This book arose from Cortez’ doctoral studies under Professor Alan Torrance. The work constitutes a sustained argument for the necessity of theologians to address anthropological questions christocentrically, an exploration into the nature of christological anthropology, and its application to a key issue in human ontology.
Cortez begins by noting that, although there is a widespread consensus among theologians concerning the need for a christological centring in the area of theological anthropology, sustained attempts actually to do this remain scarce. He also draws attention to the mind-body debate as an example of a complex, unresolved issue of human ontology which continues to raise urgent questions, especially in the light of recent scientific and philosophical developments. He notes that, despite the recent widespread rejection of dualistic anthropologies in preference for both reductive and non-reductive physicalisms, there remains a lack of any real consensus concerning how physicalism is to account for human ontology, with the result that non-physicalist theories refuse to go away.
His work constitutes an attempt to bring these two areas together, drawing on the resources of Karl Barth's theological anthropology in order to elaborate the grounds, scope and methodology of a christological anthropology and tracing its implications for this precise issue in human ontology. The choice of Barth is explained in terms of the profoundly christocentric nature of his theology, his extended, systematic considerations of humanity in the light of the Incarnation, his sustained considerations of methodological issues associated with such analysis, and his specific focus on the implications of this for our understanding of the mind/soul-body relationship. The focus of the first half of the book (Chapters 2–4) is on expounding those aspects of Barth's thought pertinent to this exercise, while the second half (Chapters 5 and 6) attempts to apply the insights of Part One to a range of theories associated with the contemporary mind-body debate.
Cortez' own perception of the purpose and value of his study is threefold. First, he sees it as contributing to the ongoing project of understanding Barth's thought through ‘an analysis of an underappreciated aspect of his theology’ (p. 15). Secondly, he hopes it will contribute to contemporary philosophy of mind by serving particularly as a clarification, analysis and evaluation of a number of recent theories. Finally, he sees its distinctive contribution as the drawing together of these two disparate fields of inquiry in order to shed the light of the Incarnation on human ontology. He thus provides us with criteria for evaluating his own efforts.
Chapter 2 constitutes a systematic, rigorous and impressively researched examination of how Barth develops his theological anthropology on the basis of christology. Rooting Barth's christological anthropology in his theanthropological theology of creation Cortez explains how Barth nevertheless takes care to ensure that the christological approach does not erode the legitimate distinction between christology and anthropology by rooting Christ's uniqueness in his relation to the Father. His methodology is thus grounded on the humanity of Christ as it stands in both continuity and discontinuity to all human beings. From this, he shows how Barth establishes the minimal requirements essential for a concept of the human being which can be used theologically through a consideration of Christ's humanity and, from this, a derivation of truths about human nature in general.
Chapter 3 constitutes a demonstration that Barth's christocentric theology not only does not preclude, but makes possible the sort of interdisciplinary dialogue in which he hopes to engage in Part Two of the book. Throughout this section Cortez utilises various objections made to Barth's thought in this area in order further to clarify his position, simultaneously revealing the subtlety and strength of Barth's thought in comparison to some of his detractors. This is not to say Cortez is uncritical of Barth: in several places he indicates where his own exposition contributes to the ways in which he has been misunderstood. Where Cortez might have been more critical, in my opinion, is in his account of the limits which Barth placed on philosophical approaches to human ontology, seeming to deny to human reason a genuine metaphysical depth and range, thus relegating philosophical analysis to a concern with the merely phenomenological. The work would have benefited considerably from some sort of recognition and response in this area.
Chapter 4 establishes those criteria by which the christological validity of any theory of human ontology is to be evaluated. Here, Cortez proceeds to demonstrate that the principles Barth derives from his christological anthropology, while seeming to preclude both monistic materialism and substance dualism, may not necessarily preclude certain refinements of physicalism and dualism. In terms of the criteria for the success of his project defined by Cortez himself, this first half of the book would seem to be an impressive addition to Barthian scholarship. On this basis alone the work deserves to be read by anyone who wishes to engage with this or related aspects of Barth's theology.
In the second half of the book (Chapters 5 and 6), Cortez examines a range of modern theories of human nature, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses both in terms of consistency with Barth's christological anthropology and their own inner and contextual coherence. Chapter Five considers a range of non-reductive physicalisms (NRP) and Chapter Six a range of holistic dualisms (HD). With regard to the former, Cortez argues that any NRP theory, to be viable christologically, must be able successfully to address challenges particularly in the areas of mental causation, phenomenal consciousness and continuity of personal identity. He concludes that while such theories tend to struggle to explain the mental causation required for personal agency and freedom, they are able to account convincingly for consciousness and personal continuity through death and resurrection. His final assessment of NRP theories is that while there are substantial issues associated with them that still require resolution, they are nevertheless viable candidates for christologically adequate human ontologies. In my own estimation, Cortez treats too lightly the problems for physicalist theories concerning personal identity, essentially asserting, rather than adequately arguing for, their ability to offer a coherent account.
As far as HD is concerned, Cortez argues that the key challenges centre on mental causation, embodiment and contingent personhood. He judges that, in spite of a priori intimations to the contrary, this type of theory may be able to address the issue of mental causation more convincingly than NRP theories. Concerning the problem of personal embodiment he thinks that, while emergent and Thomistic versions of HD in particular may have the potential to offer coherent accounts of the body-soul relationship, a significant weakness of all HD theories is their simultaneous adherence to the separability of body and soul on the one hand, and the primacy of the embodiment relation on the other. At this point there are some significant lacunae in the exposition which perhaps render this conclusion a little premature, but given Cortez’ main focus and the impressive amount of ground covered in the second part of his book (as in the first), this is perhaps understandable.
Cortez considers that dualistic ontologies run the risk of threatening contingent personhood with their tendency to assume the natural immortality of the soul. He thinks, however, that there is no reason for HD proponents to commit to this idea, possibly preserving contingency through adhering to special divine intervention to preserve the soul prior to resurrection. Cortez’ analysis at this point is a little unconvincing, seeming to conflate primary and secondary causation at crucial points (as indeed Barth appears to do also). On the whole though, Part Two of Cortez’ work is an impressive piece of scholarship which evidences deep familiarity with all the pertinent issues and which certainly achieves the purpose of the author: to contribute to contemporary philosophy of mind by serving as a clarification, analysis and evaluation of recent theories. As a sourcebook for those working in the area of human ontology it is an invaluable addition, providing an extremely helpful taxonomy of the debate and a wide-ranging bibliography.
Finally, as noted, Cortez sees his distinctive contribution as the drawing together of the two fields of Barthian theology and human ontology in order to shed the light of the Incarnation on the latter. In this he achieves no small success, his profound familiarity with Barth's thought in this area helping to make visible the relevant issues for any such enterprise in terms of ground, scope and methodology, and shedding valuable light on those dimensions of both NRP and HD requiring clarification and further research if they are to yield christologically viable theories.
