Nancy MacLean’s Democracy in Chains is an enormously influential argument that the public choice revolution centered on James Buchanan was sponsored by the very wealthy, Charles Koch in particular, as an instrument of persuasive politics to protect the status quo from democratic predation. For this demand-side approach to economics, the historian takes an economist as a member of a group centered on a funding source. We begin with the reaction to how MacLean closes her long introduction with the thought that John C. Calhoun (p. xxxi) is the central figure of the American “fifth column” (p. xxx) that has triumphed politically. A stereotype of the Koch-funded economist functions in much the same way that Kenneth Arrow and Edmund Phelps made famous in their analysis of racism in the labor market: it serves to lower the cost of evaluation. Second, we discuss how MacLean’s explanation for Buchanan’s position on race, one that results from his upbringing, illustrates precisely the unfairness caused by the use of stereotypes that Buchanan wrote against. Another sort of unfairness comes into her account when she wrongly credits foundational contributions to public choice made by those outside the Koch circle to those inside. Third, we address the unquestioned contribution of Democracy in Chains, her rescuing G. Warren Nutter’s and Buchanan’s 1959/1965 “Economics of Universal Education” from obscurity. Fourth, we collapse some of the issues MacLean raises into the context of Buchanan’s long disagreement with his peers over the status of the status quo. Fifth, returning to the problems with stereotypical thinking, we address something that is not in her book, Buchanan’s long engagement with the thought of John Rawls. Sixth, we look at how the overarching vision in Democracy in Chains is an unintended consequence of the withdrawal of economists from a concern with our discipline’s history, something MacLean notices in microcosm. We call attention to Paul Samuelson’s witness to two aspects of the free market movement predating the Mont Pelerin Society. These two came together at what might have been the last bastion of the anti-democratic right, the Freedom School in Colorado, had not it been the venue at which Charles Koch encountered the libertarian anarchists. MacLean sees the Freedom School (pp. 132–132) but not where it comes from.
1. The demand side of public choice. The immediate response from MacLean’s economist reviewers to the supposed Calhoun linkage was to point out that Buchanan never cited Calhoun and then point to an article by Gordon Tullock (Tullock Reference Tullock1975) in which he claimed that Buchanan, as far as he knew, never even read him (Magness Reference Magness2018; Fleury and Marciano Reference Fleury and Marciano2018).Footnote 1 This response suggests a difficulty appreciating how her demand-side argument works: the differences among those being funded is supposed to be negligible by those paying for the results. This allows her to work with a stereotype instead of the actual writer. Buchanan received a modest amount from the Koch Foundation and Murray Rothbard received a vast amount, and since Rothbard avowed Calhoun’s principle, their views are for modeling purposes much the same.Footnote 2 Her attributing Buchanan discipleship to those at George Mason with current administrative responsibility in the Public Choice Center is more interesting, but that will wait until we consider Buchanan’s long engagement with Rawls.
MacLean connects Buchanan’s personal experience with his ideas. She reports how Buchanan’s belief that he had been unfairly treated in the Navy had a large impact on his views. Perhaps the central paragraph in her book, linking his early experiences with a paper he wrote very late in life, and which connects him to Charles Koch, should be quoted in full:
Indeed, rather than sympathize with the plight of black Americans, Buchanan later argued that the failure of the black community to thrive after emancipation was not the result of barriers put in their way, but rather proof that “the thirst for freedom, and responsibility, is perhaps not nearly so universal as so many post-Enlightenment philosophers have assumed.” It was a breathtakingly ignorant claim, a willful failure to see his paradigm would not allow him to. Both Koch and Buchanan would make similarly blind and insulting claims about others who did not do well in the labor market these men chose to believe was free and fair. (p. 35)
There is indeed ignorance at work here. MacLean does not know what Buchanan wrote about the unfairness that follows from individuals’ being judged on the basis of the stereotype of their race (Buchanan Reference Buchanan1980, Reference Buchanan and Braham1981, 1983; Levy and Peart Forthcoming). Buchanan wrote that the labor market equilibrium described in the “statistical discrimination” literature pioneered by Arrow (Reference Arrow1971) and Phelps (Reference Phelps1972) violated the fair chance to which an individual is entitled in a stochastic market economy. In the context of the debate over “reverse discrimination,” Buchanan wrote in favor of an affirmative action in hiring to give a person a chance to be judged as an individual, not as a member of a group. This remarkable gap in MacLean’s account illustrates the pitfalls of a stereotypical history of economics. Buchanan is being read as a member of a group, the libertarians financed by the Koch Foundation, so if Rothbard and others opposed hiring quotas, then Buchanan must have, too.
