The Situation in Scotland

In order to understand the archipelagic context fully and, consequently, where the statutes sit in relation to the Plantation of Ulster, which also began in 1609, it is important to return to the 1580s and 1590s and the formulation of James VI's civilizing policy for Scottish Gaeldom. From the moment James VI began his personal rule in Scotland in the mid-1580s, he sought to bring the Highlands and Isles to order by initiating a number of policies intended to “civilize” the inhabitants of the western Highlands and Isles.Footnote 10 On occasion these efforts met with success; in the late 1580s and 1590s, various Highland chiefs submitted and gave assurances for their good behavior. Unfortunately for James, these submissions were tenuous; lawlessness and blatant flouting of royal authority remained the rule rather than the exception.Footnote 11 What was needed was a more systematic, far-reaching policy, subsequently to be expressed in James's civilizing of the region that aimed at “reducing … the rebellious inhabitants thairof to obedience … establishing of peace, justice and quietnes,” transforming the barbarous nature of the Highlanders, stimulating commercial development, increasing crown revenue, and, thereby, integrating the region fully into Scottish society. Such policies were wrapped up in the rhetoric of religion, law, and order, designed to appeal to Lowland society where many were reluctant to support the king's expeditions to the west.Footnote 12

By the late 1590s with the civilizing of the Highland Gaels under way, James was fluctuating between various policies, including plantation. In his advice to his son Henry, Basilicon Doron, published in 1598, James discussed the Highland problem and the best way to deal with the situation. Here James asserted that his plan for the Highlanders was to plant “Colonies among them of answerable In-lands subiects that within short time may reforme and ciuilize the best inclined among them; rooting out or transporting the barbarous and stubborne sort, and planting ciuilitie in their rooms.”Footnote 13 The introduction of a plantation policy was a reaction to ongoing lawlessness in the west Highlands and the failure of previous efforts to extend law and order throughout the region. Initial efforts to plant the west Highlands and Isles had begun earlier in 1596 when Angus MacDonald of Clan Donald South submitted in writing to the king.Footnote 14 MacDonald agreed to hand over his eldest son James as a hostage, to “remove himself, his family and dependers, and all others who are not actual tenants or possessors of the ground, out of the bounds of Kintyre and isle of Giga,” and accept new crown tenants, notably in Islay and Kintyre, the traditional patrimony of his clan. Although this plan was never implemented, it was not long before the policy of plantation was extended to other parts of the region, albeit with a significant departure.Footnote 15

The plans for Islay, Kintyre, and Gigha had involved the Hebridean chiefs, but future plans would involve outsiders, effectively supplanting the traditional elite. Foundations were laid through the 1597 Act of Parliament, which required all landowners to appear before the council and show titles to land they inhabited; plans for the plantation of Lewis soon followed. Torquil MacLeod, chief of the MacLeods of Lewis, was forfeited on account of his failure to produce the required documentation. The lands of Lewis, Ronalewis, the Shiant Islands, and Troutternish in Skye reverted to the crown, theoretically leaving the way clear for James to implant “civilized,” that is, God-fearing, rent-paying, obedient Lowland subjects into the Highland region.Footnote 16 In doing so, James hoped that the barbarous inhabitants would become imbued with Lowland values and behavior, resulting in the Highlanders becoming fully assimilated into the Scottish realm. However, there had been little anticipation of the level of opposition the planters would face from the inhabitants of Lewis, and the first attempt ended in 1601 with the planters either meeting their death at the hands of the islanders or fleeing back to the safety of Fife.Footnote 17 These initial setbacks did little to alter the king's mind, or indeed the minds of the adventurers. After all, there had been a degree of opposition and resentment to all efforts by the crown to intervene in Highland affairs, but those involved believed this could be overcome. Consequently, a second attempt began in August 1604.Footnote 18

By this time, James VI, no longer resident in Edinburgh, was managing the affairs of his three kingdoms from Westminster. In 1603, James had inherited not just the thrones of England and Ireland but also the law-and-order problem that existed in Ireland, most notably in the north.Footnote 19 As king of Scotland he had been all too aware of how events in one realm could have repercussions elsewhere. Although he was now in London, the situation in Scotland warranted his attention. Aware that lawlessness in Scotland had the potential to spill over into Ireland, and vice versa, while heightening unease at the English court, James stated “that it cannot stand with his Hienes honour and princely dignitie that sic a infamous byke of lawles lymmaris salbe sufferit in ony pairt of his Majesties dominions.”Footnote 20 Consequently, in February 1605 the king wrote from London to the three estates in Scotland encouraging the promotion of royal policy and, turning his attention to the Isles, expressed his hope that they “may be reduceit to oure obedyence, coloneis of civile and industrious people planted thair,” whereby barbarity and poverty would be stamped out, while trade and profit would increase.

