Fawaz Gerges argues with a powerful and convincing voice that al-Qaeda does not provide a meaningful threat anymore, more than a decade after the attacks of 9/11/2001. Al-Qaeda only continues to loom large in the imagination of Western policy makers and publics because of a combination of cultural, economic and political factors inherent to the West. It also only continues to replenish its thinned ranks because of the resentment produced by damaging American policies, including the use of drone attacks. Making al-Qaeda appear significant through words and actions, Gerges argues, creates a self-fulfilled prophecy.

The book includes many valuable contributions. One is its interesting synopsis of the debates among the leaders of the Arab ansar (a better term for the so-called Afghan Arabs that many authors, including Gerges, use) after the Soviet defeat about the direction that the jihad should take (fighting dictators in Muslim lands, liberating Palestine, pushing further towards Moscow, or fighting the United States). Another is its illustration of the complicated relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Chapter 1). The book also contextualizes the very important argument made earlier by Michael Scheuer in his own books that al-Qaeda's strategy was to provoke the US to embroil itself in long conflicts in the Muslim World that would lead to draining the US economy and, subsequently, its demise as a superpower that bolsters tyrants, supports Israel's violence against the Palestinians and other Arabs, and hinders the advancement of Muslims more broadly.

The book shines in the second part of Chapter 3, where Gerges describes the critique of Osama Bin-Laden's attack on American civilians by other proponents, or previous proponents, of jihad in Egypt. While this book only occasionally relies on original research (most of its narrative is based on journalistic and official publications), Gerges's knowledge of the thinking of “reformed” Egyptian militants allows him to provide a particularly interesting summary of their writings on the topic. One wonders, however, how much of a role the Egyptian intelligence services played in the production of these writings.

In another strong chapter, the fourth, Gerges charts how the Bush Administration, Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi (leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq) all damaged themselves and their causes by the use of massive power or extreme violence against civilians. Bin Laden gained little traction with Muslim publics from 9/11 but benefitted immensely from the Bush Administration's brutal occupation of Iraq. Later, Zarqawi's use of beheadings and mass attacks on Shiite Muslims dissipated all the goodwill al-Qaeda gained from helping the resistance against the US invasion of Iraq. Gerges eloquently weaves findings from surveys and analyses of intellectual debates to make the point.

Chapter 5 drives the point home that anti-terror US activities that amount to overkill in the face of a vestigial al-Qaeda help keep al-Qaeda afloat. Al-Qaeda is an organization that is not rooted in the social structure of any country and therefore needs popular sympathy for its cause to replenish its ranks. This recruitment is therefore facilitated by the resentment produced by the inhumane and extra-judicial use of tactics such as drone attacks that have killed thousands of Muslim civilians around the world along with al-Qaeda operatives. US policies to fight al-Qaeda also included the use of torture and increased cooperation with very unpopular governments, such as in Yemen and Pakistan, leading to their demise. Gerges powerfully and convincingly makes the case that restraint, responsible policies vis-à-vis Muslims and humane behavior are much more beneficial for reducing the cost of terrorism and the potency of terrorist organizations than the policies of either the Bush or Obama administrations.

In the conclusion, Gerges builds on these points by advocating the need for the US to reconsider some of the policies that cause enough damage to Arabs and Muslims to drive them to consider joining militant organizations that position themselves as challengers to the world's remaining super power. The policies he questions include uncritical support of Israel's military transgressions and mistreatment of Palestinians, the military occupation of Muslim lands, the posting of military forces in the Arabian Peninsula, the imposition of crippling embargoes on Iranians and other Muslim populations, and support for brutal dictators.

The book includes some surprising mistakes that do not take away from the thrust of the argument but are worth pointing out. Gerges talks of Arab ‘asabiyya (sense of solidarity and superiority over people from other tribes or over non-Arab Muslims, p. 30) within al-Qaeda but there is no sign that such ‘asabiyya exists. In fact, some key players in al-Qaeda are (were) not Arabs (e.g. the Baluch Khaled Sheikh Muhammad), the organization's ideology focuses clearly on pan-Muslim solidarity, it relies on alliances with non-Arab Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it was forged in the crucible of the anti-Soviet jihad in defense of non-Arab Afghan Muslims along with many non-Arab ansar. Gerges also expands the concept of tribal ‘asabiyya to explain the coming together of the Egyptian “tribe” and peninsular “Islamist tribes” into an “unholy alliance” (p. 34)—a very unusual, and not at all rigorous, way to understand the sociology of the organization.

It is puzzling that Gerges mentions that Sayyid Qutb, a thinker and ideologue only, “spearheaded” (pp. 30–34) the Egyptian Ikhwan's secret militant branch while frequently tortured in prison—perhaps “inspired” would have been a more accurate term. It is also not correct that Bin Laden was the point of contact between Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services before 1991 (p. 47). The two intelligence services had regular, direct, high-level contact.

Another surprising assertion that is at the heart of Gerges's argument (Chapter 2) that al-Qaeda was formed out of desperation by nearly defeated “jihadis” (mujahideen is a more accurate term) is that these “jihadis” were nearly defeated in the early 1990s. While this was certainly true in Egypt where Gerges did field research, it simply was not the case in the rest of the Muslim world: Islamists were fighting tooth and nail in Algeria after being deprived of the fruit of electoral victory by a military junta, Islamists ruled in the Sudan, Hamas and Hizballah were on the rise, the Taliban were spreading in Afghanistan like wildfire, Pakistani militants were becoming more brazen, and mujahideen from around the world were supporting fellow Muslims in Bosnia against genocidal Serbian militias. Gerges's problematic generalization unfortunately detracts from the other important points of Chapter 2, particularly the lack of support among “jihadis” for the internationalization of their struggle and a direct conflict with the US, and how Bin Laden kept the Taliban in the dark regarding his plans of attacking the US in 2001, even after his advisory council asked him to inform Mullah Omar and seek his consent.

These problematic digressions do not take much away from the value and general thrust of Gerges's book. Political elites in the US and some key European powers suffer from endemic groupthink on issues of policy in the Muslim world. This book does a wonderful job of deconstructing their assumptions and strategies (but not motivations). This is not exactly a work of original research but it is well written and generally compelling. Teachers will find it useful for undergraduate courses on US foreign policy in the Muslim world, intelligent readers will find it revealing, and non-specialized academics will find it informative.