Another sort of unfairness follows from MacLean’s stereotyping. Critical steps in the public choice enterprise are miscredited to Buchanan’s circle (Fleury and Marciano Reference Fleury and Marciano2018, p. 1500). Given how central the public choice denial of the analytical usefulness of the public interest is to her argument, the most egregious of these gaps is her ignoring the formative role of Anthony Downs’s 1957 Economic Theory of Democracy. “The most brilliant and most persuasive exposition of a theory of democracy based on the assumption that there exist only individual self-interests is that by Anthony Downs,” wrote Gerhart Cohm in his review entitled “In Defense of the Public Interest” (1960, pp. 295–296). MacLean credits “rational ignorance” to Tullock (MacLean 2017, p. 161) when it, too, was introduced into the modern literature by Downs. Downs does not fit the stereotype of the Koch-funded public choice scholar. His thesis was directed by Arrow; he was sponsored by Howard Ellis at Berkeley for an Earhart fellowship (Earhart Foundation 2015, p. 99; Levy and Peart Forthcoming). Downs enters her book only as the JPE reviewer of Calculus of Consent (p. 85). She seems not to be curious why the JPE editors asked him to review the book.
2. The economics of universal education. This chapter is surely MacLean’s most important contribution, since the Nutter–Buchanan proposal to address the crisis in Virginia education had received very little attention before her book. She reads it as part of the “massive resistance” to the desegregation ordered by the Supreme Court in Brown vs Board of Education. The state had closed the public schools where they had been threatened with integration, opened only by court order. She singles out for praise the parental push-back to the state closing of the public schools, the creation of “basement” schools operated in parents’ homes (p. 63). The letters that Buchanan and Nutter sent that accompanied their 1959 essay had a phrase—“let the chips fall where they may”—that she uses to title a chapter as illustration of their unconcern for the fates of others (pp. 61–73). In the controversy that followed her book’s publication, it was discovered that one of basement schools was in Nutter’s house (Magness, Carden, and Geloso Reference Magness, Carden and Geloso2019; Kuehn Reference Kuehn2018). Neither the cover letters to “Universal Education” that were addressed to the governor nor those to the committee in charge of reforming public education have the “chips” phrase; that appears only in the letters to colleagues. Only now has the importance of a recording of a Nutter talk at the 1959 Mont Pelerin Society been understood. It features both his discussion of the school in the family basement and his illuminating conversation with the dean of the School of Education. The dean was one of those who received the letter with the “chips” phrase. And, perhaps most remarkably, in the 1965 “Occasional paper” in which the “Economics of Universal Education” is republished, there is a sentence added that would put segregated private schools on the same ground as religious schools, to be prohibited from receiving state aid (Thomas Jefferson Center 1965, p. 19). How that was overlooked is a puzzle.
MacLean does not see how the Nutter–Buchanan proposal fits in a Knightian worldview of policy, and neither does she notice how they link public education to a system of majority rule (Thomas Jefferson Center 1965, p. 7) in contrast to a voucher system they compare with proportional representation (Thomas Jefferson Center 1965, p. 9). Given the long liberal worries about majority rule and the proposal to replace it with proportional representation (Mill Reference Mill1859; Wicksell Reference Wicksell, Musgrave, Peacock and Buchanan1958), the Nutter–Buchanan proposal ought to be seen as an important public choice contribution to the analysis of the provision of public services (Levy and Peart Forthcoming). Nonetheless, MacLean first saw the importance of “Universal Education,” and that speaks well of her book.