Ongoing opposition to crown policy from the inhabitants of the Isles was perceived in London as evidence of the need for rigorous implementation of plantation. Consequently, on 18 July 1605 James asserted that “the interpryse of the conques of Lewis … sal be yit prosequuted … in a mair substantious maner nor it wes befoir, as alswa that the haill remanent Ilis and lands nixt adjacent quha are now disobedient sal be reducit to his Hienes obedience.”Footnote 21 A commission of lieutenancy in the western Isles and Kintyre was granted to David Murray, Lord Scone, on 8 August 1605 to undertake an expedition to the region for “the furtherance and advancement of His Majesteis authoritie and service,” although the commission itself gave Scone very few powers. A warrant was issued for Angus MacDonald of Clan Donald South and other chiefs in the western Highlands and Isles to appear before Lord Scone in Kintyre and render their castles to crown forces, but the expedition achieved little. It was almost a year later before Scone gave an account of his visit to the west, which had resulted in the submission of only one chief, Angus MacDonald, who nonetheless promised to pay his rents for Kintyre and Islay. This refusal by Highland chiefs to submit to James's royal authority, compounded by the situation in Lewis, was “a matter twitching His Hienes in honour.” Indeed, as he had declared to the three estates in Scotland the previous year, bringing the Isles to order would benefit the whole nation economically, but it would also increase Scotland's reputation in a wider European context.Footnote 22

James was aware of the problem of his “north,” the north and west Highlands and Isles, where men followed clan chiefs and lived according to their own rules.Footnote 23 Highland lawlessness had been of concern to Scottish monarchs throughout the previous centuries, and especially to James V in the 1530s; but James VI and I, as monarch of three kingdoms, was particularly preoccupied with it because of the detrimental impact it could have on his attempts to pacify the north of Ireland.Footnote 24 In July 1604 the king confirmed an earlier grant of all the lands of the Route and the Glens in the north of Ireland to Sir Randal MacDonnell.Footnote 25 This grant contained a clause that authorized Sir Randal to divide the territory into parts of around 2,000 acres and build a castle or mansion house in each. Later, between December 1604 and February 1606, James issued instructions and grants that laid the foundations for the Hamilton-Montgomery plantation of Down and the Ards in the northeast of Ireland.Footnote 26 If such endeavors were to be successful, James would have to limit the movement of the Highlanders from the west of Scotland to the north of Ireland.Footnote 27 In short, as far as James was concerned, the situation in the Highlands was of “grite hurt” to “the commonweill.” It was offensive also to his position as sovereign.Footnote 28

While James liked to theorize about kingship, as The Trew Law of Free Monarchies highlights, in practice he was prepared to compromise to reach a workable solution, as suggested in Basilicon Doron and evident in his grant to the Irish Catholic Randal MacDonnell.Footnote 29 The fundamental principle that James would not compromise on, however, was recognition of his royal authority.Footnote 30 While the Highland elite undoubtedly recognized James as their king, holding their lands from the crown by charter, their compliance with crown policy was marginal. Local issues came to the fore too readily, and, due to complex networks of alliances between clan chiefs, a minor dispute could escalate rapidly, leading to widespread disorder. James saw this problem as stemming from the ongoing refusal on the part of Highland chiefs to acknowledge his sovereignty and remained even more determined to deal with continued lawlessness in the west. James sought to utilize a tried and tested, and relatively successful, initiative of his predecessors and turned to local and regional magnates to help execute royal policy in the west.

Throughout the sixteenth century, successive Scottish monarchs had delegated responsibility for the Highlands and Isles to the Gordons of Huntly in the North Isles and the Campbells of Argyll in the South Isles. James now looked to the heads of these houses. On 3 December 1606 James declared his intention that George Gordon, sixth earl and first marquess of Huntly, should “reduce the North Yllis … to civilitie and oure obedyence.” The finer details of the plan were thrashed out over the following months, and on 30 April 1607 Huntly agreed to undertake the business of settling the region, to be achieved by extirpation of the inhabitants, specifically the Clan Donald. Fortunately for them, the Clan Donald and the rest of the inhabitants of the North Isles received an eleventh-hour reprieve, albeit indirectly. While Huntly offered to undertake the project at his own expense, there had been no agreement concerning the annual duty to be paid by the marquess. Huntly would not agree to more than £400 Scots per year, which the Privy Council considered “a very meane dewytie for the haill North Yllis.”Footnote 31 At the same time, James finally gave in to pressure from an increasingly outspoken Protestant kirk that sought to push ecclesiastical proceedings against Huntly on account of his Catholicism.Footnote 32 In June 1607, Huntly was ordered to confine himself within the burgh of Aberdeen, thereby ensuring that he played no further part in the plantation in the Isles.Footnote 33

