing vessels) that were fixed in the short and medium term (in the sense of being unaffected by changes in revenues). Analysis of annual reports, voyage accounts, and deck plans indicates that profits on migration traffic in this period averaged roughly 10 percent of revenues. Because costs hardly moved at all with revenues, a 10 percent move up or down in ticket receipts from migrant passengers would therefore be magnified into something like a 50 percent swing in bottom line profits.6
This is a very crude “ballpark” estimate, which takes into account a limited ability of shipping managers to cancel some voyages, and the roughly 50 percent of revenues coming, on average, from other, less cyclical business segments, principally tourist travelers, freight transport, and mail carriage.
Analysis of politicians' strategies, government regulations, and debarment rates shows that the immigration restriction movement, which was increasingly prominent over the period, achieved no significant effect on North Atlantic migration levels prior to the First World War. The intentions and activities of policy makers and regulatory officials focused instead on reducing the political and practical risks associated with the relocation and processing of large crowds across land, sea, and through port cities.
These findings revise prior understandings about the nature of the migrant transport business, and to some degree also, therefore, the fundamental forces shaping physical migration. Shipping did not have the strong direct effects on migration that it sometimes has been assumed to have had, but transporters and the transported did share a fundamental need to prudently manage the inherent gamble of migration, which both were undertaking. Their risk management strategies shaped not only the timing, but also the incidence of migration moves.
Falling fares do not explain the several-fold rise in migration over the period because fares did not fall over the period. Furthermore, by 1900 already, the total expense of moving to America (of which the oceanic fare was roughly half) had dropped to well below what an average European migrant working in the U.S. could expect to have saved, net of living costs, six months after the move. The principal filter in transatlantic migrant self-selection, at least during this period, was risk, not cost. The most risk averse stayed in Europe, and the less risk averse who emigrated overseas relied heavily on family and community “chains” in order to diversify the hazards of relocation across multiple individuals making multiple moves.
Because European migrants in early-twentieth-century America worked disproportionately at temporary and marginal jobs and in cyclical industries, their employment prospects were highly cyclical. The marginal shift into employment associated with westward migration to the United States was even more cyclical. Fixed costs meant still further magnification of cyclical variation in the transport lines' net income.
Congruent risk management strategies ameliorated such volatility and uncertainty to no small degree, however. In coping with the U.S. business cycle by relying on kinship networks and going back to Europe during U.S. recessions, migrants reduced the cyclicality of passenger revenues for shipping lines.7
Eastward migrant flows were countercyclical, while the larger westward movement was procyclical.
Many of the “economic” findings summarized here are developed in some detail in the opening sections of the dissertation, and much of the supporting quantitative analysis behind them appears in tables, in functionally organized appendices, and in related separate articles. The larger middle part of the dissertation consists of chronologically ordered chapters highlighting key analytical examples of risk management within the context of significant narrative episodes across this 15 year history of the business: attempts to avert cutthroat competition in a politically sensitive and inherently multinational high-fixed-cost service business (chapters 3–4), how the risks of government to migration and vice versa were mitigated (chapter 5), the methods for surviving the challenges of the business cycle (chapter 6), and the hazards of the oceanic crossing itself (chapter 7). The effective end of transatlantic migration to the United States as a major business, in the early 1920s, and some possible implications for global migration processes today, are discussed in an epilogue.
Potential migrants across the North Atlantic a century ago faced neither the dauntingly high costs of prior periods, nor the severe legal barriers of later times. As a result, the fundamental processes of voluntary mass migration are more clearly traceable during this period, and offer insights applicable to both transnational migration and the evolving risks of globalization generally.
This Ph.D. dissertation was completed at the University of California, Berkeley in May 2005 under the direction of Gerald Feldman, Jan de Vries, Jon Gjerde, Richard Sutch, and with substantial advice and assistance from many others.