3. The status quo. The most systematic complaint MacLean advances is Buchanan’s defense of the status quo, something widely discussed in the disciplinary controversies. The most important context is Buchanan’s reformulation of Knut Wicksell’s proposal that expenditures and the taxes to finance them be voted on simultaneously. The proposal for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution is a variation on the theme that those who benefit from services should pay their costs.Footnote 3 We remember, as if it were yesterday, his exchange with Warren Samuels at which the status of the status quo was a central issue (Buchanan and Samuels Reference Buchanan, Samuels, Peart and Levy2008). We start, Buchanan said, where we are, not where we’d like to be.
There is no requirement that we start at a libertarian utopia, or even where the “Lockean proviso” (Nozick Reference Nozick1974) is satisfied. The worked example to which he would point is William H. Hutt’s Reference Hutt1943 Plan for Reconstruction, written for a Britain Hutt hoped would survive the war. Democratic Britain, he claimed, was endangered by self-interested productive restrictions, which for obvious reasons did not trouble the Hitler regime with which it warred. Hutt’s proposal for post-war Britain is a de facto market socialism with private ownership, something not surprising, given his London School of Economics education and his publications on the matter. Hutt learned the importance of linking reforms to compensation from John Hicks earlier than Buchanan learned the lesson from Wicksell (Hutt Reference Hutt1943; Buchanan Reference Buchanan1975, p. 227; Levy and Peart Forthcoming).
Buchanan’s great difference from Wicksell is precisely the status of the status quo. For Wicksell, the starting point of political exchange needed to be just (Wicksell Reference Wicksell, Musgrave, Peacock and Buchanan1958, p. 108): “It is clear that justice in taxation tacitly presupposes justice in the existing distribution of property and income.” This is not in Buchanan? Why? MacLean suggests Buchanan simply wanted to lock in the status quo. Behind Buchanan there is Frank Knight and the belief that democracy is government by discussion. If we ask who participates in the discussion, the answer is, actual people in the here and now. That’s another way of thinking about the status quo (Levy and Peart Forthcoming).
This reformulation of Buchanan’s defense for the status quo does not, of course, justify advice to dictators. It is no surprise that MacLean’s account of Buchanan’s proposal of the Wicksellian simultaneity principle in his 1980 visit to Chile we quoted (footnote 3) has raised an enormous number of questions. The most important one, in our opinion, is to whom was he talking? Was he talking to the military junta (Pinochet himself?) or his fellow economists and their students? This is now something being explored in the literature (Farrant Reference Farrant2019; Farrant and Tarko Reference Farrant and Tarko2018). In this context, Buchanan’s controversial proposal—that when a democracy is restored, the debts incurred by the dictator should be renounced—takes on considerable importance. Needless to say, this position did not endear him to “free market” bankers (Farrant Reference Farrant2018).
