In a review of recent Newton scholarship, H. Floris Cohen charges that my paper is not a ‘case of worthwhile innovation, or even of any innovation at all’.Footnote 1 I beg to differ.
My paper gave (1) a descriptive explanation of vis inertiae and of action–reaction as they held sway over German thought until 1755, and (2) a reconstruction and assessment of Christian Wolff's arguments against action at a distance. I had two aims in it. First, to correct a serious error: how ‘force of inertia’, ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ occurring in Germany c.1700 has misled some into thinking that the Germans had early adopted Newton's ideas. That is wrong – the words resemble Newton's, but the underlying concepts are very different, and incompatible with the Principia. Second, to assess critically the Continentals’ main conceptual point against Newton, viz. that action at a distance (hence gravity too) is unintelligible.
Pace Cohen, my results are all new. My point (1) above has no precedent in Westfall's book, which studied vis viva, Leibniz's name for a capacity to deform masses and move weights. My result (2) has no precedent anywhere. Thereby I demonstrated that Franco-German arguments against actio in distans were crudely fallacious, question-begging or self-defeating, which should lead us to reassess the sincerity of their opposition to Newton.
Cohen admits I write lucidly, yet it seems my evidence and reasoning eluded his ken. I am unable to help him further on this count.
And he wonders why I assume that ‘a book regarded nowadays as revolutionary is immediately recognized and embraced at any given place’ (p. 692). Well, the evidence suggests it. Within a decade of the Principia’s publication, Leibniz and Huygens had rushed to catch up with it, Varignon to understand from it what he could, and Johann Bernoulli to extol it effusively: ‘no matter how great my praise [for Newton's solution to the brachistochrone problem], it is small next to the praise he earned by his incomparable Work [the Principia]’.Footnote 2 No wonder I expected the Germans to welcome it too.
Cohen's stated preference is for pictures to be drawn ‘very broadly speaking’ (p. 692). If a result does not overturn his very broad views, he dismisses it as nihil novi. But then only a proof that after 1687 England turned Cartesian and France Newtonian would count as new by his unreasonable criteria. Fortunately, scholarship has moved well past the crude outlines that H.F. Cohen found enough in his youth. That is just as well. Our modern care for precision and detail has enabled us to, for example, correct errors to which Cohen still adheres. Thanks to our methods, we finally know that mechanical foundations in Enlightenment Germany owed much to Jakob Hermann, not just to Leibniz – which made them an incoherent jumble, and that Leibniz–Hermann–Wolff foundations survived nearly intact in Kant's collision mechanics well into the 1780s.Footnote 3 Hence Cohen is wrong to say that ‘in German lands Leibniz's dynamics and its attendant metaphysics held sway for at least the first half of the eighteenth century, with Kant among the earliest Leibnizians to switch allegiance’ from it to Newton's theory (p. 692).
