The general impression of Thailand's political parties is that most of them are short-lived and lack a distinctive political ideology. Their existence is seen mostly as a stepping stone for politically ambitious “big men” who wish to achieve their dream through the less than effective parliamentary system. Most parties are founded by and thus geared to serve the interests of influential Bangkok-based elites, especially well-connected retired military generals, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business tycoons. Thai political parties are run by small groups of people with connections to power and money, which is either generated through the party leaders' private wealth or donated by top business tycoons from a handful of Sino-Thai corporate families.

In many aspects, the Democrat Party appears to stand out from this impression of parliamentary politics in Thailand. Marc Askew's book is a timely publication, given the recent political crisis and problematic democratization in the country. The book is among the rare ethnographically grounded studies of how political parties in the country have actually worked through electoral politics. It is an ethnographic account of “Thailand's electoral politics as a symbolic and thus culturally informed process” (p. xiv). It provides some articulated explanations to the questions of how the Democrat Party has maintained its ascendancy in southern Thailand, and particularly how it so tenaciously denied the Thai Rak Thai's challenges in both local and national elections in 2004 and 2005.

In this book, the uniqueness of southern Thailand's political exceptionalism is persuasively disclosed and retold. Askew unveils the mystery of the Democrat Party's long ascendancy and domination in Songkhla and the south. He argues that the Democrat Party's success depends considerably on its wily campaigning techniques, multilevel electoral resources, and symbolic advantages. The Democrat leaders and candidates are master performers in the electoral sociodramas, with superb campaigning skills and great decisiveness. They have persistently cultivated political bonds and identities among southern voters “through the rhetorical and symbolic seduction of ordinary voters and the astute management of allegiances among key followers” (p. xi). Consistently branding itself as a party for southerners with strong ideology (udomkan), the Democrats have identified and confirmed positive moral and cultural ideals highly valued by its voters. Some examples of such moral and cultural ideals include unconditioned loyalty to and trust in one's phuak (group), barami (morally infused repute generated by good deeds), kwangkhwang (well-connected, expansive, and generous nature), and chai nakleng (having the heart of a nakleng).

Askew's argument is built upon observation and insight that he gained through long-term, engaged anthropological fieldwork in Songkhla Province between 2003 and 2005. His approach of “hang[ing] around with a purpose” (p. xiii) guides him through an eventful series of political elections. It also places him in an unusual position to write some deep and sensitive accounts of political performing culture and its electoral machineries in the south. The way he deals with a key portion of Thai-language scholarship on southern Thai folklore and related debates on the discourse of southern Thainess is particularly impressive. He reconstructs one of his major conceptual frameworks from a local cultural understanding of political phuak affiliation as a model of and for symbolic and pragmatic interpretations of political culture in southern Thailand.

Askew's intensive utilization of the socioculturally specific concept of phuak needs some critical consideration. The phuak relationship is an inclusive cultural construct conveying multiple meanings, such as same-group informal belonging, sociocultural bond and identities, hierarchically structured political affiliation, and intimate everyday vocabularies. In the southern Thai political context, phuak or phakphuak and phuakphong could mean cliques or groups of people sharing the same locality and affiliation under a certain organized canvasser (hua khanaen), general followers/voters, or fictive and blood-tied kin people. The obvious strength of using phuakphong (I personally prefer this term, or samak phakphuak, to the generic and broad classifier of phuak) as a conceptual model is that it provides some nuanced, subtle, and grounded alternative explanations to many existing theories on Thai politics, such as the polarized urban–rural “two democracies” proposed by Anek Laothamatas (“A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand,” in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R. H. Taylor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 201–23), the old-fashioned money politics and “big men” argued by many political scientists and the media, and the elite-centered “monarchical networks” recently suggested by Duncan McCargo (“Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review 18, no. 4 [2005]: 499–519). The term elaborates political performance and actors at the grassroots level and augurs well for the lively and active popular participation in local, provincial, and national politics. However, phuak as a political concept is fuzzy and requires some subjectively engaged interpretation. Essentializing the phuak relationship is close to adopting a primordialist stance to the study of electoral politics. Phuak is a very important sophisticated organization in understanding political elections, but it is not a locally or regionally specific and should be examined from certain comparative perspectives.

Askew's linguistic expertise and cultural familiarity are undeniably extraordinary and admirable. Nonetheless, both Thai and non-Thai English-speaking readers might find Askew's heavy usage of Thai terms and expressions a little too repetitive. Although it is Askew's intention to make the most of his linguistic talent in order to gauge the depth of symbolic and cultural interpretation of southern Thais' political performing identity, terms or expressions should be scaled down to a limited utilization and employed where and when necessary. In this respect, the book badly needs a glossary of central or southern Thai terminologies.

Some Thai-language terms and expressions are not fully employed to express their linguistic or cultural connotations. For example, kin mueang, meaning “eating the country” or “corruption,” should be fully used as kin ban kin mueang (pp. xi, 42). Kin mueang, if used alone, could mean “to rule” or “to govern” in the traditional Siamese administration system, when Bangkok-appointed officials were sent to assume administrative posts upcountry. Mai pen prachathipat (non-Democrats) (p. 20) should be mai chai prachathipat. “Participation,” suanruam (p. 145), should be kan mi suanruam (p. 145).

There are also some factual errors. “Suchinda Khraphayun's coup” (p. 36) is not totally correct. The coup was staged the National Peace Keeping Council under the leadership of General Suchinda Khraprayun, General Issaraphong Noonpakdi, and Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rojananin. Indeed, the late General Sunthorn Khongsomphong, the Supreme Commander, was formally named as its senior leader. Churin Laksanawisit is an MP of Phang-Nga, not Phuket (p. 339). Doi khwam sabai chai should be duai khwam sabai chai (p. 95), and thammaphiban should be translated as “good governance,” not “good government” (p. 134).

Despite the book's minor flaws, Askew must be congratulated for this innovative and ethnographically grounded study of contemporary electoral performances by a major Thai political party. He shows an in-depth and articulate interpretation of grassroots-level political election culture in southern Thailand. To date, this book is perhaps the most engaged and sophisticated study of Thai electoral politics. It is a must-read for all students of election politics in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.