The fortunes of Archibald Campbell, seventh earl of Argyll, in the Isles were rather different. The Campbell clan had been acquiring further territory and influence stealthily in the southwest Highlands and Isles of Scotland ever since the forfeiture of the MacDonald lordship of the Isles in 1493. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that successive earls of Argyll had been able to gain crown commission to pursue unruly Highland clans, specifically the Clan Donald, and had benefited from such service to the crown. But the Campbells had faced internal weakness during the minority of the seventh earl, and James appeared reluctant to extend Campbell jurisdiction in the west.Footnote 34 However, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Argyll had been instrumental in executing James's action against the MacGregors, and in return the king “maid promise to give to the Erle of Ergyle ane worthie reward, to remayne heretablie with him and his aires heirafter.” The reward asked for in 1607 was a “gift of the landis of Kintyre,” lands previously held by the Clan Donald South. In putting forward Argyll's case, the Privy Council reminded James that the lands were small and that “na proffeitt thay evir importeit to the King, his Majestie often tymes being driven to put the cuntrey to greitar chairges in the space of thrie or four yeir for getting in of the rent thairof, quhilk is nocht greit, than mycht haif doubled the pryce and utter valew of the haill land.” The council continued, asserting that a grant of Kintyre to the earl would assist Argyll in action against the Clan Donald, “the strangest piller of all the broken hieland men, quha nevir in any aige wer civill, bot hes bein the scoolemaisteris and fosteraris of all barbaritie, savaignes, and crueltye—hes evir from the beginning bein addictit nocht only to rebellioun within this continent land and the iles, bot evir wer assisteris of the northern Irische people, dwelling in Ireland, in all thair rebellionis.” Thus, Argyll's action against the Clan Donald “nocht only will … procuire thair ruitteing out and utter suppressing, bot upoun that same respect will evir be ane feir to those in the northe of Ireland to rebel, having ane enemye lyand sa neir to thame.” The council was well aware of the wider context of James's policy and emphasized that the gift of Kintyre to Argyll would assist in establishing law and order in Scotland—and Ireland. This reflects the view long held by successive English governments that the west of Scotland constantly encouraged rebels in the nearby north of Ireland and supplied them with men and munitions. Pacifying the west of Scotland, therefore, would ensure stability in the north of Ireland. Also, in economic terms it would be of great benefit, a point the council, in advocating “the removeing of that mischevous Clan … thair utter extirpatioun and ruitteing out,” made clear to the king: “sa lang as the said Clan Donald remaynes unremoveit furth of the saidis landis, his Majestie nor na utheris sal half any proffeit, and the uncivilitie and barbaritie sall continew nocht only thair bot in the Iles.” James needed little more persuasion, and Argyll was granted legal tenure of the lands of Kintyre on 30 May 1607.Footnote 35

The acquisition by the Campbell chief of land formerly pertaining to Clan Donald South was not well received in the west, and it resulted in the spontaneous outbreak of rebellion. On 16 July 1607, Sir Arthur Chichester, lord deputy of Ireland, wrote to the English Privy Council with intelligence that Angus MacDonald and his men were planning an attack on Kintyre, also stating he had written to the earl of Argyll.Footnote 36 Two weeks later, on 31 July 1607, the Scottish Privy Council likewise noted that Angus MacDonald and others of the Clan Donald had amassed a force of men and galleys with the intention “to invaid and persew his Majesteis guid subjectis be sey and land.” As a result of this unrest by the Highlanders, on 12 August 1607 the earl of Argyll received a commission of lieutenancy and justiciary that extended across much of the South Isles.Footnote 37

In presenting Argyll's case to the king, the council had mentioned the earl's action against the Clan Donald South as important not just within a Scottish context, but within a wider archipelagic one. This was a calculated move. The council was aware of the king's belief that unrest in one of his kingdoms had repercussions in another, and James had emphasized the importance of his policies toward the Highlands as being not just for the commonweal of Scotland, but for his “haill impyre.” The council asserted that Argyll would bring stability to the Highlands and secure the coastal borders against the Irish rebels, who sought aid from and refuge in the west of Scotland. This was a deliberate attempt to ensure James would grant Kintyre to Argyll, rather than continue to work toward a solution involving the MacDonald chief himself and his son James.Footnote 38

Earlier in the 1590s Argyll had been threatened by the king's attempts to reach a settlement with the Hebridean elite. Agreements regarding plantation in the western Isles were made with Angus MacDonald of Clan Donald South in 1596 and with Angus's son, James MacDonald of Knockrinsay, in 1599, although these were never implemented.Footnote 39 In 1597 James MacDonnell of the Glens in Ireland had won the favor of James VI while visiting the Scottish court, and, although he was denied title to Kintyre and Islay, he was knighted in December, becoming Sir James MacDonnell of Dunluce and gaining lands in south Kintyre.Footnote 40 MacDonnell sought to reunite the Clan Donald lands, but Argyll, fearful of a reunited and reinvigorated MacDonald lordship that straddled the Irish Sea, was able to thwart such endeavors through the influence he had at council.Footnote 41 As a consequence of the failure to reach a workable solution with the Highland chiefs, combined with ongoing rebellion on Lewis, the king looked to regional magnates and Lowland lords for assistance in civilizing the region. Argyll was ready to exploit any opportunity to extend his authority in the Isles, and while the MacDonalds continued to feud among themselves, the Campbells worked to extend their influence at Clan Donald expense.Footnote 42 However, events in Ireland in 1607 and 1608 would alter the course of Highland history dramatically.

The Situation in Ireland

Although James had been developing plantation schemes in relation to the western Isles of Scotland, on inheriting the throne of Ireland in 1603 he was reluctant initially to extend this policy into Ireland. Michael Perceval-Maxwell argued that the main reason for his change of mind was financial. When James realized the cost of maintaining order in Ulster, the idea of plantation suddenly became more attractive, although it is questionable whether at this juncture James envisaged extending such a plan across all of Ulster. Indeed, Perceval-Maxwell held that pre-1607 plantation meant simply “the changing of Irish tenure to English, with the introduction of non-Irish persons being kept to a minimum.”Footnote 43 In 1605, when James had granted the lands formerly held by Con O’Neill of Clandeboye in Down and the Ards to a Scot, James Hamilton, the son of a minister from Dunlop in Ayrshire, part of the grant stipulated that one-third of these lands would be passed to Hugh Montgomery, sixth laird of Braidstane, and another third to Con O’Neill himself. Nonetheless, Hamilton and Montgomery were to provide enough Scottish and English tenants to secure plantation of one-third of O’Neill's estate. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that Down and Ards were divided up in such a way as to ensure that the Scots Hamilton and Montgomery had control of the east coast.Footnote 44 This was a strategic move: it offered a base from which expeditions could be launched, while it also ensured the continuation of trade.Footnote 45

James's agenda for Ulster at this stage may not have included widespread plantation, but the king was warming to the strategic and economic benefits he might reap from such a policy. Scots had been settling in the north of Ireland unofficially for decades, and even in 1606 Sir Thomas Craig commented independently on the “stream of emigrants” that passed daily into Ulster.Footnote 46 James now envisaged the planting of significant numbers of loyal, law-abiding “British” subjects who would advance commercial activities in the area, and in some cases there was no need to remove the tenants as they could be used to work the land.

