When Horace wrote in Ars Poetica, “If you would have me weep, you must first feel grief yourself” (“Si vis me flere dolendum est primum ipsi tibi”), he expressed the ancient world's view that, in order to emotionally affect his audience, an orator needed to feel the emotion himself. This idea was widely subscribed to in the eighteenth century. In the modern era Konstantin Stanislavsky engaged in a sustained investigation of emotion and acting, stressing that the actor needed to experience “real feeling” in order for the audience to experience authentic emotions also. As a theory of emotional transmission, it seems like common sense. Yet, when Denis Diderot witnessed in Baron d'Holbach's salon David Garrick's parlor trick of sticking his head out between two screens, and cycling through a range of passions with his face, the great philosophe wondered whether the actor felt anything at all even though his audience, including Baron Grimm, evidently did.Footnote 1 “Can his soul have experienced all these feelings, and played this kind of scale in concert with his face?” Diderot asked, and then answered, “I don't believe it; nor do you.”Footnote 2 By deciding in the negative, that Garrick could not have felt anything, Diderot reveals a common fallacy of the audience: the belief that what an audience feels reflects, and is a result of, what an actor feels. The problem for Diderot, which he addressed in the Paradox of Acting (1773), was how an actor such as Garrick managed to evoke emotions in his audience when he apparently felt nothing himself.Footnote 3
Pulling faces or “mugging” belongs to the realm of broad comedy or bad acting, and yet eighteenth-century actors were extolled for their skill in doing so. Garrick was a superlative face-puller, and there are numerous accounts of his performances, both on the stage and off, that attest to the mobility of his countenance.Footnote 4 How, then, to account for the apparent superficiality of such acting with the eighteenth-century belief that the actor needed to feel the emotions he or she represented? In his study on the performance of praise in South Indian Hindu communities, the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai suggests another model of emotional interaction, one that allows us to reconsider how convention and emotion operated in eighteenth-century tragedy. According to Appadurai, Western theories of empathy are predicated on the idea that true “inner” intentions can be separated from a falsifiable exterior; such a view, he argues, is based on a Western “topography of the self.”Footnote 5 In contrast, within South Indian Hindu communities, emotional interaction occurs not through empathy but through the repetition of formulaic and conventionalized acts. The praisers and the subjects of their praise, by engaging in these formulaic exchanges, cocreate what he terms a “community of sentiment.”Footnote 6 This set of ideas articulates to Monique Scheer's notion of “emotional practices”; that is, that emotions are not something we have but are something we do. According to Scheer emotional practices manifest in four ways: through mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating.Footnote 7 Just as Appadurai highlights the cultural contingency of emotions, Scheer emphasizes their historical contingency, and together both theorists provide a useful way to reexamine eighteenth-century acting.
Whatever else may be said of actors, in any century, they are profound “doers” of emotions who, through their performances, embody the social practices of emotion in their societies more generally. Drawing on the theories of Scheer and Appadurai, I argue that conventionalized gestures were more involved with the emotional work of actors in eighteenth-century tragic acting than empathy theories would allow. Although eighteenth-century writers on acting and rhetoric frequently reiterated variations on Horace, when it came to commenting on actual acting, the focus of observers was on how emotions were mediated by an actor's person, voice, and gestures. Modern critics frequently argue that the enlarged theatres of the 1790s led to more gesturally grandiose (and hence less “natural”) performances; however, such an argument cannot be sustained when the evidence shows actors used similar gestural codes earlier in the century, when the theatres were smaller. By considering the work of Scheer and Appadurai in relation to the eighteenth-century theatre space, and using the Theatre Royal Drury Lane, where Garrick acted, as my example, I argue that eighteenth-century actors and audiences were bound in a web of emotional practices that were regulated by shared social conventions and the physical conditions of the theatres wherein those performances took place.
“The Most Violent Passions Rise and Fall in the Quickest Succession”
When attempting to account for how a performer evoked emotional responses in his or her audience, eighteenth-century theories of acting and oratory usually returned to the hackneyed truism from antiquity that, in order to make an audience feel an emotion, the performer needed to feel it too. As Joseph Roach observes, Quintilian argued in his Institutio Oratoria, one of the eighteenth-century's main classical sources, that the orator, like the actor, must use “imaginative identification to ‘impersonate’ and ‘exhibit’ emotions as if they were his own” and to take “those passions into himself and transform[ ] them into vocal and bodily eloquence.”Footnote 8 The problem for Quintilian, as Roach notes, was how would the actor or orator generate these emotions?Footnote 9 Theorists in the eighteenth century attempted to answer Quintilian using variations on the same theme, moving from mechanist theories early in the century to vitalism toward the end.Footnote 10 Charles Gildon (1710), ventriloquizing the great Restoration actor Thomas Betterton, proclaimed in his Life that “The Player […] ought to form in his Mind a very strong Idea of the Subject of his Passion, and the Passion it self will not fail to follow, rise into the Eyes, and affect both the Sense and Understanding of the Spectators with the same Tenderness”; similarly, the Abbé Dubos (1733) claimed that “actors who truly impassion themselves” could never fail to move their audiences, for “men who are themselves touched touch us without difficulty”; and Robert Lloyd (1760), nearly thirty years after Dubos and half a century after Gildon, maintained that: “Here lies the golden secret; learn to feel. / […] happy or distress't, / No Actor pleases who is not possess'd.”Footnote 11
Although the mechanics of how an actor experienced emotion changed, for these writers and others, the end effect was always the same: feeling the emotion in oneself was a necessary precondition for an audience to feel it too. Yet, from an earlier age, Shakespeare had Hamlet wonder at the player who, without any authentic motivation (the “motive and the cue for passion”), convincingly represented fictional passions through his actions: “his whole function suiting / With forms to his conceit” (II.2, ll. 588, 583–4). Taking my “cue” from Hamlet, this section does not consider the putative stimuli for emotions but instead examines the expressive form it took in eighteenth-century acting.
