In her introductory book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Jill Vance Buroker says her ‘main purpose is to explain Kant's arguments intelligibly to the student who has some familiarity with the history of philosophy’ (p. 12). Buroker's method of interpretation is ‘the principle of charity’, giving ‘Kant's views the most plausible interpretation consistent with the texts’ (p. 12). Although she does not hesitate to point out weaknesses in Kant's views, she also defends his views against some well-known criticisms and notes some ‘clear misunderstandings’ on the part of recent commentators. Buroker also sees the importance of placing her discussion of Kant's views and arguments in their historical context. Moreover, she explains the role of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant's Critical project as a whole. For a ‘guide’ to the Critique of Pure Reason, Buroker's book is thus unusually rich and unabashedly rigorous in its treatment of Kant's main arguments.

The book contains eleven chapters and a conclusion. The four sections of the first chapter introduce the reader to Kant's life and works, Kant's Critical project, the structure of the Critique and the difference between the first (A) and the second (B) edition versions of the Critique. Although some have recently questioned the adequacy of interpreting Kant's Critical philosophy as a response to rationalism and empiricism, Buroker maintains that such a view is ‘not misleading’ (p. 7). In fact, it is in the light of this view that Buroker clarifies the nature of Kant's Critical project, Kant's view of the power of human reason, Kant's Copernican revolution and Kant's analytic–synthetic distinction. In chapter 2, Buroker offers a clear and helpful reading of the A edition preface, the B edition preface, and the Introduction to the Critique. Particularly helpful in this chapter is her discussion of transcendental idealism, which she places in historical perspective. Having explained Kant's account of the analytic–synthetic distinction, moreover, Buroker offers a reformulation of the distinction that is consistent with Kant's account in her effort to make the distinction sufficiently general. Every chapter of the book (except for the first) closes with a summary. This feature is especially helpful as it allows the student to get an overview of the most important points and arguments presented in each of the major sections of the Critique.

In chapter 3 Buroker begins her discussion of the Transcendental Aesthetic by providing definitions of some key terms such as ‘intuition’, ‘sensibility’, ‘sensation’, ‘appearance’, the ‘matter’ and ‘form of intuition’, and ‘inner’ and ‘outer sense’. Although the terms are notoriously difficult to define, Buroker provides definitions that are clear enough to understand the main arguments of the Aesthetic. In section 2 she expands on Kant's rather brief references to the three possible theories of space and time, the absolute theory, the relational theory and Kant's own theory. An engaging discussion of the theories is followed by a lucid explication of the four metaphysical expositions of space and time. Here she incorporates the interpretations of recent commentators including Lorne Falkenstein and Arthur Melnick. After discussing the transcendental exposition and the transcendental ideality and empirical reality of space and time, Buroker closes the chapter by addressing the two most common objections against Kant's theory, according to which things in themselves are non-spatial and non-temporal, and geometry and arithmetic are synthetic a priori.

The Transcendental Analytic is discussed in four chapters: ‘The Metaphysical Deduction’ (chapter 4), ‘The Transcendental Deduction’ (chapter 5), ‘Schematism, Analytic of Principles I’ (chapter 6) and ‘Analytic of Principles II’ (chapter 7). In her discussion of Kant's table of judgements in chapter 4, Buroker offers reasons why, even if the table is outmoded from the standpoint of modern logic, we should not dismiss Kant's theory of categories. Her reading of the key passage (A79/B105) of the metaphysical deduction focuses on Kant's notion of synthesis. While the focus on synthesis does help make clear how pure concepts as ‘syntactic concepts also have a semantic use’ (p. 93), some emphasis could also have been placed on the role of the difference between general and transcendental logic, and the two different kinds of unity said by Kant in the same passage to be brought about by ‘the very same actions’ of the understanding. The issue regarding the respective priority of general and transcendental logic could then have briefly been mentioned. The discussion of the key passage is followed by an account of how Kant conceives the relation between the categories and the logical forms of judgement.