Removal of the Irish elite had not been part of his original plan. Indeed, immediately after his succession to the thrones of England and Ireland, O’Neill submitted to the king, receiving in return a pardon and a patent to his lands. Rory O’Donnell likewise submitted and soon after was elevated to an earldom. A short time later, James issued a grant of the Route and the Glens to Sir Randal MacDonnell. This was more than recognition of the de facto situation in the north; it was an indication of James's willingness to work with those who were prepared to cooperate with him. James's preference may well have been for Protestant undertakers whose loyalty he could be assured of, and, as he later asserted, “the settling of religion, the introducing civility, order, and government amongst a barbarous and unsubdued people” were “acts of piety and glory, and worthy always of a Christian prince to endeavour.”Footnote 47 In practice, however, James was happy to accept Catholic, and indeed Irish Catholic, undertakers like Randal MacDonnell of Antrim, brother of Sir James MacDonnell of Dunluce, so long as they acknowledged James's authority and his position as king of Ireland.Footnote 48 While the Scottish branch of the family continued to cause trouble, the Irish branch appeared much more amenable to cooperation with the crown.

James sought to work with Irish lords like MacDonnell in order to pacify the north of Ireland, and he aimed for further cooperation with O’Neill and O’Donnell too, as he considered this to be the best and cheapest means of stabilizing the region. Forced removal of the native elite had not been given serious consideration, although he had initiated such a policy in the Highlands and Isles of Scotland, albeit without much success. It was the decision by the Irish lords themselves to depart for the continent—the Flight of the Earls—that offered James the opportunity to develop a scheme for plantation in Ulster that was much more ambitious than anything he had conceived of previously.

On 18 September 1607, the Privy Council in Edinburgh noted that “some noblemen of the cuntrey of Ireland, with a nowmer of thair speciall freindis and dependairis, hes of lait, without the previtie, knawlege, and consent of his Majestie, or of the Lord Deputie of Ireland, tane schipping in Lochfuillie [Lough Swilly] for some treasonable deseygne and practize aganis his Majesties estate and cuntrey.” In response, the council ordered the sheriff of Wigtown, the steward of Kirkcudbright, and the magistrates of the burgh of Kirkcudbright and all other towns along the west coast to give “diligent attendance … be day and nycht, upoun thair coistis and harboreyis, to espy gif ony Ireland men sall cum willinglie in thair boundis or be contrarious windis salbe drevin upoun thair coistis.” If any Irishmen did land in Scotland, men and ships were to be arrested and handed over to the authorities. Concerned that the fallout from the flight would heighten an already unstable situation in the west of Scotland, this legislation was designed to try to contain the situation. But apart from this, the event passed with Scotland, or at least the Scottish administration, barely raising a collective eyebrow.Footnote 49

The flight of O’Neill and O’Donnell and their associates in September 1607 certainly was unexpected, for James had harbored hopes that he might forge a workable relationship with O’Neill.Footnote 50 Their departure, and feared imminent return, focused the minds of many in Ireland and England. The Flight of the Earls, and the subsequent rebellion of Sir Cahir O’Doherty, was “providential” for James. The removal of the elite from Tyrone and Tyrconnell allowed James to take back into crown hands a large swath of land in the west of Ulster, and it offered him the opportunity to reconsider his plans for Ireland.Footnote 51 Within thirteen days of the departure of the earls from Ireland, Chichester had drawn up two proposals for reallocation of their Irish estates. He promoted plans for plantation and sought to convince James that it was a sound economic move, while also securing law and order in a region with a long history of disorder. But while the Flight of the Earls in 1607 would alter the situation in Ireland, the event had repercussions across the water in Scotland as well.

The Archipelagic Context

Plantation was to be advanced by Scottish and English undertakers.Footnote 52 Chichester actually advocated Scottish and Irish involvement in the project from the outset, albeit in a secondary role with the English as the main undertakers. The Scots and Irish would be predominately tenants, while the English undertakers were to have the first choice of land. This attitude stemmed from his belief that a successful outcome of the scheme for the plantation of Ulster would result from integration of Irish, Scots, and English. Chichester, after all, was well aware of the extent of Scottish settlement that had already taken place in Ulster and of the success of the Hamilton-Montgomery plantation in Down and the Ards. If plantation was to succeed, the cooperation of these Scots with the crown's plans would be advantageous.Footnote 53 But as plans evolved, Chichester increasingly became concerned at the role the Scots were to play in the plantation of Ulster. He was uneasy that they would be not only tenants but undertakers as well and was reluctant to see large-scale removal of the Irish if they were only to be replaced by a certain type of Scot. He explained his position in a letter to Salisbury: “if the nobility and subjects of Scotland … be permitted to bring over the islanders or their neighbours of those northern parts … more trouble and less profit will arise from thence, than if the Irish themselves held it as they now do.”Footnote 54