The highly conventionalized modes of eighteenth-century acting seem to preclude emotional empathy due to their artificiality, but for their audiences this was not the case. Equal, if not more, weight was given to actors’ vocal expression, gestures, and facial expressions, together with their overall suitability to the role. It is here that art and nature collided. Gildon wrote that “Every Passion or Emotion of the Mind has from Nature its proper and peculiar Countenance, Sound and Gesture,” a comment that suggests actors performed emotions conventionally rather than from spontaneous impulse.Footnote 12 Spontaneity is a post-Stanislavskian value and, as Dene Barnett has demonstrated, eighteenth-century actors employed complex gestural systems, inspired by the oratorical treatises from antiquity, that were interpreted whole or in part by audiences: it was an “art of gesture.”Footnote 13 This gestural art was paralleled by a vocal one, which reflected an eighteenth-century concern with oratory more generally.Footnote 14 According to Paul Goring, in eighteenth-century British culture there was a “preoccupation … with the human body as an eloquent object, whose eloquence arises from the performance of an inscribed system of gestures and expressions.”Footnote 15 It is clear from contemporary accounts that audiences, knowledgeable about vocal and gestural conventions, closely appraised actors’ eloquent bodies.
Another value, inherited from Horace, was Decorum, a term that encompassed appropriateness (or “justness” or “propriety”), grace, and beauty. Commentators across the century refer to the comeliness, or not, of certain actors and focused on the melody of their voices and the grace of their gestures. Paul Hiffernan wrote in Dramatic Genius (1770) that “the performer … in general, ought to have a well-formed person, and a well-toned voice, since, the art of acting consists entirely in being seen and heard with pleasure” [emphasis in original].Footnote 16 The consistency of this view can be seen in an earlier description, by John Downes in Roscius Anglicanus (1708), of the actor Robert Wilks, whom he described as “Proper and Comely in Person, of Graceful Port, Mein [sic] and Air; void of Affectation.”Footnote 17 In his 1769 open letter to David Garrick, the correspondent “H. W.” railed against lesser actors because he believed they provided bad role models for young people due to their “vicious pronunciation ” and “ungraceful manner.”Footnote 18
This aesthetic gloss produced other effects in the area of characterization. Actors’ portrayals were judged not by how believable they were but by how convincingly they represented their characters as Ideals, particularly in tragedy. Critics had set ideas about character types and the passions they experienced, and expected to see these embodied by actors. In an account from 1757 of Spranger Barry's Othello at Covent Garden, the critic in the London Chronicle observes the following:
Mr. Barry's Powers in general are nobly adapted to this Character. … The Vehemence of his tender Passion for Desdemona seizes every imagination: His Dignity in quelling the Riot is commanding: his first Tendencies to Jealousy are beautifully expressed, and finely smothered, till at length they burst out into an amazing Wildness of Rage … and when he collars Iago, it is actually astonishing how his Powers carry him through such a long-continued Climax of Terror. … The whole is vented with the impetuous Ferocity natural to one of Othello's Complexion, still improved with the wildest Harmony of Voice. … [H]is acting through the whole fifth Act, where the most violent Passions rise and fall in the quickest succession, … is sufficient to stamp him an admirable Tragedian.Footnote 19
Although the modern reader cannot avoid the inherent bigotry of this interpretation, for the purposes of this discussion there are four elements identified in this account that reflect how an informed spectator understood the work of the actor. Barry performs readily identified passions that are “improved” by his “Harmony of Voice” and his capacity, like Garrick, to perform a “quick[ ] succession” of passions on his face marks his skill as a tragic actor. Barry's Othello also conforms to a conventional type; his performance is “natural to one of Othello's Complexion.” Here what the writer sees as “natural” conforms to a racial stereotype that was produced as much by the slaveowning English in the eighteenth century as it was by Shakespeare's text.
