If the twentieth century witnessed “the triumph of democracy,” then the twenty-first century appears wedded to “the failure of democracy” as citizens around the world appear to have become distrustful of politicians, skeptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about the capacity of democratic politics to resolve pressing social concerns. The rise of “disaffected democrats” has, as David Runciman notes in the preface to this excellent book, been accompanied “by a constant drumbeat of intellectual anxiety” (p. xii) about the past, present, and future of democratic politics. Even the most cursory glance along the spines of postmillennium books hardly engenders confidence that all is well (Disaffected Democracies [2000], Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies [2012], Hatred of Democracy [2009], Why We Hate Politics [2007], Democratic Deficit [2011], Vanishing Voters [2003], Democracy in Retreat [2014], Uncontrollable Societies and Disaffected Individuals [2012], etc.). It is exactly in this context that Runciman dares to challenge this popular intellectual pessimism and instead offer a more nuanced and sophisticated account of the internal paradox that he captures in the notion of “a confidence trap.”
The great beauty of this approach is the manner in which it rejects simple “crisis/stability,” “good/bad,” “failure/success” dualities and instead seeks to build a more dialectical model that comprehends the manner in which such ideas or interpretations form two sides of the same (democratic) coin, rather than opposing poles: “This is the democratic condition. It means that the triumph of democracy is not an illusion but neither is it a panacea. It is a trap” (p. xiv). The factors that make democracy work successfully (flexibility, responsiveness, capacity, restrictions, etc.) are exactly the same factors that explain why democracy often fails. What Runciman is therefore seeking to bring to the fore is the manner in which the democratic process itself—in terms of values, expectations, and processes—contains the seeds of its own failings. The electoral system builds in “short-termism,” party competition ensures a childish quality, the ebb and flow of successive generations of politicians undermines institutional memory, and the public often despairs at democracy’s inability to learn from its mistakes. In democratic regimes, politicians and political institutions will sometimes fall victim to hubris and overreach, but such frailties are held at bay by the increasingly pluralized and aggressive network of “monitory” organizations that John Keane outlines in his The Life and Death of Democracy (2009). Runciman’s argument is not therefore that democracy is perfect but that its weaknesses are often intertwined and interdependent with its strengths.
In order to develop this thesis, Runciman takes the reader through a series of crises for democracy from the past hundred years—focusing on events in 1918, 1933, 1947, 1962, 1974, 1989, and 2008—to explore how functioning democracies cope with crises. What this reveals is a pattern of behavior: misapprehension, confusion, brinkmanship, experimentation, recovery. Poor at spotting crises on the horizon, given to ignoring signs of impending trouble and then prone to overreacting to the routine challenges of governing in an increasingly complex world, democracies, in Runciman’s narrative, experience an almost semipermanent state of crisis (which, in turn, makes it hard to know whether any fire lurks beneath the smoke of the latest crisis claims). And yet democracies continue to adjust and adapt: “This process is not pretty, and it creates a pervasive feeling of disappointment” (p. 293), but democracies are adept at “muddling through,” and this reveals the root of the problem: the confidence trap. The flexibility of democratic systems allow them to muddle through, and this in itself creates a lingering complacency: “Democracies survive their mistakes. So the mistakes keep coming” (p. 294).
In terms of stress-testing this thesis and setting it against a number of reference points in the wider literature, three issues deserve brief comment. The first is Runciman’s failure to engage and develop many of the arguments about the internal contradictions of democracy developed by Bernard Crick in his seminal In Defence of Politics (1962). Politics is messy, often cumbersome, generally slow, frequently opaque, and tending to deliver suboptimal decisions because it is somehow charged with reconciling competing demands in an increasingly diverse society. At the same, time the democratic process encourages candidates to overinflate the public’s expectations to the extent that postelection disappointment is almost inevitable. Crick’s contentions are arguably more relevant today than they were when first published over half a century ago for the simple reason that the challenges faced have become “super-wicked,” the projects being coordinated have become mega-projects, society has become “hyper-diverse,” and the public’s expectations have become ever greater. And yet the link between Crick and Runciman is the manner in which the former highlights that the frailties and failings often associated with democratic politics are at one and the same time elements of its great beauty. For Crick, democratic politics was not perfect, it could not “make every sad heart glad,” but it offered a form of collective social engagement through which tensions, debates, and arguments could be heard and mediated in order to provide a largely safe and stable environment.
Runciman’s analysis of the reasons that democracies seem to stumble from blunder to blunder flows into a second reference point and, in particular, to Anthony King and Ivor Crewe’s The Blunders of Our Governments (2013) in which they offer an account of what might be termed the über-blunders and omni-shambles of government (specifically in the United Kingdom). Although at some level both working within the same intellectual and empirical terrain—crisis and failure within democratic political systems—these books could not be more different. Moreover, in some ways, Runciman provides answers to many of the questions that King and Crewe leave hanging. Those authors open with a comment about declining public confidence in politics and then ponder whether this is because governments “screw up so often” (p. xi), but what Runciman provides is a far deeper and more systemic account of why democratically elected governments “screw up,” why they stumble and blunder, and why (paradoxically) this stems from many of the strengths of democracy as a governing regime, which are at the same time its weaknesses (qua. Crick).
“The cumulative success of democracy has created the conditions for systematic failure,” Runciman argues, and “[t]he time may be past for muddling through” (p. 296). In this regard, it is almost impossible not to locate his thesis regarding the confidence trap against a set of worrying narratives concerning the politics of climate change that are best captured in works such as David Shearman and Joseph Smith’s The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy (2007) or Anthony Giddens’s The Politics of Climate Change (2009). For Shearman and Smith, the confidence trap that Runciman exposes with such clarity is a fundamental flaw, rather than one simply of cultural complacency. “In other words,” they suggest that “democracy itself has a big problem” (Climate Change Challenge p. vx). Other scholars have gone further, with Geoffrey Harper, for example, reluctantly posing the question of Democracy or Survival? (2012), and while Runciman does not put the challenge in such stark terms, he does admit that climate change “represents the potentially fatal version of the confidence trap” (p. 318).
Let us hope that The Confidence Trap is read widely within but especially beyond academe so that politicians and policymakers might learn of the risks of overconfidence and through this avoid a fatal blunder.