Nonetheless, Chichester continued to believe that Scottish participation in the Ulster venture was crucial for establishing and maintaining both an English presence and Protestantism. Others in the English Council advocated the removal of the Irish on account of their being “men full of poison.” In 1607 the Irish attorney general, Sir John Davies, asserted that “his Majesty's blessed genius will banish all those generations of vipers out of it, and make it … a right fortunate island.” In contrast, Chichester had pragmatic reasons for advocating accommodation with the native Irish: this would limit the extent of opposition the planters would face.Footnote 55

In Scotland, however, it was the outbreak of Sir Cahir O’Doherty's rebellion in Derry in April 1608 that caused greater consternation, provoking a spate of communication between the Scottish Council and Chichester regarding the deployment of both land and naval forces in Ulster and in the Isles, as well as additional legislation that aimed to prevent movement of rebels between Scotland and Ireland.Footnote 56 The rebellion of Sir Cahir O’Doherty witnessed a combined naval and land force of English, Irish, and Scots in a coordinated effort to prevent the rebels receiving aid from, or shelter in, Scotland.Footnote 57 Following the outbreak of rebellion, Chichester wrote to the Scottish Privy Council on 24 April 1608.Footnote 58 He expressed his concern that the Highlanders and Islesmen of Scotland “being now in ill grace withe his Majestie, sould transporte over ony assistance unto thame [the Irish rebels] quhairthrough thay may grow togidder to greatair insolenceis, and bring mony otheris into thair pairtye whilkis otherwise durst not declair thameselffis.” To assist his efforts, Chichester asked for two ships. They were “to be rigged and sett furth with all dew expeditioun, for refraining the comeing hither of those Ylandaris to succour the Kingis rebellis on this syde during oure prosequutioun of thame.”Footnote 59 Considering that the activity of Scots in the north of Ireland had been regarded for some time as an obstacle to both the successful implementation of Tudor policy and the peace and stability of the region, Chichester's fears were entirely justified.

The council in Edinburgh was also concerned. From its perspective, the rebellion had the potential to “progres ouer mony other pairtis of his Majesteis dominionis, and sua disturb the haill body of the estate.” Because the rebellion in Ireland occurred “so neir to the coistis of this kingdome,” the imminent arrival of “rebellious and traterous subjectis of Yrland” who continued to “prosequutis thair shamefull rebellioun and defectioun with thair haill poueris and endevoiris” carried “no litle appeirance of prejudice to this Estate, besydis the generall disturbance of his Majesteis haill impyre.” Of more immediate concern was the extent to which the rebellion could undermine the ongoing preparations for the expedition to the Highlands and Isles, which sought to extend “civile societie” in the region. Indeed, the day after receiving Chichester's letter, the Scottish Privy Council ordered wapinshaws to be held on 9 May in an effort to prepare the realm against “foreyne invasioun … domestique and intestine seditioun.”Footnote 60 This was followed up six days later with a royal proclamation stating that no one in Scotland was to provide refuge for, or give assistance to, any Irish rebels, while any that did arrive in Scotland were to be apprehended and handed over to the authorities.Footnote 61

James was apprehensive too. On 9 May he wrote to his council in Edinburgh informing its members that “oure kingdome” was to be left with enough soldiers to carry out the pacification of the Isles and, if need be, assist in quashing the rebellion in Ireland. Therefore, “all leveing of souldiouris to serve in ony foreyne pairtis be expreslie inhibite and dischargeit.” On the same day, Sir Thomas Phillips, an English servitor who had obtained Coleraine in 1605, wrote to the council reiterating Chichester's request for two ships but elaborating on what was required: “one of thame of goode burdyne with ordinance in hir, allowing hir ane hundreth goode men besyde sayllaris, to do some service in the revair of Lochfoyle, and other to ly in Lochsulley, to stoppe the recourse of barkis and boittis thair.”Footnote 62 James was aware of the problems his council in Edinburgh was facing regarding the supply of ships, as proclamations had been made in the east for the arrest of ships to be put into service in the Isles. But he was concerned with events in Ireland as well as Scotland and directed the Scottish Council to send 200 men to Ireland under two captains and to provide two months’ pay.Footnote 63 On 21 June the council wrote to the governor of Carrickfergus Castle to inform him the soldiers had been sent, under captains Patrick Crawford and William Stewart.Footnote 64

A few weeks later, on 13 July the council in Edinburgh wrote to Chichester. The council acknowledged that James, “in his princelie and tender affectioun whiche he indifferentlie beiris to the subjectis of boithe kingdomes, hes gevin directioun that two hundreth sojouris salbe sent frome thense to the furtherance of this service.” However the council requested that “no unnecessair burdyne” be placed on the soldiers and that Chichester be “verie spairing of thair travellis unles a present and urgent necessitie so requiris.” Rather, they should be kept “in reddynes attending in some commodious parte upoun the coist most ewest to our Yllis, quhair thay may be transportit and send over as the occasioun sall present.” In contrast to this preoccupation regarding the Scottish soldiers sent to Ireland, the rest of the letter is full of rhetoric regarding close cooperation between the two kingdoms. While making reference to their “deir Soverane” and his “grite wisdome and providence,” the Scottish Council asserts that it, and the Irish Council, “who ar memberis of one body under so gratious a soverayne and head … aucht to be sensible of otheris harmes” and, therefore, should keep in regular communication. If this was maintained, the two administrations could “hand in hand, harte in harte, and foote for foote” cooperate to the honor of the king and for the pacifying of both their respective regions.Footnote 65