What is apparent from the Chronicle’s author is the degree to which the formalism of Barry's performance is imbricated with the emotions or passions he represents as Othello. It would be easy to dismiss the conventionality and formalism of Barry's performance, but as Evelyn Tribble argues in relationship to players on the earlier Shakespearean stage:
[The] evidence points equally to the perception that gesture and movement were viewed as the pinnacle of the players’ art, the “grace” that enlivened the words of the playwright. Moreover, the terms “conventional” and “formalized” imply a set of hack routines; instead, we might more fruitfully see such practices as shared assumptions undergirding a sophisticated techné.Footnote 20
Not understanding what these “shared assumptions” were, it still surprises us today that audiences had at times powerful emotional responses to these performances. This is why the putative naturalism of David Garrick is often overstated. It is not surprising that the late great translator, biographer, and reinterpreter of Stanislavsky, Jean Benedetti, saw most strongly the “birth of modern theatre” in the “revolution in acting” putatively begun by David Garrick.Footnote 21 Although Benedetti draws on unimpeachable primary sources, his interpretation of those sources has Stanislavsky as their touchstone. According to Benedetti, a great actor such as Garrick uses “inner impulse[s]” and a proto–“Emotion Memory”; he considers the “circumstances” and “situation” of a scene; and he demonstrates an unusually high level of concentration in both his preparation and performance.Footnote 22 Benedetti, too, leans on the familiar dichotomy between a neoclassical style—mannered, mechanical, declamatory, and emotionally cold—and Garrick's more lifelike acting derived from his consideration of the text and observations of life. Although Benedetti provides the most egregious example of the Garrick “natural” acting argument (even though he—as I have just done, and many others have also done—qualifies the adjective with quotation marks), he is merely reiterating what has become a truism in Garrick scholarship.Footnote 23 Mark S. Auburn in the Cambridge History of British Theatre is less Stanislavskian than Benedetti, but he claims that Garrick “broke with the received traditions by focusing a sympathetic imagination upon characters as parts of whole dramas and as embodiments of behaviours observable in real life.”Footnote 24 In other words, Garrick's approach was diachronic; his performances were created from the dramaturgy of the whole role, unlike his contemporaries who approached their parts synchronically by moving from “point” to “point” (what George W. Stone and George Kahrl term “aria” acting).Footnote 25 Unsurprisingly Stone and Kahrl, in their definitive biography of Garrick, provide a more nuanced interpretation to Garrick's acting by arguing he combined elements of the “conventional” and the “new.” They make the further point that the “best practices of both” should be assessed rather than comparing the efforts of “second-rate” conventional actors with “first-rate” actors performing in the new style.Footnote 26
In a rare diversion from critical orthodoxy extolling Garrick's naturalism, Peter Thomson wrote in The Dictionary of National Biography that “Garrick did not dispense with the rhetorical style he inherited; he changed its timing. It was a subtle, not a flagrant, desecration.”Footnote 27 Here he echoes an earlier view, that of Alan S. Downer, who argued Garrick was “in fact was more of a refiner than a reformer of previous acting techniques.”Footnote 28 Returning to the claim Tribble makes, above, for actors in Shakespeare's time, the same can be said for eighteenth-century actors. Rather than engaging in hack routines, eighteenth-century actors employed a “sophisticated techné” that relied upon a performative exchange between audiences and actors. To understand how this occurred, we need to turn now to Appadurai and Scheer.
A “Community of Sentiment”
In his study of praise in Hindu India, Arjun Appadurai observes that “praise, in both formalized and everyday settings […] has something of the formulaic and the hyperbolic about it. To the observer-analyst it often appears exaggerated, formal, and unrelated to the emotional interior of the person who praises.”Footnote 29 For modern commentators, the conventional expressions of passions in eighteenth-century acting seems similarly “formulaic and hyperbolic.” However, if we are prepared to put aside our own commonsense ideas of empathy and eighteenth-century rehashes of classical theorists, and pay more attention to how actors and audiences actually interacted in the theatres, a perspective such as Appadurai's, from another cultural context, can be revealing.
Appadurai begins his essay with a social constructivist account of emotions as culturally and socially located in a matrix of practices and habits that he terms the “topography of the self.” Appadurai argues that:
our current common sense about intention and expression, about “real feelings” as opposed to “voiced sentiments,” about superficial statements that conceal “real” and “inner” emotional states is … merely our embodied doxa misrepresented as general theories about the relationship between affect and expression. (AA, 92)
Such ideas, he continues, underpin “emotion talk in the contemporary Anglophone world,” and their origins can be found “in the New Testament, where … a major normative claim was made about the separability of act and actor, intention and action, ‘inner states’ and ‘outer forms’” (AA, 92–3). Over time a Western topography of the self emerged, “anchored in a spatial image of layers, of which the affective bedrock is seen as simultaneously the simplest, the most general, and the most directly tied to the somatic side of personality” (AA, 93). Fundamentally, to put this another way, for Westerners the truth lies within, and this is nowhere more apparent than in post-Stanislavskian theories of acting; as Method acting teacher Edward Dwight Easty writes: “This truth can only come from the actor himself [sic] through … long and sometimes arduous self-exploration.”Footnote 30
Although the notion of an inward-dwelling truth being the foundation for a private (and privatized) self emerged in the late sixteenth century, such a topography does not appear to be part of good actors’ preparation in the eighteenth century.Footnote 31 As Jane Wessel has written recently in Theatre Survey, for Charles Macklin the labor behind a part such as Shylock consisted of textual revision (he restored most of Shakespeare's original script), observation, and quasi-historical research; how far he delved into his own mind—if at all—cannot be determined.Footnote 32 Unlike a modern Method actor, the eighteenth-century player saw himself as a translator of the author's vision, and Macklin did not diverge from this:
As the Poet hath drawn an individual characteristic, so ought it to be represented: the Actor must take especial care not to mould and suit the character to his looks, tones[,] gestures, and manners; if he does so, it will then become the Actor's character, and not the Poet's.—No; he must suit his looks, tones, gestures, and manners to the character:—the suiting the character to the powers of the Actor, is imposture.Footnote 33
In either case the arguments are irremediably dualist—regardless of whether they promote an inside-out or outside-in approach—and are rooted in the Western topography of the self identified by Appadurai. For Appadurai, topographies of the self are “variable cultural phenomena,” and only by acknowledging this can we begin to understand emotions as “discursive public forms whose special power does indeed draw on embodied experience, without implying any parsimoniously describable universal biological substrate” (AA, 93).
