The Nobel Laureate Illya Prigogine compares the recent breakthroughs in human biology to the major changes that occurred when the Neolithic period succeeded the Paleolithic, 12,000 years ago. Although there is disagreement about the meaning of these changes, most opposing views recognize that a “major transformation” took place.1
Prigogine I. Interview La Libre Belgique, Nov 22 2002. In: Guillebaud JC. Le goût de l'avenir. Paris: Seuil; 2003:13.
Fukuyama F. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2002.
I begin by critically examining the discourse of those who perceive in neuroscience the royal road toward posthumanity and, consequently, the futility of all discourse about transcendence and the spiritual. Two features of the posthumanist perspective are discussed: first, the support given to this position by biotechnology, and, second, the vision of ethics considered implicit in neurobiological knowledge. In the second section, I analyze the opposite position, the apocalyptic view in which neuroscience announces the end of humanity and, by the same token, the end of transcendence and the spiritual dimension. Once again, two features are examined: the contribution of biotechnology to the apocalyptic view, using the example of neuropharmacology, and the interpretation of neurobiological knowledge labeled “neuro-essentialism.” Are these positions so diametrically opposed that only one of them can be considered defensible? I don't think so. Both discourses are saying something important about who we are and could make a major contribution to the field of healthcare ethics. This constitutes the third section of the article.
Neuroscience and Optimism
Dominique Lecourt, a French philosopher, has adopted the expression “proud techno prophetism” to characterize biotechnology, one of the sources of the major transformation identified by Illya Prigogine.3
Lecourt D. Humain, Posthumain. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (PUF); 2003.
The transhumanistic and posthumanistic trends belong to the Baconian mode of thinking. Nick Bostrom defines transhumanism as
The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.4
Bostrom N. The Transhumanist FAQ: A General Introduction. version 2.2; 2003. Available at: www.transhumanism.org (accessed Jun 2005).
It refers to “an intermediary form between the human and the posthuman.”5
See note 4, Bostrom 2003:6.
See note 4, Bostrom 2003:5.
See note 1, Prigogine 2003:226.
To become posthuman, does it suffice to modify our vision of the human being, or to make changes in our psychological nature? It would be an error to interpret posthumanity in such a limited way. The transformations called for are of another order: “Radical technological transformations to our brains and bodies are needed.”8
See note 4, Bostrom 2003:6.
The posthumanism that aims at transforming what we call human cannot be separated from biotechnology. It is the most powerful example of what Dominique Lecourt has called “proud techno prophetism.” It is, however, not the only optimistic trend in the field of neuroscience. For some neuroscientists and philosophers, the development of neurobiology engenders unbridled enthusiasm because it challenges the classical vision of what it means to be human and takes intellectual debates in new directions. The works of the neurobiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux are enlightening examples of an attempt to explore a new humanism and a new universal ethics.
Changeux, a member of the faculty of the College de France and former president of the French National Ethics Committee, is a neuroscientist with an international reputation. His scientific research is grounded in issues of a philosophical nature. He has published, among other things, Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind and, more recently, L'homme de vérité. In 1998, he published La nature et la règle, translated in 2000 under the title What Makes Us Think?, a challenging dialogue with the philosopher Paul Ricœur. Changeux concludes L'homme de vérité by saying:
Having decoded the human genome, scientific research gives us hope that we will understand the brain and its functions, at the individual as well as at the societal level. Everything that traditionally belonged to the spiritual, the transcendent, and the immaterial domain is in process of being materialized, naturalized, and, dare I say, humanized. Is it the end of humankind? On the contrary, I rather see a prodigious, vital ferment.9
Changeux JP. L'Homme de vérité. Paris: Odile Jacob; 2002:411.
Jean-Pierre Changeux has a comprehensive agenda, described by the author himself as “immense.”10
Changeux JP, Ricoeur P. What Makes Us Think? Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 2000:180; translation of La nature et la règle. Paris: Seuil; 1998.