5. John Rawls. John Rawls’s name does not appear in MacLean’s book, perhaps because his philosophy is not associated with the stereotypical Koch-funded economist. Indeed, Tyler Cowen, the most important figure at Mercatus, who is cited frequently, was much influenced by the most subtle of the libertarian anarchists, Roy Childs. Robert Nozick and the importance of a just starting point (Nozick Reference Nozick1974) are much more important for him than is Rawls. Buchanan himself corresponded with Rawls and wrote a great deal about his philosophy. From this, we select two articles that link Rawls with Adam Smith. The first, from 1976, warns against stereotypes:
In what may be surprising, and especially to those who are only casually familiar with the works of each man, I shall demonstrate that the similarities outweigh the differences. A returned Adam Smith would be a long distance from the modern libertarian anarchists, and even from the espousal of the minimal state described by Robert Nozick. But John Rawls is also a long distance from the position which has been attributed to him, that of being a “defender of the liberal welfare state, somewhat modified in the direction of greater egalitarianism.” These philosophers would surely be closer to each other than either would be to the image that intellectual fashion has imposed. (1976, pp. 1–2)
In his 1976 essay Buchanan works with Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, something rather remarkable for that era. In expanding upon Smith’s conception of justice, Buchanan called attention to Smith’s famous example of the equality of the street porter and the philosopher:
There is a second element of Adam Smith’s model of social interaction that is helpful in evaluating his conceptions of justice. Smith did not assume or postulate significant differentials in capacities among human beings. The differences between the “philosopher and the street porter” were explained largely in terms of upbringing, training, and education. In the current debates, Smith would find himself arrayed squarely on the side of those who stress environmental factors and who play down the relevance of genetic endowment. (1976, p. 3)
Between 1976 and 2003, Buchanan sharpened the argument. No longer were Smith and Rawls closer than they appear, but they are fundamentally the same. The critical paragraph in Buchanan’s obituary notice reformulated Rawls’s difference principle in Smithian terms:
I have always considered the utilitarian arguments to the effect that Rawls presumed generalized risk averseness to be trifling and contrary to the spirit of his whole construction. His elevation of the difference principle to a central role in his definition, properly interpreted, is roughly comparable to Adam Smith’s criterion that measures be adjudged in accordance with the promised benefits to the “labouring classes.” And, interestingly in this respect, why have the utilitarian critics concentrated their fire almost exclusively on the difference principle? The criticism could be equally applied to the first principle, that of equal liberty. Slavery may indeed, in some forms, maximize expected utility, as perceived from behind the veil. John Rawls remained consistent in his focus on justice, not utility. (Buchanan Reference Buchanan2003)
The closing lines of the obituary are entirely Smithian, aimed directly at the vanity of the philosopher who does not recognize the street porter as an equal: “He was not a ‘do gooder’ in the surface sense of that word; he did not think himself to be a member of a natural elite, looking down from Harvard on the peons below. He was a genuine seeker after justice for a society of natural equals, each of whom can imagine better worlds” (ibid.). This egalitarianism might be contrasted with one of Rothbard’s more popular books, Egalitarianism as a Revolt against Nature (Rothbard Reference Rothbard2000). One of the properties of stereotypes is a blindness to important distinctions.
6. The past does not begin at Mont Pelerin. The abandonment of the past by the Koch enterprise is something that struck MacLean as she began her archival research.Footnote 4 This abandonment is a regularity in modern economics so we address how this impacts MacLean’s argument. The critical issue, to which we called attention elsewhere (Peart and Levy Reference Peart, Levy, Peart and Levy2013) and to which we return, is the new convention that the free market movement starts with the Mont Pelerin Society with center stage occupied by the University of Chicago contingent. We see this new convention in play when MacLean quotes the president of the University of Chicago in 1946 as noticing it housed the most conservative economics department in the world (p. 35). That may very well be true, but to make her argument work, she needs to ask what funders believed.