In the South Indian Hindu context, Appadurai argues that the performance of praise does not entail the communication of “‘inner’ states of the relevant persons, but involves the public negotiation of certain gestures and responses”—which, if successful, “creates a ‘community of sentiment’” (AA, 94; italics in original). Although I am not trying to make a universalist claim about the relationship of Hindu Indians to eighteenth-century English people, Appadurai's identification of the public nature of performed gestures and responses among a praiser, the object of praise, and an audience, suggests a closer affinity to the very public and visible nature of eighteenth-century theatrical experience than to the passive spectator-in-the-dark of modern theatre.
In developing his idea of a community of sentiment, Appadurai turns to rasa theory from Indian classical aesthetics. Rasa defines “eight feelings (bhāva)” that are experienced by all people: love, mirth, grief, energy, terror, disgust, anger, and wonder.Footnote 34 Each bhāva is aesthetically
transformed into a corresponding mood (rasa), a generalized, impersonal feeling capable of being understood by other persons in similar states. In drama, these moods are expressed in a publicly understood set of gestures, and both the dramatic performance and its critical analysis involve the appraisal of these gestures. (AA, 106)
Considering this observation in the eighteenth-century context, we recognize that there, too, it was the publicly expressive and communally understood aspects of the gestures that were important and “appraised” by audiences. What of the affective dimension? How do actors’ gestures translate from appraisal into felt emotion in an audience?
The key assumption is that the [Indian] actor evokes certain feelings in the viewer by exteriorizing his or her own emotions in a particularly formulaic, publicly understood, and impersonal way. The object is to create a chain of communications in feelings, not by unmediated empathy between the emotional “interiors” of specific individuals but by recourse to a shared, and relatively fixed set, of public gestures. The creation of shared emotions is thus unyoked from the emotional authenticity of any particular person's feelings. (AA, 106–7)
By describing the Indian classical actor's expression of emotion as “impersonal” Appadurai argues that the emotion is not personalized or idiosyncratically connected to the actor as an individual with his or her own biography, but is communicated through his or her “formulaic” (in the sense of according to accepted conventions) and “publicly understood” gestures. As a consequence, emotions are cocreated between actors and audiences through their shared understanding of how such emotions, in general, should be represented (again, a rasa is an “impersonal feeling capable of being understood by other persons in similar states”). An emotion, such as praise in Appadurai's example, is “measured by the ‘community of sentiment’ it evokes and creates, and not by the authenticity of the link between the private (or idiosyncratic) emotions” of the performer and his or her audience (AA, 107). Communities of sentiment, then, are created by the performance of “standardized verbal and gestural forms” of which there is “no assumption of any correspondence between the words and gestures and the internal emotional world of the ‘actor’” (AA, 109). Can the same be said of audience responses to eighteenth-century acting? Here the consideration of Monique Scheer's notion of emotions as a practice provides insight into the emotional work of audiences.
Emotional Practices
Appadurai's analysis takes us away from theories of empathy, which stress emotions as something we have, to the idea that emotions are something we do. This idea is developed by Monique Scheer, who, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, argues that “the body is not a static, timeless, universal foundation that produces ahistorical emotional arousal, but is itself socially situated, adaptive, trained, plastic, and thus historical.”Footnote 35 Like Appadurai, who makes a case for the cultural variability of emotions and selves, Scheer does likewise for their historical variability; the habitus is
fused with the body, which is thus infused with the temporality of society. … The body thus cannot be timeless; it contains history at multiple levels. This consists not only of sedimentations of evolutionary time, but also the history of the society in which the organism is embedded, and its own history of constantly being molded by the practices it executes. (MS, 201)
It is the everyday nature of emotional practices that elides this historicization; for example, if “the ‘interior’” is believed to be “the locus of ‘true feelings,’” the self that is produced by the habitus is one that is “daily engage[d] in denigrating the ‘exterior’ and ‘emancipating’ the subject from it” (MS, 206). According to Scheer, emotional practices are “very often distributed, that is, carried out together with other people, artifacts, aesthetic arrangements, and technologies” and involve processes of “mobilizing, naming, communicating, and regulating emotion” (MS, 193).Footnote 36 If emotional practices involve “an active doing as opposed to a passive experience of emotions,” how might this have been for eighteenth-century audiences (MS, 206)?
Before James Boswell went to see Garrick as King Lear, he claimed that he prepared himself for the experience: “I kept myself at a distance from all acquaintances, and got into a proper frame. Mr. Garrick gave me the most perfect satisfaction. I was fully moved, and I shed abundance of tears.”Footnote 37 Not only was Boswell expecting pleasure from his tears, but he was also prepared to work at it. This is nothing compared to Georg Lichtenberg, who set out in the morning on a journey of “six German miles” to see Garrick perform, missing his dinner in the process, and not eating “until after eleven o'clock in the evening.” Waiting for the performance to begin he was “sensible at once of delighted expectation and anxiety when I heard the music begin that was played before the representation [i.e., the overture] in which I saw him for the first time.”Footnote 38 Both Boswell and Lichtenberg were “mobilizing” emotional practices that, for Scheer, are those directed toward “achieving a certain emotional state” whether that is “striving for a desired feeling” or the “modifying of one that is not desirable” (MS, 209). Experiencing a tragedy required its audiences to practice maintaining pleasant feelings, the “pleasantly unpleasant,” and depended on the degree to which such practices continued to be effective; if they were not, they would be discarded (MS, 210–11).
