In a world in which Luxon maintains that authoritative and purportedly universal standards no longer provide an accepted basis for ethical and political judgments, the political arena as a whole is now characterized by uncertainty and paralysis. For Luxon, political theory today is at an impasse, which necessitates confronting the question of how “individuals can both author and ground their political judgments” (ix). Among the issues that Luxon confronts in this volume are the question of what constitutes truth, the relation of self to others, and practices of self-creation. For Luxon, two understandings of the practices through which the person relates to him-/herself, to others, and to truth telling open up the prospect of breaking the paralysis of contemporary politics: Freudian psychoanalytic and Foucauldian parrhesiastic practices. Reading Freud for and against Foucault, and Foucault for and against Freud, she says, can illuminate the possibilities for individuals to become more “agentic,” to become agents of their own practices. Luxon argues that Freud and Foucault illuminate “the psychological and political dimensions of personhood crucial to projects of political subjectivity and agency” (xii). We are, however, immediately confronted with the question whether there actually is a crisis in the political arena, a paralysis, as Luxon claims, as well as the question whether Freud and Foucault were preoccupied with the issue of such a crisis which, for Luxon, is characterized by “uncertainty, apathy, or withdrawal” (x).
We are also confronted with the question of which Freud, and which Foucault? With respect to Freud, it is not the classical psychoanalytic practices based on drive theory that Luxon looks to, but the later practices of relational psychoanalysis theorized in the 1930s, which were oriented to self-formation. With respect to Foucault, it is not the early Foucault, the Foucault of Discipline and Punish, and power and subjection, for example, with whom Luxon is concerned, but the final Foucault, the Foucault whose lecture courses at the Collège de France between 1980 and his death in 1984 focused on parrhesia, an art of living, and ethical self-formation. That Freud, and that Foucault, were concerned with the conditions under which individuals “author their actions” (23); both the psychoanalytic and the parrhesiastic relationship are collaborative, according to Luxon. In neither is there command or external coercion; neither is characterized by “subordination” (25).
In relational psychoanalysis there is a “‘combative collaboration’ between patient and analyst, premised on a deliberate disruption of usual social roles” (51). In contrast to Judith Butler's reading of Freud, in which, as Luxon sees it, subjectivity and agency are “radically divorced” (97), in relational psychoanalysis, as Luxon idealizes it, a real encounter between analyst and analysand occurs, one in which the authorial agency of the patient is cultivated. For Luxon, those psychoanalytic practices can disrupt the “reflexive structure of subjection . . . in order for self-cultivation to take a new direction” (110). Luxon's “rereading” of Freud emphasizes his own focus not on psychoanalysis as a “confessional technology” but rather as a collaboration the object of which is a “re-education, a second education, a Nacherziehung” (75). It seems to us that Luxon's reading is an idealization of psychoanalysis, a claim that this is the way relational psychoanalytic practice could work. Here the question of transference/countertransference is resolved by a shift in “authorial perspective away from a third-person authority and toward participant observers” (96). Assuming such a mutuality of collaboration within relational psychoanalytic practices, Luxon holds out the prospect of a link between “ethical cultivation and political engagement” (91), of a link between the analyst's “couch” and the actual political realm. Moreover, it is here that a connection is forged by Luxon between her vision of a combative collaboration within psychoanalytic practice and the equally agonistic relationship she sees between the parrhesiastes or educator and his/her interlocutor, both of which are based, according to her, on “‘care’ rather than knowledge” (164). Luxon's recourse to parrhesia here will permit her to try to get beyond the authoritative role of the analyst in psychoanalysis, and to make good on her claims about combative collaboration.
For Foucault, parrhesia “allows us to distinguish analytically those relations that produce individuals (to fit a specific mold) from those that educate individuals for self-governance (such that they are the result of their own design)” (136). Luxon's distinction between “produces” and “educates” here evokes her articulation of the Freudian experience of “re-education.” It would seem that for Luxon, the production of the individual is closely linked to Foucault's understanding of “subjection” or assujettissement, whereas the “education” of the individual is linked to self-formation and self-governance, to what Foucault and Luxon mean by “expressive subjectivity.” Moreover, Foucault's ethical turn was not primarily focused on the Greco-Roman world, but “sought to move beyond ancient models of self-cultivation and to adapt parrhesia for the contemporary world” (136). While the relationship of the parrhesiastes, or “educator,” to student or interlocutor certainly entails strong affective bonds, they are not bonds of dependency. Indeed with “parrhesia, Foucault seeks to replace relations of obedience with those of self-governance and trust” (166). The parrhesiastic relationship excludes the student's simple imitation of, or dependence on, the parrhesiastes. Indeed, as Luxon forcefully contends in her conclusions, the parrhesiastic relationship is one in which educator and student “readily change position.” Students become educators and educators give up their authoritative role “in order to incite discovery” (303). For Luxon, the “political salience” of Foucauldian parrhesia lies in its capacity “to contest the forms of political order,” and to challenge them (170). Indeed, both Freud's relational psychoanalyst and Foucault's truth-teller serve as hinges “between individual projects of self-formation and collective practices,” between the micro practices of the individual and the macro practices that are “constitutive of a culture or society” (133); the world of the political. Indeed, as Luxon insists, “Foucault's parrhesiastic practices seek to extend individuals out and into politics” (180), though here too the analysis of just how such practices can directly impact the political realm, let alone prepare us to “exit the prison” of disciplinary political power relations on which his earlier works had focused, seems underdeveloped. While Luxon herself concedes that the “weakest element in Foucault's rendering of parrhesia is . . . an account of collective practices” (200), she insists that “such ethical work might prepare for public engagement, [though] he avoids any claim that such cultivation translates automatically into political action” (201). As with Freudian psychoanalytic practices, “individuals may have a richer set of ethical resources upon which to draw and potentially enter politics, but it remains for them to make that choice” (201).
What is needed, then, according to Luxon, are ways “to rouse a wider audience” (207), and for that audience to attain “legibility,” the capacity to grapple with and understand political issues: an audience that is engaged in the public space. Foucauldian parrhesia, in particular, has the promise of overcoming the prevailing limitations of public discourse in which people cannot escape the “common opinion with which they are familiar, and hide behind the authority of others” (228). For Luxon, parrhesiastic practices hold out the promise of “frame breaking,” dislodging the taken-for-granted modes in which the political shows up and is conceptualized: what is needed are practices that break the frames that now “compose political events and lines of action” (257). Frame breaking, then, “could initiate an ongoing conversation with the political unknown—with preferences and identities not-yet captured by elites and not-yet articulated by citizens” (272), leading to the creation of a multiplicity of such frames. But could the dialogic encounters instantiated in the psychoanalytic and parrhesiastic practices explored by Luxon, with their heightened role for personal judgment, realistically provide a basis for her frame breaking? One has the sense that Luxon herself may not be very sure: “And yet the nature of modern mass politics suggests that personal judgment will never be enough to counter the organized effects produced by media and political elites” (281). Has Luxon, then, given in to a form of cultural and political pessimism here? She appears to accept the necessity of living “within liberalism's present contradictions and seeking to make its tensions productive rather than one's of disillusionment” (293). Therein lies a certain tension between the frame of the really existing political and Luxon's compelling call for frame breaking.
