Clapham's perception of the Horn covers only part of the region commonly referred to by that name. It perceives Ethiopia as the centre of a regional system, with Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland as satellites revolving in its orbit. Sudan is excluded because it is Egypt's satellite, and Kenya because it is part of the East Africa regional system. What determines this schema according to the author is what he calls the ‘non-colonial’ origins of the Horn states. An interesting and novel point of view, it argues that the historical trajectories of state formation in this region are determined by forces that are essentially ‘home grown’ and less influenced by external intervention, in contrast with most African states that are creations of external intervention and ‘successors of European colonialism’. The Horn's distinctive non-colonial heritage, according to the author, accounts for its tortuous political history, while ‘paradoxically’ the impact of colonialism on Africa ‘appears … to have been stabilizing’.

Certainly the contrast is vivid. The consensus over the colonial boundaries reached by the African nationalist leadership did not apply in the Horn, where decolonisation unleashed a free-for-all struggle to revise the colonial map, a chaotic and bloody process that has yet to be concluded.

Thus far the struggle to revise the map in this region has gone through two contrasting phases. The first saw Ethiopia annex Eritrea, Sudan annex Southern Sudan (a region the British administered separately from the North while mulling over its future) and Somaliland join Somalia into a union the former later had cause to regret: the Djibouti enclave survived by remaining a French colony for another two decades. The first phase reduced the number of states in the Horn from seven to four. The second phase saw the fragmentation of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia with the separation of the annexed territories which emerged as independent states; Eritrea and South Sudan de jure, Somaliland de facto. This phase increased the number of states from four to seven, in a faithful restoration of the colonial map.

Novel and interesting though it is, the ‘non-colonial’ origins concept is likely to provoke an argument from, among others, scholars from the region who perceive the colonial experience of the ‘satellites’ as crucial to their origin. For example, as one writer warns, Eritreans are likely to see it as part of the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ thesis designed ‘to question the very historical legitimacy of the Eritrean state’ (Chelati Dirar Reference Chelati Dirar2007: 1).

The focus of the study is on the most recent phase of state formation and decay in the region, which begins in 1991 when a general rearrangement of intra and inter-state dynamics takes place, raising expectations of peace and good governance. These were disappointed before long, as the region reverted to violent conflict between and within states. The bulk of the book provides a synoptic description of this period, but without shedding new light on why the ‘home grown’ dynamics in this region have proved unmanageable.