For “naming,” Scheer draws on William Reddy's concept of “emotives,” which “stresses the performative nature of emotional expression” (MS, 212). Whereas in everyday life one may perform an emotive—for example, say, “I am happy”—it is the context and situation that inform the meaning of the statement. Characters in Anton Chekhov's plays often exclaim they are happy when it is clear from the context they are profoundly unhappy. Onstage the emotive is double coded, as an audience interprets an actor performing the performance of emotions. The critic observing Spranger Barry's Othello comments on his “Jealousy,” “Rage,” and “Terror,” a process that Scheer identifies as the work of emotives: to reinterpret, reexperience and understand emotional experiences after they have occurred (MS, 213). Emotives, as sociohistorically situated words and actions, are variable; a modern critic or actor would not interpret Othello according to an Ideal but apply a standard of believable psychology or, as is more common, discourses of race and gender.Footnote 39 The emotives used might be different or, if the same, different in how they are used.
Scheer writes that emotional practices are most obvious when they are used in “communicating” (MS, 214). The success of an “emotional performance depends on the skill of the performer as well as that of its recipient(s) to interpret it” (MS, 214). In the eighteenth century, actors were appraised on the grace and beauty of their voices, actions, and an “it” quality—a sensibility or feeling for the role. All three were important: feeling without the other two was unsatisfactory, just as voice and action without feeling failed to satisfy. Not only did an actor have to communicate the emotions of the character, but he or she needed to please through voice, gestures, and person in order to achieve effective emotional communication. Lichtenberg, in his letter dated 10 January 1775 to Ernst Gottfried Baldinger, wrote of Ann Barry's Cordelia that he would ship all German actresses to London in order to “learn from Mrs. Barry how to use their arms.” Barry's gestures, he wrote, “are more supple and her air gentler. Her height and bosom could not be better. When in King Lear she raised her clasped hands to Heaven and then embraced her father, I was completely carried away.”Footnote 40 Referring to Appadurai's essay, Scheer identifies the too frequent Western “stereotype of ‘Eastern’ hypocrisy and insincerity” that arises from a misinterpretation of “bodily performances that did not conform to Western notions of honest expression” (MS, 215). She argues that the same misinterpretations apply when considering emotions historically unless one starts to see them as practices; then, “the question becomes how and why historical actors mobilized their bodies in certain ways, cultivated specific skilled performances, and debated emotional practices among themselves” (MS, 215).
Scheer's fourth set of emotional practices are those that relate to the “regulating” of emotions; that is, the social rules and expectations that govern how and in what ways emotions may or may not be expressed. In the study of emotions these are called “emotional norms” (MS, 215). According to Scheer the emotional “expectations of the group are implicated in learned habits of feeling and stored in the habitus [of individuals]. The acquisition of the sensibility, or emotional style, of a group proceeds via tacit socialization as well as explicit instruction” (MS, 216). The “emotional style” of a particular group—a term Scheer prefers to Barbara Rosenwein's “emotional communities”—can be explicitly inculcated through “concepts of éducation sentimentale,” important in an eighteenth-century context (which I discuss in the next section) and “programs of teaching aesthetic appreciation of literature, art, music and religion”; all of which assume a hierarchy of feelings between the “‘highest’ or ‘most true’” versus “‘primitive’” reflexes of the body (MS, 216). Emotional responses, however, are not simply learned conceptually but are embodied: the “imparting of the desired emotional response involves imparting the requisite bodily disposition” (MS, 216). Drawing on the work of Benno Gammerl, Scheer argues that emotional styles are not only embodied but also “interact with spaces, construing them, for example, as public or private”; in turn, emotional styles are “shaped by the kinds of spaces they are performed in” (MS, 217).
The four ways in which emotions are practiced provide a set of analytical tools that allow us to consider how historical subjects understood their own emotional arousals without accepting the “truth” claims implicit in these subjects’ accounts. The theatre provides a uniquely contained and time-based environment that reveals how a society practices its emotions in all their complexity. What gives people in that audience pleasure, and what does not? What words do they use to describe their emotional experiences? How does emotional communication occur and when is it effective? What influences this? And finally: What are the emotional norms that govern what can or cannot be expressed?
