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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2004
In the Preface, Fereydoun Hoveyda tells us that many readers consider this study of militant Islamic fundamentalism “a prescient book.” Published before the 11 September terrorist attacks on America, the book predicts future violence directed against the West and its Muslim allies by terrorist groups and their sponsors. Hoveyda's main thesis is that in the 12th century, Muslim religious authorities began to condemn the intellectual achievements of Islamic civilization and discourage scientific research and curiosity. The mainstream clerical leadership's espousal of a doctrinaire interpretation of sacred Islamic texts encouraged fanaticism and intolerance. This inflexible attitude paved the way for the first wave of militant Islamic fundamentalism, which swept through the Middle East and North Africa, precipitating a steady decline in learning and resulting in the present underdevelopment and weakness of the Muslim world. The newest wave of militancy, triggered by Khomeini's successful revolution against the Shah of Iran in 1979, is another drastic step backward—one that threatens Muslim countries much more than it does the West, because it prevents the Muslim world's transformation into modern democratic states.
Hoveyda makes a compelling case for paying closer attention to militant fundamentalist ideology, which, he claims, is “the most important dimension” of an effective strategy for eliminating terrorism. However, in his zeal to demonstrate Khomeini's influence on virtually all terrorist groups, he drastically oversimplifies the complex phenomenon he seeks to explain. Despite his prescience, he minimizes the risks posed by the Taliban, which “should not be exaggerated” because “the Taliban are at odds with Iran's fundamentalists and other Islamic militants … in my opinion, they do not constitute, at least for the time being, a perilous challenge to Western countries,” Also, his charge that “Khomeini's demise has not basically changed the picture” is strangely unobservant, given the lively debate raging in Iran over the meaning of Khomeini's central premise: rule by an Islamic jurist. Another peculiar assertion is that “Khomeini's grand design seems to be progressing toward its final goal.” He provides no evidence to support this notion, which flies in the face of recent developments in Iran and the region as a whole. Moreover, it ignores the competing visions and agendas within Shi

ism itself and the significant differences among Sunnis, Shi

is, Arabs, Persian, Kurds, Turks, and so on.
Hoveyda's analysis reduces a complex web of regional and local forces to a single cause and seems policy-blind. There is virtually no mention of the Shah's abuses or societal conditions at the time of the revolution, and he minimizes the important ways in which colonialism fostered radical Islamic ideology. The Middle East was subjected to continuous foreign interference, the siphoning off of its resources, and Western support for fundamentalist groups as bulwarks against nationalists and communists. Hoveyda cites all of these injustices and interventions but does not adequately relate them to Islamic militancy. Although he asserts, “[R]eform cannot take root in the absence of a democratic atmosphere, which was not allowed to flourish by the modernizers, he still insists that the main obstacle to development is the militants' “mind-set and that of their co-religionists.” This mind set, in addition to the “ominous lesson” of the Iranian Revolution, means “fundamentalism will win if it is not stopped.” The way to stop it is for “Muslim intellectuals alone” to “provide the basic cultural effort,” because “they have failed to create a modern Islamic symbolism and insisted on maintaining age-old traditions, methods of thinking, and ways of life.”
As the former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations under the Shah (1971–78), Hoveyda puts excessive emphasis on Khomeini's ideological control and strategic reach. This perhaps is understandable. His early chapters on the linkages and divisions among various fundamentalist and secular nationalist thinkers provide interesting insights into the psychological responses to Western-imposed notions of modernity. He also makes a good case for the continuity of a distinct strain of militant Islamic thought, which he traces throughout the centuries. The most eloquent and compelling section of the book describes how secular leaders imported only the material side of modernity, without generating the democratic debate that would help people absorb the new elements being introduced: “people did not know the how and why of the changes. They could not effectively discuss, complain, approve, or reject. They had to bow to the will of the authorities.” The resulting “split identity” led to the malaise of these “semi-modernized societies.” The most interesting points concern the widespread feeling that one cannot modernize without incurring damnation, because when religion is isolated from a social system devoted to technical and scientific progress, “it seems you are killing God…. [P]eople feel they have to be either fundamentalist or atheist.” Many other religions and societies have faced this same agonizing dilemma.
Although the book contains thought-provoking material for undergraduates as well as the general public, it is disorganized chronologically and conceptually. The same points and illustrations are reiterated, and names are reintroduced as though they are being mentioned for the first time. Although highly derivative, the book includes interesting insights from an eclectic array of scholars and should stimulate lively classroom and seminar discussions.