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:9.
Changeux JP. Quelques remarques sur neuroscience et normativité éthique. Annales d'histoire et de philosophie du vivant. 1999;2:147.
Changeux's thinking does not take him back to an ancient world where natural law was based on the finality of nature. On the contrary, in his debate with Paul Ricœur, he states, regarding Spinoza: “Can anything more exciting be imagined than to try to reconstruct human life in a way that rejects teleology, that rejects anthropocentrism, that rejects all conceptions of the world that take shelter in religious superstition?”13
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:8.
See note 12, Changeux 1999:155.
Human beings are naturally disposed to resolve moral dilemmas, and ethical normativity is the result of the dynamics of evolution. Indeed the natural predispositions to make moral judgments are based on the extreme complexity of the human brain, a complexity characterized by levels of organization developed through the evolutionary process. According to Changeux, the brain's complexity will, in the end, make it possible “for humankind to create a future where ‘the good life, with and for others, within just institutions’ (Ricoeur's definition of ethics) is reached. Let us hope that it will lead to increased happiness.”15
See note 9, Changeux 2002:412.
Neuroscience and Pessimism
A discussion of major concerns arising from biotechnology within the field of neuroscience will help to introduce the apocalyptic vision. In his book, Our Posthuman Future, Francis Fukuyama devotes a great deal of space to the domain of neuropharmacology. He mainly alludes to Prozac and Ritalin as examples to illustrate the neurotransmitter revolution—“that is, a vast increase in scientific knowledge about the biochemical nature of the brain and its mental processes.”16
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:42.
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:43.
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:44.
Elliot C. Better than Well. American Medicine Meets the American Dream. New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 2003:303.
Fukuyama's main critique of neuropharmacology is that drugs are diverted from their therapeutic aim to promote instead well-being and enhancement: “The path is opened toward a drug that in certain ways looks uncomfortably like the soma of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.”20
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:46.
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:58.
The concept of neuro-essentialism as meaning the end of the human is another aspect of the pessimistic vision. The techniques of functional imaging such as position emission tomography—PET—do not only offer information about neurological diseases, but also reveal the basic physiology of cognitive phenomena. This knowledge raises the same challenge we face with genomics. In discussing the sequencing of the human genome, some authors equate the human being with its genes. In Science, Alex Mauron raises the question: “Is the Genome the Secular Equivalent of the Soul?”22
Mauron A. Is the Genome the Secular Equivalent of the Soul? Science 2001;291:831–2.
Racine E, Bar-Ilan O, Illes J. fMRI in the Public Eye. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 2005;1:159–64.
In my view, neuro-essentialism corresponds to the biological naturalism of a number of neurobiologists and philosophers: “Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.”24
Searle J. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 1992:1.
Crick F. The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. London: Simon & Schuster; 1995.
By reducing human reality to its scientific dimension and mind to brain, a number of personal, social, and cultural dimensions are cast aside. In the healthcare field, this is implicit in the fact that we prioritize symptoms over causes. Although we recognize that for “millions of people in the world who are clinically depressed … Prozac and related drugs have been a godsend,”26
See note 2, Fukuyama 2002:46.
Haegel P. Le corps, quel défi pour la personne? Paris: Fayard; 1999:148.
Between Proud Prophetism and Apocalyptic Catastrophe
The previous pages have presented opposing views on the role of neuroscience in the way we think of the human. These theories are not simply those of philosophers debating among themselves; they affect healthcare, for which neuroscience has become an integral part, as well as bioethics, whose orientations rest on our specific understandings of human nature. The ethical interpretations of neuroscience already confront us at the clinical level, many neural interventions being already easily accomplished. Of course many of the ethical issues are similar to those that are faced in medicine. Others are specific, neuroscience raising questions about basic dimensions of our human identity. “Our definitions of competence, mental health and illness, and death” will likely be affected.28
Farah MJ, Wolpe PR. Monitoring and manipulating brain function: New neuroscience technologies and their ethical implications. Hastings Center Report 2004;34(3):35.