“We Then […] Knew All the Luxury of Grief”
In the second half of the eighteenth century, it was believed that the physiologically sensitive person was predisposed to sentimentality and to virtue. Unsurprisingly there was a gendered aspect to sentimentality; women were supposed to be more sensitive and as a result more moral creatures than men. Women were hailed, if not actually fully enlisted, in the moral reform of the theatre in response to Jeremy Collier's attacks in the 1690s,Footnote 41 and according to Fiona Ritchie, this led to a sentimental dramaturgy in new plays such as Richard Steele's The Conscious Lovers (1722). “In the case of sentimental drama,” writes Ritchie, “women's ability to feel and to inspire virtue worked together: by making their intensely emotional responses to drama visible in the theatre, women were displaying the ‘proper’ reaction to these plays and demonstrating that they had internalised the moral lesson shown on stage.” Through their public performances of sentiment, women became exemplars to others in the audience, “encouraging others [in attendance] to improve their virtue by developing their own feeling response.”Footnote 42
This cult of sentimentality that emerged in the mid-eighteenth century was a product of scientific paradigm shifts that had occurred in the last third of the seventeenth century.Footnote 43 According to George Rousseau, the publication of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) made possible a new science, the “science of man” [sic], through its “integration” of a range of theories on the relationship of mind to body—in particular, the anatomical work of one of his teachers, Thomas Willis.Footnote 44 As Rousseau notes, Willis's An Essay of the Pathology of the Brain and Nervous Stock (Pathologiae cerebri, 1667) for the first time limited the soul to the brain; if the soul was brain-based, then this increased the importance of the nerves, its messengers, which for most of the century were believed to be hollow tubes that conveyed the “magical” animal spirits to all parts of the body and animated them.Footnote 45 Locke had the insight to take Willis's anatomical work and extrapolate more broadly and, in so doing, to “deflect” the work of subsequent eighteenth-century philosophers of the mind such as the Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith.Footnote 46
Rousseau elegantly summarizes how a physiological insight makes possible the emergence of a cultural phenomenon:
Crudely stated in the form of a syllogism: (1) the soul is limited to the brain; (2) the brain performs the entirety of its work through the nerves; (3) the more ‘exquisite’ and ‘delicate’ one's nerves are, morphologically speaking, the greater the ensuing degree of sensibility and imagination; (4) refined people and other persons of fashion are usually born with more ‘exquisite’ anatomies, the tone and texture of their nervous systems more ‘delicate’ than those of the lower classes; (5) the greater one's nervous sensibility, the more one is capable of delicate writing [or other art making or appreciating].Footnote 47
Across the channel, the moral and medical dimensions to ideas of sensibility were reinforced in the Diderot and D'Alembert Encyclopédie. Under the entry for sensibilité, they articulate its moral aspect: “Sensible souls get more out of life than others; both the good and the ill are increased for them. … [S]ensibility makes a man virtuous. Sensibility is the mother of humanity and of noble-mindedness [générosité]; it increases worth, it helps the spirit, and it carries persuasion.”Footnote 48 Similarly, the medical definition for sensibilité is given as:
the basis and conserving agent of life, animality par excellence, the most beautiful and most singular phenomenon of nature … is in the living body, [and is] a property by which certain parts perceive the impressions of external objects, and in consequence of this produce motions in proportion to the degree of intensity of this perception.Footnote 49
In both medical and moral terms, “refined” people were physiologically predisposed to be more sensitive to the world around them; therefore, it followed they were more virtuous, due to their heightened sensitivity to good and evil.
The virtuous women in Ritchie's theatre displayed a “feeling response,” that is, a heightened capacity to identify with the distress of another.Footnote 50 Jean Marsden argues that “increasingly, audiences came to the theater expecting not only to be spectators of distress but to be able to identify personally with the distresses they witnessed.”Footnote 51 Marsden and Ritchie reveal the emergence of a distinct emotional style; the pleasure of attending a tragedy (or “sentimental drama”) lay in the emotional arousal of giving in to one's sentimental feelings. Sentimental audience members not only gained pleasure from their feeling responses but, by performing them in public, revealed themselves to others as being of a higher sensibility. A key aspect of sentimental response, Ritchie argues, was its “communal” aspect; as Baron Grimm observed in relation to communal reading: “To read in silence and in secret does not produce the same effect. One is alone, there is nobody to witness one's honesty, one's taste, one's sensibility and one's tears.”Footnote 52 Ritchie suggests, following Paul Goring, that such reading responses created an embodied “interpretive community,” that the act of weeping demonstrated to others that a “reader had experienced the appropriate response to a text.”Footnote 53 These same “interpretive communities” could be just as “readily constructed in the theatre” where the relatively well-lit auditorium allowed audience members to see each other as easily as they could see the actors.Footnote 54
I would take Ritchie's insight even further and argue that the theatre was the site par excellence of emotional interaction; more than simply interpreting, audiences were mobilizing, regulating, and communicating emotions. From the second half of the century, the occupants of pit, boxes, and lower gallery aspired to be seen as persons of feeling and of sentiment, as possessing a nervous sensibility so acute they could not help but respond to the pathos in a tragedy. These public demonstrations reached new heights in the Siddons–Kemble era in the last decades of the century. A biographer of Sarah Siddons, James Boaden, reports how the audience responded to her 1782 performance in Nicholas Rowe's Jane Shore (1713) when she delivered the line:
“Forgive me! But forgive me.”
