In the past decades, philosophical interest in Hegel has seen a resurgence in both continental and analytic circles. What has marked this veritable renaissance, however, has been a noteworthy neglect of Hegel's second major work, The Science of Logic. In one respect, this is surprising—the Logic is the self-professed centrepiece of Hegel's system; no comprehension of his thinking can thus occur in its absence. In another, it is very understandable: if the Logic deals, as Hegel himself says, with the concept of God before creation, it would seem prima facie difficult if not impossible to make such a project palatable to current mainstream philosophical commitments.
Rosen's book is not only an admirable achievement insofar as it presents us with a complete commentary on Hegel's often ignored groundwork, which counts amongst the hardest texts in the history of philosophy. That there are only a handful of other books in English that cover its entire trajectory alone makes it an important contribution. Furthermore, it is laudable because it elevates the Logic to its rightful place with great audacity, arguing it is those very features that have made so many shy away from it that prove its value. For Rosen, it is the heart of the system due to its concern with logos, that is, the underlying structure that renders the world intelligible not merely for us, but more primordially in itself (49). Its task is to show how being is intrinsically open to thinking because both are a part of a single “formation process,” which Hegel names “God” (87-88), thus guaranteeing science.
What makes Hegel's Logic so distinctive is its methodology. It justifies its worldview through “a presentation of the incoherent conceptual structure of classical and modern (i.e., pre-Hegelian) ontology” (213). While Parmenides fails to elucidate what being is because, when taken so globally, being is indistinguishable from nothing, Heraclitus makes an advance by stating that the multiplicity of becoming is the metaphysical beginning of order. However, this creates the dilemma of how sporadic multiples can give rise to stable unity. Plato's attempt to hypostatize the unity-multiple relation in Ideas merely poses the problem as the solution; moreover, divorced from ontology, thinking amounts to a lifeless activity “disconnected from the content of thought” and thereby cannot resolve these aporias (208). For a Hegelian history of philosophy, on Rosen's reading, the crucial turning point is Aristotle, whose claim that the human passive intellect can see the self-actualization of essences effected by the divine active intellect allows being and thinking to be unified.
Yet, taken as something intuited through “cognitive perception,” Aristotle's theory of essences proves to be at once static and circular: we must already know an essence to identify it (220). But this entails we cannot rationally discern intelligible structure, reducing experience to an illusion (Schein), a mere appearing without any recognizable ground of unity. All we have is what Nietzsche will call “chaos”—hence, we are on the brink of the “nihilism of becoming” (274). Hegel's great accomplishment is to demonstrate how this standpoint, too, is internally inconsistent. For chaos to be even thinkable as radical becoming, this becoming must minimally structure itself. Both classical metaphysics (foundationalism) and postmodern metaphysics (anti-foundationalism) are therefore wrong (325): because essence proves to be nothing but the appearance of appearances insofar as these display an inner rule that is at once immanent in and transcendent to them (358), “unsupported” appearances are all we need for truth (365).
Yet, if the nature of essence is to appear, there is no ultimate gap between being and thinking. Kantian subjectivism has also therefore been defeated: noumena and phenomena are intertwined. Philosophy finally shows itself to be “scientific knowledge and, in that sense, wisdom” (79). We can now declare substance is subject, which, for Rosen, simply means substance “possesses no secrets from the logician who thinks it” (392). More importantly, this signifies that the categories of ultimate reality are nothing without the particular forms in which they manifest themselves. Qua inseparable, the absolute must thus be both subjective and objective and yet neither (392)—it is the formation process of a totality that brings them together because both obey the same laws of self-unfolding negativity. Stated differently, God is unthinkable without His creation such that our task now morphs into seeing how these categories become actual in nature and humanity: “It now remains for us who are at one with God to create the world” (486).
There are, however, two issues with Rosen's book that deserve to be highlighted. The first is conceptual. The Logic's most challenging thesis is indubitably that the structure of being and thinking is the same. Is this a metaphysical or transcendental thesis? Rosen argues for the former, advocating that, since being and thinking are part of the negativity of a metaphysical totality, it is the very work of negativity that lets them be identified (for a summary, see 224ff.). But rather than explaining in detail how this epistemologically works, the claim is merely repeated in different modes of expression that explain how being metaphysically comes to be one with thinking in the formation process (cf. 18, 74-75, 298-299, 394-395, etc.), leaving one wondering how Rosen's Hegel is capable of developing a truly post-Kantian metaphysics. Some of these descriptions seem more Schellingian than Hegelian (see above paragraph).
The second concerns the book's presentation. One wonders why Rosen desires so strongly to offer a strict, almost line-by-line, commentary. Perhaps a stand-alone interpretation would have been more streamlined. In many ways, this is de facto what Rosen does. He takes the liberty of bringing in many extra-textual references to past and contemporary debates ranging from Plato's Parmenides and Heidegger's ontology to brief interludes on logical atomism and his own work on nihilism to make Hegel more relevant. In-between, however, there are purely exegetical analyses. Yet, because Rosen also follows the step-by-step progression of the Logic, the reader often loses track of both Rosen's and Hegel's argument as they constantly oscillate between different registers kept firmly apart. More problematically, since Rosen wants to supply sufficient hermeneutical background and cover every logical category, these analyses are often too terse to be informative. For instance, his account of the determinations of reflection spans less than three full pages (272-274), while his reading of the conclusion of the Doctrine of Essence is a mere four full pages (385-389). These are amongst the most demanding and significant transitions in the Logic.
Despite these drawbacks, Rosen's book deserves to be taken seriously. Being one of the few complete readings of Hegel's masterpiece in English, it is recommended for those already interested in German Idealism and especially Hegel. For those already convinced by deflationary readings, they will find little here to persuade them to switch sides, but will definitely see areas where fault lines of interpretation become visible. Why, for example, does Rosen use so much space talking about human experience in a book that is about the intelligibility of the world out there? As for individuals who already advocate a metaphysical Hegel, although many well-known classical Hegelian tropes abound in Rosen's reading, there are many captivating insights and suggestions.
