This book investigates electronic government reform at the local level in China. In the city of Chengdu the author seeks answers to the research question “how does e-government affect power relations in Chinese local government organizations?” A related subset of questions explore who controls e-government, whose interests it serves, and through what mechanisms e-government affects power relations. Informed by theories of how information and communications technologies (ICT) lead to reinforcement or distribution of power, the author investigates whether existing power holders in the political system at the local level are strengthened by the implementation of e-government solutions, or if power becomes dispersed in more hands. The hypothesis to be tested is whether the power of the government is reinforced.
In Chengdu municipality and four city districts, from September 2009 through March 2010, Schlæger interviewed 21 informants at informatization offices, government affairs service centres, and in the digital urban management system. The offices are internal government units responsible for general informatization policy shaping the contexts for the centres and urban management system. At the centres, citizens mainly apply for business licenses. The research design and methodology are solid, and the study's theoretical framework is clearly laid out in chapter three. Useful ideas of principal–agent theory are employed to tackle the issue of information asymmetry between principals (political leaders) and agents (managers/street-level workers) in the local bureaucracy. In a context where actors might be constrained or enabled by ICTs, institutions and ideas, there are actor strategies to gain more control as well as counter-strategies to shirk control and seek legitimacy. The author views actor behaviour as shaped by two fundamental mechanisms, facilitated through e-government. The first is called “the virtual panopticon,” whereby monitoring capacity over individuals is increased. The other, termed “the battering ram,” implies a mechanism by which principals will use improved statistics to force agent units that do not comply with higher-up demands.
Through his fieldwork, Schlæger sought to confirm his reinforcement hypothesis. Not surprisingly, strategic decisions about e-government solutions are controlled and made by the city government and its district governments. The centres that used to be plagued with corruption, impeding economic growth, radically improved their efficiency. Combined with carrots and the hard stick of a “red alert warning” that went off if a time limit was transgressed, the virtual panopticon worked well, making it possible to control employee misconduct. Thus, corruption and inefficiency were effectively combatted. As for the urban management, a CCTV system and citizen hotline were combined to monitor different city bureaus and solve sudden infrastructural problems in the city. Interestingly, what was not examined in the case study of urban management was the larger part of it: the chengguan (law enforcement bureau) and its notoriously heavy-handed practices of manhandling vagrants and petty sellers in the street. The reason for government not implementing a virtual panopticon for the “mini-police” is quite important for understanding the ideology underlying the local e-government reforms that are in fact implemented. Certain layers of government and society are served by e-government, others are not. Arguably the chengguan was not subject to e-government monitoring as harsh methods that target the have-nots, serve the interests of the middle class and the general investment climate need no e-government solutions. Only the inspectors out in the field doing repairs were monitored by CCTV-cameras. Thus a virtual panopticon, even if less perfect than in the service centres, was established only for the public service units, not the chengguan. The hypothesized “battering ram” mechanism did not play out in such cases: pure statistics were not enough to force better coordination and reform, as a leadership group had to be established for that purpose.
The main findings of the book point to reinforced power relations within the government apparatus through successful construction of a virtual panopticon for select screen-level government workers who meet (middle-class) citizens, but also that e-government in itself didn't spur further organizational reform as additional efforts were needed to push for it. Reinforcement theory was thus proven correct insofar that local power relations were somewhat sustained. However, the author argues that his cases show that the theory needs revision, as while individual oversight was increased by e-government, organizational reform was not deepened by it. This leads to a situation where power relations were neither fully reinforced nor distributed. He interprets this as “mutual,” simultaneous,” or “conditional” empowerment, as both the interests of the local government and the citizens are served. Leaning toward the idea that citizens have been empowered through the complaints hotline and other ways of exerting pressure on the service centres and public service units is puzzling, especially in light of the earlier convincing evidence of the virtual panopticons that strengthen local power holders. So, with the argument for reinforcement of power relations quite strong, at best it renders citizens' empowerment “conditional” as they are strengthened most in the new vulnerable layer of the bureaucracy – the service centres.
Overall, this book is a valuable study. Most studies of e-government have been on central government policy, not local e-government reform. It also contributes to literature about the fragmented Chinese bureaucracy and well-known problems related to the policy implementation chain. It can certainly be used in graduate courses in political science and Chinese studies.