I well remember […] the sobs, the shrieks, among the tender part of her audiences; or those tears, which manhood, at first, struggled to suppress, but at length grew proud of indulging. We then, indeed, knew all the luxury of grief; but the nerves of many a gentle being gave way before the intensity of such appeals; and fainting fits long and frequently alarmed the decorum of the house, filled almost to suffocation.Footnote 55
Although an extreme example, Boaden's anecdote reveals how, according to the accepted emotional style, nervously excitable women shrieked, sobbed, and fainted, behavior so outside usual social expectations that it “alarmed the decorum of the house” (that is, normal, socially regulated public behavior). Nonetheless, in the emotional regulation of the theatre, such behavior was permitted, as it was seen to be a natural female response for women with a heightened moral and nervous sensitivity. Nor were the men immune; at first they “struggled to suppress” their tears before proudly indulging in them. Boaden's description of the men's emotional performance reveals the expected regulating practices through their initial attempts to deny their tears (an emotional restraint expected of their gender) eventually followed by the mobilization of pleasurably surrendering to them. The men's performance of sensitivity overrode their expected gender performance, and Boaden's use of “we” reveals his own participation in these practices. Here we see an example of a tragic performance being used as a technology for mobilizing pleasantly unpleasant emotions. These performances of sentimentality in response to Siddons's acting demonstrated the virtuous emotional style expected of men and women, at least for the occupants of the pit and the boxes; as Joseph Haslewood reported in The Secret History of the Green Rooms (1790): “It became fashionable for all the Ladies to weep, and sometimes to faint.”Footnote 56
“It Was Quite Irresistible”
Just as emotions are embodied, they are also situated in particular places. An eighteenth-century theatre was such a place, where audiences gathered to experience a series of events, one of which was either a tragedy or comedy, over a period of five to seven hours. In the hierarchically organized architecture of pit, boxes, and galleries the audience was anything but homogenous. Footmen and servants in the galleries engaged in emotional practices that differed from their masters below, and the latter fought to regulate the behavior of their often unruly underlings.Footnote 57 Not that the denizens of pit and boxes were any less unruly, despite their own high opinions of themselves; and if one thing makes us pause to consider how different emotional practices were in the eighteenth century compared to our own time, it was the noisy sociability of theatre audiences. Nonetheless, regardless of class, there were still occasions when great actors plunged the whole house into silence. Lichtenberg reports how, when Garrick's Hamlet encountered the ghost of his father, “the absolute silence of the audience intensified everything so much more that, believe me, several times a cold shiver ran through me, even before he had begun his speech.”Footnote 58 Like Siddons's weeping and fainting audiences only six years later, here we see a community of sentiment being created through the emotional practices of an audience combined with the architecture of the theatre and a great actor's performance. Scheer argues that it is the materialization of thoughts and feelings through bodies and various artifacts that makes them available to the senses and to memory; emotions, she writes, “cannot be conjured out of thin air” (MS, 219). So even though emotions must be practiced by someone, it is equally important that they are practiced somewhere. Having considered the emotional practices of eighteenth-century audiences, in this final section I now turn to this emotional emplacement, and consider how the architecture of the Theatre Royal Drury Lane, as a standard for other eighteenth-century theatres, mediated the interaction of actors with their audiences.
The Theatre Royal Drury Lane that Garrick took over in 1747 was essentially the same theatre in which Betterton had performed, built in 1674. Christopher Rich had modified it in the late 1600s, so that by the 1740s the auditorium could now seat 900–1,000 spectators. In 1762, Garrick increased the size of the house to more than 2,000, and Henry Holland greatly increased it again in 1791–4, to 3,600.Footnote 59 Admittedly the Holland expansion was extreme, but prior to this, the auditorium capacity had only doubled from the end of Betterton's career to well into the 1780s. Garrick acted in both the 2,000-plus-seat theatre and in its earlier version, when it was half the size. Although contemporaries commented on changes to how actors performed on the Drury Lane stage after the massive Holland modifications, there does not seem to have been an equivalent commentary on any adjustments Garrick might have made to his acting after the 1762 expansion. If Garrick modified his acting at all, it did not seem to warrant any comment.
Critics have commented on the enlarging auditoriums as an excuse for a more exaggerated gestural style of acting. In reference to Sarah Siddons, Lindal Buchanan claims that “[e]xpanding theaters made intimacy between the performer and audience increasingly difficult. In consequence, Siddons's acting style changed to accommodate the increasing distance between the stage and the back of the house.”Footnote 60 Similarly, Shearer West argues that bigger theatres led to Siddons's “broader, more operatic use of gesture and picturesque posing to convey meaning.”Footnote 61 Expressing some discomfort with Siddons's heightened style, biographer Roger Manvell writes that “[i]n simplicity she found the way to keep her acting human and true even in this vault of a theatre.”Footnote 62 However, the distinct Kemble style of acting practiced by Siddons and her brother, John Phillip Kemble, was established by the mid-1780s.Footnote 63 Claiming that the massive house size from the 1790s contributed to changes in acting style, as do Buchanan, West, and Manvell, is an overstatement; auditorium sizes only marginally affected how actors performed from the 1690s to the 1780s.
Despite a house with a capacity in the thousands, the actual distance from the edge of the apron at Drury Lane to the front boxes, after the 1762 expansion, was approximately thirty-one feet (10 m).Footnote 64 This compact auditorium wrapped the acting platform on three sides and, combined with the easy social interactivity between spectators facilitated by their proximity to the stage and each other, produced an atmosphere in the candle-lit theatre not unlike, as Allardyce Nicoll writes, “a kind of family party”; or to borrow the analogy used by Jocelyn Powell to describe the earlier Restoration theatre, “a sophisticated cabaret.”Footnote 65
The effect of this on styles of acting from the Restoration to the early 1790s produced a dialogic convention of actors including the audience as another interlocutor in the onstage conversation.Footnote 66 Just as Appadurai's Hindu praisers perform a “script” in dialogue with the objects of their praise, so too did the architecture of stage and auditorium “compel[ ] actors to share the large majority of their speech and action directly with the audience.”Footnote 67 This is borne out by numerous paintings and prints that show how English actors generally performed in an arc of forty-five degrees to the right or left of an axis perpendicular to the front of the stage.Footnote 68 Such a conversational arc would allow the actor to direct his or her speech toward the other actor while encompassing the audience and, most important, presenting his or her face to them. C. A. G. Goede, a German visitor to London at the end of the eighteenth century, reported approvingly: English actors “never turn their backs on the public, and seldom show their faces in profile, or hide them behind a pocket handkerchief, or their hands; they never approach too rapidly; nor do they unnecessarily touch each other.”Footnote 69 For an acting style that communicated emotion through the transition of passions across the face, staying turned toward the audience was essential.