This is actually a group of related concerns resulting from the many ways in which neuroscience-based enhancement intersects with our understanding of what it means to be a person, to be healthy and whole, to do meaningful work, and to value human life in all its imperfections.29
See note 28, Farah, Wolpe 2004:43.
The critics of cognitive enhancement “worry that these enhancement technologies will separate us from what is most our own.”30
Parens E. Authenticity and ambivalence toward understanding the enhancement debate. Hastings Center Report 2005;35(3):35.
See note 19, Elliot 2003:26.
To this first remark I would add a second: Neuroscience does bring a positive contribution to our understanding of ethics, especially bioethics. Standard bioethics, to borrow McKenny's term,32
McKenny GP. To Relieve the Human Condition. Albany: State University of New York Press; 1997:8–9.
See note 32, McKenny 1997:184.
Doucet H. The concept of person in bioethics: Impasse and beyond. In: Thomasma D, Weisstub DN, Hervé C, eds. Personhood and Beyond. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press; 2001:121–8.
Engelhardt HT. The Foundations of Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986:106–7.
Neuroscience forces us to develop an incarnate notion of ethics, wherein the body is affirmed: “If specific abilities, personality traits and dispositions are manifest in characteristic patterns of brain activation and can be manipulated by specific neurochemical interventions, then they must be part of the physical world.”36
See note 28, Farah, Wolpe 2004:44.
In its work on the biological foundations of the consciousness, neuroscience reaffirms the central importance of the body for ethics: The body has something to teach ethicists. Among other things, as Damasio's works show, ethics cannot neglect the emotions, because reason and emotions are closely linked. In its debates focusing on the human body and the human person, bioethics could be greatly enriched by neurobiology.37
Damasio AR. The Feeling of What Happens. Body and Emotions in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company; 1999.
Neuroscience allows ethics to reestablish links with the universal. The exclusive cultural approach advocated by ethical relativism closes each community in on itself. Each of them has its own culture and values: How can they be challenged? In restoring a place for the body and the species, biological approaches open avenues that have been closed to ethics, especially bioethics.
The third point focuses on the assertion that neuroscience calls for a naturalization of ethics. A number of neurobiologists are convinced that their field of research has firmly established the natural or scientific foundations of ethics. Changeux, among others, largely refers to social Darwinism to base his view. This view had already been criticized by George Edward Moore in his Principia Ethica. He called it “naturalistic sophism.”38
Moore GE. Principia Ethica. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1903:29–34.
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:180.
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:181.
Ricœur explains the naturalistic sophism by the fact that neuroscientists, like Changeux, in hoping to establish a “neurology of meaning,” “are dealing only with a psyche found in the psychology laboratory, which may not be the rich psyche of lived human experience.”41
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:71.
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:177.
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:173.
Beside this materialism to which many scientists subscribe, looming ahead we see a huge revival of interest in “the inner meaning of the universe and human life”44
Watts A. Myths and Rituals in Christianity. New York: Thames and Hudson; 1954:7.
Levinas E. Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by R. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press; 1985.
It seems to me that the most dangerous theory is the one that asserts its superiority without attempting to understand the total human experience. Toward the end of What Makes Us Think? Paul Ricœur tries to help Jean-Pierre Changeux understand the meaning of his religious experience. To the latter, who invites him “to travel the same path without religion,” Ricœur answers: “Fine, I've got nothing against it. I'm trying to explain to you what a religious man says and does in response to your arguments.”46
See note 10, Changeux, Ricoeur 2000:270–1.
Neuroscience is another example of how divided we are about many of the major issues that concern our life together. Bioethics originated from the dream of restoring the dialogue between “biological knowledge and human values.”47
Potter VR. Bioethics for Whom? Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1972;196:201.