Despite the rhetoric emanating from both the Irish and Scottish councils, most of the planning behind cooperation between Scotland and Ireland originated in London with James, who was coordinating policy in all of his three kingdoms. While both the Irish and Scottish councils complied with James's directions, ultimately each was more concerned with their own respective realm. It was James who had a wider archipelagic, or “British,” agenda.Footnote 66 But these traditional, national perspectives are understandable. Each was jostling with the other in a new, unfamiliar, three-kingdoms context, and each sought to deal with its own problems. James, however, could see the wider implications of disorder in Ireland or Scotland for his plans for the outlying regions of his “impyre.” It is within this archipelagic context that we need to consider James's plans for the Isles and his response to the military expedition led by Ochiltree in 1608, which resulted in the imprisonment in Edinburgh of most of the main Highland chiefs, and the 1609 expedition led by Bishop Knox, which aimed at encouraging cooperation with the chiefs.

On 10 March 1608 James had expressed his concern that the inhabitants of the Highlands and Isles continued in their lawlessness, thinking that the king had forgotten them. Consequently, he conveyed his resolve to deal with them properly. He would assert his royal authority via land and sea and declared that forces should meet at Islay on 1 June, to be joined by forces from Ireland, for “reduceing of the rebellious inhabitantis thairof to his Heynes obedyence and establischeing of religioun, peace, and justice.” At the same time James was considering his options in relation to the north of Ireland, now “fred and disburdynit of the former rebellious and disobedient inhabitantis thairof.” On account of this, he had taken “a verie princelie and good course, alswele for establischeing of religioun, justice, and civilitie within the saidis boundis, as for planting of coloneis thairin and distributing of the same boundis to lauchfull, ansuerable, and weill affected subjectis.” Plantation in Ireland would “extend the reach of union” and secure James's vision of a united Britain.Footnote 67 The outbreak of O’Doherty's rebellion threatened to throw the proverbial spanner in James's plan, so he initiated the steps necessary to coordinate efforts by all three realms in order to contain the situation.

Following a delay in the proposed timescale, James discussed the expedition to the Isles with his council in Edinburgh. The council had advised James that “the interpryse of the reduceing of the Yllandis of this kingdome to a perfyte and setled obedyence is verie necessar and expedient” and should continue as planned.Footnote 68 James ordered all forces to meet at Islay on 1 July. However, the king stated his wish that the expedition should go ahead “by a moderat course, as mycht be least hurtfull.” His previous assertion to treat with his Highland subjects rigorously had diluted somewhat and the king appeared to be urging a degree of caution. No doubt this leniency was a result of the recent actions of O’Doherty. Already facing rebellion in Ireland, James was reluctant to cause further unrest in the western Isles.

Naval support for Ochiltree's expedition to the Isles was sent from England. On 17 July 1608, Sir William St. John wrote to the council in Edinburgh informing them of his arrival in Loch Ryan with three ships for service in the Isles: The Advantage, which was manned and victualled for six months, The Moon, and Mercury.Footnote 69 Within a week, O’Doherty's rebellion was over, although a number of the main protagonists were still at large. According to the Privy Council's declaration of 2 August 1608, the rebellion's coming to an end was nothing short of a sign from God “manifesting his divyne providence and cair quhilk he hes … for the preservatioun and mantenance of all lauchfull authoriteis.”Footnote 70

Thus, events in one kingdom directly influenced James's plan of action elsewhere. By adopting a three-kingdoms perspective, James, to a greater degree than the Scottish and Irish councils, was able to adapt policy as circumstances dictated, and in this the king was successful. Ochiltree's expedition progressed as planned, and by the end of summer the following year Andrew Knox, bishop of the Isles, had reached a negotiated agreement with the Hebridean chiefs that subsequently became known as the Statutes of Iona.Footnote 71

The Statutes of Iona: Context

The Statutes of Iona, of which there are seven in total, have been regarded popularly as an attack on Gaelic culture.Footnote 72 There is no doubt that some of the statutes sought to modify certain aspects of Gaelic society and behavior. Yet rather than attacking Gaelic culture, the aim of the statutes was to improve the living standards of the inhabitants of the region, maintain the position of the traditional elite, and assimilate the chiefs into wider Scottish society.Footnote 73 Hence, both Macinnes and MacGregor have highlighted the statutes’ concern with economic issues. For example, the suppression of sorning—the free extraction of food and drink by travelers and strangers—was necessary because it was “an intolerable burden” on Highland society.Footnote 74 Instead, inns were to be established so that “straingeris, passingeris and utheris idill men” could purchase bed and board for “reasonable expensis.” In addition there was an effort to limit trade in wines and whisky, as this would undermine the viability of the inns and hinder the socioeconomic improvement of Highland society. Other statutes were concerned with reform of religion, the provision of education for the eldest sons of the chiefs, the movement of itinerants and other “idill and sturdie beggaris” that were a further drain on the resources of Gaelic society, and the limitation of the use of firearms throughout the wider population.Footnote 75 Another statute aimed at preventing the military element within clan society from continuing their activity in either Scotland or Ireland, thereby ensuring these clansmen did not obstruct the plantation of Ulster. James made it clear that this military class had two options: “tak thame selffis to industrie” or “face transportation and banishment.”Footnote 76 Therefore, far from being, as Goodare has described them, “a temporary tidying-up operation,” “paradoxical,” and “inimical” to the power of the elite, MacGregor asserted that the statutes constituted a “coherent program, paramount being the economic condition of the Isles.” In relation to clan society itself, Macinnes argued that the “privileged position” of the chiefs was “upheld and defined at the expense of their clansmen.”Footnote 77 Meanwhile, more concerned with context than content, Maurice Lee argued that the statutes represented a “virtual abandonment of the colonization policy.”Footnote 78 While efforts to plant Lewis continued until 1610, to view the statutes, and indeed James VI and I's wider policy, in this light is to adopt a Scottish, rather than a British, perspective. But it is precisely this British, or archipelagic, context that is crucial to understanding both the statutes themselves and James's policy toward his three kingdoms.