The architecture of stage and auditorium allowed actors to perform in close proximity to the pit and side boxes, so that when they were downstage on the apron, the audience in these seats had a clear view of them. This proximity and the well-lit auditorium mediated how actors and audiences interacted with each other. Actors engaged in the same emotional practices we saw among audiences—mobilizing, regulating, naming, communicating—when representing characters and emotions onstage. Depending on his or her ability, an actor was (and remains) a master of communicating emotions, and it is his or her skillful mediation of emotion through voice, facial expression, and gesture that allows such communication to occur. In a piece of doggerel comparing the competing Lears of Spranger Barry at Covent Garden and David Garrick at Drury Lane, the writer claims: “‘The Town have found two different Ways, / To Praise the different Lears; / To Barry, they give loud Huzza's [sic], / To Garrick only Tears.”Footnote 70 This suggests the former was applauded for his virtuosity and the latter for his naturalness, but the implied binary is misleading: the point is that both actors effectively communicated the perceived Ideal of Lear and were praised for doing so. In another context, where Barry and Garrick presented competing Jaffiers in Thomas Otway's Venice Preserved (1682), Thomas Davies reports that Garrick presented the “dreadful image” of his friend's torture “with such astonishing force, that [the audience] trembled at the imaginary picture”; however, “in all the softer scenes of domestic woe, conjugal tenderness, and agonizing distress, Barry, it must be owed, was Garrick's master.”Footnote 71
We have to wonder about these tearful audiences mobilizing their emotions for pleasurable unpleasure and the actor who was its source. In a late anecdote reported in The Morning Post in 1821, the veteran actor Thomas King recalled playing in King Lear with Garrick:
Why, Sir, I was playing with him one night in Lear,—when in the middle of a most passionate and affecting part, and when the whole house was drowned in tears, he turned his head around to me, and putting his tongue in his cheek, whispered—“D–n me, Tom, it'll do.”Footnote 72
This was the same actor playing the same Lear, the very man who, Davies claimed:
had displayed all the force of quick transition from one passion to another: he had, from the most violent rage, descended to sedate calmness; had seized, with unutterable sensibility, the various impressions of terror, and faithfully represented all the turbid passions of the soul; he had pursued the progress of agonizing feelings to madness in its several stages.Footnote 73
So here we have two apparently contradictory reports of Garrick's acting; one where the actor seems fully to “inhabit” the part, and the other where the artful mugger is at work. (Diderot, as I stated at the beginning, favored the latter.) Howsoever audiences mobilized their emotions, these accounts reveal the fallacy of the audience implicit in Horace; it is not that actors need to feel anything (although they may) for an audience to feel, but it is how they mediate emotional communication through face, voice, and gesture that does the trick. Within the regulated and regulating emotional practices of eighteenth-century English society, Garrick demonstrated “unutterable sensibility,” confirming he was one of those highly attuned biological-moral beings capable of sensing, responding to, and interpreting emotions for others similarly attuned—as was his viewer, Davies.
The relationship between gesture and emotion in Garrick's acting is borne out by Lichtenberg, who, in a letter to Heinrich Boie on 1 October 1775, comments: “[Garrick's] gestures are so clear and vivacious as to arouse in one similar emotions. With him one looks serious, with him one wrinkles one's forehead, and with him one smiles.”Footnote 74 In another letter to Boie, nine days later, Lichtenberg provides a detailed observation of Garrick's Hamlet performing his soliloquy from act 1, scene 2:
The last of the words: ‘So excellent a King’, is utterly lost; one catches it only from the movement of the mouth, which quivers and shuts tight immediately afterwards, so as to restrain the all too distinct expression of grief on the lips, which could easily tremble with unmanly emotion. The manner of shedding tears, which betrays both the heavy burden of grief on his heart and the manly spirit which suffers under it, is irresistibly poignant. But as soon as one is attuned to Shakespeare's mind, each word, as Garrick speaks it, pierces one's heart.Footnote 75
Hamlet's “manly” suppression of emotion accords with the gender performance of the character that Lichtenberg expects, but Garrick's performance of it—the choked words, the tight mouth—reveals to this acute observer the sensibility of an actor who with Shakespeare's words can “pierce[ ] one's heart.” Lichtenberg's close observation of Garrick's mouth reveals how near he is to the stage and the position of the actor. Garrick would be delivering his soliloquy downstage as far as he could go, lit by the footlights so that the audience was drawn to his face, not unlike a close-up in film. At the end of the soliloquy, Lichtenberg and the stranger next to him, “to whom I had not as yet uttered a word,” were compelled to “look[ ] at each other” and speak: “It was,” he reports, “quite irresistible.”Footnote 76
Here we see an eighteenth-century community of sentiment at work. Whether Garrick's emotions were “felt” or not, his voice, facial expressions, and gestures, combined with the size, layout, and lighting of the Drury Lane theatre, mediated and facilitated the communicative act. Across the footlights, audiences were emotionally mobilized and regulated by their expectations of each other's behavior and by their expectations of the actors. Scheer directs us to the emplacement of emotional practices, and Appadurai, from a different cultural context, reveals how emotions are communicated through shared gestural and vocal conventions; indeed, these conventions are essential to that emotional practice. Appadurai and Scheer highlight how the emotional styles of a culture or historical period reflect that culture or period's doxa of emotions; in other words, we believe that if we feel a certain way, so must everyone else, and they must feel it in a similar way. And to some extent that is true; problems arise only when trying to interpret emotions interculturally or historically. Despite eighteenth-century writings that endorse the Horatian dictum, what emerges from reports of actual performances is not a split between performance conventions and emotions, between gestures and feelings, but an acute awareness among audiences that feelings were mediated through gestures in spaces that created, maintained, allowed, and revealed a community of sentiment.