If we as a discipline forget the free market movement before the Mont Pelerin Society, then we do not understand why it is important that the Koch sons participated in the Freedom School and there encountered the libertarian anarchists. The Freedom School held the remnant both of the labors of Merwin K. Hart and of the 1936 GOP “brain trust.” These are far older than the Mont Pelerin Society. Samuelson (Reference Samuelson1997) told much we need to know when he pointed to the circle around Rose Wilder Lane’s attack on the first American Keynesian textbook and to the role of William F. Buckley Jr. in widening the attack. From Lane, we find the National Economic Council, as Hart called himself, and its Review of Books.Footnote 5 We also find her attack on the democratic views of that great figure of the Mont Pelerin Society, Ludwig von Mises (Levy, Peart, and Albert Reference Levy, Peart and Albert2012). The link from Hart to the John Birch Society goes through Buckley, something he was at pains to conceal (Peart and Levy Reference Peart, Levy, Peart and Levy2013; Levy and Peart Forthcoming). We find Robert LeFevre, who organized the Freedom School, working for Hart. The head of the Freedom School, Orval Watts, had a PhD in economics from Harvard. Samuelson offered guidance about Watts, too.Footnote 6
The link between the Koch foundation and Buchanan comes very late in Buchanan’s career, but before that there were the funding sources for the Thomas Jefferson Center at the University of Virginia. Here is MacLean’s account that emphasizes the Chicago economics linkage and the approbation of the funders:
With so many of its own allies supporting the VCCG, the Thomas Jefferson Center helped out as it could. Richmond businessman Eugene B. Sydnor Jr. and Darden must have appreciated the economics departments hire of yet another University of Chicago Ph.D., the British economist Ronald Coase, then working out a case for how more strictly defined property rights could obviate the need for government regulation—one that later won him a Nobel Prize. But Buchanan’s operation also provided more. (p. 83)
This mistake shows clearly that MacLean did not show her manuscript to someone knowledgable about twentieth-century economics. Anyone would have told her that Coase’s education was at the London School of Economics. Does it matter? We ask the counter-factual. Had Coase’s PhD been from the University of Chicago, would the radical right funders be pleased?
One easy-to-find answer is provided in the 1960 staple of the John Birch Society, Keynes at Harvard. Its hidden author, O. Glenn Saxon, was the chair of the 1936 Republican “brain trust,” something only now coming back to the scholarly attention. Harvard and Yale, but not Chicago, were represented on it (Luca and Orsi 2017). As far as we know, the only overlap between the “brain trust” and the Mont Pelerin Society was V. Orval Watts, who served on the 1936 “brain trust” as an assistant to that formidable economist and eugenicist Thomas N. Carver, his thesis director at Harvard. Friedrich A. Hayek was required to invite Watts to the Mont Pelerin Society as a condition of funding (Levy, Peart, and Albert Reference Levy, Peart and Albert2012). The only Chicago economist mentioned by Saxon was Oskar Lange, who was brought to America by the Rockefeller Foundation from the Fabian-founded London School of Economics ([Saxon] Reference Saxon1960, pp. 27–28).Footnote 7 Lange’s later service to the communist government of Poland is cited to make Saxon’s point about the hidden connection among Fabians, communists, and the Rockefeller Foundation.Footnote 8
With archival evidence, we can be more precise about the beliefs of the radical right and the University of Chicago. James Clise encountered Milton Friedman in 1957 at his lecture at the University of Washington and, via what would become the John Birch Society intelligence network, discovered nothing about the University of Chicago to address what Friedman told him, that the economics department was the only first-rate department still libertarian (Clise Papers, Box 1, “Milton Friedman” Folder). Clise was important enough for Robert Welch to ask him to send Friedman a copy of the Blue Book (Clise Papers, Box 1, “John Birch Society” folder).
If the funding sources are the primary driver of public choice economics, we need to know what they believed. Merely because we know how important the Mont Pelerin Society and the University of Chicago economists would become does not tell us all that much about what Merwin Hart and his correspondents knew in the 1950s.
7. Conclusion. We remember Buchanan posing the question whether it would be better to be famous for a little while, with all the material rewards that flow from fame, and then forgotten, or to leap from lifetime obscurity to immortality. He thought the answer obvious and suggested that those who didn’t see it that way were a little dim. MacLean’s book is, in an important sense, Buchanan’s wish come true. He has taken center stage. While it is true that he forgot to specify the sign attached to the immortality, that’s a common failing of such requests to the gods. Eternal youth is not something to neglect in an immortality contract. But he also said we have a duty to be cheerful; and surely the copious mistakes in MacLean’s account will be removed in the fullness of time and Buchanan will remain center stage.