Events in Ireland from September 1607 to July 1608 dramatically changed the wider context. The Flight of the Earls in September 1607 and the rebellion, and subsequent forfeiture, of Sir Cahir O’Doherty left large swaths of land in the north of Ireland vacant. With the removal of the native elite, James could contemplate plantation in Ulster on a grand scale in the north and west, while in the east Randal MacDonnell was already cooperating with the crown. But James was cautious regarding the development and implementation of plantation in both Ireland and the west of Scotland. Plantation could be considered for Ireland, but recent experience in Scotland did not bode well. At the same time, in light of long-standing traffic between the west of Scotland and the north of Ireland, further dispossession of the Hebridean elite could severely hamper efforts at plantation. Instead, a negotiated settlement with the native elite in Scotland would realize lasting and beneficial results, as we can see by tracing the events that led from Ochiltree's expedition to the statutes.

In spring 1608, around the time of the O’Doherty rebellion, “strategy toward the west remained coercive,” but by the end of the year this had shifted, due to the quick suppression of the Irish revolt but also the outcome of Ochiltree's expedition to the Isles in the summer of that year. During the expedition, Ochiltree established garrisons in the castles of Dunivaig and Duart and apprehended a number of the leading chiefs, after which he brought them back to the Lowlands and placed them in ward.Footnote 79 By the end of the year, James had set up a commission for the Isles whose aim was “to reasoun, advise, consult and deliberat upoun the best, reddiest, and most spedie meanis how that bipast savaigenes and barbaritie whiche hes bene of so long continewance in these boundis may be ruted oute, and that civilitie, oure obedyence, and trew religioun (the onlie meane to preserve bothe), may be planted.”Footnote 80 While the king's “Instructions” to the Commission for the Isles of December 1608 “contemplated the expropriation or banishment of at least some of the indigenous elite,” MacGregor argued, this “diplomatic process yielded signs of encouragement.” The instructions asserted that as the principal chiefs of the Isles were now in ward “thair can not be offerrit ony better occasioun of capitulatioun with that sorte of people.” The “present oportunitye” was “very remarkable,” and James went on to state that he was “unwilling to extermine, yea skairse to transplant, the inhabitantis of the same, bot upoun a just caus.”Footnote 81

A period of negotiation followed in early 1609 between the commissioners and the Islesmen, and, although some agreement was reached, it was not enough. In spring 1609 Knox went to London to discuss matters with the king, and in June 1609 he received a commission to undertake another expedition to the Isles to survey crown lands and bring in the chiefs that “are not yitt enterit” by offering “libertie of saulff comeing and going without trouble and impediment, that so by these means thay may be induceit to come in and mak assurance of all the offeris that ar maid in thair name.” The chiefs currently imprisoned were to be released “upoun sufficient pledgeis and bandis takin of foirfeyte of thair whole landis yf thay do not observe every thing that is required of thame.” Knox subsequently held court in August 1609 at Iona, where the statutes were negotiated. He then appeared briefly before the council in September, after which he made straight for London to present the outcome of his expedition to the king. In May 1610 James asked the council to proceed with the registration of the statutes, which finally took place in July 1610.Footnote 82

In order to support his view that the statutes represented a “temporary tidying-up operation” rather than “a solution,” Goodare pointed to the lack of communication concerning them that followed Knox's submission to the king of the statutes through to their registration, in the period between September 1609 and July 1610. This was the result of the statutes, he continues, being “cast into oblivion.” In contrast, MacGregor put forward a radically different interpretation. He afforded Knox a pivotal role in advancing crown policy during this period from August 1608 to August 1609, when it shifted from “colonisation or expropriation to … an unfolding scenario where chiefs were not merely secure if they co-operated, but also enlisted to act on government's behalf.” Thus, the statutes were much more than a mere sticking plaster. Indeed, according to MacGregor “Knox had hit the jackpot” and “far from departing from his brief, he had fulfilled it beyond anyone's expectations … the delay represents, not the consigning of the statutes to oblivion and irrelevance, but their imminent presence.”Footnote 83 Knox had achieved more than James had hoped for. Numerous attempts had been made previously to reach a workable agreement with the Highland chiefs, but they had come to nothing. Now James could proceed realistically along the lines of cooperation; but he needed time to reconsider how to implement this policy further.

