Consumers in Europe and America buy similar products, their homes feature similar time-saving appliances, they watch the same movies, and they use the same soap powder. This was not the case in 1906. Today, income matters more than social class as a determinant of spending patterns. In Europe a century ago, local norms and social class were far more important. According to Victoria de Grazia, as America was focusing on raising the standard of living for all, European cultural elites “feared a de-basement of taste, craftsmanship, and civility” (p. 78).
Irresistible Empire provides a richly detailed and fascinating account of the creation of a trans-Atlantic market for consumer goods. It explains the evolution of business practices and standards on both sides of the Atlantic through the twentieth century, with a particular emphasis on the adoption of American institutions and norms within Europe. De Grazia's history takes us from the early days of Rotary International (chapter 1), to the introduction of mass production in manufacturing (Ford, chapter 2), marketing services to the masses (Filene, chapter 3), advertising (J. Walter Thompson, chapter 4), movies (chapter 5), self-service supermarkets (chapter 8), and today's global fast-food franchises (conclusion).
The story de Grazia wants to tell is one of American hegemony through the imposition of the Market Empire on Europe. America regarded other nations as having limited sovereignty over their public space (p. 6). This was particularly obvious in the realm of culture. Identifying this view as an imperialist characteristic involves the implicit value judgment that nations (or influential national elites) should have dominion over people's consumption decisions whenever these decisions have spillovers into the public space. Even if the nation's sovereignty over its public space is granted, de Grazia's imperial claim is weakened by her evidence that many American imports were passionately embraced by European elites (for example, Rotary International, p. 40). Other American institutions or products were exported to Europe by recent immigrants; for example, Carl Laemmle, founder of Universal Pictures, migrated to the United States from Germany before exporting the American Western to Europe (p. 297).
De Grazia introduces her market imperialism thesis using Woodrow Wilson's 1916 address to salesmen in Detroit (p. 2). Wilson's advice, that salesmen adapt goods to the taste of the local consumer, seems reasonable when addressed to a group of people already doing just that to sell new products abroad. Wilson's speeches show a government already supportive of America's “democracy of business” (p. 1), but de Grazia goes further and argues that “at the turn of the 1960s, state and civil society operated with the impeccable synchronicity of a movie dance routine” (p. 7). De Grazia's evidence for this synchronicity is the focus of Marshall Plan aid on “addressing the dollar shortage that prevented European suppliers from purchasing U.S. goods” (p. 346) and the activities of American diplomats who searched out locations and contacts for businessmen. State support for exports is not uniquely American, however. As de Grazia herself points out, in many European countries the connections between the political, civil, and commercial spheres were much closer.
The far richer story de Grazia actually tells is a complex one of relations between people, companies, and countries across the Atlantic, with a number of issues at stake. Many American firms tried to enter the European market and failed. Others succeeded after a long struggle, and many American products and practices embraced by Europeans only survived because they adapted to the local European culture. Exchange was also multidirectional. For example, French companies were the leading motion picture producers in the early 1900s: in 1907, “40 percent of the total film receipts from the U.S. territory went to French firms” (p. 294). Only after World War I did Hollywood start to dominate the international market, with the onset of talking films in 1927 giving it a secure advantage. European countries thought the conversion to sound would finally allow them to “reestablish sovereignty over their cinema establishments,” (p. 315) but American firms soon responded with European production and dubbing facilities that allowed them to sell their films throughout Europe.
De Grazia is correct to point out that some regulations clearly helped American firms succeed abroad. In particular, the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 gave export associations exemption from the Sherman Anti-Trust laws. This allowed the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America trade association to operate abroad on behalf of many American film producers (p. 299). While presented as evidence of state regulation furthering the interests of America's Market Empire, the exemption can also be seen as allowing American firms to compete on a level playing field in Germany, where firms could enforce cartel agreements in court. (See Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990: 398.)
It is true that the increasingly global market in consumer products challenged European social hierarchies. European elites wanted the new products for themselves while retaining the existing class structures. For example, European critics of American brands were not against brand name products per se; indeed they favored certain brands of distinction that allowed them to parade their wealth and status. As de Grazia tells us about the German advertising pioneer, Hanns W. Brose, “What he abhorred was the proliferation of cheap brands to the detriment of the status of the celebrated ones” (p. 221).
The twentieth century rise of the market consumer also tells a complex story of women and their emancipation from household labor. Women tended to be the major purchasers of consumer goods (food, clothing, laundry detergent) making them the “Market Empire's main interlocutors” (p. 13). De Grazia does an excellent job of highlighting the challenges women faced in Europe. The middle class or petite bourgeoisie strained to purchase newly available products beyond their means to keep up with the wealthy in terms of social status. Even though the rise of the consumer had largely obliterated old European social distinctions by the 1950s, the first consumer survey in France in 1954 (almost a decade after the end of the war) found that “76 percent of all households had no running water, 90 percent had no washing machine, and 91 percent no refrigerator” (p. 361)—figures far higher than in the United States. But they caught up fast. With the closure of France's annual Salon of Household Appliances in 1983, it was evident that household commodities had become as familiar in Europe as in America (p. 426).
Despite my qualms about the imperial thesis, I consider Irresistible Empire a carefully researched, highly rewarding book. I recommend it to a wide audience, including everyone interested in economic and cultural relations between the United States and Europe, the history of consumption, business practices and norms, industrial development, trans-Atlantic institutions, or the role of women as consumers.