In her discussion of the first or A edition of the transcendental deduction, Buroker remarks that ‘everyone agrees’ that the ‘proof fails miserably’ (p. 106). Nevertheless she offers some good reasons for examining the first edition proof. Through her examination of the ‘threefold synthesis’ Buroker brings into relief the several defects in the proof that Kant will remedy in the B edition deduction. In her discussion of the B edition deduction, she is guided by Henry Allison's interpretation, according to which the two steps of the deduction (the first in sections 15–20, the second in sections 21–6) show respectively the ‘objective validity’ and the ‘objective reality’ of the categories. An alternative interpretation of how the two steps relate to one another, most famously, that given by Dieter Henrich, is rejected by Buroker in favor of Allison's interpretation on the grounds that the latter ‘provides a more coherent reading of the text’ (p. 117). Buroker's line-by-line reading of the critical passages of the deduction culminates in a lucid presentation of the argument of section 20, one of the most important paragraphs in the Critique, in which Kant relates judgement to the categories. Buroker provides fine examples to clarify Kant's point that categories are the logical forms of judgement as applied to objects (p. 126). Having sorted out the relevant passages in sections 21–6 for the second step of the deduction, Buroker elucidates its arguments. The chapter closes with a section titled ‘Kant and Innate Ideas’, in which Buroker explains how Kant's theory of cognition differs from both rationalist and empiricist theories.

The Analytic of Principles is discussed in two chapters. In chapter 6 Buroker first examines the text of the Schematism, which, she argues, contrary to many commentators, is not ‘incidental’ to Kant's argument, and then the arguments in the Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception. In chapter 7, Buroker examines the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought, including the Refutation of Idealism. She holds that it is in the Analogies and the Refutation of Idealism that Kant offers his most compelling arguments against scepticism. Her discussion of the Analogies relies on the interpretations of Henry Allison and Arthur Melnick. Having explained Kant's argument in the Refutation of Idealism she replies to three noted objections to the argument. The arguments discussed in these two chapters may be the most demanding in the book for the student, but Buroker's line-by-line analysis and the many examples that are provided throughout will enable the student to follow Kant's main line of reasoning.

The Transcendental Dialectic is discussed in three chapters: ‘Transcendental Illusion I’ (on the paralogisms), ‘Transcendental Illusion II’ (on the antinomies), and ‘Transcendental Illusion III’ (on the existence of God). Buroker's examination of the paralogisms in chapter 8 is prefaced by a discussion of the section on the distinction between phenomena and noumena and the appendix on the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection, as well as an account of transcendental illusion, which draws on Michelle Grier's interpretation. In this and the two chapters that follow, each of Kant's main arguments is explained step by step, leading the student from one premise to the next, and making clear how the conclusion follows. This method of presentation, which Buroker employs throughout the book in explaining the main arguments of the Critique, is especially helpful in examining the complex arguments of the Dialectic. In chapter 11, titled ‘Reason and the Critical Philosophy’, Buroker discusses the regulative use of reason and the first two chapters of the Doctrine of Method, the Discipline and the Canon of Pure Reason. The book closes with a brief examination of Kant's transcendental idealism. Buroker provides what she takes to be ‘the most charitable interpretation of Kant's position’ (p. 305), which involves ruling out the ‘two worlds’ view. At least three other views are mentioned, including Buroker's own. Although there are many questions she leaves out of discussion, she answers ‘some of the more serious charges’ against Kant's position and argues that the position is ‘not blatantly incoherent’ (p. 309).

Buroker succeeds in doing more than merely making intelligible Kant's arguments to the student who is being introduced to the Critique of Pure Reason. No doubt her reading of some of the crucial passages relies strongly on some recent interpretations that not everyone would subscribe to. Even so, students who study the Critique with Buroker's book as a guide will be aided in their understanding of its main arguments. What is more, by allowing students to examine Kant's views and arguments in relation to those of his rationalist and empiricist predecessors (as well as in relation to recent philosophical debates to which occasional references are made) her book will also enable them to appreciate the philosophical achievements of his greatest work.