James wanted to ensure that the implementation of policy in both regions would be mutually beneficial. A negotiated agreement with the Hebridean elite would help secure the success of his Ulster venture by limiting dislocation and curtailing unrest, while plantation on such a scale as that planned for Ulster would ensure no refuge could be offered to lawless Highlanders and Islesmen. There was no blanket policy for Gaeldom.Footnote 84 Instead, responsive to events as they happened and ready to adapt as circumstances dictated, James progressed with a number of different strategies for different parts of his kingdoms.Footnote 85 The delay, therefore, between Knox's submission of the statutes in September 1609 and their registration in July 1610, was not the result of “indecision” or “neglect” but caution.Footnote 86

Nor did James register the statutes “begrudgingly, through gritted teeth and double-negatives.”Footnote 87 Instead, the agreement that Knox reached with the Hebridean elite, although unexpected, was very welcome, and James was optimistic about pursuing a negotiated settlement. Extirpation and plantation had been on the agenda for some time but had been envisaged for the most barbaric inhabitants who resolutely refused to submit to royal authority.Footnote 88 James had always hoped to make his Scottish Gaelic subjects obedient to his authority, yet ongoing resistance had encouraged James to take a firmer stance, implementing plantation in Lewis and advocating further plantation in the western Isles.Footnote 89 Although James would pursue plantation in Ireland, this was a response to the opportunity presented by the Flight of the Earls and the O’Doherty rebellion. In December 1608 he had counseled the commissioners of the Isles to “be moir cairfull for recovery of one member of your awne body almost rottin and decayed” than for a “parcell of that whiche, howevir pertening to this estate, yitt is no parte of this kingdome.”Footnote 90 Reform of the Hebridean elite would see them integrated into wider Scottish society both politically and, as the statutes emphasized, economically.Footnote 91

Through his negotiations with the chiefs, Knox offered James the opportunity to achieve what a few years previously had appeared unobtainable: the integration of his Highland subjects into Scottish society.Footnote 92 In May 1610 James acknowledged that “the said Ilesmen, in a court haldin be the said Bischop at Icolmakill, have bound thameselffis to performe dew obedience to us and our authoritie, and to keip peace and quietnes in the cuntrey.”Footnote 93 But the process that led the chiefs to this position, much like the development of crown policy, was a long and continuous one, and its roots lie back in 1607 and 1608. Considering the wider context, it is not surprising that the chiefs reacted in the way they did and agreed to the proposals put forward by Knox. In recent years they had witnessed the crown's repeated attempts at the Lewis plantation despite opposition from the MacLeods, while the Clan Donald South faced displacement as the earl of Argyll acquired legal rights to their lands. Coming to terms with the political situation in Scotland meant acknowledging that crown intervention was not going to go away. Although the west Highlands and Isles of Scotland had a history of royal intervention followed by some degree of accommodation, events in Ireland raised the possibility of an altogether different scenario. When the native elite in Ireland heard rumors of impending crown action, they took leave and headed for the continent. Meanwhile, in Scotland the crown had made its attitude quite clear; the wording of the commission given to Knox in 1609 was far from subtle: use “all kynd of hostilitie yf thay continew rebellious and dissobedyent.”Footnote 94 Ongoing opposition to the crown looked distinctly unappealing.

While the fate of O’Neill and O’Donnell loomed over them, the Islesmen could consider the example of Randal MacDonnell and recognize the benefits that came from cooperation with the crown. Thus, since their alternatives were to be forced from their land by the earl of Argyll, who had received a commission to extirpate the Clan Donald, or to see their patrimonial lands planted like Lewis or Ulster, the Highland elite were amenable and open to negotiation with Knox. Macinnes's reasoning that the “aversion of chiefs and leading clan gentry to collaborate with Ochiltree and Knox was … remedied after brief gaoling in the Lowlands” is perhaps too simplistic. So too is MacGregor's explanation that a “constant factor conditioning the behavior of the Hebridean elite since spring 1608 must have been fear.”Footnote 95 Certainly these were contributing factors, as was the fact that both Ochiltree and Knox were from west coast families. Of utmost importance, however, was the realization on the part of Highland chiefs that ongoing resistance to crown policy would reap further ruthless, coercive government action. Because the Highland chiefs were ready to negotiate terms and acknowledge royal authority, in the resulting Statutes of Iona James achieved what he had originally intended: not the removal of the clan elite but instead their assimilation into Scottish landed society.Footnote 96

Initial progress toward this assimilation made little headway until the suppression of the Clan Donald South rebellion in 1615. In response, the Privy Council issued a legislative package in 1616–17 that redefined and reinforced many aspects of the statutes introduced through individual contracts with clan chiefs. Largely identified with the eighteenth century, the beginnings of a commercialized society emerged in the Highlands in the early seventeenth century. However, for clan society there were unforeseen by-products of the statutes. The obligation on chiefs to appear annually before council and give account of themselves and their clan meant extended visits to the Lowlands. This resulted in absenteeism and accumulation of debt, while indebtedness encouraged dependence on lawyers to manage the chiefs’ financial affairs. Within the Highland region itself, the shift from oral contracts to written leases clearly defined the terms of landholding. As chiefs became more commercially oriented, land came to be viewed not as the patrimony of the clan but as an economic resource to be exploited. Chiefs raised rents; they no longer viewed tenants as clansmen and increasingly resorted to evictions of those tenants who could not meet their demands. In the [Gaelic] oral tradition this shirking of the traditional obligations of clan society was criticized.

The repercussions of the Statutes of Iona, therefore, were more far-reaching than James could have envisaged. They had offered a means by which he could eliminate certain characteristics of clan society while simultaneously bringing the Highlands more into line with the rest of Scotland. Admittedly, throughout the seventeenth century absentee monarchs became less concerned with implementing reform in the region, but, in forging this agreement with the Hebridean elite, James, far from being “the hammer of the Highlands,” showed himself to be a traditional Stuart monarch, inclined rather more toward conciliation than retribution.Footnote 97